Punching another hole in the Obama administration's assertion that there are only a "handful" of al Qaeda in Afghanistan...
From ISAF (September 25, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kunar province last night targeting an Al Qaida senior commander who coordinates the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan province. The Al Qaida facilitators and extremists he works with throughout the Middle East directly threaten the safety and security of Afghan government officials and civilians. He routinely facilitates the travel of foreign fighters into the region.
The commander's older brother was killed in a coalition force precision strike in March 2009. The brothers worked in tandem for several years facilitating for the Al Qaida network.
"These operations prevent violent extremists from being able to threaten Afghan sovereignty or maintain safe havens from which they can threaten the security of people around the world," said U.S. Air Force Col. James Dawkins, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "We deliberately targeted a major threat last night, which will significantly degrade the Al Qaeda activities throughout the region."
Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked the commander to a remote compound in Darah-ye Pech District. After verifying his location and careful planning to help reduce the collateral damage, coalition forces conducted a precision air strike on the targeted compound, which was subsequently destroyed. The International Security Assistance Force is still gathering information to assess the results of the strike.
"Just like we do with all of our precision air strikes, we balanced the possible risks posed by precision air strikes with the dangers posed by the targeted individual. In this instance we decided we could not let this opportunity pass us by," said Dawkins. "Careful planning, de-confliction with Afghan authorities and intelligence gathering helped ensure collateral damage was kept to a minimum."
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Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Afghanistan. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Saturday, September 25, 2010
Senior Haqqani Member Killed
I wrote a while back that the Haqqani Network was in the process of extending its reach directly into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. An airstrike killed Qari Mansur, a senior leader in the Network, on September 24, 2010.
From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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Thursday, September 23, 2010
Sunday, September 19, 2010
No al Qaeda in Afghanistan?
An interesting article from the Longwar Journal (September 18, 2010). This is not too much of a stretch to believe since Kunar and Nuristan Provinces are so close to the Bajur in the FATA. Keep in mind that we pulled out of Nuristan last year when 8 our troops were killed at the remote outpost attack in 2009. How is SecDef Gates claiming progress when we are ceding entire provinces to the Taliban and al Qaeda?
A Taliban commander with links to al Qaeda was killed while plotting to attack a polling station in the northeastern province of Kunar today. Haji Mohammad, the Taliban's shadow governor for the district of Shigal, was killed by Coalition forces "in a precision airstrike," the International Security Assistance Force stated.
Mohammed was described as "a key insurgent leader" in Kunar who was behind multiple attacks against US and Afghan forces. "Mohammad orchestrated attacks on Afghans who opposed his tactics, conducted illegal checkpoints intended to intimidate local Afghans, and kidnapped wealthy individuals in order to finance his activities," ISAF said.
ISAF linked Mohammed to two attacks in June, both which killed US soldiers: the June 7 IED attack that killed five US soldiers; and the June 21 suicide attack that killed two US soldiers and wounded 18 Afghans, including eight children.
The suicide attack on June 21 was the first in Afghanistan to have been carried out by a woman. ISAF directly linked the June 21 suicide attack to Qai Zia Rahman, one of the senior most terrorist leaders in northeastern Afghanistan. Qari Zia took credit for the suicide attack.
Qari Zia Rahman is the Taliban's top regional commander as well as a senior member of al Qaeda. He operates in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan province in Afghanistan, and he also operates across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. Earlier this year, the Pakistani government claimed they killed Qari Zia in an airstrike, but he later spoke to the media and mocked Pakistan's interior minister for wrongly reporting his death.
Qari Zia is closely allied with Faqir Mohammed as well as with Osama bin Laden. Qari Zia's fighters are from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and various Arab nations. He commands a brigade in al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army, or the Lashkar al Zil, US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal.
The US has targeted Qari Zai in three raids over the past summer. On June 29, the US launched a battalion-sized operation in Kunar's Marawara district. Move than 150 Taliban fighters were reported killed in the operation. On July 20, US and Afghan forces launched another battalion-sized operation in Marawara to flush out Qari Zia. And on Aug. 2, combined forces conducted a raid, again in Marawara, that targeted the al Qaeda leader.
The top al Qaeda commander in Kunar province is Abu Ikhlas al Masri, an Egyptian who has spent years in Afghanistan and has intermarried with the local tribes. Abu Ikhlas is al Qaeda's operations chief for Kunar province, having assumed command after Abu Ubaidah al Masri was promoted to take over al Qaeda's external operations branch (Abu Ubaidah died in early 2008 of a disease).
Kunar province is a known sanctuary for al Qaeda and allied terror groups. The presence of al Qaeda cells has been detected in the districts of Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Dangam, Asmar, Asadabad, Shigal, and Marawana; or eight of Kunar's 12districts, according to an investigation by The Long War Journal.
ISAF has ceded ground to al Qaeda and the Taliban over the past year when it withdrew from outposts in remote districts in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan as part of its population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. The Taliban and al Qaeda have taken advantage of these new safe havens to strike at neighboring districts and provinces.
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A Taliban commander with links to al Qaeda was killed while plotting to attack a polling station in the northeastern province of Kunar today. Haji Mohammad, the Taliban's shadow governor for the district of Shigal, was killed by Coalition forces "in a precision airstrike," the International Security Assistance Force stated.
Mohammed was described as "a key insurgent leader" in Kunar who was behind multiple attacks against US and Afghan forces. "Mohammad orchestrated attacks on Afghans who opposed his tactics, conducted illegal checkpoints intended to intimidate local Afghans, and kidnapped wealthy individuals in order to finance his activities," ISAF said.
ISAF linked Mohammed to two attacks in June, both which killed US soldiers: the June 7 IED attack that killed five US soldiers; and the June 21 suicide attack that killed two US soldiers and wounded 18 Afghans, including eight children.
The suicide attack on June 21 was the first in Afghanistan to have been carried out by a woman. ISAF directly linked the June 21 suicide attack to Qai Zia Rahman, one of the senior most terrorist leaders in northeastern Afghanistan. Qari Zia took credit for the suicide attack.
Qari Zia Rahman is the Taliban's top regional commander as well as a senior member of al Qaeda. He operates in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan province in Afghanistan, and he also operates across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. Earlier this year, the Pakistani government claimed they killed Qari Zia in an airstrike, but he later spoke to the media and mocked Pakistan's interior minister for wrongly reporting his death.
Qari Zia is closely allied with Faqir Mohammed as well as with Osama bin Laden. Qari Zia's fighters are from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and various Arab nations. He commands a brigade in al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army, or the Lashkar al Zil, US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal.
The US has targeted Qari Zai in three raids over the past summer. On June 29, the US launched a battalion-sized operation in Kunar's Marawara district. Move than 150 Taliban fighters were reported killed in the operation. On July 20, US and Afghan forces launched another battalion-sized operation in Marawara to flush out Qari Zia. And on Aug. 2, combined forces conducted a raid, again in Marawara, that targeted the al Qaeda leader.
The top al Qaeda commander in Kunar province is Abu Ikhlas al Masri, an Egyptian who has spent years in Afghanistan and has intermarried with the local tribes. Abu Ikhlas is al Qaeda's operations chief for Kunar province, having assumed command after Abu Ubaidah al Masri was promoted to take over al Qaeda's external operations branch (Abu Ubaidah died in early 2008 of a disease).
Kunar province is a known sanctuary for al Qaeda and allied terror groups. The presence of al Qaeda cells has been detected in the districts of Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Dangam, Asmar, Asadabad, Shigal, and Marawana; or eight of Kunar's 12districts, according to an investigation by The Long War Journal.
ISAF has ceded ground to al Qaeda and the Taliban over the past year when it withdrew from outposts in remote districts in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan as part of its population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. The Taliban and al Qaeda have taken advantage of these new safe havens to strike at neighboring districts and provinces.
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Friday, September 10, 2010
A New Way Forward??? Part 1
So the Afghanistan Study Group (http://www. afghanistanstudygroup.org) recently published a new and revised war strategy going forward in Afghanistan called "A New Way Forward: The Report". It's on the main page of the website, so download it and read it. It won't take long to read, which may or may not be good. Rather than copy and paste the entire report, I decided to carry over the five conclusions of the report and offer an assessment.
"1. Emphasize Power-Sharing and Political Reconciliation. Afghanistan will not achieve a sustainable peace without broader support from the Afghan people themselves. Accordingly, the United States should fast track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and to encourage a power sharing arrangement among all parties.
Under the current Afghanistan Constitution, the President has unchecked authority to appoint provincial governors and hundreds of other positions in government. As David Miliband wrote, in many parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent, half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. As an important start to reform, the Afghan Parliament should be given confirmation authority for major appointments, district councils should be elected, budgeting authority decentralized, and elected provincial representatives should be included in the national level council that determines the portion of funds distributed. The ethnic base of the Afghan army should be broadened. More generally, governance should depend more heavily on local, traditional, and community-based structures.
In contrast to President Karzai’s recent and narrowly conceived “peace jirga,” political outreach should include leaders selected by key tribal and village leaders in all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and regional divisions, including rural Pashtuns. This effort should be open to those among the fragmented Taliban who are willing to engage in genuine reconciliation, a step that can help marginalize those Taliban who remain defiant. Preconditions for negotiations, such as recognizing the existing Afghan Constitution, should not be required."
Fast Tracking the Peace Process
This is an overly simplistic and naive view of the region. The Taliban, with the backing of the local populace (or at least no resistance), al Qaeda, and the Pakistani ISI, have been in control of a majority of Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Maybe it has not been flying flags and sending out notes on official letterhead control, but really "in control" through on-going intimidation, narco-trafficking, and shadow governments. On one side sits the Taliban, for the most part safely ensconced in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who have nothing but time and know that we don't. It's a waiting game to them and with the stomach of the American people turned wretchedly by Iraq, they won't have to wait very long. The so-called 2011 withdrawl schedule announced by President Obama does NOT send a signal to the militants that they already don't know. They are smart, under little military pressure, and know that our stay in AfPak is limited by money and weak morale back at home.
On the other side sit 135,000 ISAF troops whose countries, for the most part, have been there since the beginning in late 2001. Many of these same countries fought in Iraq and their citizens and governments have grown weary and are in debt. ISAF forces, with the exception of small groups of Special Forces, will not bring the fight to the Taliban in the tribal areas due to many practical restraints, such as logistics, politics, and manpower. Thus, the only pressure we can exert on the Taliban is through either 1) face to face (direct action) confrontations or 2) drone strikes in the tribal areas. Our mission in southern Afghanistan has largely revolved around trying to bait the Taliban into the open, but they have learned that no fighting force can defeat the modern U.S. military in a direct action engagement. Consequently, the Taliban have adopted the same strategy that doomed the Soviets in the 1980s, which is to 1) melt into the local population and 2) retreat to the mountainous areas and pick the time and place to fight in small unit engagements. Aside from the rare direct action engagement at places like Marjah and Lashkar Gah, ISAF military power has been relegated to conducting drone strikes in the tribal areas.
There is no doubt that the U.S drone strike campaign has killed a large number of Taliban and other jihadis (virtually every #3 man in every jihadi group has been killed several times), but it is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall number of combatants, which is estimated to be between 30,000 – 60,000. Let me be clear--drone strikes are an indispensible part of the effort as they effectively and (relatively) cheaply destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy. However, they are not mass casualty weapons. Additionally, unlike al Qaeda, the tribal militants have an effective and in-depth leadership and training structure (based on the tribal structure), so that even when drone strikes kill the leadership, the lower echelon troops are well versed in tactics and can still carry on the mission. An unintended effect of the drone strikes has been an increased recruitment of new fighters and increasing resentment towards the Pakistani government and the ISAF effort (TTP bombings in heavily populated areas). Thus, as they wait, they grow stronger while continuing to receive financial and military aid from the narco-trafficking profits (courtesy of American and European drug users) and Gulf State donors.
Which brings me to my point—to fast track anything, ISAF and the Afghan government need leverage. We have little leverage in face to face combat, as the Taliban is reluctant to participate in large scale direct action engagements. We have some leverage with the drone strikes, but their effects are limited and are a double-edged sword. We have no economic leverage because the narco-trade is extremely lucrative and our continuing presence in a Muslim country inspires Islamic donors. We have almost no leverage to force the Taliban to come to the table. The only hope we have is to convince the Taliban leadership that living in Afghanistan and earning an honest day’s wage is better than living in the tribal areas wondering if the next Hellfire missile is aimed at them. There may be some merit to this approach, but it definitely won’t be something that can be accomplished in short order.
A more effective, but probably less realistic solution, is not through military power, but through economic and political pressure. If the U.S, were to cease $5 billion in annual monetary aid to Pakistan (or dole it directly to the humanitarian projects) and military hardware, this would pressure Pakistan to, in turn, pressure the Taliban to come to the table. Pakistan is so insanely paranoid about a conflict with India (most of the financial assistance given to them goes to military efforts in the Kashmir region), that a denial of conventional arms and money, in all likelihood, would pressure them to cooperate. This solution, while effective, would probably never happen from a political standpoint, though. Pakistan is viewed as our "friend", and to deny aid to our "partner" in the war on terror would be viewed as directly aiding the Taliban. This conundrum is similar to our situation with Israel--if we cut off military aid, they would be forced to come to the table and adopt a two-state solution. Any rubbish about this type of move prompting Pakistan to help the Taliban as retribution is just that--rubbish. Pakistan cares first and foremost about it's survival. The government is largely secular and tries to cater to the extremists only to the extent that it serves their own interest. Faced with the option of either losing a war with India or kicking the militants out of the tribal areas, Pakistan would undoubtedly choose the former as its priority.
Decentralization of Power
This is exactly what needs to happen. A federal model of government in Afghanistan is a Soviet relic. The country has existed for centuries as a decentralized series of provinces based on ethnicity, language, tribal and religious affiliation, and geographic location. It was not until the Soviets established a centralized puppet government in the 1980s that the various provinces were "federated". After the pullout in 1989, the Najibullah government collapsed quickly as the various ethnic and tribal groups jockyed for power.
The Bush and Obama administrations have made the centralization of power a focus of their strategies, perhaps because it is the backbone of the American democratic model. Aside from the faulty centralized approach, President Karzai is viewed as extremely corrupt by locals (he's actually fairly honest, but he tolerates rampant corruption, which makes him seen as corrupt) and quite powerless to provide protection or support to areas far away from Kabul. I think our fascination with the centralized model has been championed by the military and CIA, the two entities that should NOT be responsible for a strategic nation building plan. The more effective approach is to have a weak centralized government, designed by the State Department, that does nothing but promote hegemony between the provinces, and allow the power to rest in the hands of the provincial governors. This can only be done by effectively stripping Karzai of his power (through a national referendum) and allowing the provinces to conduct elections with the express intent of strong local governance.
I guess the Taliban thought a direct action assault would turn out differently. Obviously they didn't read my blog. From the Long War Journal (Sep 2nd):
US and Afghan troops have beaten back another attempt by the Haqqani Network to overrun a US base in eastern Afghanistan.
More than 20 members of the Haqqani Network were killed after launching an early morning attack today on Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province.
"The attack began in the early morning with small arms and indirect fire directed against the outpost," the International Security Assistance Forces stated in a press release. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers.
"Aircraft from TF [Task Force] Viper conducted two passes over the area, killing at least 20 insurgents in two separate engagements," ISAF stated. No US or Afghan troops were killed or wounded in the attacks.
Combat Outpost Margah is the third US base to be assaulted by the Haqqani Network since Aug. 28. Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province on Aug. 28.
In the Aug. 28 attacks, US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that the Haqqani Network attacks, and similar assaults carried out against major US bases across the country, are ineffective.
"These sorts of FOB [forward operating base] attacks have become little more than exercises in target practice here," the official said in the aftermath of the Aug. 28 attacks. "They show up, we watch them; we kill them."
But a senior US military intelligence official and several US military officers contacted by The Long War Journal cautioned that the attacks demonstrate that the Haqqani Network still has the capacity to organize and strike just outside the walls of US outposts.
"That they [the Taliban and Haqqani Network] can muster their forces so close to large US bases and launch the attacks shows that their presence is strong just outside the gates of our largest bases," an officer who wished to remain anonymous said. "There is no doubt that these are lopsided battles."
"All they need to do is get their fighters inside the wire and create havoc, and the Taliban score a major propaganda coup," a senior US military intelligence official said. "The Taliban know the worst case scenario for them in these attacks - they lose all of their men - and they are willing to take those losses to achieve that goal."
In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base, and conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July. Three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
"1. Emphasize Power-Sharing and Political Reconciliation. Afghanistan will not achieve a sustainable peace without broader support from the Afghan people themselves. Accordingly, the United States should fast track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and to encourage a power sharing arrangement among all parties.
Under the current Afghanistan Constitution, the President has unchecked authority to appoint provincial governors and hundreds of other positions in government. As David Miliband wrote, in many parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent, half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. As an important start to reform, the Afghan Parliament should be given confirmation authority for major appointments, district councils should be elected, budgeting authority decentralized, and elected provincial representatives should be included in the national level council that determines the portion of funds distributed. The ethnic base of the Afghan army should be broadened. More generally, governance should depend more heavily on local, traditional, and community-based structures.
In contrast to President Karzai’s recent and narrowly conceived “peace jirga,” political outreach should include leaders selected by key tribal and village leaders in all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and regional divisions, including rural Pashtuns. This effort should be open to those among the fragmented Taliban who are willing to engage in genuine reconciliation, a step that can help marginalize those Taliban who remain defiant. Preconditions for negotiations, such as recognizing the existing Afghan Constitution, should not be required."
Fast Tracking the Peace Process
This is an overly simplistic and naive view of the region. The Taliban, with the backing of the local populace (or at least no resistance), al Qaeda, and the Pakistani ISI, have been in control of a majority of Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Maybe it has not been flying flags and sending out notes on official letterhead control, but really "in control" through on-going intimidation, narco-trafficking, and shadow governments. On one side sits the Taliban, for the most part safely ensconced in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who have nothing but time and know that we don't. It's a waiting game to them and with the stomach of the American people turned wretchedly by Iraq, they won't have to wait very long. The so-called 2011 withdrawl schedule announced by President Obama does NOT send a signal to the militants that they already don't know. They are smart, under little military pressure, and know that our stay in AfPak is limited by money and weak morale back at home.
On the other side sit 135,000 ISAF troops whose countries, for the most part, have been there since the beginning in late 2001. Many of these same countries fought in Iraq and their citizens and governments have grown weary and are in debt. ISAF forces, with the exception of small groups of Special Forces, will not bring the fight to the Taliban in the tribal areas due to many practical restraints, such as logistics, politics, and manpower. Thus, the only pressure we can exert on the Taliban is through either 1) face to face (direct action) confrontations or 2) drone strikes in the tribal areas. Our mission in southern Afghanistan has largely revolved around trying to bait the Taliban into the open, but they have learned that no fighting force can defeat the modern U.S. military in a direct action engagement. Consequently, the Taliban have adopted the same strategy that doomed the Soviets in the 1980s, which is to 1) melt into the local population and 2) retreat to the mountainous areas and pick the time and place to fight in small unit engagements. Aside from the rare direct action engagement at places like Marjah and Lashkar Gah, ISAF military power has been relegated to conducting drone strikes in the tribal areas.
There is no doubt that the U.S drone strike campaign has killed a large number of Taliban and other jihadis (virtually every #3 man in every jihadi group has been killed several times), but it is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall number of combatants, which is estimated to be between 30,000 – 60,000. Let me be clear--drone strikes are an indispensible part of the effort as they effectively and (relatively) cheaply destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy. However, they are not mass casualty weapons. Additionally, unlike al Qaeda, the tribal militants have an effective and in-depth leadership and training structure (based on the tribal structure), so that even when drone strikes kill the leadership, the lower echelon troops are well versed in tactics and can still carry on the mission. An unintended effect of the drone strikes has been an increased recruitment of new fighters and increasing resentment towards the Pakistani government and the ISAF effort (TTP bombings in heavily populated areas). Thus, as they wait, they grow stronger while continuing to receive financial and military aid from the narco-trafficking profits (courtesy of American and European drug users) and Gulf State donors.
Which brings me to my point—to fast track anything, ISAF and the Afghan government need leverage. We have little leverage in face to face combat, as the Taliban is reluctant to participate in large scale direct action engagements. We have some leverage with the drone strikes, but their effects are limited and are a double-edged sword. We have no economic leverage because the narco-trade is extremely lucrative and our continuing presence in a Muslim country inspires Islamic donors. We have almost no leverage to force the Taliban to come to the table. The only hope we have is to convince the Taliban leadership that living in Afghanistan and earning an honest day’s wage is better than living in the tribal areas wondering if the next Hellfire missile is aimed at them. There may be some merit to this approach, but it definitely won’t be something that can be accomplished in short order.
A more effective, but probably less realistic solution, is not through military power, but through economic and political pressure. If the U.S, were to cease $5 billion in annual monetary aid to Pakistan (or dole it directly to the humanitarian projects) and military hardware, this would pressure Pakistan to, in turn, pressure the Taliban to come to the table. Pakistan is so insanely paranoid about a conflict with India (most of the financial assistance given to them goes to military efforts in the Kashmir region), that a denial of conventional arms and money, in all likelihood, would pressure them to cooperate. This solution, while effective, would probably never happen from a political standpoint, though. Pakistan is viewed as our "friend", and to deny aid to our "partner" in the war on terror would be viewed as directly aiding the Taliban. This conundrum is similar to our situation with Israel--if we cut off military aid, they would be forced to come to the table and adopt a two-state solution. Any rubbish about this type of move prompting Pakistan to help the Taliban as retribution is just that--rubbish. Pakistan cares first and foremost about it's survival. The government is largely secular and tries to cater to the extremists only to the extent that it serves their own interest. Faced with the option of either losing a war with India or kicking the militants out of the tribal areas, Pakistan would undoubtedly choose the former as its priority.
Decentralization of Power
This is exactly what needs to happen. A federal model of government in Afghanistan is a Soviet relic. The country has existed for centuries as a decentralized series of provinces based on ethnicity, language, tribal and religious affiliation, and geographic location. It was not until the Soviets established a centralized puppet government in the 1980s that the various provinces were "federated". After the pullout in 1989, the Najibullah government collapsed quickly as the various ethnic and tribal groups jockyed for power.
The Bush and Obama administrations have made the centralization of power a focus of their strategies, perhaps because it is the backbone of the American democratic model. Aside from the faulty centralized approach, President Karzai is viewed as extremely corrupt by locals (he's actually fairly honest, but he tolerates rampant corruption, which makes him seen as corrupt) and quite powerless to provide protection or support to areas far away from Kabul. I think our fascination with the centralized model has been championed by the military and CIA, the two entities that should NOT be responsible for a strategic nation building plan. The more effective approach is to have a weak centralized government, designed by the State Department, that does nothing but promote hegemony between the provinces, and allow the power to rest in the hands of the provincial governors. This can only be done by effectively stripping Karzai of his power (through a national referendum) and allowing the provinces to conduct elections with the express intent of strong local governance.
I guess the Taliban thought a direct action assault would turn out differently. Obviously they didn't read my blog. From the Long War Journal (Sep 2nd):
US and Afghan troops have beaten back another attempt by the Haqqani Network to overrun a US base in eastern Afghanistan.
More than 20 members of the Haqqani Network were killed after launching an early morning attack today on Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province.
"The attack began in the early morning with small arms and indirect fire directed against the outpost," the International Security Assistance Forces stated in a press release. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers.
"Aircraft from TF [Task Force] Viper conducted two passes over the area, killing at least 20 insurgents in two separate engagements," ISAF stated. No US or Afghan troops were killed or wounded in the attacks.
Combat Outpost Margah is the third US base to be assaulted by the Haqqani Network since Aug. 28. Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province on Aug. 28.
In the Aug. 28 attacks, US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that the Haqqani Network attacks, and similar assaults carried out against major US bases across the country, are ineffective.
"These sorts of FOB [forward operating base] attacks have become little more than exercises in target practice here," the official said in the aftermath of the Aug. 28 attacks. "They show up, we watch them; we kill them."
But a senior US military intelligence official and several US military officers contacted by The Long War Journal cautioned that the attacks demonstrate that the Haqqani Network still has the capacity to organize and strike just outside the walls of US outposts.
"That they [the Taliban and Haqqani Network] can muster their forces so close to large US bases and launch the attacks shows that their presence is strong just outside the gates of our largest bases," an officer who wished to remain anonymous said. "There is no doubt that these are lopsided battles."
"All they need to do is get their fighters inside the wire and create havoc, and the Taliban score a major propaganda coup," a senior US military intelligence official said. "The Taliban know the worst case scenario for them in these attacks - they lose all of their men - and they are willing to take those losses to achieve that goal."
In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base, and conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July. Three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
Monday, July 19, 2010
The Haqqani Network--Post 9/11 (Updated 9/2010)
Organization and Leadership
The Haqqani network is divided into four distinct groups based on social and military status: 1) those who fought against the Soviets; 2) those from the Loya Paktiya (Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces); 3) those from North Waziristan or local madrassas; and 4) foreign fighters (Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks). Members of the last group are considered “bottom of the barrel” as they are foreign and not considered trustworthy. Ironically, they are most often “volunteered” for martyrdom operations. Turnover is high in all four groups due to frequent drone strikes. Attacks in rural areas are accomplished with IEDs/roadside bombs and urban attacks are accomplished with VBEIDs and suicide bombers. The section that performs suicide and commando-style attacks is known as the “Hamza Brigade.”
The network is headquartered in Miram Shah, also known as the Miram Shah Shura, but also has large compounds in Sarai Darpa Khel and Danday Darpa Khel. All three locations are closely monitored by ISAF and are the frequent recipients of drone strikes. The network operates primarily in the Loya Paktiya, but they also have a strong presence in the Logar and Wardak Provinces. The network issues press releases under the title of “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”
Although labeled “Taliban”, the network operates autonomously, most likely because the QST needs them more, although both Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin hold positions in the Taliban’s Quetta Shura. The local Afghan and Waziri populace view the Haqqani militants as more moderate and fair than the mainstream QST, which can often use heavy-handed tactics. In Logar Province, for example, the QST was so despised by the locals that they were evicted and eventually replaced by the Haqqani network. Both groups will often mutually support each other, however, as evidenced by recent Haqqani attacks in Kabul (new territory for the network).
Jalaluddin Haqqani was the founder of the network and, on paper, remains so. But his son, Sirajuddin, runs the show these days. He is, by most accounts, more charismatic, violent, and devout than his father, which may explain the growing radicalization of the network. The vast majority of higher echelon commanders are from the Zardan Tribe in Afghanistan. Notable commanders include Nai Arsallah, Maulavi Noor Kasim, Muhammad Amin, Mira Jan, and Bahram Jan, who are all from the Paktiya/Khost area. Local commanders’ lineage varies depending on the location and they receive some support from headquarters, but are required to raise their own money through "donations", taxes, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and narco-trafficking. Notable local field commanders include Mullah Sangin (kidnapped a private from the 82nd Airborne) and Zakim Shah, the shadow governor of Khost, although they typically lack the apparatus to act as shadow governments. The network has a distant contact well to the north—Mullah Inayatullah in the Kunduz Province, who is also from the Zardan Tribe).
The network, which is known for its fairness and adherence to Pashtunwali, has acted as the mediator between many warring parties in the past several years (usually performed by Sirajuddin and Bakhti Jan). It helped negotiate a peace treaty between Pakistan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in South Waziristan in 2006 and a peace treaty between the late Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistan in 2008. The network also negotiated a truce between Mullah Nazir and Uzbek foreigners in 2007 (Pashtuns tend to despise foreign fighters). And what may have been considered a stroke of political deftness, the network unified the rival militant groups led by Bahadur, Nazir, and Mehsud in the spring of 2009. A fatal drone strike on Mehsud in August 2009, however, destroyed the coalition.
Jalaluddin Haqqani
Jalaluddin Haqqani was born around 1950 in Srani, Paktiya and lived near Khost until the Soviet invasion when he moved to Miram Shah, North Waziristan. He is from the Mezi Clan of the Zardan Tribe. He has (at least) two wives, one who is Pashtun and one who is Arab. Although he is close to bin Laden, who espouses extreme global views, his politics are somewhat progressive (by Pashtun standards), as he supports social and civil rights for women and a fair application of Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal code). He was appointed Justice Minister by the mujahedeen in 1992 and was even offered the Prime Minster position by Hamid Karzai. It is rumored that he enjoys a closer relationship with bin Laden than Mullah Omar, which is surprising due to the wide divergence of political and social views between the two. This may be partially due to their shared experiences during the Soviet occupation when he helped build, staff, and protect bin Laden’s training camps in Paktiya and Nangarhar between 1986 and 2001. When he is not trying to kill Americans, he runs several madrassas (religious indoctrination schools) in and around Miram Shah.
Jalaluddin also enjoys a cozy relationship with Pakistan’s ISI, which provides him with weapons, money, intelligence, and a “heads up” any time the Pakistani army is about to raid one of his facilities. While he receives tremendous assistance from ISI, he is constantly being targeted by ISAF forces. He was badly wounded on November 13, 2001 in an airstrike and a good chunk of his family was killed (32 KIA) in a drone strike on September 8, 2008 near Dandi Darpa Khail, North Waziristan.
Jalaluddin has at least two brothers, Haji Khalil and Ibrahim, and at least five sons, Sirajuddin, Badruddin, Nasiruddin, Omar, and Mohammed. All of his sons travel to the Gulf to raise money, but Nasiruddin is half-Arab, thus making him an ideal liaison for al Qaeda and wealthy financial sponsors in the Gulf. Omar was killed by ISAF forces in Paktiya in July 2008 and Mohammed was killed in a Predator drone strike on February 18, 2010.
He has no strong tribal ties to North Waziristan, but enjoys tremendous respect throughout the FATA by both civilians and militants. Part of his popularity stems from his wisdom and sense of fairness. He is often called to mediate disputes between civilians and between rival militant groups in North and South Waziristan. But, because he has no local tribal ties, he does have rivals in North Waziristan, the most powerful of which is Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
Sirajuddin Haqqani
Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, was born around 1979 and grew up in the Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa near Peshawar, NWFP. He is considered more devout and radical than his father. His father is the leader of the network in name only as Sirajuddin oversees all political and military activities. He also serves as the official liaison with QST and al Qaeda. Sirajuddin’s deputy commander is Bakhti Jan and his political deputy is Jan Baz Zadran, who has no military experience. Notably, Bakhti Jan has close ties with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan, a militant group that is a sworn enemy of Pakistan.
**It will be interesting to see if Sirajuddin burns his bridges with Pakistan/ISI in favor of supporting the TTP.**
Sirajuddin enjoys a $5 million bounty on his head and is the frequent target of drone strikes.
Radicalization
**This is purely conjecture on my part, but it makes sense**
There is increasing evidence that the network is cooperating more with al Qaeda. The network facilitates suicide attacks in urban areas and al Qaeda provides the bodies. Although the relationship is “strained” because of Haqqani’s support of Pakistan (al Qaeda does not like Pakistan), there is evidence that the newer, younger members (who tend to be Arab and not Pashtun) definitely favor the global jihadist philosophy of al Qaeda. This can be observed in the closer military and financial cooperation between the two groups, the growing use of suicide attacks, and closer ties with the TTP in North and South Waziristan. The network also appears to be isolating itself from the QST based on its recent target list. The Taliban favors not attacking United Nations/international organizations in order to increase its “legitimacy” as an actual government, whereas the network has stepped up its attacks on international targets. And what strikes me most important, network members now spend all of their “down time” in madrassas rather than farming/working at home, which is typical fare for most Taliban members.
For some strange reason (well, not really since the US is a lackey to Pakistan), the Haqqani network has escaped the US State Department’s list of foreign terror groups. In May 2010, however, the “flaming liberal” Senator Diane Feinstein from California lobbied to place the group on the list.
Notable Attacks
January 2008-Bombing of Serena Hotel in Kabul
March 2008-Kidnapping of British journalist Sean Langan
April 2008—Asassination attempt on Hamid Karzai
July 2008—Bombing of Indian Embassy in Kabul
November 2008—Kidnapping of Time magazine journalist David Rohde
December 2009-Attack on Camp Chapman
May 2010-Sucide bombing in Kabul
9/2010 Update
The U.S. State Department finally designated the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization, subject to sanctions under Executive Order 13224:
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg782.htm
The Haqqani network is divided into four distinct groups based on social and military status: 1) those who fought against the Soviets; 2) those from the Loya Paktiya (Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces); 3) those from North Waziristan or local madrassas; and 4) foreign fighters (Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks). Members of the last group are considered “bottom of the barrel” as they are foreign and not considered trustworthy. Ironically, they are most often “volunteered” for martyrdom operations. Turnover is high in all four groups due to frequent drone strikes. Attacks in rural areas are accomplished with IEDs/roadside bombs and urban attacks are accomplished with VBEIDs and suicide bombers. The section that performs suicide and commando-style attacks is known as the “Hamza Brigade.”
The network is headquartered in Miram Shah, also known as the Miram Shah Shura, but also has large compounds in Sarai Darpa Khel and Danday Darpa Khel. All three locations are closely monitored by ISAF and are the frequent recipients of drone strikes. The network operates primarily in the Loya Paktiya, but they also have a strong presence in the Logar and Wardak Provinces. The network issues press releases under the title of “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”
Although labeled “Taliban”, the network operates autonomously, most likely because the QST needs them more, although both Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin hold positions in the Taliban’s Quetta Shura. The local Afghan and Waziri populace view the Haqqani militants as more moderate and fair than the mainstream QST, which can often use heavy-handed tactics. In Logar Province, for example, the QST was so despised by the locals that they were evicted and eventually replaced by the Haqqani network. Both groups will often mutually support each other, however, as evidenced by recent Haqqani attacks in Kabul (new territory for the network).
Jalaluddin Haqqani was the founder of the network and, on paper, remains so. But his son, Sirajuddin, runs the show these days. He is, by most accounts, more charismatic, violent, and devout than his father, which may explain the growing radicalization of the network. The vast majority of higher echelon commanders are from the Zardan Tribe in Afghanistan. Notable commanders include Nai Arsallah, Maulavi Noor Kasim, Muhammad Amin, Mira Jan, and Bahram Jan, who are all from the Paktiya/Khost area. Local commanders’ lineage varies depending on the location and they receive some support from headquarters, but are required to raise their own money through "donations", taxes, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and narco-trafficking. Notable local field commanders include Mullah Sangin (kidnapped a private from the 82nd Airborne) and Zakim Shah, the shadow governor of Khost, although they typically lack the apparatus to act as shadow governments. The network has a distant contact well to the north—Mullah Inayatullah in the Kunduz Province, who is also from the Zardan Tribe).
The network, which is known for its fairness and adherence to Pashtunwali, has acted as the mediator between many warring parties in the past several years (usually performed by Sirajuddin and Bakhti Jan). It helped negotiate a peace treaty between Pakistan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in South Waziristan in 2006 and a peace treaty between the late Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistan in 2008. The network also negotiated a truce between Mullah Nazir and Uzbek foreigners in 2007 (Pashtuns tend to despise foreign fighters). And what may have been considered a stroke of political deftness, the network unified the rival militant groups led by Bahadur, Nazir, and Mehsud in the spring of 2009. A fatal drone strike on Mehsud in August 2009, however, destroyed the coalition.
Jalaluddin Haqqani
Jalaluddin Haqqani was born around 1950 in Srani, Paktiya and lived near Khost until the Soviet invasion when he moved to Miram Shah, North Waziristan. He is from the Mezi Clan of the Zardan Tribe. He has (at least) two wives, one who is Pashtun and one who is Arab. Although he is close to bin Laden, who espouses extreme global views, his politics are somewhat progressive (by Pashtun standards), as he supports social and civil rights for women and a fair application of Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal code). He was appointed Justice Minister by the mujahedeen in 1992 and was even offered the Prime Minster position by Hamid Karzai. It is rumored that he enjoys a closer relationship with bin Laden than Mullah Omar, which is surprising due to the wide divergence of political and social views between the two. This may be partially due to their shared experiences during the Soviet occupation when he helped build, staff, and protect bin Laden’s training camps in Paktiya and Nangarhar between 1986 and 2001. When he is not trying to kill Americans, he runs several madrassas (religious indoctrination schools) in and around Miram Shah.
Jalaluddin also enjoys a cozy relationship with Pakistan’s ISI, which provides him with weapons, money, intelligence, and a “heads up” any time the Pakistani army is about to raid one of his facilities. While he receives tremendous assistance from ISI, he is constantly being targeted by ISAF forces. He was badly wounded on November 13, 2001 in an airstrike and a good chunk of his family was killed (32 KIA) in a drone strike on September 8, 2008 near Dandi Darpa Khail, North Waziristan.
Jalaluddin has at least two brothers, Haji Khalil and Ibrahim, and at least five sons, Sirajuddin, Badruddin, Nasiruddin, Omar, and Mohammed. All of his sons travel to the Gulf to raise money, but Nasiruddin is half-Arab, thus making him an ideal liaison for al Qaeda and wealthy financial sponsors in the Gulf. Omar was killed by ISAF forces in Paktiya in July 2008 and Mohammed was killed in a Predator drone strike on February 18, 2010.
He has no strong tribal ties to North Waziristan, but enjoys tremendous respect throughout the FATA by both civilians and militants. Part of his popularity stems from his wisdom and sense of fairness. He is often called to mediate disputes between civilians and between rival militant groups in North and South Waziristan. But, because he has no local tribal ties, he does have rivals in North Waziristan, the most powerful of which is Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
Sirajuddin Haqqani
Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, was born around 1979 and grew up in the Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa near Peshawar, NWFP. He is considered more devout and radical than his father. His father is the leader of the network in name only as Sirajuddin oversees all political and military activities. He also serves as the official liaison with QST and al Qaeda. Sirajuddin’s deputy commander is Bakhti Jan and his political deputy is Jan Baz Zadran, who has no military experience. Notably, Bakhti Jan has close ties with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan, a militant group that is a sworn enemy of Pakistan.
**It will be interesting to see if Sirajuddin burns his bridges with Pakistan/ISI in favor of supporting the TTP.**
Sirajuddin enjoys a $5 million bounty on his head and is the frequent target of drone strikes.
Radicalization
**This is purely conjecture on my part, but it makes sense**
There is increasing evidence that the network is cooperating more with al Qaeda. The network facilitates suicide attacks in urban areas and al Qaeda provides the bodies. Although the relationship is “strained” because of Haqqani’s support of Pakistan (al Qaeda does not like Pakistan), there is evidence that the newer, younger members (who tend to be Arab and not Pashtun) definitely favor the global jihadist philosophy of al Qaeda. This can be observed in the closer military and financial cooperation between the two groups, the growing use of suicide attacks, and closer ties with the TTP in North and South Waziristan. The network also appears to be isolating itself from the QST based on its recent target list. The Taliban favors not attacking United Nations/international organizations in order to increase its “legitimacy” as an actual government, whereas the network has stepped up its attacks on international targets. And what strikes me most important, network members now spend all of their “down time” in madrassas rather than farming/working at home, which is typical fare for most Taliban members.
For some strange reason (well, not really since the US is a lackey to Pakistan), the Haqqani network has escaped the US State Department’s list of foreign terror groups. In May 2010, however, the “flaming liberal” Senator Diane Feinstein from California lobbied to place the group on the list.
Notable Attacks
January 2008-Bombing of Serena Hotel in Kabul
March 2008-Kidnapping of British journalist Sean Langan
April 2008—Asassination attempt on Hamid Karzai
July 2008—Bombing of Indian Embassy in Kabul
November 2008—Kidnapping of Time magazine journalist David Rohde
December 2009-Attack on Camp Chapman
May 2010-Sucide bombing in Kabul
9/2010 Update
The U.S. State Department finally designated the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization, subject to sanctions under Executive Order 13224:
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg782.htm
The Haqqani Network--A Brief History up to 2001
The Haqqani Network is a semi-autonomous group of Sunni Muslim militants based out of the North Waziristan Province in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Their primary mission is to expel (kill) all Western and non-Muslim people from the country of Afghanistan. They share somewhat close ties to the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) led by Mullah Omar (eye-patch guy) and the al Qaeda global terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden. Additionally, they enjoy preferential treatment and protection by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI. Consequently, they publicly support the country of Pakistan and reject the goals of anti-Pakistan militant groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). They have been euphemistically labeled a “moderate” militant group, but have become increasingly radicalized in the past few years.
**I call them militants and not insurgents because they were in Afghanistan/North Waziristan long before NATO "occupied" Afghanistan.**
The Haqqani "network" formed in the early 1980s as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its founder and current figurehead, Jalaluddin Haqqani, is from the town of Khost in the Paktiya Province of eastern Afghanistan. To counter the Soviet occupation from a safe haven, Haqqani relocated to the North Waziristan and set up operating bases near the capital of Miram Shah, where he could safely launch cross border raids. The group was originally comprised mainly of fellow Zardani Tribesmen. Haqqani joined the Khalis offshoot of the Hezb-i-Islami organization (he had issues with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who enjoyed support from Iran) and worked in close concert with other mujahedeen groups, which were collectively known as the Peshawar Seven.
Jalaluddin Haqqani was a natural born military leader and went on to become the most successful and well respected mujahedeen commander during the Soviet occupation. Part of his success was due, however, to the generous support bestowed upon them by the Pakistani ISI (an organization that is widely known to suffer widespread corruption) and the American CIA. Both organizations funneled in millions of dollars in aid and weapons. Along with the ISI and CIA, a tall, lanky fellow from Saudi Arabia also played a hand in Haqqani's (and the rest of the mujahedeen's) success. While fighting in Afghanistan, Haqqani met Osama bin Laden, where the two formed a professional and personal relationship around 1986. Bin Laden was not known for his military prowess, but had access to vast amounts of funding and was charismatic, thus he made an excellent recruiter of foreign fighters. Presumably in exchange for money and weapons, Haqqani offered his men to protect bin Laden’s training camps (in the Khost area).
After the pullout of Soviet troops in 1989, a civil war erupted in Afghanistan. The "network" became amorphorous, as a safe haven was not needed, but Haqqani continued to rely on the Khost and North Waziristan areas for support. Haqqani continued to lead his men in combat, this time against the pro-Soviet puppet government headed by Dr. Mohammad Najibullah. In 1991, his troops captured the City of Khost and after the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992, he continued fighting against other mujahedeen factions, which were primarily comprised of non-Pashtun ethnic groups from central and northern Afghanistan. As the free for all civil war continued into 1995, Haqqani came under increasing pressure by the Pakistani ISI and bin Laden to join a new group called the Taliban (formed to unify the like-minded miltant groups and impose strict Sharia law throughout the country) in order to help take Kabul and defeat the Northern Alliance (mostly non-Pashtun). His troops eventually joined the Taliban, but never professed allegiance to or took orders from Mullah Omar (the guy with an eye patch) or bin Laden. After the fall of Kabul, Haqqani's militants continued to fight the Northern Alliance where they (and many, many other groups)committed atrocities against the local populace.
Haqqani could do no wrong in the eyes of America prior to approximately 1998. He had helped win the war, which was distantly related to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Empire. Charlie Wilson (yes, that one) even said of him that he was "goodness personified". President Bill Clinton apparently disagreed and launched more than 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles in 1998 at the Haqqani sponsored al Qaeda training camps near Khost. While the primary objective was a response to the Tanzania bombings, the Haqqani-bin Laden link finally appeared on the United States' radar screen.
The Taliban had the Northern Alliance on the ropes just prior to the September 11th attacks. Their hugely popular leader, Ahmad Shah Massood, was killed by Taliban/al Qaeda asassins (exploding video camera) just days before and the entire Alliance was backed into a small corner of northern Afghanistan. In late September 2001, Mullah Omar appointed Haqqani commander in chief of all armed Taliban forces. But, within a month, the tables were completely turned. USASOC troops arrived in October and by November, the Taliban and al Qaeda were in full scale retreat towards the Pakistani border. Along the way, Jalaluddin Haqqani survived several deliberate missile and air strikes. Having operated in the area for decades and resurrecting the "network", Haqqani secured safe passage of many key al Qaeda and Taliban personnel across the border into North Waziristan from the Tora Bora/Nangarhar area.
Would you buy a used car from these guys? Only if you check to see if it's wired first. Sirajuddin Haqqani (Jal's son) on the left, Jalaluddin Haqqani in the middle, and some Pashtun guy on the right.
**I call them militants and not insurgents because they were in Afghanistan/North Waziristan long before NATO "occupied" Afghanistan.**
The Haqqani "network" formed in the early 1980s as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its founder and current figurehead, Jalaluddin Haqqani, is from the town of Khost in the Paktiya Province of eastern Afghanistan. To counter the Soviet occupation from a safe haven, Haqqani relocated to the North Waziristan and set up operating bases near the capital of Miram Shah, where he could safely launch cross border raids. The group was originally comprised mainly of fellow Zardani Tribesmen. Haqqani joined the Khalis offshoot of the Hezb-i-Islami organization (he had issues with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who enjoyed support from Iran) and worked in close concert with other mujahedeen groups, which were collectively known as the Peshawar Seven.
Jalaluddin Haqqani was a natural born military leader and went on to become the most successful and well respected mujahedeen commander during the Soviet occupation. Part of his success was due, however, to the generous support bestowed upon them by the Pakistani ISI (an organization that is widely known to suffer widespread corruption) and the American CIA. Both organizations funneled in millions of dollars in aid and weapons. Along with the ISI and CIA, a tall, lanky fellow from Saudi Arabia also played a hand in Haqqani's (and the rest of the mujahedeen's) success. While fighting in Afghanistan, Haqqani met Osama bin Laden, where the two formed a professional and personal relationship around 1986. Bin Laden was not known for his military prowess, but had access to vast amounts of funding and was charismatic, thus he made an excellent recruiter of foreign fighters. Presumably in exchange for money and weapons, Haqqani offered his men to protect bin Laden’s training camps (in the Khost area).
After the pullout of Soviet troops in 1989, a civil war erupted in Afghanistan. The "network" became amorphorous, as a safe haven was not needed, but Haqqani continued to rely on the Khost and North Waziristan areas for support. Haqqani continued to lead his men in combat, this time against the pro-Soviet puppet government headed by Dr. Mohammad Najibullah. In 1991, his troops captured the City of Khost and after the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992, he continued fighting against other mujahedeen factions, which were primarily comprised of non-Pashtun ethnic groups from central and northern Afghanistan. As the free for all civil war continued into 1995, Haqqani came under increasing pressure by the Pakistani ISI and bin Laden to join a new group called the Taliban (formed to unify the like-minded miltant groups and impose strict Sharia law throughout the country) in order to help take Kabul and defeat the Northern Alliance (mostly non-Pashtun). His troops eventually joined the Taliban, but never professed allegiance to or took orders from Mullah Omar (the guy with an eye patch) or bin Laden. After the fall of Kabul, Haqqani's militants continued to fight the Northern Alliance where they (and many, many other groups)committed atrocities against the local populace.
Haqqani could do no wrong in the eyes of America prior to approximately 1998. He had helped win the war, which was distantly related to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Empire. Charlie Wilson (yes, that one) even said of him that he was "goodness personified". President Bill Clinton apparently disagreed and launched more than 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles in 1998 at the Haqqani sponsored al Qaeda training camps near Khost. While the primary objective was a response to the Tanzania bombings, the Haqqani-bin Laden link finally appeared on the United States' radar screen.
The Taliban had the Northern Alliance on the ropes just prior to the September 11th attacks. Their hugely popular leader, Ahmad Shah Massood, was killed by Taliban/al Qaeda asassins (exploding video camera) just days before and the entire Alliance was backed into a small corner of northern Afghanistan. In late September 2001, Mullah Omar appointed Haqqani commander in chief of all armed Taliban forces. But, within a month, the tables were completely turned. USASOC troops arrived in October and by November, the Taliban and al Qaeda were in full scale retreat towards the Pakistani border. Along the way, Jalaluddin Haqqani survived several deliberate missile and air strikes. Having operated in the area for decades and resurrecting the "network", Haqqani secured safe passage of many key al Qaeda and Taliban personnel across the border into North Waziristan from the Tora Bora/Nangarhar area.
Would you buy a used car from these guys? Only if you check to see if it's wired first. Sirajuddin Haqqani (Jal's son) on the left, Jalaluddin Haqqani in the middle, and some Pashtun guy on the right.
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Greetings!
The Global War on/of Terror can be a bit confusing--a drone missile strike in North Whatistan killed Muhammed al-Somebody--you get the point. There are literally hundreds of sites out there that paint a picture of our enemies, but few choose to consolidate all of that information into one spot into a manageable mess. The South Asian sub-continent has become a hobby of mine, so here's my attempt at creating a somewhat coherent mosaic.
My focus is mostly on Afghanistan and Pakistan (the FATA and NWFP areas) and to a lesser extent, Kashmir, Chechnya, Balochistan, and the four "Stans" of Central Asia, which produce some really bad dudes, to the extent that "moderate" militants, like the Haqqani Network, (used to) try to distance themselves.
I will always do my best to credit information/photos when possible. My commentary will be duly noted. If I get any facts wrong, please drop me a line and a source so that I may correct it.
**DISCLAIMER**
I'm not a foreign policy "expert", just a guy that reads a lot about AfPak issues and has some insight to offer. I won't even try to pretend that I understand the tribal and religious dynamics of the region, but human nature being what it is, I think that quite a bit of what is going on over there is not so foreign.
Enjoy!
My focus is mostly on Afghanistan and Pakistan (the FATA and NWFP areas) and to a lesser extent, Kashmir, Chechnya, Balochistan, and the four "Stans" of Central Asia, which produce some really bad dudes, to the extent that "moderate" militants, like the Haqqani Network, (used to) try to distance themselves.
I will always do my best to credit information/photos when possible. My commentary will be duly noted. If I get any facts wrong, please drop me a line and a source so that I may correct it.
**DISCLAIMER**
I'm not a foreign policy "expert", just a guy that reads a lot about AfPak issues and has some insight to offer. I won't even try to pretend that I understand the tribal and religious dynamics of the region, but human nature being what it is, I think that quite a bit of what is going on over there is not so foreign.
Enjoy!
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