Another Pakistan-based militant group to join in the fray.
From Time Magazine (September 10, 2010):
There was nothing unfamiliar about last month's hours-long gun battle between Afghan security forces and insurgents in Nuristan province — except the identity of some of the militants. Of the 40 or so fighters killed, Gen. Mohammad Zaman Mahmoodzai, head of Afghanistan's border security force, says about a quarter had carried documents implicating them as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based outfit better known for its role in the Kashmir insurgency and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.
The general claims that recent months have seen a steady increase of violent clashes in the east that have yielded a higher ratio of Pakistanis and other foreigners among the insurgent casualties. That, he says, is proof of the nominally Kashmir-oriented group's growing involvement in Afghanistan. The trend is confirmed by U.S. military officials, who say that well-trained LeT fighters are bringing deadlier tools and tactics to the war's second-fiercest front.
With NATO's attention fixed on the southern battle zone where the Taliban is strongest, the LeT, or "Army of the Pure," has aligned with a host of militant groups that have ramped up attacks against Afghan and U.S. forces in the borderlands and beyond. Since they began tracking the group's involvement in Afghanistan in 2008, U.S. officials say the LeT has expanded from a small presence in Kunar province to multiple cells in at least five provinces, actively collaborating with everyone from the Afghan Taliban to the Haqqani network. Kunar and Nuristan remain their focal point, provinces where the U.S. military shut down several remote, heavily targeted bases in the past year. But when NATO in July announced the arrest of two Taliban commanders accused of aiding the LeT, a statement noted the influx of LeT foot soldiers in Nangarhar province, an important commercial center and military supply route. A spike in suicide- and roadside bomb attacks against convoys and government officials have disrupted the once stable area, and Afghan security officials allege the LeT is providing fake documents to attackers.
Originally nurtured by Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as a proxy force to drive India out of Kashmir, the LeT has since raised its profile with spectacular strikes on India's parliament and commercial capital. It was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002 under pressure from the U.S., although the organization continues to operate freely there via thinly disguised front organizations.
But according to Stephen Tankel, a U.S.-based analyst and author of the book Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, "Lashkar was never just a Kashmir-centric organization and always had ambitions beyond the region." Today, he explains, some cadres are motivated by anti-Indian sentiment; others want to wage war against America. Because of increased Indian influence in the government of post-Taliban Afghanistan, these jihadist desires converge. And while India remains its main enemy, anti-Western activity by the LeT is nothing new — as the arrest of operatives as far away as the United States shows. "What we're seeing now is an acceleration of trends that have been in place," Tankel says, "rather than Lashkar trying to go in a new direction."
The LeT's presence in Afghanistan has coincided with mounting Pakistani concern that India's influence in Kabul represents an Indian strategy of encirclement. Ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul was the reason for the ISI helping the Taliban seize power in Afghanistan in 1996, and U.S. officials suspect ongoing Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban since the movement's ouster by U.S.-led forces in 2001. U.S. intelligence officials also suspect a direct Pakistani hand in some attacks in Afghanistan, notably the mid-2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul that left 58 people dead. More recently, Afghan intelligence officials blamed a Feb. 26 attack on a guesthouse in the capital on LeT operatives. (Half of the 18 killed were Indian nationals.) Pakistan, for its part, has denied any responsibility, insisting that its priority is its battle with its domestic Taliban insurgency. But in light of its long-standing reluctance to crack down on the LeT — and alleged involvement in attacks in Afghanistan — Tankel says we "must take seriously" the possibility that elements within the ISI are making use of LeT militants in Afghanistan, even if "there's no smoking gun."
While there's some dispute over just how substantial the LeT presence in Afghanistan really is, Afghan and U.S. officials agree that the group's role is likely to escalate as Western forces begin to withdraw and Pakistan tries to strengthen its influence. What's more, some contend, the LeT's threat should not be measured in numbers. Given that its training program was developed by the Pakistani army, its operatives are still considered among the most capable at small-unit tactics and explosives, making them ideally suited to the low-intensity Afghan conflict. "A few well-equipped pros who go around teaching and coordinating can do a lot more damage" than your average Taliban guerrilla, says the senior U.S. military official, noting the increased level of cooperation. "They're already having a big impact."
Monday, September 13, 2010
Sunday, September 12, 2010
Datta Khel
From the Long War Journal:
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan, administers the region, but the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. The US has conducted 13 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, nearly 25 percent of its current total of 58 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 156 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 19 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
Datta Khel borders the Mohammed Khel and Jani Khel regions in the settled district of Bannu. The Jani Khel region has long been a strategic meeting place and safe haven for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Jani Khel was identified as the headquarters for al Qaeda's Shura Majlis back in 2007. Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command, has operated in the Jani Khel region. The US has struck al Qaeda safe houses in Jani Khel twice since last year. These strikes are the only two Predator attacks that have occurred outside of Pakistan's tribal areas since the US airstrikes began in 2004.
The town of Jani Khel is a known haven for al Qaeda leaders and fighters. Senior al Qaeda operative Abdullah Azzam al Saudi was killed in a Predator strike in Jani Khel on Nov. 19, 2008. Azzam served as a liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest.
In addition, Al Qaeda is known to have deposited its donations received from Europe into the Bayt al Mal, or Bank of Money, in Jani Khel, according to a report at the NEFA Foundation. The Bayt al Mal served as al Qaeda's treasury.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan, administers the region, but the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. The US has conducted 13 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, nearly 25 percent of its current total of 58 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 156 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 19 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
Datta Khel borders the Mohammed Khel and Jani Khel regions in the settled district of Bannu. The Jani Khel region has long been a strategic meeting place and safe haven for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Jani Khel was identified as the headquarters for al Qaeda's Shura Majlis back in 2007. Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command, has operated in the Jani Khel region. The US has struck al Qaeda safe houses in Jani Khel twice since last year. These strikes are the only two Predator attacks that have occurred outside of Pakistan's tribal areas since the US airstrikes began in 2004.
The town of Jani Khel is a known haven for al Qaeda leaders and fighters. Senior al Qaeda operative Abdullah Azzam al Saudi was killed in a Predator strike in Jani Khel on Nov. 19, 2008. Azzam served as a liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest.
In addition, Al Qaeda is known to have deposited its donations received from Europe into the Bayt al Mal, or Bank of Money, in Jani Khel, according to a report at the NEFA Foundation. The Bayt al Mal served as al Qaeda's treasury.
Saturday, September 11, 2010
The Long War Journal - Charts on US Strikes in Pakistan
The Long War Journal - Charts on US Strikes in Pakistan
It's not a good time to own real estate in North Waziristan right now.
It's not a good time to own real estate in North Waziristan right now.
Haqqani Network Update 12Sep10
The Pentagon must really like my blog. A drone strike near Miram Shah, home base for the Haqqani Network.
From the AP:
DERA ISMAIL KHAN, Pakistan – A suspected American missile strike killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan early Thursday, an intelligence official said, the fourth such attack on suspected insurgent targets there in 24 hours.
The barrage was one of the most intense since the attacks were stepped up more than two years ago in a bid to keep pressure on al-Qaida and its allies. Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
U.S. officials do not publicly acknowledge the missile strikes but have said privately that they have killed several senior Taliban and al-Qaida militants and scores of foot soldiers in a region largely out of the control of the Pakistani state. Critics say innocents are also killed, fueling support for the insurgency.
The latest attack took place before dawn on a house close to a disused match factory a little more than a mile (three kilometers) west of Miran Shah town, a hub for local and international militants in the North Waziristan region, an intelligence official said. He spoke on condition of anonymity in line with the policy of his agency. Five alleged militants were killed, he said.
Folks, its Miram Shah not Miranshah.
Also from the AP:
MIRANSHAH, Pakistan (AFP) – A US drone attack Thursday killed six militants in Pakistan's rebel-infested northwestern tribal belt, security officials said -- the fourth strike in 24 hours.
The latest strike hit North Waziristan, the same tribal district targeted in three other drone attacks since Wednesday and a renowned hub for Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.
The target of the fourth drone attack was a compound in the outskirts of Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
A total of 24 militants were killed in the four strikes.
"Two US drones fired three missiles. We have reports that six militants were killed," a security official based in Peshawar told AFP.
Residents in Miranshah said they heard three huge explosions and later the villagers started announcements from local mosques asking for help.
"Militants have dug out six dead bodies. Five people were critically wounded," a local resident told AFP, requesting anonymity.
"They are still digging the rubble, two nearby houses were also damaged," he added.
Intelligence officials said they were trying to find out the nationalities of the militants killed, but they had no reports about the presence of any high-value target.
"An informer told us there were some Afghan Taliban among the dead but we are investigating," one intelligence official in Miranshah told AFP.
Two intelligence officials in Miranshah also confirmed the attack and the death toll.
Washington has branded the rugged area on the Afghan border -- part of which has been hit by Pakistan's catastrophic flooding -- a global headquarters of Al-Qaeda and the most dangerous place on Earth.
US forces have been waging a drone war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked commanders in the northwestern tribal belt, where militants have carved out havens in mountains outside direct government control.
Officials in Washington say the drone strikes are a vital tool needed to protect foreign troops in Afghanistan and have killed a number of high-value targets including Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud.
The US military does not as a rule confirm drone attacks, but its armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency operating in Afghanistan are the only forces that deploy pilotless drones in the region.
More than 1,040 people have been killed in over 100 drone strikes in Pakistan since August 2008, including a number of senior militants. However, the attacks fuel anti-American sentiment in the conservative Muslim country.
Al-Qaeda announced in June that its number three leader and Osama bin Laden's one-time treasurer Mustafa Abu al-Yazid had been killed in what security officials said appeared to be a drone strike in North Waziristan.
Under US pressure to crack down on Islamist havens along the Afghan border, Pakistan has in the past year significantly increased operations against militants in the area.
More than 3,700 people have been killed in the past three years in a series of suicide attacks and bomb explosions across Pakistan, many of them carried out by the Taliban and other Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist extremists.
Finally, from the Long War Journal:
US Predators struck yet again in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
Six Taliban fighters, including some possibly from Afghanistan, were killed and five more were critically wounded in an attack on a compound in Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
"Two US drones fired three missiles" at the compound, a Pakistani intelligence official told AFP. "We have reports that six militants were killed."
The Taliban reportedly cordoned off the area and are attempting to recover the dead and wounded from the rubble. No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed at this time.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in Danda Darpa Khel, a village just outside of Miramshah that serves as a hub of activity for the terror group.
The strike is the fourth recorded in the past 24 hours. In the four strikes combined, 24 terrorists were reported killed. Earlier today, US Predators or the more powerful Reapers struck twice in Danda Darpa Khel and once in Datta Khel, a known hub for al Qaeda's leadership.
North Waziristan is a known haven for the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and a host of Pakistani and Central and South Asian terror groups, but the Pakistani military has refused to carry out an operation to root them out. The Pakistani military maintains a garrison in Miramshah, but it is confined to base while the US is forced to carry out airstrikes against the terror groups.
The number of strikes is unprecedented, as the US has yet to carry out four strikes in a 24-hour period since the campaign began in 2004 and was ramped up in July 2008.
With today's strikes, the US has carried out 62 attacks inside Pakistan this year. The US exceeded last year's strike total of 53 with a strike in Kurram late last month. In 2008, the US carried out 36 strikes inside Pakistan.
Note to Haqqani members: stay away from Danda Darpa Khel.
From the AP:
DERA ISMAIL KHAN, Pakistan – A suspected American missile strike killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan early Thursday, an intelligence official said, the fourth such attack on suspected insurgent targets there in 24 hours.
The barrage was one of the most intense since the attacks were stepped up more than two years ago in a bid to keep pressure on al-Qaida and its allies. Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
U.S. officials do not publicly acknowledge the missile strikes but have said privately that they have killed several senior Taliban and al-Qaida militants and scores of foot soldiers in a region largely out of the control of the Pakistani state. Critics say innocents are also killed, fueling support for the insurgency.
The latest attack took place before dawn on a house close to a disused match factory a little more than a mile (three kilometers) west of Miran Shah town, a hub for local and international militants in the North Waziristan region, an intelligence official said. He spoke on condition of anonymity in line with the policy of his agency. Five alleged militants were killed, he said.
Folks, its Miram Shah not Miranshah.
Also from the AP:
MIRANSHAH, Pakistan (AFP) – A US drone attack Thursday killed six militants in Pakistan's rebel-infested northwestern tribal belt, security officials said -- the fourth strike in 24 hours.
The latest strike hit North Waziristan, the same tribal district targeted in three other drone attacks since Wednesday and a renowned hub for Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.
The target of the fourth drone attack was a compound in the outskirts of Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
A total of 24 militants were killed in the four strikes.
"Two US drones fired three missiles. We have reports that six militants were killed," a security official based in Peshawar told AFP.
Residents in Miranshah said they heard three huge explosions and later the villagers started announcements from local mosques asking for help.
"Militants have dug out six dead bodies. Five people were critically wounded," a local resident told AFP, requesting anonymity.
"They are still digging the rubble, two nearby houses were also damaged," he added.
Intelligence officials said they were trying to find out the nationalities of the militants killed, but they had no reports about the presence of any high-value target.
"An informer told us there were some Afghan Taliban among the dead but we are investigating," one intelligence official in Miranshah told AFP.
Two intelligence officials in Miranshah also confirmed the attack and the death toll.
Washington has branded the rugged area on the Afghan border -- part of which has been hit by Pakistan's catastrophic flooding -- a global headquarters of Al-Qaeda and the most dangerous place on Earth.
US forces have been waging a drone war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked commanders in the northwestern tribal belt, where militants have carved out havens in mountains outside direct government control.
Officials in Washington say the drone strikes are a vital tool needed to protect foreign troops in Afghanistan and have killed a number of high-value targets including Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud.
The US military does not as a rule confirm drone attacks, but its armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency operating in Afghanistan are the only forces that deploy pilotless drones in the region.
More than 1,040 people have been killed in over 100 drone strikes in Pakistan since August 2008, including a number of senior militants. However, the attacks fuel anti-American sentiment in the conservative Muslim country.
Al-Qaeda announced in June that its number three leader and Osama bin Laden's one-time treasurer Mustafa Abu al-Yazid had been killed in what security officials said appeared to be a drone strike in North Waziristan.
Under US pressure to crack down on Islamist havens along the Afghan border, Pakistan has in the past year significantly increased operations against militants in the area.
More than 3,700 people have been killed in the past three years in a series of suicide attacks and bomb explosions across Pakistan, many of them carried out by the Taliban and other Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist extremists.
Finally, from the Long War Journal:
US Predators struck yet again in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
Six Taliban fighters, including some possibly from Afghanistan, were killed and five more were critically wounded in an attack on a compound in Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
"Two US drones fired three missiles" at the compound, a Pakistani intelligence official told AFP. "We have reports that six militants were killed."
The Taliban reportedly cordoned off the area and are attempting to recover the dead and wounded from the rubble. No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed at this time.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in Danda Darpa Khel, a village just outside of Miramshah that serves as a hub of activity for the terror group.
The strike is the fourth recorded in the past 24 hours. In the four strikes combined, 24 terrorists were reported killed. Earlier today, US Predators or the more powerful Reapers struck twice in Danda Darpa Khel and once in Datta Khel, a known hub for al Qaeda's leadership.
North Waziristan is a known haven for the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and a host of Pakistani and Central and South Asian terror groups, but the Pakistani military has refused to carry out an operation to root them out. The Pakistani military maintains a garrison in Miramshah, but it is confined to base while the US is forced to carry out airstrikes against the terror groups.
The number of strikes is unprecedented, as the US has yet to carry out four strikes in a 24-hour period since the campaign began in 2004 and was ramped up in July 2008.
With today's strikes, the US has carried out 62 attacks inside Pakistan this year. The US exceeded last year's strike total of 53 with a strike in Kurram late last month. In 2008, the US carried out 36 strikes inside Pakistan.
Note to Haqqani members: stay away from Danda Darpa Khel.
Hafiz Gul Bahadur Update 12Sep10
It seems that the Pentagon has been reading my blog and decided to send Gul a care package...
From the AP:
MIR ALI, Pakistan – A suspected U.S. missile strike early Sunday killed at least four suspected associates of a warlord who is fighting Western troops in Afghanistan, intelligence officials said.
Powerful militant leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur struck a truce with the Pakistani military and agreed to stay on the sidelines last year as it waged an offensive in the South Waziristan tribal area against the Pakistani Taliban, a group dedicated to attacking the Pakistani state, among other targets.
Bahadur has focused instead on battling U.S. and NATO troops across the border in Afghanistan
Two Pakistan intelligence officials told The Associated Press that two missiles targeted a home in the village of Tata Khel in the North Waziristan tribal area where Gul's associates were believed to be staying. They said three men were believed to be wounded.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.
A steady series of suspected U.S. missile attacks have happened in North Waziristan, a lawless region home to al-Qaida leaders plotting attacks in the West, insurgents battling foreign troops in Afghanistan and extremists behind bombings in Pakistan.
Four airstrikes pounded the area over 24 hours this past week, the last killing five suspected militants early Thursday, officials said.
There were at least four other attacks earlier in the week.
Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
Pakistan has condemned the American missile strikes as violations of its sovereignty, warning that the civilian casualties they cause deepen anti-U.S. sentiment and complicate the fight against terrorism.
But many suspect the two countries have a deal allowing the drone-fired attacks.
And from the Long War Journal:
The US killed 18 "militants" in three Predator airstrikes today in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
The first strike took place just outside of Miramshah in the town of Danda Darpa Khel. The strike targeted a compound, killing 10 "militants," Pakistani security officials told AFP. The US Predators returned to Danda Darpa Khel and struck again at another compound, killing four more Haqqani Network fighters, according to Dawn.
The village of Danda Darpa Khel is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in the village of Danda Darpa Khel, a hub of activity for the terror group. The US has struck at targets in Danda Darpa Khel seven times since Aug. 20, 2009, and nine times since September 2008.
The other strike took place in the town of Ambor Shaga in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan. Three missiles were fired at a vehicle, killing four more "militants."
No senior Taliban or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed in any of the three strikes, and the targets of the attacks are not known.
Datta Khel is the stronghold of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a Taliban commander who is viewed as "good Taliban" by the Pakistani military as he does not advocate attacks on the Pakistani state. Bahadar supports attacks in Afghanistan and shelters al Qaeda fighters in tribal areas under his control.
Datta Khel also serves as a headquarters for al Qaeda. The US has killed top al Qaeda leaders Mustafa Abu Yazid, Abdullah Said al Libi, and Zuhaib al Zahib in strikes in the area over the past year.
Four of the last six Predator strikes in Pakistan have all taken place in Datta Khel. Five Taliban were killed in a strike on Sept. 6. Nine Taliban fighters, including a commander known as Inayatullah, were killed in a strike on a compound in Datta Khel on Sept. 3. And eight Taliban fighters were killed in a strike on a compound and a vehicle in Datta Khel on Sept. 4.
From the AP:
MIR ALI, Pakistan – A suspected U.S. missile strike early Sunday killed at least four suspected associates of a warlord who is fighting Western troops in Afghanistan, intelligence officials said.
Powerful militant leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur struck a truce with the Pakistani military and agreed to stay on the sidelines last year as it waged an offensive in the South Waziristan tribal area against the Pakistani Taliban, a group dedicated to attacking the Pakistani state, among other targets.
Bahadur has focused instead on battling U.S. and NATO troops across the border in Afghanistan
Two Pakistan intelligence officials told The Associated Press that two missiles targeted a home in the village of Tata Khel in the North Waziristan tribal area where Gul's associates were believed to be staying. They said three men were believed to be wounded.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.
A steady series of suspected U.S. missile attacks have happened in North Waziristan, a lawless region home to al-Qaida leaders plotting attacks in the West, insurgents battling foreign troops in Afghanistan and extremists behind bombings in Pakistan.
Four airstrikes pounded the area over 24 hours this past week, the last killing five suspected militants early Thursday, officials said.
There were at least four other attacks earlier in the week.
Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
Pakistan has condemned the American missile strikes as violations of its sovereignty, warning that the civilian casualties they cause deepen anti-U.S. sentiment and complicate the fight against terrorism.
But many suspect the two countries have a deal allowing the drone-fired attacks.
And from the Long War Journal:
The US killed 18 "militants" in three Predator airstrikes today in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
The first strike took place just outside of Miramshah in the town of Danda Darpa Khel. The strike targeted a compound, killing 10 "militants," Pakistani security officials told AFP. The US Predators returned to Danda Darpa Khel and struck again at another compound, killing four more Haqqani Network fighters, according to Dawn.
The village of Danda Darpa Khel is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in the village of Danda Darpa Khel, a hub of activity for the terror group. The US has struck at targets in Danda Darpa Khel seven times since Aug. 20, 2009, and nine times since September 2008.
The other strike took place in the town of Ambor Shaga in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan. Three missiles were fired at a vehicle, killing four more "militants."
No senior Taliban or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed in any of the three strikes, and the targets of the attacks are not known.
Datta Khel is the stronghold of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a Taliban commander who is viewed as "good Taliban" by the Pakistani military as he does not advocate attacks on the Pakistani state. Bahadar supports attacks in Afghanistan and shelters al Qaeda fighters in tribal areas under his control.
Datta Khel also serves as a headquarters for al Qaeda. The US has killed top al Qaeda leaders Mustafa Abu Yazid, Abdullah Said al Libi, and Zuhaib al Zahib in strikes in the area over the past year.
Four of the last six Predator strikes in Pakistan have all taken place in Datta Khel. Five Taliban were killed in a strike on Sept. 6. Nine Taliban fighters, including a commander known as Inayatullah, were killed in a strike on a compound in Datta Khel on Sept. 3. And eight Taliban fighters were killed in a strike on a compound and a vehicle in Datta Khel on Sept. 4.
Friday, September 10, 2010
A New Way Forward??? Part 1
So the Afghanistan Study Group (http://www. afghanistanstudygroup.org) recently published a new and revised war strategy going forward in Afghanistan called "A New Way Forward: The Report". It's on the main page of the website, so download it and read it. It won't take long to read, which may or may not be good. Rather than copy and paste the entire report, I decided to carry over the five conclusions of the report and offer an assessment.
"1. Emphasize Power-Sharing and Political Reconciliation. Afghanistan will not achieve a sustainable peace without broader support from the Afghan people themselves. Accordingly, the United States should fast track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and to encourage a power sharing arrangement among all parties.
Under the current Afghanistan Constitution, the President has unchecked authority to appoint provincial governors and hundreds of other positions in government. As David Miliband wrote, in many parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent, half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. As an important start to reform, the Afghan Parliament should be given confirmation authority for major appointments, district councils should be elected, budgeting authority decentralized, and elected provincial representatives should be included in the national level council that determines the portion of funds distributed. The ethnic base of the Afghan army should be broadened. More generally, governance should depend more heavily on local, traditional, and community-based structures.
In contrast to President Karzai’s recent and narrowly conceived “peace jirga,” political outreach should include leaders selected by key tribal and village leaders in all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and regional divisions, including rural Pashtuns. This effort should be open to those among the fragmented Taliban who are willing to engage in genuine reconciliation, a step that can help marginalize those Taliban who remain defiant. Preconditions for negotiations, such as recognizing the existing Afghan Constitution, should not be required."
Fast Tracking the Peace Process
This is an overly simplistic and naive view of the region. The Taliban, with the backing of the local populace (or at least no resistance), al Qaeda, and the Pakistani ISI, have been in control of a majority of Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Maybe it has not been flying flags and sending out notes on official letterhead control, but really "in control" through on-going intimidation, narco-trafficking, and shadow governments. On one side sits the Taliban, for the most part safely ensconced in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who have nothing but time and know that we don't. It's a waiting game to them and with the stomach of the American people turned wretchedly by Iraq, they won't have to wait very long. The so-called 2011 withdrawl schedule announced by President Obama does NOT send a signal to the militants that they already don't know. They are smart, under little military pressure, and know that our stay in AfPak is limited by money and weak morale back at home.
On the other side sit 135,000 ISAF troops whose countries, for the most part, have been there since the beginning in late 2001. Many of these same countries fought in Iraq and their citizens and governments have grown weary and are in debt. ISAF forces, with the exception of small groups of Special Forces, will not bring the fight to the Taliban in the tribal areas due to many practical restraints, such as logistics, politics, and manpower. Thus, the only pressure we can exert on the Taliban is through either 1) face to face (direct action) confrontations or 2) drone strikes in the tribal areas. Our mission in southern Afghanistan has largely revolved around trying to bait the Taliban into the open, but they have learned that no fighting force can defeat the modern U.S. military in a direct action engagement. Consequently, the Taliban have adopted the same strategy that doomed the Soviets in the 1980s, which is to 1) melt into the local population and 2) retreat to the mountainous areas and pick the time and place to fight in small unit engagements. Aside from the rare direct action engagement at places like Marjah and Lashkar Gah, ISAF military power has been relegated to conducting drone strikes in the tribal areas.
There is no doubt that the U.S drone strike campaign has killed a large number of Taliban and other jihadis (virtually every #3 man in every jihadi group has been killed several times), but it is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall number of combatants, which is estimated to be between 30,000 – 60,000. Let me be clear--drone strikes are an indispensible part of the effort as they effectively and (relatively) cheaply destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy. However, they are not mass casualty weapons. Additionally, unlike al Qaeda, the tribal militants have an effective and in-depth leadership and training structure (based on the tribal structure), so that even when drone strikes kill the leadership, the lower echelon troops are well versed in tactics and can still carry on the mission. An unintended effect of the drone strikes has been an increased recruitment of new fighters and increasing resentment towards the Pakistani government and the ISAF effort (TTP bombings in heavily populated areas). Thus, as they wait, they grow stronger while continuing to receive financial and military aid from the narco-trafficking profits (courtesy of American and European drug users) and Gulf State donors.
Which brings me to my point—to fast track anything, ISAF and the Afghan government need leverage. We have little leverage in face to face combat, as the Taliban is reluctant to participate in large scale direct action engagements. We have some leverage with the drone strikes, but their effects are limited and are a double-edged sword. We have no economic leverage because the narco-trade is extremely lucrative and our continuing presence in a Muslim country inspires Islamic donors. We have almost no leverage to force the Taliban to come to the table. The only hope we have is to convince the Taliban leadership that living in Afghanistan and earning an honest day’s wage is better than living in the tribal areas wondering if the next Hellfire missile is aimed at them. There may be some merit to this approach, but it definitely won’t be something that can be accomplished in short order.
A more effective, but probably less realistic solution, is not through military power, but through economic and political pressure. If the U.S, were to cease $5 billion in annual monetary aid to Pakistan (or dole it directly to the humanitarian projects) and military hardware, this would pressure Pakistan to, in turn, pressure the Taliban to come to the table. Pakistan is so insanely paranoid about a conflict with India (most of the financial assistance given to them goes to military efforts in the Kashmir region), that a denial of conventional arms and money, in all likelihood, would pressure them to cooperate. This solution, while effective, would probably never happen from a political standpoint, though. Pakistan is viewed as our "friend", and to deny aid to our "partner" in the war on terror would be viewed as directly aiding the Taliban. This conundrum is similar to our situation with Israel--if we cut off military aid, they would be forced to come to the table and adopt a two-state solution. Any rubbish about this type of move prompting Pakistan to help the Taliban as retribution is just that--rubbish. Pakistan cares first and foremost about it's survival. The government is largely secular and tries to cater to the extremists only to the extent that it serves their own interest. Faced with the option of either losing a war with India or kicking the militants out of the tribal areas, Pakistan would undoubtedly choose the former as its priority.
Decentralization of Power
This is exactly what needs to happen. A federal model of government in Afghanistan is a Soviet relic. The country has existed for centuries as a decentralized series of provinces based on ethnicity, language, tribal and religious affiliation, and geographic location. It was not until the Soviets established a centralized puppet government in the 1980s that the various provinces were "federated". After the pullout in 1989, the Najibullah government collapsed quickly as the various ethnic and tribal groups jockyed for power.
The Bush and Obama administrations have made the centralization of power a focus of their strategies, perhaps because it is the backbone of the American democratic model. Aside from the faulty centralized approach, President Karzai is viewed as extremely corrupt by locals (he's actually fairly honest, but he tolerates rampant corruption, which makes him seen as corrupt) and quite powerless to provide protection or support to areas far away from Kabul. I think our fascination with the centralized model has been championed by the military and CIA, the two entities that should NOT be responsible for a strategic nation building plan. The more effective approach is to have a weak centralized government, designed by the State Department, that does nothing but promote hegemony between the provinces, and allow the power to rest in the hands of the provincial governors. This can only be done by effectively stripping Karzai of his power (through a national referendum) and allowing the provinces to conduct elections with the express intent of strong local governance.
I guess the Taliban thought a direct action assault would turn out differently. Obviously they didn't read my blog. From the Long War Journal (Sep 2nd):
US and Afghan troops have beaten back another attempt by the Haqqani Network to overrun a US base in eastern Afghanistan.
More than 20 members of the Haqqani Network were killed after launching an early morning attack today on Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province.
"The attack began in the early morning with small arms and indirect fire directed against the outpost," the International Security Assistance Forces stated in a press release. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers.
"Aircraft from TF [Task Force] Viper conducted two passes over the area, killing at least 20 insurgents in two separate engagements," ISAF stated. No US or Afghan troops were killed or wounded in the attacks.
Combat Outpost Margah is the third US base to be assaulted by the Haqqani Network since Aug. 28. Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province on Aug. 28.
In the Aug. 28 attacks, US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that the Haqqani Network attacks, and similar assaults carried out against major US bases across the country, are ineffective.
"These sorts of FOB [forward operating base] attacks have become little more than exercises in target practice here," the official said in the aftermath of the Aug. 28 attacks. "They show up, we watch them; we kill them."
But a senior US military intelligence official and several US military officers contacted by The Long War Journal cautioned that the attacks demonstrate that the Haqqani Network still has the capacity to organize and strike just outside the walls of US outposts.
"That they [the Taliban and Haqqani Network] can muster their forces so close to large US bases and launch the attacks shows that their presence is strong just outside the gates of our largest bases," an officer who wished to remain anonymous said. "There is no doubt that these are lopsided battles."
"All they need to do is get their fighters inside the wire and create havoc, and the Taliban score a major propaganda coup," a senior US military intelligence official said. "The Taliban know the worst case scenario for them in these attacks - they lose all of their men - and they are willing to take those losses to achieve that goal."
In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base, and conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July. Three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
"1. Emphasize Power-Sharing and Political Reconciliation. Afghanistan will not achieve a sustainable peace without broader support from the Afghan people themselves. Accordingly, the United States should fast track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and to encourage a power sharing arrangement among all parties.
Under the current Afghanistan Constitution, the President has unchecked authority to appoint provincial governors and hundreds of other positions in government. As David Miliband wrote, in many parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent, half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. As an important start to reform, the Afghan Parliament should be given confirmation authority for major appointments, district councils should be elected, budgeting authority decentralized, and elected provincial representatives should be included in the national level council that determines the portion of funds distributed. The ethnic base of the Afghan army should be broadened. More generally, governance should depend more heavily on local, traditional, and community-based structures.
In contrast to President Karzai’s recent and narrowly conceived “peace jirga,” political outreach should include leaders selected by key tribal and village leaders in all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and regional divisions, including rural Pashtuns. This effort should be open to those among the fragmented Taliban who are willing to engage in genuine reconciliation, a step that can help marginalize those Taliban who remain defiant. Preconditions for negotiations, such as recognizing the existing Afghan Constitution, should not be required."
Fast Tracking the Peace Process
This is an overly simplistic and naive view of the region. The Taliban, with the backing of the local populace (or at least no resistance), al Qaeda, and the Pakistani ISI, have been in control of a majority of Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Maybe it has not been flying flags and sending out notes on official letterhead control, but really "in control" through on-going intimidation, narco-trafficking, and shadow governments. On one side sits the Taliban, for the most part safely ensconced in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who have nothing but time and know that we don't. It's a waiting game to them and with the stomach of the American people turned wretchedly by Iraq, they won't have to wait very long. The so-called 2011 withdrawl schedule announced by President Obama does NOT send a signal to the militants that they already don't know. They are smart, under little military pressure, and know that our stay in AfPak is limited by money and weak morale back at home.
On the other side sit 135,000 ISAF troops whose countries, for the most part, have been there since the beginning in late 2001. Many of these same countries fought in Iraq and their citizens and governments have grown weary and are in debt. ISAF forces, with the exception of small groups of Special Forces, will not bring the fight to the Taliban in the tribal areas due to many practical restraints, such as logistics, politics, and manpower. Thus, the only pressure we can exert on the Taliban is through either 1) face to face (direct action) confrontations or 2) drone strikes in the tribal areas. Our mission in southern Afghanistan has largely revolved around trying to bait the Taliban into the open, but they have learned that no fighting force can defeat the modern U.S. military in a direct action engagement. Consequently, the Taliban have adopted the same strategy that doomed the Soviets in the 1980s, which is to 1) melt into the local population and 2) retreat to the mountainous areas and pick the time and place to fight in small unit engagements. Aside from the rare direct action engagement at places like Marjah and Lashkar Gah, ISAF military power has been relegated to conducting drone strikes in the tribal areas.
There is no doubt that the U.S drone strike campaign has killed a large number of Taliban and other jihadis (virtually every #3 man in every jihadi group has been killed several times), but it is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall number of combatants, which is estimated to be between 30,000 – 60,000. Let me be clear--drone strikes are an indispensible part of the effort as they effectively and (relatively) cheaply destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy. However, they are not mass casualty weapons. Additionally, unlike al Qaeda, the tribal militants have an effective and in-depth leadership and training structure (based on the tribal structure), so that even when drone strikes kill the leadership, the lower echelon troops are well versed in tactics and can still carry on the mission. An unintended effect of the drone strikes has been an increased recruitment of new fighters and increasing resentment towards the Pakistani government and the ISAF effort (TTP bombings in heavily populated areas). Thus, as they wait, they grow stronger while continuing to receive financial and military aid from the narco-trafficking profits (courtesy of American and European drug users) and Gulf State donors.
Which brings me to my point—to fast track anything, ISAF and the Afghan government need leverage. We have little leverage in face to face combat, as the Taliban is reluctant to participate in large scale direct action engagements. We have some leverage with the drone strikes, but their effects are limited and are a double-edged sword. We have no economic leverage because the narco-trade is extremely lucrative and our continuing presence in a Muslim country inspires Islamic donors. We have almost no leverage to force the Taliban to come to the table. The only hope we have is to convince the Taliban leadership that living in Afghanistan and earning an honest day’s wage is better than living in the tribal areas wondering if the next Hellfire missile is aimed at them. There may be some merit to this approach, but it definitely won’t be something that can be accomplished in short order.
A more effective, but probably less realistic solution, is not through military power, but through economic and political pressure. If the U.S, were to cease $5 billion in annual monetary aid to Pakistan (or dole it directly to the humanitarian projects) and military hardware, this would pressure Pakistan to, in turn, pressure the Taliban to come to the table. Pakistan is so insanely paranoid about a conflict with India (most of the financial assistance given to them goes to military efforts in the Kashmir region), that a denial of conventional arms and money, in all likelihood, would pressure them to cooperate. This solution, while effective, would probably never happen from a political standpoint, though. Pakistan is viewed as our "friend", and to deny aid to our "partner" in the war on terror would be viewed as directly aiding the Taliban. This conundrum is similar to our situation with Israel--if we cut off military aid, they would be forced to come to the table and adopt a two-state solution. Any rubbish about this type of move prompting Pakistan to help the Taliban as retribution is just that--rubbish. Pakistan cares first and foremost about it's survival. The government is largely secular and tries to cater to the extremists only to the extent that it serves their own interest. Faced with the option of either losing a war with India or kicking the militants out of the tribal areas, Pakistan would undoubtedly choose the former as its priority.
Decentralization of Power
This is exactly what needs to happen. A federal model of government in Afghanistan is a Soviet relic. The country has existed for centuries as a decentralized series of provinces based on ethnicity, language, tribal and religious affiliation, and geographic location. It was not until the Soviets established a centralized puppet government in the 1980s that the various provinces were "federated". After the pullout in 1989, the Najibullah government collapsed quickly as the various ethnic and tribal groups jockyed for power.
The Bush and Obama administrations have made the centralization of power a focus of their strategies, perhaps because it is the backbone of the American democratic model. Aside from the faulty centralized approach, President Karzai is viewed as extremely corrupt by locals (he's actually fairly honest, but he tolerates rampant corruption, which makes him seen as corrupt) and quite powerless to provide protection or support to areas far away from Kabul. I think our fascination with the centralized model has been championed by the military and CIA, the two entities that should NOT be responsible for a strategic nation building plan. The more effective approach is to have a weak centralized government, designed by the State Department, that does nothing but promote hegemony between the provinces, and allow the power to rest in the hands of the provincial governors. This can only be done by effectively stripping Karzai of his power (through a national referendum) and allowing the provinces to conduct elections with the express intent of strong local governance.
I guess the Taliban thought a direct action assault would turn out differently. Obviously they didn't read my blog. From the Long War Journal (Sep 2nd):
US and Afghan troops have beaten back another attempt by the Haqqani Network to overrun a US base in eastern Afghanistan.
More than 20 members of the Haqqani Network were killed after launching an early morning attack today on Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province.
"The attack began in the early morning with small arms and indirect fire directed against the outpost," the International Security Assistance Forces stated in a press release. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers.
"Aircraft from TF [Task Force] Viper conducted two passes over the area, killing at least 20 insurgents in two separate engagements," ISAF stated. No US or Afghan troops were killed or wounded in the attacks.
Combat Outpost Margah is the third US base to be assaulted by the Haqqani Network since Aug. 28. Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province on Aug. 28.
In the Aug. 28 attacks, US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that the Haqqani Network attacks, and similar assaults carried out against major US bases across the country, are ineffective.
"These sorts of FOB [forward operating base] attacks have become little more than exercises in target practice here," the official said in the aftermath of the Aug. 28 attacks. "They show up, we watch them; we kill them."
But a senior US military intelligence official and several US military officers contacted by The Long War Journal cautioned that the attacks demonstrate that the Haqqani Network still has the capacity to organize and strike just outside the walls of US outposts.
"That they [the Taliban and Haqqani Network] can muster their forces so close to large US bases and launch the attacks shows that their presence is strong just outside the gates of our largest bases," an officer who wished to remain anonymous said. "There is no doubt that these are lopsided battles."
"All they need to do is get their fighters inside the wire and create havoc, and the Taliban score a major propaganda coup," a senior US military intelligence official said. "The Taliban know the worst case scenario for them in these attacks - they lose all of their men - and they are willing to take those losses to achieve that goal."
In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base, and conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July. Three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)