A short article from the Longwar Journal describing the senior leadership of al Qaeda in Pakistan:
Al Qaeda has a deep bench inside Pakistan and relies on highly-skilled operatives from other like-minded jihadist organizations in plotting against the West. Members of various terror groups allied with al Qaeda, including Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), work with al Qaeda’s external operations committee.
Al Qaeda shares a safe haven in northern Pakistan with these groups, and this allows the organization to regenerate its external operations network despite being heavily targeted by the covert US air campaign in the tribal areas.
No terrorist better typifies this phenomenon than Rashid Rauf. A senior member of JeM, which was founded by the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, Rauf has a long pedigree in Pakistan's terror circles. He is a relative of Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of JeM. His father founded Crescent Relief, a Muslim charity that collected funds for earthquake relief and is currently under investigation for funding the failed 2006 London airliner plot.
Rauf and senior al Qaeda leader Matiur Rehman were the architects of the 2006 London airline plot. The foiled attack, which has been called the "son of Bojinka," was modeled after the 1995 Bojinka plot devised by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and his nephew Ramzi Yousef. Rauf also assisted Adnan el Shukrijumah in training the al Qaeda operatives who planned to attack trains in the New York City area last year.
Ilyas Kasmiri, like Rauf, is a good example of how al Qaeda fills leadership voids by hand-selecting members from allied terror groups. Kashmiri is one of al Qaeda's top military leaders and the architect of al Qaeda's terror assaults utilizing coordinated suicide attack teams in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.
Kashmiri is the operational commander of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI), a terror group backed by Pakistan's military and Inter-Service Intelligence directorate. He is also the leader of Brigade 313, al Qaeda's military organization in Pakistan. His training camp in Miramshah is hosted in a region administered by Siraj Haqqani, a top Taliban and al Qaeda leader.
Kashmiri has organized multiple attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, including the November 2008 terror assault on the Indian city of Mumbai, in collaboration with the Lashkar-e-Taiba. He has also attempted to execute attacks in the US and in Denmark, and was indicted by the US in 2009 along with David Coleman Headley, his point man. In Pakistan, he masterminded the assassination of the former commander of the Pakistani Special Services Group, and organized attacks on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters and Pakistani police headquarters in Lahore.
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Wednesday, October 6, 2010
A Brief History of the IMU
From everything that I am reading, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has become a real player in the global jihad arena. I will provide a more in-depth analyis of the IMU later, but the Longwar Journal provides a nice synopsis of the group:
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is based in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan, and primarily operates along the Afghan-Pakistani border and in northern Afghanistan. According to one estimate, more than 3,000 Uzbeks and other Central Asian fighters are sheltering in North Waziristan.
Since Sept. 1, the US has ramped up airstrikes against the terror groups in North Waziristan, with 21 strikes that month and three more already this month. The IMU's former leader, Tahir Yuldashev, was killed in a US Predator airstrike in South Waziristan in September 2009. Yuldashev sat on al Qaeda's top council, the Shura Majlis. He has been replaced by Abu Usman Adil.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan fighters often serve as bodyguards to top Pakistani Taliban leaders. The IMU fights alongside the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, the IMU has integrated its operations with the Taliban, and senior leaders serve as members of the Taliban's shadow government [see LWJ report, Coalition continues pursuit of IMU commanders in the Afghan north].
Tajikistan has seen an uptick in attacks from Islamist terror groups since the summer of 2009. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda-linked IMU claims deadly ambush on Tajik troops.] In late spring of that year, NATO opened a supply line from Tajikistan into northern Afghanistan after the Taliban and allied groups heavily targeted the main NATO route from Pakistan.
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The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is based in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan, and primarily operates along the Afghan-Pakistani border and in northern Afghanistan. According to one estimate, more than 3,000 Uzbeks and other Central Asian fighters are sheltering in North Waziristan.
Since Sept. 1, the US has ramped up airstrikes against the terror groups in North Waziristan, with 21 strikes that month and three more already this month. The IMU's former leader, Tahir Yuldashev, was killed in a US Predator airstrike in South Waziristan in September 2009. Yuldashev sat on al Qaeda's top council, the Shura Majlis. He has been replaced by Abu Usman Adil.
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan fighters often serve as bodyguards to top Pakistani Taliban leaders. The IMU fights alongside the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. In northern Afghanistan, the IMU has integrated its operations with the Taliban, and senior leaders serve as members of the Taliban's shadow government [see LWJ report, Coalition continues pursuit of IMU commanders in the Afghan north].
Tajikistan has seen an uptick in attacks from Islamist terror groups since the summer of 2009. [See LWJ report, Al Qaeda-linked IMU claims deadly ambush on Tajik troops.] In late spring of that year, NATO opened a supply line from Tajikistan into northern Afghanistan after the Taliban and allied groups heavily targeted the main NATO route from Pakistan.
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German al Qaeda, or "White al Qaeda"
AP file photo of an ICE Predator drone on the Mexican border. With the escalating violence in Mexico (and national security threat), I wonder how long it will take to put Hellfire missiles on these bad guys.
Presumably, in response to the disrupted (maybe?) terror plot in Europe that seems to stem out of the Hamburg, Germany mosque (same one tied to 9/11) and tied to the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), German al Qaeda, or "white al Qaeda", have been getting a beating.
From Dawn.com (October 4, 2010):
MIRANSHAH: A suspected US drone strike killed eight militants of German nationality in northwest Pakistan on Monday, Pakistani intelligence officials said.
They were killed when two missiles from a suspected CIA pilotless aircraft struck a mosque in Mirali in North Waziristan, the intelligence officials said.
The strikes came a day after the United States and Britain issued warnings of an increased risk of terrorist attacks in Europe.
The US State Department warned American citizens to exercise caution if travelling in Europe. Britain raised the threat level to “high” from “general” for its citizens travelling to Germany and France.
The plot that triggered the alerts involved al Qaeda and allied militants, possibly including European citizens or residents, intelligence sources said last week.
They said the militants were plotting coordinated attacks on European cities.
Western security officials said they believed a group of individuals in northern Pakistan were connected to the plot.
The United States has stepped up drone missile bombings on the Pakistan border with Afghanistan.
It is as yet unclear, however, how closely these intensified drone strikes are linked to the reported plot in Europe.
Nato helicopters from Afghanistan have also attacked militant targets within Pakistan, drawing anger in Islamabad
which has condemned these as violation of sovereignty.
Pakistan blocked one of the supply routes for Nato troops in Afghanistan after a helicopter strike last week killed three Pakistani soldiers in the western Kurram region.
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Newton's Third Law (of Geopolitics)
Newtown's third law states that for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. So when ISAF crosses the Pakistani border and kills a boatload of insurgents and "Frontier Corps", Pakistan is obliged to repond in a quid pro quo fashion. Frontier Corps (FC) troops are like mall cops in the FATA areas and notoriously cowardly and on the take.
You have to wonder why the FC were in the immediate vicinity of Haqqani militants in the first place (and not engaging them).
From the Longwar Journal (October 3, 2010):
The Taliban destroyed 28 NATO fuel tankers bound for Afghanistan in an attack near Islamabad. The attack is the second of its kind since Pakistan closed down the Khyber Pass on Sept. 30 in protest against US cross-border attacks on Haqqani Network fighters fleeing from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
Suspected Taliban fighters hit the fuel tankers during a midnight raid on a compound on the outskirts of Pakistan's capital. Three people were reported killed and 28 tankers burned in the aftermath of the attack. The suspected Taliban fighters escaped. It is unclear if Pakistani security forces provided any security for the fuel tankers.
The Taliban, commanded by Hakeemullah Mehsud, claimed the Islamabad attack and vowed to carry out further attacks on convoys in Pakistan.
“We will carry out more such attacks in future," Azam Tariq, Hakeemullah's spokesman, told AFP. We will not allow the use of Pakistani soil as a supply route for NATO troops based in Afghanistan."
Tariq also stated the attacks on NATO convoys were designed "to avenge drone attacks" from US Predators and Reapers that have been pounding Taliban and al Qaeda operatives in North Waziristan.
The Islamabad attack took place just two days after a nearly identical raid by the Taliban in the city of Shikarpur in Sindh province in the Afghan south. More than 36 fuel tankers and several container trucks were destroyed.
The Taliban spokesman Tariq also claimed the Shikarpur attack, and said a group based in Sindh known as the Siyara Group carried out the attack.
“They were local militants and had acquired training in South Waziristan and returned to their native towns to start attacks on government and security installations,” Tariq told The News.
The Taliban struck at a NATO convoy outside Islamabad earlier this year, when a 15-man squad of Taliban hit a truck stop in Tarnol on June 9. Eight people, including two drivers, were killed in the attack, while more than 30 NATO fuel and supply trucks were destroyed. The Taliban have consistently hit NATO convoys and trucks in Peshawar, Khyber, and Quetta.
The latest two strikes took place after the Pakistani government angrily shut down NATO's supply route through the Khyber Pass, the main passage to NATO troops in Kabul and the surrounding areas. The Pakistan government closed the Khyber Pass after US helicopters pursued Haqqani Network fighters across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan three times last week. The Pakistani military claimed that three Frontier Corps troops had been killed in the attacks, and the US military apologized for the attack before an investigation into the incident began.
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You have to wonder why the FC were in the immediate vicinity of Haqqani militants in the first place (and not engaging them).
From the Longwar Journal (October 3, 2010):
The Taliban destroyed 28 NATO fuel tankers bound for Afghanistan in an attack near Islamabad. The attack is the second of its kind since Pakistan closed down the Khyber Pass on Sept. 30 in protest against US cross-border attacks on Haqqani Network fighters fleeing from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
Suspected Taliban fighters hit the fuel tankers during a midnight raid on a compound on the outskirts of Pakistan's capital. Three people were reported killed and 28 tankers burned in the aftermath of the attack. The suspected Taliban fighters escaped. It is unclear if Pakistani security forces provided any security for the fuel tankers.
The Taliban, commanded by Hakeemullah Mehsud, claimed the Islamabad attack and vowed to carry out further attacks on convoys in Pakistan.
“We will carry out more such attacks in future," Azam Tariq, Hakeemullah's spokesman, told AFP. We will not allow the use of Pakistani soil as a supply route for NATO troops based in Afghanistan."
Tariq also stated the attacks on NATO convoys were designed "to avenge drone attacks" from US Predators and Reapers that have been pounding Taliban and al Qaeda operatives in North Waziristan.
The Islamabad attack took place just two days after a nearly identical raid by the Taliban in the city of Shikarpur in Sindh province in the Afghan south. More than 36 fuel tankers and several container trucks were destroyed.
The Taliban spokesman Tariq also claimed the Shikarpur attack, and said a group based in Sindh known as the Siyara Group carried out the attack.
“They were local militants and had acquired training in South Waziristan and returned to their native towns to start attacks on government and security installations,” Tariq told The News.
The Taliban struck at a NATO convoy outside Islamabad earlier this year, when a 15-man squad of Taliban hit a truck stop in Tarnol on June 9. Eight people, including two drivers, were killed in the attack, while more than 30 NATO fuel and supply trucks were destroyed. The Taliban have consistently hit NATO convoys and trucks in Peshawar, Khyber, and Quetta.
The latest two strikes took place after the Pakistani government angrily shut down NATO's supply route through the Khyber Pass, the main passage to NATO troops in Kabul and the surrounding areas. The Pakistan government closed the Khyber Pass after US helicopters pursued Haqqani Network fighters across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan three times last week. The Pakistani military claimed that three Frontier Corps troops had been killed in the attacks, and the US military apologized for the attack before an investigation into the incident began.
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Tuesday, October 5, 2010
Imam Mamoun Darkazanli
I'm all about the 4th and 5th Amendments (privacy and due process), but the fact that the Imam (religious leader) of the al Quds Mosque prior to 9/11 has escaped prosecution is absolutely insane. From the country that started two world wars, comes the denial of extradition to Spain for facilitation of the 3/11 Madrid attacks??? Now we learn that Siddiqui (recently captured in Afghanistan and plotter of the 2010Europe attacks) and Darkazanli may have had a strong relationship...
From the Longwar Journal (September 30, 2010):
One of the more significant connections between Siddiqui and the 9/11 plotters may be the imam who ran the Al Quds-Taiba mosque: Mamoun Darkazanli.
Western intelligence agencies have long known that Darkazanali is an al Qaeda operative.
The imam has repeatedly avoided being brought to justice, however.
Darkazanli first popped up on the CIA’s radar in 1993 when a man carrying false passports and counterfeit money was arrested in Africa and Darkazanli’s phone number was found in his possession. Authorities failed to assemble a case against Darkazanli at the time. That same year, ironically, he purchased a ship named “Jennifer” for Osama bin Laden.
Darkazanli garnered the FBI’s attention in 1998 after al Qaeda’s bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The FBI found Darkazanli’s contact information in the address book of Wadi el Hage, Osama bin Laden’s personal secretary. The bureau also learned that Darkazanli had power of attorney over a bank account owned by Abu Hajer al Iraqi, who is one of al Qaeda’s founding members and was a senior member of bin Laden’s organization at the time. Abu Hajer al Iraqi (whose real name is Mamdouh Mahmud Salim) was arrested in Germany and extradited to the US for his involvement in the embassy bombings.
Darkazanli’s ties were scrutinized again in March 1999 when US officials learned he was in contact with a student named “Marwan.” The student turned out to be Marwan al-Shehhi, one of the 9/11 hijackers.
Indeed, there is considerable evidence that Darkazanli and another Syrian named Mohammed Zammar were heavily involved with al Qaeda’s Hamburg cell. The pair, who are veterans of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, likely played an important role in indoctrinating and financing the 9/11 hijackers.
Prior to 9/11, American authorities pressured the Germans to clamp down on Darkazanli. But German laws did not prohibit his involvement with a foreign terrorist organization at the time. After 9/11, the US and UN quickly added Darkazanli and his import-export business to the list of al Qaeda-affiliated entities.
Spanish officials sought Darkazanli’s extradition in 2004 and 2005. They accuse Darkazanli of being involved with the al Qaeda cell in Madrid that was responsible for the March 11, 2004, train bombings. Darkazanli is a longtime compatriot of Imad Yarkas, who was one of Osama bin Laden’s chief points of contact in Europe prior to 9/11 and ran the Madrid cell.
Darkazanli’s extradition to Spain was blocked by a German court, however. The Germans found that the EU arrest warrant issued by Spain violated Germany’s constitution. Darkazanli was allowed to go free – avoiding justice once again.
All of this raises the possibility that Darkazanli was involved in the most recent terror plot against Europe. It would not be surprising to learn that authorities are investigating any ties between Darkazanli and Siddiqui.
Darkazanli’s mosque has been the epicenter for terrorist plotting before, including the most devastating terrorist attack in history.
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From the Longwar Journal (September 30, 2010):
One of the more significant connections between Siddiqui and the 9/11 plotters may be the imam who ran the Al Quds-Taiba mosque: Mamoun Darkazanli.
Western intelligence agencies have long known that Darkazanali is an al Qaeda operative.
The imam has repeatedly avoided being brought to justice, however.
Darkazanli first popped up on the CIA’s radar in 1993 when a man carrying false passports and counterfeit money was arrested in Africa and Darkazanli’s phone number was found in his possession. Authorities failed to assemble a case against Darkazanli at the time. That same year, ironically, he purchased a ship named “Jennifer” for Osama bin Laden.
Darkazanli garnered the FBI’s attention in 1998 after al Qaeda’s bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The FBI found Darkazanli’s contact information in the address book of Wadi el Hage, Osama bin Laden’s personal secretary. The bureau also learned that Darkazanli had power of attorney over a bank account owned by Abu Hajer al Iraqi, who is one of al Qaeda’s founding members and was a senior member of bin Laden’s organization at the time. Abu Hajer al Iraqi (whose real name is Mamdouh Mahmud Salim) was arrested in Germany and extradited to the US for his involvement in the embassy bombings.
Darkazanli’s ties were scrutinized again in March 1999 when US officials learned he was in contact with a student named “Marwan.” The student turned out to be Marwan al-Shehhi, one of the 9/11 hijackers.
Indeed, there is considerable evidence that Darkazanli and another Syrian named Mohammed Zammar were heavily involved with al Qaeda’s Hamburg cell. The pair, who are veterans of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, likely played an important role in indoctrinating and financing the 9/11 hijackers.
Prior to 9/11, American authorities pressured the Germans to clamp down on Darkazanli. But German laws did not prohibit his involvement with a foreign terrorist organization at the time. After 9/11, the US and UN quickly added Darkazanli and his import-export business to the list of al Qaeda-affiliated entities.
Spanish officials sought Darkazanli’s extradition in 2004 and 2005. They accuse Darkazanli of being involved with the al Qaeda cell in Madrid that was responsible for the March 11, 2004, train bombings. Darkazanli is a longtime compatriot of Imad Yarkas, who was one of Osama bin Laden’s chief points of contact in Europe prior to 9/11 and ran the Madrid cell.
Darkazanli’s extradition to Spain was blocked by a German court, however. The Germans found that the EU arrest warrant issued by Spain violated Germany’s constitution. Darkazanli was allowed to go free – avoiding justice once again.
All of this raises the possibility that Darkazanli was involved in the most recent terror plot against Europe. It would not be surprising to learn that authorities are investigating any ties between Darkazanli and Siddiqui.
Darkazanli’s mosque has been the epicenter for terrorist plotting before, including the most devastating terrorist attack in history.
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The Infamous Hamburg Mosque
OK, with concrete proof that the 9/11 attacks were financed and managed through the now infamous al Quds (now Taiba) Mosque, why the FUCK was it not closed earlier???
Always willing to give the benefit of the doubt, I suppose it was kept open so that German intelligence could monitor the comings and goings of members, which is why the recent Mumbai-style Europe plot was uncovered. Maybe. Or it was sheer dumb luck.
From the Longwar Journal (September 30, 2010):
The recently uncovered terror plot against European cities, which was to involve attacks similar to the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, is tied to the same Hamburg mosque that was attended by some of the 9/11 hijackers.
The purported plot was discovered during the interrogation of a German citizen named Ahmed Siddiqui, who attended the Taiba mosque in Hamburg. The Taiba mosque gained infamy under its former name -- Al Quds. Al Qaeda’s Hamburg cell for the 9/11 operation frequented the Al Quds mosque, where they were indoctrinated in the ways of jihad.
Siddiqui’s ties to Taiba were previously reported by Der Spiegel. In a Sept. 6 piece titled, “Hamburg Islamist Speaks of Threat of Attacks in Germany,” Der Spiegel reported that American forces had detained a German of Afghan descent named “Ahmad S.” in Kabul.
During interrogations at the US base in Bagram, Ahmad S. spoke “extensively about attack scenarios in Germany and neighboring European countries.” His full name was not known at the time, but "Ahmad S." is Ahmed Siddiqui.
Der Spiegel reported that Siddiqui was among a “total of around a dozen” terror suspects who disappeared from the Hamburg mosque during a “short period of time in 2009.” The dozen suspects, including Siddiqui, “moved in circles close to Hamburg's Taiba mosque” and are suspected of training in terrorist camps along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Siddiqui’s arrest in July 2010 may explain why the Taiba mosque was closed just weeks later in early August 2010. German authorities allowed the mosque to remain open for years, despite its numerous ties to terrorism and extremism. Then, suddenly, authorities raided and closed the mosque.
Siddiqui has ties to al Qaeda’s Hamburg cell. According to Der Spiegel, Siddiqui regularly drove Mounir el Motassadeq’s father to the jail where Mounir is imprisoned for visits. Mounir is serving a 15-year sentence in a German prison for his involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Der Spiegel noted that Siddiqui “also went on vacation with Motassadeq's family in Morocco” in 2002 and “worked at the Hamburg airport,” just as Mounir Motassadeq did.
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Always willing to give the benefit of the doubt, I suppose it was kept open so that German intelligence could monitor the comings and goings of members, which is why the recent Mumbai-style Europe plot was uncovered. Maybe. Or it was sheer dumb luck.
From the Longwar Journal (September 30, 2010):
The recently uncovered terror plot against European cities, which was to involve attacks similar to the November 2008 attack in Mumbai, is tied to the same Hamburg mosque that was attended by some of the 9/11 hijackers.
The purported plot was discovered during the interrogation of a German citizen named Ahmed Siddiqui, who attended the Taiba mosque in Hamburg. The Taiba mosque gained infamy under its former name -- Al Quds. Al Qaeda’s Hamburg cell for the 9/11 operation frequented the Al Quds mosque, where they were indoctrinated in the ways of jihad.
Siddiqui’s ties to Taiba were previously reported by Der Spiegel. In a Sept. 6 piece titled, “Hamburg Islamist Speaks of Threat of Attacks in Germany,” Der Spiegel reported that American forces had detained a German of Afghan descent named “Ahmad S.” in Kabul.
During interrogations at the US base in Bagram, Ahmad S. spoke “extensively about attack scenarios in Germany and neighboring European countries.” His full name was not known at the time, but "Ahmad S." is Ahmed Siddiqui.
Der Spiegel reported that Siddiqui was among a “total of around a dozen” terror suspects who disappeared from the Hamburg mosque during a “short period of time in 2009.” The dozen suspects, including Siddiqui, “moved in circles close to Hamburg's Taiba mosque” and are suspected of training in terrorist camps along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Siddiqui’s arrest in July 2010 may explain why the Taiba mosque was closed just weeks later in early August 2010. German authorities allowed the mosque to remain open for years, despite its numerous ties to terrorism and extremism. Then, suddenly, authorities raided and closed the mosque.
Siddiqui has ties to al Qaeda’s Hamburg cell. According to Der Spiegel, Siddiqui regularly drove Mounir el Motassadeq’s father to the jail where Mounir is imprisoned for visits. Mounir is serving a 15-year sentence in a German prison for his involvement in the 9/11 attacks. Der Spiegel noted that Siddiqui “also went on vacation with Motassadeq's family in Morocco” in 2002 and “worked at the Hamburg airport,” just as Mounir Motassadeq did.
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Europe Plot/Drone Strikes Connection
More on the connection between the recent spate of drone strikes in North Waziristan and the plot to bomb public targets in Europe. Just a few months ago, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) seemed to be a fringe al Qaeda group. Conventional wisdom was that IMU was not welcome in most Taliban-held areas of Pakistan, due to their "extreme" global jihad views. The fact that they now appear relatively welcome in North Waziristan could mean a few things:
1) The IMU is closely allied with al Qaeda, and
2) al Qaeda has stepped up its influence with the Taliban (eg, Haqqani Network), and
3) The Taliban has embraced the global jihad view
OR
1 & 2 above, plus
4) The Taliban does not support IMU-like elements, but al Qaeda's growing power has suppressed the Taliban, and
5) al Qaeda's global influence is NOT as weak as the Obama administration claims
Either scenario is NOT good.
From the Longwar Journal (September 30, 2010):
Eight Germans and two Britons were killed in the same airstrike that killed an Islamic Jihad Group commander who trained Europeans to carry out attacks in England, France, and Germany.
The eight Germans and two Britons, who were involved in the recently exposed plot to conduct Mumbai-like attacks in Europe, are said to have been killed in one of the two Sept. 8 airstrikes in the Datta Khel area in North Waziristan, a known safe haven and command and control center for al Qaeda and allied terror groups.
The 10 Europeans are thought to have been killed in the same strike that killed Qureshi, a commander in the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), a splinter faction of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Qureshi is believed to have been helping to train and facilitate the European plot, which is said to involve Mumbai-like terror assaults of armed suicide bombers in major European cities, a US intelligence official told The Long War Journal.
Qureshi was described by AKI as a commander who "used to receive foreigners especially the Germans in North Waziristan and then train them and resend them to their country of origins."
The Islamic Jihad Group is based out of the Mir Ali region and maintains close ties with al Qaeda leader Abu Kasha al Iraqi, and with North Waziristan Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar, who controls the Datta Khel region. The IJG is known to operate a 'German Taliban village' in Waziristan. The IJG is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization. Both the IJG and IMU are al Qaeda affiliates that operate in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.
A Pakistani intelligence official said that the 10 Europeans killed in the Sept. 8 strikes were communicating with their support cells in Germany and London, and have been tracked for months.
"They have been making calls to Germany and London," the official told The Associated Press. "They have been talking about and looking for facilitators and logistics they need there to carry out terror strikes."
One of the Britons was identified as Abdul Jabbar, who originated from the district of Jhelum in Pakistan's Punjab province. Multiple Pakistani terror groups, including Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Laskar-e-Jhangvi, are active in Punjab. These groups receive the support of Pakistan's military and intelligence establishments.
Rashid Rauf, the elusive Jaish-e-Mohammed and al Qaeda operative, may be involved in the plot in Britain, a senior US intelligence official told The Long War Journal. Rauf and senior al Qaeda leader Matiur Rehman, who is said to hold the "rolodex" of jihadists who have passed through terror camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, were the architects of the 2006 London airline plot. Rauf escaped Pakistani custody under very suspicious circumstances and was thought to have been killed in a Predator strike in 2008, but his death was never confirmed. US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal that they believe Rauf is alive, and Rauf's family has denied he is dead.
Another link to the Uzbek terror groups' involvement in the European terror plot is the arrest of Ahmed Sidiqui, a German from Hamburg. Sidiqui, a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, was captured in the Afghan north in July and has since provided information on the terror plot. Sidiqui also said that the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network, which is based in North Waziristan and operates in eastern and northern Afghanistan, was involved in the European terror plot.
Sidiqui had attended the Taiba mosque in Hamburg, which was home to several of the 9/11 plotters under its previous name -- Al Quds. German authorities closed the Taiba mosque on Aug. 12.
Coalition Special Operations Forces dramatically stepped up operations against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan immediately after Sidiqui's capture in July. Multiple IMU commanders have been killed or captured in the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar since July. Many of these commanders had integrated their operations with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, and some held senior positions in the Taliban’s shadow government.
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1) The IMU is closely allied with al Qaeda, and
2) al Qaeda has stepped up its influence with the Taliban (eg, Haqqani Network), and
3) The Taliban has embraced the global jihad view
OR
1 & 2 above, plus
4) The Taliban does not support IMU-like elements, but al Qaeda's growing power has suppressed the Taliban, and
5) al Qaeda's global influence is NOT as weak as the Obama administration claims
Either scenario is NOT good.
From the Longwar Journal (September 30, 2010):
Eight Germans and two Britons were killed in the same airstrike that killed an Islamic Jihad Group commander who trained Europeans to carry out attacks in England, France, and Germany.
The eight Germans and two Britons, who were involved in the recently exposed plot to conduct Mumbai-like attacks in Europe, are said to have been killed in one of the two Sept. 8 airstrikes in the Datta Khel area in North Waziristan, a known safe haven and command and control center for al Qaeda and allied terror groups.
The 10 Europeans are thought to have been killed in the same strike that killed Qureshi, a commander in the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG), a splinter faction of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Qureshi is believed to have been helping to train and facilitate the European plot, which is said to involve Mumbai-like terror assaults of armed suicide bombers in major European cities, a US intelligence official told The Long War Journal.
Qureshi was described by AKI as a commander who "used to receive foreigners especially the Germans in North Waziristan and then train them and resend them to their country of origins."
The Islamic Jihad Group is based out of the Mir Ali region and maintains close ties with al Qaeda leader Abu Kasha al Iraqi, and with North Waziristan Taliban commander Hafiz Gul Bahadar, who controls the Datta Khel region. The IJG is known to operate a 'German Taliban village' in Waziristan. The IJG is a Specially Designated Global Terrorist organization. Both the IJG and IMU are al Qaeda affiliates that operate in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia.
A Pakistani intelligence official said that the 10 Europeans killed in the Sept. 8 strikes were communicating with their support cells in Germany and London, and have been tracked for months.
"They have been making calls to Germany and London," the official told The Associated Press. "They have been talking about and looking for facilitators and logistics they need there to carry out terror strikes."
One of the Britons was identified as Abdul Jabbar, who originated from the district of Jhelum in Pakistan's Punjab province. Multiple Pakistani terror groups, including Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Laskar-e-Jhangvi, are active in Punjab. These groups receive the support of Pakistan's military and intelligence establishments.
Rashid Rauf, the elusive Jaish-e-Mohammed and al Qaeda operative, may be involved in the plot in Britain, a senior US intelligence official told The Long War Journal. Rauf and senior al Qaeda leader Matiur Rehman, who is said to hold the "rolodex" of jihadists who have passed through terror camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan, were the architects of the 2006 London airline plot. Rauf escaped Pakistani custody under very suspicious circumstances and was thought to have been killed in a Predator strike in 2008, but his death was never confirmed. US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal that they believe Rauf is alive, and Rauf's family has denied he is dead.
Another link to the Uzbek terror groups' involvement in the European terror plot is the arrest of Ahmed Sidiqui, a German from Hamburg. Sidiqui, a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, was captured in the Afghan north in July and has since provided information on the terror plot. Sidiqui also said that the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network, which is based in North Waziristan and operates in eastern and northern Afghanistan, was involved in the European terror plot.
Sidiqui had attended the Taiba mosque in Hamburg, which was home to several of the 9/11 plotters under its previous name -- Al Quds. German authorities closed the Taiba mosque on Aug. 12.
Coalition Special Operations Forces dramatically stepped up operations against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan immediately after Sidiqui's capture in July. Multiple IMU commanders have been killed or captured in the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar since July. Many of these commanders had integrated their operations with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, and some held senior positions in the Taliban’s shadow government.
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The White Man's al Qaeda???
So German Caucasians are the latest members of al Qaeda's quest for global jihad. After uncovering the link between 9/11 and Hamburg, Germany, I guess I'm not too surprised.
From the Telegraph (September 25, 2010):
The village, in Taliban-controlled Waziristan, is run by the notorious al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which plots raids on Nato forces in Afghanistan.
A recruitment video presents life in the village as a desirable lifestyle choice with schools, hospitals, pharmacies and day care centres, all at a safe distance from the front.
In the video, the presenter, "Abu Adam", the public face of the group in Germany, points his finger and asks: "Doesn't it appeal to you? We warmly invite you to join us!"
According to German foreign ministry officials a growing number of German families, many of North African descent, have taken up the offer and travelled to Waziristan where supporters say converts make up some of the insurgents' most dedicated fighters.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has a foothold in several German cities, has capitalised on growing concern over the rising profile of German forces in Afghanistan. Their role has become increasingly controversial in Germany in recent weeks after dozens of civilians were killed in an air strike ordered by German officers.
Last night a foreign ministry spokesman told The Daily Telegraph they were now negotiating with Pakistani authorities for the release of six Germans, including "Adrian M", a white Muslim convert, his Eritrean wife and their four year old daughter, who were arrested as they were making their way to the "German village". They are particularly concerned about the welfare of the child.
They are being held in custody in Peshawar after their arrest in May shortly when they crossed the border from Iran. They are understood to have left Germany in March this year.
The spokesman said negotiations were "under way" with Pakistani authorities "concerning a group of German citizens" and that it had been aware that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan had been recruiting in Germany "since the beginning of the year".
Their recruitment drive has been led by "Abu Adam", a 24-year-old German believed to be of Turkish or North African descent who was raised with fellow Jihadi, Abu Ibrahim, in the smart Bonn suburb of Kessenich.
Adam, whose real name is Mounir Chouka, received weapons training from the German army as part of his national service, and later spent three years training at the Federal Office of Statistics where colleagues described him as a "nice boy".
He left in 2007, telling colleagues he was joining a trading firm in Saudi Arabia, but is believed to have joined a terrorist training camp in Yemen.
In another recruitment video released earlier this year he urged supporters to: "Die the death of honour."
Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistan intelligence officer, who describes himself as a friend of Osama bin Laden, said he was aware of a German contingent and that there were a number of Swedish converts too who had arrived in Pakistan "for Jihad".
"The Europeans are there [in Waziristan]. The most dedicated people there are from Europe. They will do anything for Islam. They are not there because their fathers are Muslim, but by choice," he said.
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From the Telegraph (September 25, 2010):
The village, in Taliban-controlled Waziristan, is run by the notorious al-Qaeda-affiliated Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which plots raids on Nato forces in Afghanistan.
A recruitment video presents life in the village as a desirable lifestyle choice with schools, hospitals, pharmacies and day care centres, all at a safe distance from the front.
In the video, the presenter, "Abu Adam", the public face of the group in Germany, points his finger and asks: "Doesn't it appeal to you? We warmly invite you to join us!"
According to German foreign ministry officials a growing number of German families, many of North African descent, have taken up the offer and travelled to Waziristan where supporters say converts make up some of the insurgents' most dedicated fighters.
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which has a foothold in several German cities, has capitalised on growing concern over the rising profile of German forces in Afghanistan. Their role has become increasingly controversial in Germany in recent weeks after dozens of civilians were killed in an air strike ordered by German officers.
Last night a foreign ministry spokesman told The Daily Telegraph they were now negotiating with Pakistani authorities for the release of six Germans, including "Adrian M", a white Muslim convert, his Eritrean wife and their four year old daughter, who were arrested as they were making their way to the "German village". They are particularly concerned about the welfare of the child.
They are being held in custody in Peshawar after their arrest in May shortly when they crossed the border from Iran. They are understood to have left Germany in March this year.
The spokesman said negotiations were "under way" with Pakistani authorities "concerning a group of German citizens" and that it had been aware that the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan had been recruiting in Germany "since the beginning of the year".
Their recruitment drive has been led by "Abu Adam", a 24-year-old German believed to be of Turkish or North African descent who was raised with fellow Jihadi, Abu Ibrahim, in the smart Bonn suburb of Kessenich.
Adam, whose real name is Mounir Chouka, received weapons training from the German army as part of his national service, and later spent three years training at the Federal Office of Statistics where colleagues described him as a "nice boy".
He left in 2007, telling colleagues he was joining a trading firm in Saudi Arabia, but is believed to have joined a terrorist training camp in Yemen.
In another recruitment video released earlier this year he urged supporters to: "Die the death of honour."
Khalid Khawaja, a former Pakistan intelligence officer, who describes himself as a friend of Osama bin Laden, said he was aware of a German contingent and that there were a number of Swedish converts too who had arrived in Pakistan "for Jihad".
"The Europeans are there [in Waziristan]. The most dedicated people there are from Europe. They will do anything for Islam. They are not there because their fathers are Muslim, but by choice," he said.
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Surge in Drone Attacks Linked to Europe Plot
With the HUGE surge in drone strikes in North Waziristan in September, something had to be going on. It looks like the uptick in strikes was a reaction to intelligence learning of the plot to attack Europe and to disrupt it.
From the Longwar Journal (September 29, 2010):
Within the past 24 hours, the existence of an ongoing multi-pronged international terror plot in Europe modeled after the 2008 Mumbai attacks has been exposed. The plan is said to involve simultaneous attacks, consisting of commando-style raids and hostage-taking, on major targets in England, France, and Germany.
The US Predator campaign in Pakistan has been ramped up to counter this threat, and several terrorist leaders associated with the plot are thought to have been killed in these strikes over the past month. Also, US special operations forces have targeted al Qaeda-linked terror groups in northern Afghanistan who have been linked to the plot.
The revelation of this latest terror plot shakes an already edgy Europe, which has recently seen the Eiffel Tower evacuated twice in the past two weeks due to anonymous bomb threats, the arrest in Norway of several operatives planning another attack on the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, and specific threats to the French public transportation systems. At present, the terror alert level in France is high, as it is in England.
Western security officials may have made several arrests in an attempt to disrupt the plot, which apparently was not yet in the ‘imminent’ stage. These arrests follow a series of terror-related incidents in recent weeks linking individuals in Europe with al Qaeda and some of its affiliates.
The attack planning has been under the scrutiny of Western intelligence agencies for some time, and the recent flurry of drone strikes managed to interrupt the planning for the attack, according to the BBC. The dramatic increase in strikes has resulted from briefings with the Obama administration about the terror plot. In addition, the BBC observes, Western intelligence agencies have been somewhat dismayed by the leaks, as they have compromised an ongoing investigation.
According to Sky News, the plan had been hatched by Pakistan-based militants and was “in an ‘advanced but not imminent stage’” and its planners “had been tracked by spy agencies ‘for some time’.” The report in The Telegraph states that the plan “was foiled after Western intelligence agencies, including MI6 and GCHQ, uncovered the plans by senior al Qaeda operatives in the lawless tribal areas.”
The Telegraph goes on to note that a German resident who was detained by the US military in Afghanistan in July has revealed considerable information related to attacks being planned on German and other European targets. He was “identified in Germany as ‘Ahmad S’, aged 36, [and] was said to be a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is closely associated with al-Qaeda.” The New York Times notes that he has been identified in German media reports as Ahmed Sidiqui, of Hamburg. According to the Times, Sidiqi told US interrogators that some of the terrorist operatives may already be in Europe, and that the Haqqani Network in Pakistan is involved in the plot or plots.
Dramatic increase in drone strikes in September may be linked to European terror plans
Coalition Special Operations Forces have dramatically stepped up operations against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan immediately after Sidiqui's capture in July. Multiple IMU commanders have been killed or captured in the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar since July. Many of these commanders had integrated their operations with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, and some held senior positions in the Taliban’s shadow government.
In conjunction with the operations against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the Afghan north, the US ramped up its Predator campaign in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The unprecedented rain of Predator strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas this month has killed more than 100 militants, from several terror affiliates, including al Qaeda, the Islamic Jihad Group, and the Haqqani Network. Three top al Qaeda and Islamic Jihad Group commanders who may be linked to the plot have been reported killed in the past month.
The most significant al Qaeda leader reported to have been killed is Sheik Abu el Fatah al Masri, al Qaeda’s chief of operations for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Fateh is thought to have been killed in a drone strike on Sept. 25 in North Waziristan. Since the news of the European terror plot surfaced, reports have suggested that Fateh’s death has severely disrupted the plot. Other reports also suggest, however, that the plot itself, though unraveling, may not yet be completely interrupted.
Another significant terror leader linked to the plot who is thought to have been killed is Qureshi, an Uzbek commander from the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Jihad Group, a US intelligence official told The Long War Journal. Qureshi was targeted in a drone strike in North Waziristan on Sept. 8. According to AKI, Qureshi "used to receive foreigners especially the Germans in North Waziristan and then train them and resend them to their country of origins." The Islamic Jihad Group is a splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and has numerous German and Turkish members.
Also thought killed in the strike that killed Qureshi are two Britons and eight Germans, The Telegraph reported. One of the Britons, who was originally from Pakistan, was identified as Abdul Jabbar of the district of Jhelum in Punjab province.
Also, unconfirmed reports indicate that Bekkay Harrach, a German national who is based along the Afghan-Pakistani border, may have been killed in the Aug. 23 Predator strike in Danda Darpa Khel, the hub for the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. Harrach is a German national who is a senior member of al Qaeda's external operations branch.
Uncertainties remain as to scope of plot and terror groups' involvement
The latest reports on the plot appear to downplay its significance as an imminent threat, and to stress the uncertainties at the moment. The Associated Press reports that "U.S. intelligence had heard of the European plot about a month ago and was monitoring the people involved" and states that the US had increased the number of drone strikes in Pakistan in an effort to disrupt the plot. Reflecting the present lack of any clear answers on the issue, however, the AP report goes on to quote an anonymous British official who cautioned that although the drone strikes were believed to have interrupted the planning for the European attacks, "the operation was still considered active."
Looking at the scope of the interrupted plot to attack several European countries simultaneously, it is apparent that for a plan of this size to succeed, operatives with diverse backgrounds would be most useful, in order for them to blend in effectively with the local populations. Al Qaeda planners might draw from the group’s various affiliates for this sort of extensive operation: they would likely use Pakistanis for the planned attacks in London, North Africans from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb for the attacks in France, and Germans from the IMU and IJG for the German attacks, for example.
Arrests have been recently made in Europe that may have some connection with this still-unraveling plot.
Yesterday, a US citizen of Algerian origins was arrested in Spain; he is reported to have links with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The arrest was made for his allegedly sending large amounts of money to al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, al Qaeda’s affiliate in North Africa. AQIM has an extensive network in France and southern Europe.
In July, three men were arrested in Norway for plotting terror attacks in Europe, and more recently, the Norwegian authorities have revealed that one of the three Norwegian suspects, an Iraqi Kurd named Shawan Sadek Saeed Bujak Bujak, has confessed to plotting to attack the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which had published cartoons of the prophet Mohammed several years ago. The other two suspects are an Uzbek national named David Jakobsen, and a Norwegian citizen of Uighur origins named Mikael Davud, who arrived in Norway in 1999 and apparently was the main planner for the attack. MSNBC notes that Davud had gone to Waziristan at approximately the same time as New York subway plotter Najibullah Zazi, though, according to US officials, they did not meet or train together there.
In Germany, officials remain concerned about possible future terror attacks, in light of information provided by a Sidiqui, the German national of Afghan descent who was arrested by US forces in Afghanistan in July and has been held in Baghram since that time. According to the head of the German federal police, there is “concrete evidence that 70 Islamists from Germany had undergone paramilitary training in terror camps.“ The German police estimate that over 400 Islamists are currently in Germany, of which perhaps 131 could be potential "offenders.”
As the investigation in this unraveling terror plot continues, it has become apparent that much of the planning seems to have been on the radar of the various Western intelligence agencies for weeks and even months. The recent leaks may have forced Western intelligence services and law enforcement agencies to act more quickly than they might otherwise have done to arrest planners and operatives, thus potentially leaving other suspects at large, and other terror plans possibly intact.
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From the Longwar Journal (September 29, 2010):
Within the past 24 hours, the existence of an ongoing multi-pronged international terror plot in Europe modeled after the 2008 Mumbai attacks has been exposed. The plan is said to involve simultaneous attacks, consisting of commando-style raids and hostage-taking, on major targets in England, France, and Germany.
The US Predator campaign in Pakistan has been ramped up to counter this threat, and several terrorist leaders associated with the plot are thought to have been killed in these strikes over the past month. Also, US special operations forces have targeted al Qaeda-linked terror groups in northern Afghanistan who have been linked to the plot.
The revelation of this latest terror plot shakes an already edgy Europe, which has recently seen the Eiffel Tower evacuated twice in the past two weeks due to anonymous bomb threats, the arrest in Norway of several operatives planning another attack on the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, and specific threats to the French public transportation systems. At present, the terror alert level in France is high, as it is in England.
Western security officials may have made several arrests in an attempt to disrupt the plot, which apparently was not yet in the ‘imminent’ stage. These arrests follow a series of terror-related incidents in recent weeks linking individuals in Europe with al Qaeda and some of its affiliates.
The attack planning has been under the scrutiny of Western intelligence agencies for some time, and the recent flurry of drone strikes managed to interrupt the planning for the attack, according to the BBC. The dramatic increase in strikes has resulted from briefings with the Obama administration about the terror plot. In addition, the BBC observes, Western intelligence agencies have been somewhat dismayed by the leaks, as they have compromised an ongoing investigation.
According to Sky News, the plan had been hatched by Pakistan-based militants and was “in an ‘advanced but not imminent stage’” and its planners “had been tracked by spy agencies ‘for some time’.” The report in The Telegraph states that the plan “was foiled after Western intelligence agencies, including MI6 and GCHQ, uncovered the plans by senior al Qaeda operatives in the lawless tribal areas.”
The Telegraph goes on to note that a German resident who was detained by the US military in Afghanistan in July has revealed considerable information related to attacks being planned on German and other European targets. He was “identified in Germany as ‘Ahmad S’, aged 36, [and] was said to be a member of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, which is closely associated with al-Qaeda.” The New York Times notes that he has been identified in German media reports as Ahmed Sidiqui, of Hamburg. According to the Times, Sidiqi told US interrogators that some of the terrorist operatives may already be in Europe, and that the Haqqani Network in Pakistan is involved in the plot or plots.
Dramatic increase in drone strikes in September may be linked to European terror plans
Coalition Special Operations Forces have dramatically stepped up operations against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan immediately after Sidiqui's capture in July. Multiple IMU commanders have been killed or captured in the northern Afghan provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, and Takhar since July. Many of these commanders had integrated their operations with the Taliban in northern Afghanistan, and some held senior positions in the Taliban’s shadow government.
In conjunction with the operations against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan in the Afghan north, the US ramped up its Predator campaign in Pakistan’s tribal areas. The unprecedented rain of Predator strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas this month has killed more than 100 militants, from several terror affiliates, including al Qaeda, the Islamic Jihad Group, and the Haqqani Network. Three top al Qaeda and Islamic Jihad Group commanders who may be linked to the plot have been reported killed in the past month.
The most significant al Qaeda leader reported to have been killed is Sheik Abu el Fatah al Masri, al Qaeda’s chief of operations for Afghanistan and Pakistan. Fateh is thought to have been killed in a drone strike on Sept. 25 in North Waziristan. Since the news of the European terror plot surfaced, reports have suggested that Fateh’s death has severely disrupted the plot. Other reports also suggest, however, that the plot itself, though unraveling, may not yet be completely interrupted.
Another significant terror leader linked to the plot who is thought to have been killed is Qureshi, an Uzbek commander from the al Qaeda-linked Islamic Jihad Group, a US intelligence official told The Long War Journal. Qureshi was targeted in a drone strike in North Waziristan on Sept. 8. According to AKI, Qureshi "used to receive foreigners especially the Germans in North Waziristan and then train them and resend them to their country of origins." The Islamic Jihad Group is a splinter group of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and has numerous German and Turkish members.
Also thought killed in the strike that killed Qureshi are two Britons and eight Germans, The Telegraph reported. One of the Britons, who was originally from Pakistan, was identified as Abdul Jabbar of the district of Jhelum in Punjab province.
Also, unconfirmed reports indicate that Bekkay Harrach, a German national who is based along the Afghan-Pakistani border, may have been killed in the Aug. 23 Predator strike in Danda Darpa Khel, the hub for the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network in North Waziristan. Harrach is a German national who is a senior member of al Qaeda's external operations branch.
Uncertainties remain as to scope of plot and terror groups' involvement
The latest reports on the plot appear to downplay its significance as an imminent threat, and to stress the uncertainties at the moment. The Associated Press reports that "U.S. intelligence had heard of the European plot about a month ago and was monitoring the people involved" and states that the US had increased the number of drone strikes in Pakistan in an effort to disrupt the plot. Reflecting the present lack of any clear answers on the issue, however, the AP report goes on to quote an anonymous British official who cautioned that although the drone strikes were believed to have interrupted the planning for the European attacks, "the operation was still considered active."
Looking at the scope of the interrupted plot to attack several European countries simultaneously, it is apparent that for a plan of this size to succeed, operatives with diverse backgrounds would be most useful, in order for them to blend in effectively with the local populations. Al Qaeda planners might draw from the group’s various affiliates for this sort of extensive operation: they would likely use Pakistanis for the planned attacks in London, North Africans from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb for the attacks in France, and Germans from the IMU and IJG for the German attacks, for example.
Arrests have been recently made in Europe that may have some connection with this still-unraveling plot.
Yesterday, a US citizen of Algerian origins was arrested in Spain; he is reported to have links with al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. The arrest was made for his allegedly sending large amounts of money to al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, al Qaeda’s affiliate in North Africa. AQIM has an extensive network in France and southern Europe.
In July, three men were arrested in Norway for plotting terror attacks in Europe, and more recently, the Norwegian authorities have revealed that one of the three Norwegian suspects, an Iraqi Kurd named Shawan Sadek Saeed Bujak Bujak, has confessed to plotting to attack the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which had published cartoons of the prophet Mohammed several years ago. The other two suspects are an Uzbek national named David Jakobsen, and a Norwegian citizen of Uighur origins named Mikael Davud, who arrived in Norway in 1999 and apparently was the main planner for the attack. MSNBC notes that Davud had gone to Waziristan at approximately the same time as New York subway plotter Najibullah Zazi, though, according to US officials, they did not meet or train together there.
In Germany, officials remain concerned about possible future terror attacks, in light of information provided by a Sidiqui, the German national of Afghan descent who was arrested by US forces in Afghanistan in July and has been held in Baghram since that time. According to the head of the German federal police, there is “concrete evidence that 70 Islamists from Germany had undergone paramilitary training in terror camps.“ The German police estimate that over 400 Islamists are currently in Germany, of which perhaps 131 could be potential "offenders.”
As the investigation in this unraveling terror plot continues, it has become apparent that much of the planning seems to have been on the radar of the various Western intelligence agencies for weeks and even months. The recent leaks may have forced Western intelligence services and law enforcement agencies to act more quickly than they might otherwise have done to arrest planners and operatives, thus potentially leaving other suspects at large, and other terror plans possibly intact.
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Cross Border Strikes Kill More Than 100
Recently, ISAF Apache helicopters took it to militants belonging to the Haqqani Network. Killing more than 100. Across the border. Several times. In Pakistan.
Although this sounds like a case of “hot pursuit”, this is a BIG deal. Manned incursions into Pakistan are rare (although reliable sources indicate that Special Operation troops routinely operate in Pakistan). Predictably, the Paks were rather upset, publicly and politically.
From the Longwar Journal (September 27, 2010):
The International Security Assistance Force confirmed that its helicopters clashed with the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network near the Pakistani border, but would not confirm the aircraft crossed into Pakistan to conduct attacks.
Ten Haqqani Network fighters fighters were killed during a clash this morning along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a US military official told The Long War Journal, but current reports indicate the helicopters did cross into Pakistan to engage Taliban fighters. The military official said that ISAF is still gathering information on the clash.
The fighting took place near Combat Outpost Narizah, an Afghan base just eight miles from the Pakistani border in Khost province, the official said. Khost is a stronghold of the Haqqani Network, an Afghan Taliban subgroup based in North Waziristan, Pakistan.
The statement played down reports from earlier today that indicated US helicopters killed five insurgents as they fled into Pakistan's tribal agency of Kurram, which borders Khost.
In another report, a Pakistani security official claimed that US helicopters crossed the border and struck a local checkpoint manned by members of "noble tribal families."
Combat Outpost Narizah was the scene of two major clashes over the weekend that resulted in US helicopters pursuing Haqqani Network fighters into Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan. Initial reports indicated that more than 30 Haqqani Network fighters were killed in the two cross-border engagements, but later reports state than between 50 to 60 may have been killed.
ISAF has maintained that it legitimately attacked Taliban forces as part of an existing policy of hot pursuit of fighters.
US forces pursued the Taliban into Pakistan "after following the proper rules of engagement under inherent right of self defense," Master Sergeant Matthew Summers, an ISAF spokesman, told The Long War Journal on Sept. 26.
But a spokesman at Pakistan's Foreign Office rejected reports that such an agreement between ISAF and Pakistan exists, and said the incursions are a violation ISAF's mandate.
“These incidents are a clear violation and breach of the UN mandate under which ISAF operates,” spokesman Abdul Basit said in a statement released by the Foreign Office, according to AFP.
“There are no agreed 'hot pursuit' rules," Basit continued. "Any impression to the contrary is not factually correct. Such violations are unacceptable. In the absence of immediate corrective measures, Pakistan will be constrained to consider response options."
Background on agreement on cross-border activities between ISAF and Pakistan
Although the Pakistani Foreign Office denied the existence of any agreement that permits ISAF forces to enter Pakistan while in hot pursuit of Taliban fighters, the details of such an agreement have been known for years. In August 2007, The Associated Press released the text of the agreement.
The agreement between ISAF and Pakistan stipulated the following: US forces must be engaged with the Taliban or al Qaeda as they cross into Pakistan and US forces should not penetrate more than six miles into Pakistani territory. Also, US forces may enter Pakistan if they have identified the location of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahri, or Mullah Omar.
The US has pursued Taliban fighters across the border multiple times. Two of the most high-profile incidents occurred in 2008. The first took place in June 2008, when US troops pursued a Taliban force from Kunar into Pakistan's tribal agency of Mohmand, and killed 11 fighters. The Pakistani government claimed that the US killed Frontier Corps troops, but the US released video of the incident showing the Taliban being targeted as they fled from Kunar into Mohmand. Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps is known to support the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The second incident took place in Khyber in November 2008, when US forces launched rocket attacks and ground strikes into the Tirah Valley, a known haven for al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Lashkar-e-Islam. Seven people were reported killed and three were wounded in the strikes.
The US also launches covert airstrikes using unmanned Predators and Reapers against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas. The Pakistani government officially protests the covert strikes but quietly approves. Three such strikes have been launched inside Pakistan over the past three days; all have taken place in North Waziristan.
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Although this sounds like a case of “hot pursuit”, this is a BIG deal. Manned incursions into Pakistan are rare (although reliable sources indicate that Special Operation troops routinely operate in Pakistan). Predictably, the Paks were rather upset, publicly and politically.
From the Longwar Journal (September 27, 2010):
The International Security Assistance Force confirmed that its helicopters clashed with the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network near the Pakistani border, but would not confirm the aircraft crossed into Pakistan to conduct attacks.
Ten Haqqani Network fighters fighters were killed during a clash this morning along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a US military official told The Long War Journal, but current reports indicate the helicopters did cross into Pakistan to engage Taliban fighters. The military official said that ISAF is still gathering information on the clash.
The fighting took place near Combat Outpost Narizah, an Afghan base just eight miles from the Pakistani border in Khost province, the official said. Khost is a stronghold of the Haqqani Network, an Afghan Taliban subgroup based in North Waziristan, Pakistan.
The statement played down reports from earlier today that indicated US helicopters killed five insurgents as they fled into Pakistan's tribal agency of Kurram, which borders Khost.
In another report, a Pakistani security official claimed that US helicopters crossed the border and struck a local checkpoint manned by members of "noble tribal families."
Combat Outpost Narizah was the scene of two major clashes over the weekend that resulted in US helicopters pursuing Haqqani Network fighters into Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan. Initial reports indicated that more than 30 Haqqani Network fighters were killed in the two cross-border engagements, but later reports state than between 50 to 60 may have been killed.
ISAF has maintained that it legitimately attacked Taliban forces as part of an existing policy of hot pursuit of fighters.
US forces pursued the Taliban into Pakistan "after following the proper rules of engagement under inherent right of self defense," Master Sergeant Matthew Summers, an ISAF spokesman, told The Long War Journal on Sept. 26.
But a spokesman at Pakistan's Foreign Office rejected reports that such an agreement between ISAF and Pakistan exists, and said the incursions are a violation ISAF's mandate.
“These incidents are a clear violation and breach of the UN mandate under which ISAF operates,” spokesman Abdul Basit said in a statement released by the Foreign Office, according to AFP.
“There are no agreed 'hot pursuit' rules," Basit continued. "Any impression to the contrary is not factually correct. Such violations are unacceptable. In the absence of immediate corrective measures, Pakistan will be constrained to consider response options."
Background on agreement on cross-border activities between ISAF and Pakistan
Although the Pakistani Foreign Office denied the existence of any agreement that permits ISAF forces to enter Pakistan while in hot pursuit of Taliban fighters, the details of such an agreement have been known for years. In August 2007, The Associated Press released the text of the agreement.
The agreement between ISAF and Pakistan stipulated the following: US forces must be engaged with the Taliban or al Qaeda as they cross into Pakistan and US forces should not penetrate more than six miles into Pakistani territory. Also, US forces may enter Pakistan if they have identified the location of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahri, or Mullah Omar.
The US has pursued Taliban fighters across the border multiple times. Two of the most high-profile incidents occurred in 2008. The first took place in June 2008, when US troops pursued a Taliban force from Kunar into Pakistan's tribal agency of Mohmand, and killed 11 fighters. The Pakistani government claimed that the US killed Frontier Corps troops, but the US released video of the incident showing the Taliban being targeted as they fled from Kunar into Mohmand. Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps is known to support the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The second incident took place in Khyber in November 2008, when US forces launched rocket attacks and ground strikes into the Tirah Valley, a known haven for al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Lashkar-e-Islam. Seven people were reported killed and three were wounded in the strikes.
The US also launches covert airstrikes using unmanned Predators and Reapers against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas. The Pakistani government officially protests the covert strikes but quietly approves. Three such strikes have been launched inside Pakistan over the past three days; all have taken place in North Waziristan.
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Number 3 al Qaeda Killed in Drone Strike!!!
Having the number 3 position in al Qaeda is a dangerous job. And so is living near Datta Khel.
From the Longwar Journal (September 28, 2010):
Unconfirmed reports from Pakistan indicate the US has killed al Qaeda's newly appointed leader of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Sheikh Fateh al Masri, the leader of Qaedat al Jihad fi Khorasan, or the base of the jihad in the Khorasan, was killed in a recent Predator strike, Pakistani intelligence officials told AFP.
US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said they were aware of the reports and were investigating. One US official confirmed that Fateh was targeted in the spate of recent strikes but cautioned that given the total control that the Taliban and al Qaeda have in North Waziristan, it is difficult to be certain Fateh was killed.
Al Qaeda has not released a martyrdom statement announcing Fateh's death. Such statements are often released on jihadist Internet forums days or weeks after a leader is killed.
Fateh is thought to have been killed in the Sept. 25 strike in Datta Khel in North Waziristan, a known haven for al Qaeda's top leaders. In that attack, US Predators or Reapers fired three missiles at a vehicle, killing four "militants."
Datta Khel is administered by Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan. Despite the fact that Bahadar and the Haqqani Network shelter al Qaeda and other South and Central Asian terror groups, the Pakistani government and military refuse to take action in North Waziristan. Bahadar and the Haqqanis are viewed as "good Taliban" as they do not attack the Pakistani state.
Fatah replaced Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's former leader in Afghanistan, who was killed in the May 21 Predator airstrike in Datta Khel in North Waziristan. Yazid served as al Qaeda's chief financier and paymaster. Al Qaeda has not publicly named Yazid's replacement for its top financial official, nor is it likely to do so given the job's importance, intelligence officials said.
Fateh, like Yazid, is an Egyptian who is close to Ayman al Zawahiri. Egyptians hold a significant number of al Qaeda's top leadership positions.
The Khorasan is a region that encompasses large areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. The Khorasan is considered by jihadists to be the place where they will inflict the first defeat against their enemies in the Muslim version of Armageddon. The final battle is to take place in the Levant - Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.
Mentions of the Khorasan have begun to increase in al Qaeda's propaganda since 2007. After al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq, the group began shifting its rhetoric from promoting Iraq as the central front in their jihad and has placed the focus on the Khorasan.
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From the Longwar Journal (September 28, 2010):
Unconfirmed reports from Pakistan indicate the US has killed al Qaeda's newly appointed leader of Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Sheikh Fateh al Masri, the leader of Qaedat al Jihad fi Khorasan, or the base of the jihad in the Khorasan, was killed in a recent Predator strike, Pakistani intelligence officials told AFP.
US intelligence officials contacted by The Long War Journal said they were aware of the reports and were investigating. One US official confirmed that Fateh was targeted in the spate of recent strikes but cautioned that given the total control that the Taliban and al Qaeda have in North Waziristan, it is difficult to be certain Fateh was killed.
Al Qaeda has not released a martyrdom statement announcing Fateh's death. Such statements are often released on jihadist Internet forums days or weeks after a leader is killed.
Fateh is thought to have been killed in the Sept. 25 strike in Datta Khel in North Waziristan, a known haven for al Qaeda's top leaders. In that attack, US Predators or Reapers fired three missiles at a vehicle, killing four "militants."
Datta Khel is administered by Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan. Despite the fact that Bahadar and the Haqqani Network shelter al Qaeda and other South and Central Asian terror groups, the Pakistani government and military refuse to take action in North Waziristan. Bahadar and the Haqqanis are viewed as "good Taliban" as they do not attack the Pakistani state.
Fatah replaced Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's former leader in Afghanistan, who was killed in the May 21 Predator airstrike in Datta Khel in North Waziristan. Yazid served as al Qaeda's chief financier and paymaster. Al Qaeda has not publicly named Yazid's replacement for its top financial official, nor is it likely to do so given the job's importance, intelligence officials said.
Fateh, like Yazid, is an Egyptian who is close to Ayman al Zawahiri. Egyptians hold a significant number of al Qaeda's top leadership positions.
The Khorasan is a region that encompasses large areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Iran. The Khorasan is considered by jihadists to be the place where they will inflict the first defeat against their enemies in the Muslim version of Armageddon. The final battle is to take place in the Levant - Israel, Syria, and Lebanon.
Mentions of the Khorasan have begun to increase in al Qaeda's propaganda since 2007. After al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq, the group began shifting its rhetoric from promoting Iraq as the central front in their jihad and has placed the focus on the Khorasan.
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Drone Strike in South Waziristan Kills 4
A drone strike kills four militants belonging to Mullah Nazir.
From Dawn.com (September 28, 2010):
PESHAWAR: A US drone strike killed four militants Tuesday and destroyed a rebel compound in Pakistan's lawless tribal badlands along the Afghan border, local security officials said.
Pakistani officials say unmanned US aircraft have significantly stepped up attacks on Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked operatives in the semi-autonomous region this month, recording at least 21 attacks in September.
Tuesday's strike took place in Zeba village close to the Afghan border and west of Wana, the main town in South Waziristan.
“A US drone fired two missiles which hit a militant compound, killing four militants,” a Pakistani security official told AFP on condition of anonymity. Another security official confirmed the attack and the death toll.
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From Dawn.com (September 28, 2010):
PESHAWAR: A US drone strike killed four militants Tuesday and destroyed a rebel compound in Pakistan's lawless tribal badlands along the Afghan border, local security officials said.
Pakistani officials say unmanned US aircraft have significantly stepped up attacks on Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked operatives in the semi-autonomous region this month, recording at least 21 attacks in September.
Tuesday's strike took place in Zeba village close to the Afghan border and west of Wana, the main town in South Waziristan.
“A US drone fired two missiles which hit a militant compound, killing four militants,” a Pakistani security official told AFP on condition of anonymity. Another security official confirmed the attack and the death toll.
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3rd Drone Strike in Two Days Kills 4
From Dawn.com (September 27, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: A US drone strike killed four militants Monday and destroyed a rebel compound in Pakistan's lawless tribal badlands along the Afghan border, local security officials said.
Pakistani officials say unmanned US aircraft have significantly stepped up attacks on Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked operatives in the semi-autonomous region this month, clocking up at least 19 attacks in 24 days.
Monday's strike took place in Khushali Toorikhel village southeast of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan, the tribal district that has been the focus of the covert drone campaign as a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold.
“We can now confirm that four militants were killed when a US drone fired two missiles on a militant compound,” a senior Pakistani security official told AFP on condition of anonymity.
Another security official confirmed the attack and the death toll.
“We don't yet know the identities of those killed,” the official said.
Pakistani security officials also said US drones carried out missile strikes in North Waziristan on Saturday and Sunday, killing at least 11 militants.
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MIRAMSHAH: A US drone strike killed four militants Monday and destroyed a rebel compound in Pakistan's lawless tribal badlands along the Afghan border, local security officials said.
Pakistani officials say unmanned US aircraft have significantly stepped up attacks on Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked operatives in the semi-autonomous region this month, clocking up at least 19 attacks in 24 days.
Monday's strike took place in Khushali Toorikhel village southeast of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan, the tribal district that has been the focus of the covert drone campaign as a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold.
“We can now confirm that four militants were killed when a US drone fired two missiles on a militant compound,” a senior Pakistani security official told AFP on condition of anonymity.
Another security official confirmed the attack and the death toll.
“We don't yet know the identities of those killed,” the official said.
Pakistani security officials also said US drones carried out missile strikes in North Waziristan on Saturday and Sunday, killing at least 11 militants.
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Twin Drone Strikes in Datta Khel Kills 7
The Datta Khel area of North Waziristan, Pakistan is the territory of Hafiz Gul Bahadur (see my profile for more information).
From GEO Pakistan (September 25, 2010):
MIRANSHAH: A US missile strike targeting a vehicle killed four militants in Pakistan's rugged tribal region, near the Afghan border on Sunday, Geo News reported.
The attack took place in Asar village of Datta Khel town, some 50 kilometres (31 miles) west of Miranshah, the main district of North Waziristan tribal region, also known as a hub for Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.
and
MIRANSHAH: A second US missile strike targeting a vehicle killed three rebels Sunday in Pakistan's rugged mountainous tribal belt near the Afghan border, Geo News reported.
The attack took place in Asar village, also the site of an earlier drone strike Sunday, some 50 kilometres (31 miles) west of Miranshah, the main town in the North Waziristan tribal district.
The US drone fired four missiles, targeting a vehicle which was going to the site of the first attack for rescue work, killing three militants, sources said.
UPDATE:
The International Security Assistance Force confirmed that it killed a top al Qaeda leader who was targeted in an airstrike over the weekend. A senior al Qaeda IED facilitator and several al Qaeda operatives were also killed in the Sept. 25 airstrike.
Abdallah Umar al Qurayshi, a senior al Qaeda commander "who coordinated the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan provinces," was killed after being tracked to "a remote compound in the Korengal Valley" in the district of Pech, ISAF stated in a press release.
"The Al Qaeda facilitators and extremists he works with throughout the Middle East directly threaten the safety and security of Afghan government officials and civilians," ISAF continued. "He routinely facilitates the travel of foreign fighters into the region."
Also killed in the "precision air strike" were an al Qaeda "explosives expert" named Abu Atta al Kuwaiti "and several Arabic foreign fighters." The deaths of Qurayshi, al Kuwati, and other al Qaeda and Taliban leaders occurred while they were in a meeting.
"ISAF is working to confirm the exact identities of other high-level insurgent commanders, who were meeting when the strike was conducted," the press release stated.
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From GEO Pakistan (September 25, 2010):
MIRANSHAH: A US missile strike targeting a vehicle killed four militants in Pakistan's rugged tribal region, near the Afghan border on Sunday, Geo News reported.
The attack took place in Asar village of Datta Khel town, some 50 kilometres (31 miles) west of Miranshah, the main district of North Waziristan tribal region, also known as a hub for Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.
and
MIRANSHAH: A second US missile strike targeting a vehicle killed three rebels Sunday in Pakistan's rugged mountainous tribal belt near the Afghan border, Geo News reported.
The attack took place in Asar village, also the site of an earlier drone strike Sunday, some 50 kilometres (31 miles) west of Miranshah, the main town in the North Waziristan tribal district.
The US drone fired four missiles, targeting a vehicle which was going to the site of the first attack for rescue work, killing three militants, sources said.
UPDATE:
The International Security Assistance Force confirmed that it killed a top al Qaeda leader who was targeted in an airstrike over the weekend. A senior al Qaeda IED facilitator and several al Qaeda operatives were also killed in the Sept. 25 airstrike.
Abdallah Umar al Qurayshi, a senior al Qaeda commander "who coordinated the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan provinces," was killed after being tracked to "a remote compound in the Korengal Valley" in the district of Pech, ISAF stated in a press release.
"The Al Qaeda facilitators and extremists he works with throughout the Middle East directly threaten the safety and security of Afghan government officials and civilians," ISAF continued. "He routinely facilitates the travel of foreign fighters into the region."
Also killed in the "precision air strike" were an al Qaeda "explosives expert" named Abu Atta al Kuwaiti "and several Arabic foreign fighters." The deaths of Qurayshi, al Kuwati, and other al Qaeda and Taliban leaders occurred while they were in a meeting.
"ISAF is working to confirm the exact identities of other high-level insurgent commanders, who were meeting when the strike was conducted," the press release stated.
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al Qaeda in Afghanistan? I'm Shocked!
Punching another hole in the Obama administration's assertion that there are only a "handful" of al Qaeda in Afghanistan...
From ISAF (September 25, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kunar province last night targeting an Al Qaida senior commander who coordinates the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan province. The Al Qaida facilitators and extremists he works with throughout the Middle East directly threaten the safety and security of Afghan government officials and civilians. He routinely facilitates the travel of foreign fighters into the region.
The commander's older brother was killed in a coalition force precision strike in March 2009. The brothers worked in tandem for several years facilitating for the Al Qaida network.
"These operations prevent violent extremists from being able to threaten Afghan sovereignty or maintain safe havens from which they can threaten the security of people around the world," said U.S. Air Force Col. James Dawkins, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "We deliberately targeted a major threat last night, which will significantly degrade the Al Qaeda activities throughout the region."
Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked the commander to a remote compound in Darah-ye Pech District. After verifying his location and careful planning to help reduce the collateral damage, coalition forces conducted a precision air strike on the targeted compound, which was subsequently destroyed. The International Security Assistance Force is still gathering information to assess the results of the strike.
"Just like we do with all of our precision air strikes, we balanced the possible risks posed by precision air strikes with the dangers posed by the targeted individual. In this instance we decided we could not let this opportunity pass us by," said Dawkins. "Careful planning, de-confliction with Afghan authorities and intelligence gathering helped ensure collateral damage was kept to a minimum."
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From ISAF (September 25, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kunar province last night targeting an Al Qaida senior commander who coordinates the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan province. The Al Qaida facilitators and extremists he works with throughout the Middle East directly threaten the safety and security of Afghan government officials and civilians. He routinely facilitates the travel of foreign fighters into the region.
The commander's older brother was killed in a coalition force precision strike in March 2009. The brothers worked in tandem for several years facilitating for the Al Qaida network.
"These operations prevent violent extremists from being able to threaten Afghan sovereignty or maintain safe havens from which they can threaten the security of people around the world," said U.S. Air Force Col. James Dawkins, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "We deliberately targeted a major threat last night, which will significantly degrade the Al Qaeda activities throughout the region."
Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked the commander to a remote compound in Darah-ye Pech District. After verifying his location and careful planning to help reduce the collateral damage, coalition forces conducted a precision air strike on the targeted compound, which was subsequently destroyed. The International Security Assistance Force is still gathering information to assess the results of the strike.
"Just like we do with all of our precision air strikes, we balanced the possible risks posed by precision air strikes with the dangers posed by the targeted individual. In this instance we decided we could not let this opportunity pass us by," said Dawkins. "Careful planning, de-confliction with Afghan authorities and intelligence gathering helped ensure collateral damage was kept to a minimum."
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More Proof of al Qaeda in Afghanistan
The Taliban is now using Ford Pintos as suicide vehicles.
The Haqqani Network is not known to use suicide bombers. Not until recently, when ties between the Network and al Qaeda have been strengthened. Suicide bombing is a distinctly Arab phenomenon, not Taliban. To see the more aggressive use of suicide bombing indicates close cooperation between the militants and the global jihadists.
From ISAF (September 24, 2010):
PAKTYA PROVINCE, Afghanistan – At least five insurgents were killed and one captured during a failed attack on Forward Operating Base Gardez in Patkya Province Sept. 24.
The attack began when a vehicle, followed closely by four suicide-vest-wearing insurgents, attempted to breach a fortified area of the base.
Coalition forces engaged the vehicle, destroying it and disrupting the attack. The remaining attackers were killed as they attempted to flee the scene.
In the aftermath of the incident, explosive ordnance disposal Soldiers found and disposed of the suicide vests.
Two Afghan Security Guards were wounded during the attack and an Afghan civilian employed at the base was killed. No coalition forces were killed or injured.
The operation is still ongoing with coalition forces pursuing the remainder of the attacking force, estimated to be around 20.
From the Longwar Journal (September 25, 2010):
Since the end of August, the Haqqani Network has carried out five major attacks against heavily defended US outposts in eastern Afghanistan.
On Aug. 28, Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. During raids in the aftermath of the attacks, US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters.
On Sept. 2, the Haqqani Network attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers; 20 were reported killed.
And in the last attack, on Sept. 21, US troops killed 27 Haqqani Network fighters as they mustered to assault Combat Outpost Spera.
The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have launched attacks at several major installations across the country this year. In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base; another small team conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July; three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
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Ground Combat in Laghman Kills 30
I’ve been a way for a couple of days and boy did I miss some important events in AfPak. First, a nice-sized direct action engagement in Laghman Province in Afghanistan.
From the Longwar Journal (September 25, 2010):
A combined Coalition and Afghan force killed more than 30 Taliban fighters during an air assault in the eastern Afghan province of Laghman.
A 250-man force of Coalition and Afghan troops as well as Afghan police air assaulted into the Alishang district in Laghman to conduct "security and clearing patrols" when they took fire from Taliban forces in the area, the International Secuirty Assistance Force stated in a press release.
ISAF claimed that more than 30 "enemy fighters" were killed during the clashes, and that there were no reports of civilian casualties.
Muhammad Iqbal Azizi, the Governor of Laghman, told Pajwok Afghan News that 31 Taliban were killed; he also denied reports that civilians were killed.
Local Afghans in Alishang claimed that some civilians were among those killed, and one even claimed that all of those killed were civilians. More than 200 people protested the operations, according to Pajwok.
Laghman was the scene of the Aug. 4 clash between Afghan forces and the Taliban and allied terror groups. A battalion of Afghan troops air assaulted into the Badpakh area and were stopped cold by a coordinated ambush. Thirteen Afghan troops and two policemen were killed and more than 10 were captured. At one point in the battle, the Afghan Army Corps headquarters lost communications with the battalion.
During the fighting in August, the Taliban were supported by the Lashkar al Zil, or the Shadow Army, al Qaeda's paramilitary force. One Arab and one Chechen were reported killed in the fighting in Laghman.
The Lashkar al Zil has been involved in some of the more high-profile, complex assaults in Afghanistan over the past several years, including an assault on a US outpost in Wanat in Nuristan in July 2008, the deadly ambush of a French battalion in Kabul province in August 2008, assaults on two combat outposts in Kamdesh in Nuristan in October 2009, and most recently, a sustained assault in the district of Barg-e-Matal in Nuristan in July 2010.
The Taliban and al Qaeda have been stepping up efforts in eastern Afghanistan as ISAF and Afghan forces focus on tamping down the insurgency in Kandahar and Helmand in the south, General Mohammad Zaman Mamozai, the commander of the Afghan Border Police in the east said in August. The Afghan Taliban "are being supported by other terrorist networks including Al Qaeda, Tajikistani, Chechen, and Pakistani Taliban," as well as Taliban fighters from Waziristan, Mamozai told Larawbar and BBC Urdu. According to Mamozai, the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters stage across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. The top commanders are Arab, Pakistan, Chechen, or Tajiks, Mamozai said.
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From the Longwar Journal (September 25, 2010):
A combined Coalition and Afghan force killed more than 30 Taliban fighters during an air assault in the eastern Afghan province of Laghman.
A 250-man force of Coalition and Afghan troops as well as Afghan police air assaulted into the Alishang district in Laghman to conduct "security and clearing patrols" when they took fire from Taliban forces in the area, the International Secuirty Assistance Force stated in a press release.
ISAF claimed that more than 30 "enemy fighters" were killed during the clashes, and that there were no reports of civilian casualties.
Muhammad Iqbal Azizi, the Governor of Laghman, told Pajwok Afghan News that 31 Taliban were killed; he also denied reports that civilians were killed.
Local Afghans in Alishang claimed that some civilians were among those killed, and one even claimed that all of those killed were civilians. More than 200 people protested the operations, according to Pajwok.
Laghman was the scene of the Aug. 4 clash between Afghan forces and the Taliban and allied terror groups. A battalion of Afghan troops air assaulted into the Badpakh area and were stopped cold by a coordinated ambush. Thirteen Afghan troops and two policemen were killed and more than 10 were captured. At one point in the battle, the Afghan Army Corps headquarters lost communications with the battalion.
During the fighting in August, the Taliban were supported by the Lashkar al Zil, or the Shadow Army, al Qaeda's paramilitary force. One Arab and one Chechen were reported killed in the fighting in Laghman.
The Lashkar al Zil has been involved in some of the more high-profile, complex assaults in Afghanistan over the past several years, including an assault on a US outpost in Wanat in Nuristan in July 2008, the deadly ambush of a French battalion in Kabul province in August 2008, assaults on two combat outposts in Kamdesh in Nuristan in October 2009, and most recently, a sustained assault in the district of Barg-e-Matal in Nuristan in July 2010.
The Taliban and al Qaeda have been stepping up efforts in eastern Afghanistan as ISAF and Afghan forces focus on tamping down the insurgency in Kandahar and Helmand in the south, General Mohammad Zaman Mamozai, the commander of the Afghan Border Police in the east said in August. The Afghan Taliban "are being supported by other terrorist networks including Al Qaeda, Tajikistani, Chechen, and Pakistani Taliban," as well as Taliban fighters from Waziristan, Mamozai told Larawbar and BBC Urdu. According to Mamozai, the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters stage across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. The top commanders are Arab, Pakistan, Chechen, or Tajiks, Mamozai said.
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Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Update on the Ground War
The long-promised ground offensive in Khandahar (not Kandahar) inauspiciously started earlier this week. Not much in the media about the largest military offensive since 2001.
Khandahar is significant for a couple of reasons. First, it is the "spiritual birthplace" of the Taliban. The Taliban (in Pashto, Talib means "student" and the -an suffix pluralizes it, so "students") is the brain child of Mullah Mohammed Omar. After the fall of the Najibullah regine in 1993, the entire country was in chaos. Omar (and others) decided to offer a program of law and order supposedly based on the Qur'an. It was an easy sell in the land of decades of war and corrupt warlords. Second, having such a legacy, Khandahar is the Taliban-esque ideological stronghold today--similar to the Ba'athist stronghold of Tikrit (Saddaam's birthplace). Third, along with Helmand Province, Khandahar Province, located in the southern portion of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan, is THE main thoroughfare for militants, weapons, and narcotics. The city of Khandahar is a south Asian cross-roads, with major roadways connecting it to Kabul, Herat, and Ghazni in Afghanistan and Quetta in Pakistan (which is the relocated home base of the Afghan Taliban). Thus, Khandahar is a very important societal, economic, political, and military target.
Tyler Hicks from the New York Times gives a brief account of this week's ground combat involving the 101st Airborne (affectionately known by the Army Rangers as the "Screaming Chickens"):
NOTE: I rib the Screaming Chickens, but 16 hard-charging grunts died this week. Infantry is infantry, no matter the unit or service branch, and my condolences go out to their loved ones. You did us proud, HUAH!
ARGHANDAB, Afghanistan — American and Afghan troops began active combat last week in an offensive to drive the Taliban out of their strongholds surrounding the city of Kandahar, military officials said Sunday.
In the last several days, soldiers shifted from guarding aid workers and sipping tea with village elders to actively hunting down Taliban fighters in marijuana fields and pomegranate orchards laced with booby traps.
Sixteen Americans have died in the push so far, including two killed by a roadside bomb on Sunday.
The combat phase began five or six days ago in the Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwai Districts, Brig. Gen. Josef Blotz, a NATO spokesman in Kabul, said, defining the current phase for the first time.
“We expect hard fighting,” he said of the offensive, whose objective is to clear the Taliban from three districts to the west and south of the city.
Winning over Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban, is considered crucial to President Obama’s efforts to shift the balance of power in Afghanistan after the militants’ comeback of recent years.
“This is the most significant military operation ongoing in Afghanistan,” General Blotz, who is with the International Security Assistance Force of NATO, said, calling it the “top operational priority now.”
This is the first large-scale combat operation involving multiple objectives in Kandahar Province, where a military offensive was originally expected to begin in June. That offensive was downgraded to more of a joint civil-military effort after the military encountered problems containing the Taliban in the much smaller city of Marja and because Afghan leaders feared high civilian casualties.
During the last week of August, at the instigation of Afghan authorities, American troops supported a major push into the Mehlajat area on the southwest edge of Kandahar City, driving the Taliban from that area with few casualties on either side.
At the time, military officials said that was the beginning of what would be an increase in active combat around Kandahar.
Bismillah Khan, the police chief in the Zhari District, confirmed that the combat operation there began on Saturday, but he declined to give further details. Some of the heaviest fighting has been in Zhari, where troops have been told to avoid contact with local people because of widespread hostility toward foreign forces there.
Zhari is the hometown of the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, and it also sits astride the strategic Highway 1, connecting Kandahar with Helmand Province to the west.
Often the soldiers there run what are known as “move to contact” patrols that have no goal but to draw fire from the Taliban so aircraft can find and kill them.
Last Tuesday, a United States Army platoon left Forward Operating Base Wilson early in the morning and within 10 minutes, Taliban insurgents had opened fire with small arms, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.
Although helicopter gunships were soon overhead to support the ground forces, the insurgents continued to fire on the patrol throughout the day as the troops made their way through vineyards and fields of marijuana plants 10 feet high.
None of the Americans were wounded or killed on that patrol.
Journalists from The New York Times, during a weeklong stay there, observed that every time soldiers left their bases, they were either shot at or hit with bombs, often hidden or booby-trapped.
Frequently, the Taliban did not — as they normally would — stop shooting once air support arrived.
Soldiers on a recent patrol, clearing up after one bomb explosion, discovered that a piece of debris lodged in a tree had itself been rigged with a tripwire, practically under their noses.
Here in Arghandab, the flow of troops has made it possible to begin trying to take control of an area where thick vegetation, irrigation canals and pomegranate orchards provide good cover for the Taliban, according to Lt. Col. Joseph Krebs, deputy commander for the Second Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, but the results have been mixed.
No sooner had the First Battalion of the 22nd Armored Regiment of the Army arrived here than five soldiers were killed on Aug. 30, by a roadside bomb directed at their convoy. The dead included the first Army chaplain to be killed in active duty during the Afghan conflict.
The chaplain, Capt. Dale A. Goetz, 43, had been on a tour of some of the 18 combat outposts the military has established in the Arghandab District.
Three days later, rockets fired from orchards just outside the district center hit the dining tent at the main American base, slightly wounding five soldiers.
While no official casualty totals have been released for the recent operations in the Kandahar districts, American military reports list 16 American fatalities in the Kandahar area since Aug. 30, at least 10 of which were in the Arghandab or Zhari Districts.
An effort to bring all of the heavily Pashtun south under coalition control began on Feb. 14 with an attempt to suppress the Taliban in and around Marja. Kandahar was to be the next target.
But the Taliban in Marja have still not been subdued, so officials decided to concentrate first on bringing economic development to some districts around Kandahar city, then on gradually stepping up military operations.
“I look at each one of my 13 combat platoons as a development team,” said Lt. Col. Rodger Lemons, commander of the First Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, stationed at the district headquarters here.
“I’m not going to tell you the population is fully in support, but they are much more in support of the government and the coalition than they are of the Taliban,” he said. Along with the military buildup has come a similar effort to increase the presence of State Department employees, along with aid contractors paid by the Americans, who would serve as stabilization teams in those areas.
Although some 300 American civilian staff members have arrived in Kandahar Province, at the district levels there are only a few, mainly because of security concerns.
In Arghandab, where the civilian effort is deemed to have been the most successful, the district team consists of two Americans in addition to contractors and local employees. “It’s hard to get people to come here,” said Kevin Melton, who is finishing up a yearlong tour running the State Department team in Arghandab.
When Mr. Melton arrived, the district government was not functioning. Now, there is an active shura or village council, with people coming to the district government’s building regularly, attracted by generous aid programs.
“Five dead and that’s the news that gets out,” Mr. Melton said, referring to the first fatalities in Arghandab. “Yeah, we know what’s going wrong, but look what’s going right. If we had done this eight years ago, would we have been here now?”
By comparison, other districts like Zhari and Panjwai are just getting started, he said.
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Khandahar is significant for a couple of reasons. First, it is the "spiritual birthplace" of the Taliban. The Taliban (in Pashto, Talib means "student" and the -an suffix pluralizes it, so "students") is the brain child of Mullah Mohammed Omar. After the fall of the Najibullah regine in 1993, the entire country was in chaos. Omar (and others) decided to offer a program of law and order supposedly based on the Qur'an. It was an easy sell in the land of decades of war and corrupt warlords. Second, having such a legacy, Khandahar is the Taliban-esque ideological stronghold today--similar to the Ba'athist stronghold of Tikrit (Saddaam's birthplace). Third, along with Helmand Province, Khandahar Province, located in the southern portion of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan, is THE main thoroughfare for militants, weapons, and narcotics. The city of Khandahar is a south Asian cross-roads, with major roadways connecting it to Kabul, Herat, and Ghazni in Afghanistan and Quetta in Pakistan (which is the relocated home base of the Afghan Taliban). Thus, Khandahar is a very important societal, economic, political, and military target.
Tyler Hicks from the New York Times gives a brief account of this week's ground combat involving the 101st Airborne (affectionately known by the Army Rangers as the "Screaming Chickens"):
NOTE: I rib the Screaming Chickens, but 16 hard-charging grunts died this week. Infantry is infantry, no matter the unit or service branch, and my condolences go out to their loved ones. You did us proud, HUAH!
ARGHANDAB, Afghanistan — American and Afghan troops began active combat last week in an offensive to drive the Taliban out of their strongholds surrounding the city of Kandahar, military officials said Sunday.
In the last several days, soldiers shifted from guarding aid workers and sipping tea with village elders to actively hunting down Taliban fighters in marijuana fields and pomegranate orchards laced with booby traps.
Sixteen Americans have died in the push so far, including two killed by a roadside bomb on Sunday.
The combat phase began five or six days ago in the Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwai Districts, Brig. Gen. Josef Blotz, a NATO spokesman in Kabul, said, defining the current phase for the first time.
“We expect hard fighting,” he said of the offensive, whose objective is to clear the Taliban from three districts to the west and south of the city.
Winning over Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban, is considered crucial to President Obama’s efforts to shift the balance of power in Afghanistan after the militants’ comeback of recent years.
“This is the most significant military operation ongoing in Afghanistan,” General Blotz, who is with the International Security Assistance Force of NATO, said, calling it the “top operational priority now.”
This is the first large-scale combat operation involving multiple objectives in Kandahar Province, where a military offensive was originally expected to begin in June. That offensive was downgraded to more of a joint civil-military effort after the military encountered problems containing the Taliban in the much smaller city of Marja and because Afghan leaders feared high civilian casualties.
During the last week of August, at the instigation of Afghan authorities, American troops supported a major push into the Mehlajat area on the southwest edge of Kandahar City, driving the Taliban from that area with few casualties on either side.
At the time, military officials said that was the beginning of what would be an increase in active combat around Kandahar.
Bismillah Khan, the police chief in the Zhari District, confirmed that the combat operation there began on Saturday, but he declined to give further details. Some of the heaviest fighting has been in Zhari, where troops have been told to avoid contact with local people because of widespread hostility toward foreign forces there.
Zhari is the hometown of the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, and it also sits astride the strategic Highway 1, connecting Kandahar with Helmand Province to the west.
Often the soldiers there run what are known as “move to contact” patrols that have no goal but to draw fire from the Taliban so aircraft can find and kill them.
Last Tuesday, a United States Army platoon left Forward Operating Base Wilson early in the morning and within 10 minutes, Taliban insurgents had opened fire with small arms, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.
Although helicopter gunships were soon overhead to support the ground forces, the insurgents continued to fire on the patrol throughout the day as the troops made their way through vineyards and fields of marijuana plants 10 feet high.
None of the Americans were wounded or killed on that patrol.
Journalists from The New York Times, during a weeklong stay there, observed that every time soldiers left their bases, they were either shot at or hit with bombs, often hidden or booby-trapped.
Frequently, the Taliban did not — as they normally would — stop shooting once air support arrived.
Soldiers on a recent patrol, clearing up after one bomb explosion, discovered that a piece of debris lodged in a tree had itself been rigged with a tripwire, practically under their noses.
Here in Arghandab, the flow of troops has made it possible to begin trying to take control of an area where thick vegetation, irrigation canals and pomegranate orchards provide good cover for the Taliban, according to Lt. Col. Joseph Krebs, deputy commander for the Second Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, but the results have been mixed.
No sooner had the First Battalion of the 22nd Armored Regiment of the Army arrived here than five soldiers were killed on Aug. 30, by a roadside bomb directed at their convoy. The dead included the first Army chaplain to be killed in active duty during the Afghan conflict.
The chaplain, Capt. Dale A. Goetz, 43, had been on a tour of some of the 18 combat outposts the military has established in the Arghandab District.
Three days later, rockets fired from orchards just outside the district center hit the dining tent at the main American base, slightly wounding five soldiers.
While no official casualty totals have been released for the recent operations in the Kandahar districts, American military reports list 16 American fatalities in the Kandahar area since Aug. 30, at least 10 of which were in the Arghandab or Zhari Districts.
An effort to bring all of the heavily Pashtun south under coalition control began on Feb. 14 with an attempt to suppress the Taliban in and around Marja. Kandahar was to be the next target.
But the Taliban in Marja have still not been subdued, so officials decided to concentrate first on bringing economic development to some districts around Kandahar city, then on gradually stepping up military operations.
“I look at each one of my 13 combat platoons as a development team,” said Lt. Col. Rodger Lemons, commander of the First Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, stationed at the district headquarters here.
“I’m not going to tell you the population is fully in support, but they are much more in support of the government and the coalition than they are of the Taliban,” he said. Along with the military buildup has come a similar effort to increase the presence of State Department employees, along with aid contractors paid by the Americans, who would serve as stabilization teams in those areas.
Although some 300 American civilian staff members have arrived in Kandahar Province, at the district levels there are only a few, mainly because of security concerns.
In Arghandab, where the civilian effort is deemed to have been the most successful, the district team consists of two Americans in addition to contractors and local employees. “It’s hard to get people to come here,” said Kevin Melton, who is finishing up a yearlong tour running the State Department team in Arghandab.
When Mr. Melton arrived, the district government was not functioning. Now, there is an active shura or village council, with people coming to the district government’s building regularly, attracted by generous aid programs.
“Five dead and that’s the news that gets out,” Mr. Melton said, referring to the first fatalities in Arghandab. “Yeah, we know what’s going wrong, but look what’s going right. If we had done this eight years ago, would we have been here now?”
By comparison, other districts like Zhari and Panjwai are just getting started, he said.
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Saturday, September 25, 2010
Taliban Strategy Comes Full Circle
A very interesting article published at the AfPak Channel by Imtiaz Gul on September 22, 2010. I have his book "The Most Dangerous Place" on my list of books to read.
Late last week, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, General David Petraeus, and American AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrook descended on Islamabad to jointly think a way out of the Afghan imbroglio.
Officials touted their meetings with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, ISI officials and civilian Pakistani leaders as routine brainstorming sessions. Yet Afghanistan's surge in violence and its extremely low turnout in the Afghan parliamentary election two days later on Saturday, betray the bitter truth: the region is in crisis. Afghans are fear-stricken, the American top brass is frustrated by its failure in showcasing any tangible success back home, Karzai is resentful of Washington's high-handed approach and Pakistan itself is struggling with the consequences of an over-bearing counter-insurgency campaign, complicated by recent devastating floods. Not only do the stakeholders feel they're getting nowhere -- they feel like they're moving deeper into chaos.
This frustration essentially stems from an approach that from the first day centered more on money and military muscle than on long-term strategies.
Indeed, only two days before the big heads gathered in Islamabad, the National Security Archive (NSA) in Washington released several previously secret U.S. government documents which shed considerable light on the strategic missteps of the current war.
Contents of some of the memos suggest that despite joining hands in the anti-terror war in Afghanistan, there was little love lost between Washington and Islamabad in the aftermath of 9/11 - and that their differences centered on the question of how to best counter the Taliban
"We will not flinch from a military victory... but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men, it will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now," former ISI chief Gen. Mahmud Ahmed had told U.S. ambassador to Islamabad Wendy Chamberlin on September 23, 2001, according to a 12-page document titled "Islamabad 5337."
General Mahmud expressed these reservations after Chamberlin had "bluntly" ruled out a dialogue with the Taliban. The United States responded by pressuring Pakistan to sideline Mahmud (President Musharraf forced him to retire not long thereafter.)
Nine years since the U.S. and its allies unleashed war, the approach to Taliban has now come full circle. Where United States officials were once snubbing Pakistani requests for patience and dialogue, they are now seeking to "flip" Taliban militants.
The consequences of this long delay for Pakistan have been nightmarish. Particularly since 2007, thousands of angry young Muslims, inspired by al Qaeda's pan-Islamist revolutionary and anti-American appeals and trained in the remote tribal regions, have swelled the ranks of Pakistan's domestic radical outfits such as the TTP and Lashkare Jhangvi. Hundreds have blown themselves up in suicide bombings across Pakistan, killing thousands of innocent women and children as well as security personnel -- all in the name of Jihad against the "infidels occupying Afghanistan."
In another memo by NSA, Ronald E. Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, had warned Washington in 2005 that "if the (al Qaeda ) sanctuary in Pakistan were not addressed it would lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our (Operation Enduring Freedom] intervention in 2001."
"The 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government," Neumann wrote.
The sanctuary Neumann alluded to in his dispatches to Washington was obviously the Waziri border lands where Osama bin Laden and his cohorts settled down after their defeat by the U.S.-led coalition. The memos clearly explain how a porous and mountainous region spread over 27,200 square kilometers turned into a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and its Afghan affiliates. Initially "the tribes in [FATA regions] were overawed by U.S. firepower" after 9/11, which provided the Pakistan army a window of opportunity to march in, but the areas quickly became "no-go areas" where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, the NSA papers quote Neumann as saying.
And, as the events suggest, FATA did turn into a haven for al Qaeda, where it found local and foreign allies and facilitators to launch attacks on the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Not only that; FATA also became the birthplace for the Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a vicious al-Qaeda auxiliary that rose in the mountains of the Waziristan region, where Faisal Shehzad, the man behind the May One botched Times Square bombing attempt , received his terrorist training.
For FATA and its residents, it has been both a painful as well as a frightening ordeal; the Operation Enduring Freedom and the hunt for al Qaeda plucked these ultra-conservative and practically lawless regions from obscurity and brought them into the international limelight. Not only because of bin Laden but also because the Waziristan region became the breeding ground for future terrorists, something many in Pakistan including Gen. Mahmud Ahmed and Masood Sharif Khattak, former head of the Intelligence Bureau had warned about in September 2001.
The latest round of general elections in Afghanistan, accompanied by widespread violence and intimidation, doesn't inspire much hope for the future. The dire straits require all stake-holders to take a broader view of the situation, one embedded in ground truths, rather than driven by selfish concerns and considerations.
While I don't doubt the sincerity of General Mahmud, he was, after all, the head of ISI, which, at the time, was more interested in self-serving goals than in ridding the region of extremists. Between 2001 and 2007, ISI played both sides of the game, pitting Taliban groups against Western forces, internally hoping that the Taliban would be weakened and the US would withdraw. It wasn't until the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) was formed and began its brutal terror campaign against Pakistan, that the ISI "woke up" and realized that their pet project had turned against its master.
Gul, however, is right. We should have immediately eganged with moderate Taliban groups from the outset. Instead, we adopted a neanderthalic, "let god sort them out" mentality, which did nothing but recruit new Taliban and al Qaeda members and put a viable long term strategy on the back burner. This pragmatic, black and white approach is, unfortunately, not how the real world works.
While it may be too late to convince some Taliban groups to come to the table, it is still worth the effort to establish a dialogue and focus on the fact that neither side is winning. But, the Taliban have the trump card--as long as Pakistan refuses to effectively engage the militants in combat and kick them out of the Tribal Areas, all they have to do is wait until we pull out. Thus, this dialogue has to include Pakistan and Pakistan must demonstrate a willingness to not tolerate the presence of the Taliban. There has to be three-party talks, but each party has to be engaged in the process for it to work.
Share
Late last week, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, General David Petraeus, and American AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrook descended on Islamabad to jointly think a way out of the Afghan imbroglio.
Officials touted their meetings with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, ISI officials and civilian Pakistani leaders as routine brainstorming sessions. Yet Afghanistan's surge in violence and its extremely low turnout in the Afghan parliamentary election two days later on Saturday, betray the bitter truth: the region is in crisis. Afghans are fear-stricken, the American top brass is frustrated by its failure in showcasing any tangible success back home, Karzai is resentful of Washington's high-handed approach and Pakistan itself is struggling with the consequences of an over-bearing counter-insurgency campaign, complicated by recent devastating floods. Not only do the stakeholders feel they're getting nowhere -- they feel like they're moving deeper into chaos.
This frustration essentially stems from an approach that from the first day centered more on money and military muscle than on long-term strategies.
Indeed, only two days before the big heads gathered in Islamabad, the National Security Archive (NSA) in Washington released several previously secret U.S. government documents which shed considerable light on the strategic missteps of the current war.
Contents of some of the memos suggest that despite joining hands in the anti-terror war in Afghanistan, there was little love lost between Washington and Islamabad in the aftermath of 9/11 - and that their differences centered on the question of how to best counter the Taliban
"We will not flinch from a military victory... but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men, it will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now," former ISI chief Gen. Mahmud Ahmed had told U.S. ambassador to Islamabad Wendy Chamberlin on September 23, 2001, according to a 12-page document titled "Islamabad 5337."
General Mahmud expressed these reservations after Chamberlin had "bluntly" ruled out a dialogue with the Taliban. The United States responded by pressuring Pakistan to sideline Mahmud (President Musharraf forced him to retire not long thereafter.)
Nine years since the U.S. and its allies unleashed war, the approach to Taliban has now come full circle. Where United States officials were once snubbing Pakistani requests for patience and dialogue, they are now seeking to "flip" Taliban militants.
The consequences of this long delay for Pakistan have been nightmarish. Particularly since 2007, thousands of angry young Muslims, inspired by al Qaeda's pan-Islamist revolutionary and anti-American appeals and trained in the remote tribal regions, have swelled the ranks of Pakistan's domestic radical outfits such as the TTP and Lashkare Jhangvi. Hundreds have blown themselves up in suicide bombings across Pakistan, killing thousands of innocent women and children as well as security personnel -- all in the name of Jihad against the "infidels occupying Afghanistan."
In another memo by NSA, Ronald E. Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, had warned Washington in 2005 that "if the (al Qaeda ) sanctuary in Pakistan were not addressed it would lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our (Operation Enduring Freedom] intervention in 2001."
"The 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government," Neumann wrote.
The sanctuary Neumann alluded to in his dispatches to Washington was obviously the Waziri border lands where Osama bin Laden and his cohorts settled down after their defeat by the U.S.-led coalition. The memos clearly explain how a porous and mountainous region spread over 27,200 square kilometers turned into a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and its Afghan affiliates. Initially "the tribes in [FATA regions] were overawed by U.S. firepower" after 9/11, which provided the Pakistan army a window of opportunity to march in, but the areas quickly became "no-go areas" where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, the NSA papers quote Neumann as saying.
And, as the events suggest, FATA did turn into a haven for al Qaeda, where it found local and foreign allies and facilitators to launch attacks on the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Not only that; FATA also became the birthplace for the Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a vicious al-Qaeda auxiliary that rose in the mountains of the Waziristan region, where Faisal Shehzad, the man behind the May One botched Times Square bombing attempt , received his terrorist training.
For FATA and its residents, it has been both a painful as well as a frightening ordeal; the Operation Enduring Freedom and the hunt for al Qaeda plucked these ultra-conservative and practically lawless regions from obscurity and brought them into the international limelight. Not only because of bin Laden but also because the Waziristan region became the breeding ground for future terrorists, something many in Pakistan including Gen. Mahmud Ahmed and Masood Sharif Khattak, former head of the Intelligence Bureau had warned about in September 2001.
The latest round of general elections in Afghanistan, accompanied by widespread violence and intimidation, doesn't inspire much hope for the future. The dire straits require all stake-holders to take a broader view of the situation, one embedded in ground truths, rather than driven by selfish concerns and considerations.
While I don't doubt the sincerity of General Mahmud, he was, after all, the head of ISI, which, at the time, was more interested in self-serving goals than in ridding the region of extremists. Between 2001 and 2007, ISI played both sides of the game, pitting Taliban groups against Western forces, internally hoping that the Taliban would be weakened and the US would withdraw. It wasn't until the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) was formed and began its brutal terror campaign against Pakistan, that the ISI "woke up" and realized that their pet project had turned against its master.
Gul, however, is right. We should have immediately eganged with moderate Taliban groups from the outset. Instead, we adopted a neanderthalic, "let god sort them out" mentality, which did nothing but recruit new Taliban and al Qaeda members and put a viable long term strategy on the back burner. This pragmatic, black and white approach is, unfortunately, not how the real world works.
While it may be too late to convince some Taliban groups to come to the table, it is still worth the effort to establish a dialogue and focus on the fact that neither side is winning. But, the Taliban have the trump card--as long as Pakistan refuses to effectively engage the militants in combat and kick them out of the Tribal Areas, all they have to do is wait until we pull out. Thus, this dialogue has to include Pakistan and Pakistan must demonstrate a willingness to not tolerate the presence of the Taliban. There has to be three-party talks, but each party has to be engaged in the process for it to work.
Share
Senior Haqqani Member Killed
I wrote a while back that the Haqqani Network was in the process of extending its reach directly into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. An airstrike killed Qari Mansur, a senior leader in the Network, on September 24, 2010.
From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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Thursday, September 23, 2010
Dialogue With the Haqqani Network
A very nice article about establishing dialogue with the Haqqani Network by Tom Gregg at the AfPak Channel (September 22, 2010):
Last month Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief Northern Ireland negotiator, argued that "no group should be beyond talking to." In the context of the current crisis and a shift towards seeking a peace deal in Afghanistan, this is particularly salient. President Hamid Karzai has recently announced the creation of a commission to lead talks with the Taliban. There is also emerging consensus in Washington that stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved by reaching some sort of a political settlement with the Taliban. But not talking to particular insurgent groups will not be a good idea, and a reliance on a policy of "decapitating" them is even worse.
One group that should not "be beyond talking to" is the Haqqani network, named for its leader Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now considered one of the most feared insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The network is responsible for attacks against the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps because of this central role in the Afghan insurgency, in July, Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asserted that the Haqqanis are the Taliban network with the closest ties to al Qaeda and that dealing with them is ‘the most pressing task' in combating the insurgency. Despite their alleged links to international terrorists, even Secretary Clinton has not ruled out supporting dialogue with them (with caveats). These comments suggest the door on the U.S. side may soon be slightly ajar. However, having spent the past six years talking with members of the network, including some of its senior members, it would appear that the Haqqani's door is currently open for talks but may soon be firmly shut. The Haqqani network is in the midst of a generational power shift from father to son, which if completed will all but rule out any future talk of peace.
In June 2007, well before the Haqqani terrorist network had found its way into headlines in the western media, chatter spread through the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that the aging and ill Jalaluddin -- insurgent leader, client of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitator of Osama bin Laden's 2001 escape into Pakistan -- had passed away, reportedly due to hepatitis. The intelligence community picked up on this rumor but quickly disproved it. At the time of this report I was living in the tribal areas of southeast Afghanistan and wrote a report titled "Jalaluddin Haqqani: Dead, Alive, Does it Matter?" In short the answer is yes and no. Yes, because had he died at the time, it would have left the network more vulnerable than at anytime since its emergence in late 2004. And no, because today the Haqqanis have nearly completed what could be best described as ‘succession planning' resulting in a powerful network that many believe jeopardizes Afghanistan's stability
It is well known that for almost a decade he has suffered from health problems and requires regular medical attention rendering him relatively inactive in the day-to-day workings of the insurgency. Furthermore, as a senior insurgent commander (and former Taliban Minister), Maulavi Haqqani's profile as a "most wanted" does not permit travel to the Afghan battle space. Consequently, his 36-year-old son Sirajuddin (aka "Khalifa") has increasingly taken over, with gusto, operational command of his father's network.
However, these limitations speak nothing of the influence Maulavi Haqqani continues to enjoy as a tribal leader, religious scholar, ISI associate and close ally of Gulf Arab financiers. Indeed, the success of the Haqqani network rests with these social/religious/political connections that Maulavi Haqqani has carefully nurtured over the past 30-plus years; indeed, it was these very factors that also made him so popular with the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad). It can be assumed that these networks, particularly with Arab financiers and the ISI, have been "inherited" by Sirajuddin. However, the same cannot be said about Maulavi Haqqani's tribal, religious and mujahideen credentials. Sirajuddin is in his early 30's, grew up in Miram Shah, Pakistan and, prior to 2001, only occasionally traveled to his native village of Garde Serai, nestled in the rugged mountains of Paktia province. In Miram Shah he was involved in Islamic Studies but, unlike his father, did not graduate from a prestigious madrassah and is too young to have been a well-known fighter during the anti-Soviet jihad.
Hence, the very elements that have contributed to the success of Maulavi Haqqani's activities in eastern Afghanistan (and that could be used to assist in a peace process) -- his personal influence as a tribal leader, mujahideen commander and religious elder -- will be lost after he dies or passes control to Siraj.
Moreover, the respect of Maulavi Haqqani within Afghanistan as a mujahideen leader is matched by the respect he derives from being a prominent tribal and religious elder. As a result, it has been difficult for the various Zadran sub tribes of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to actively oppose his network's activities in their respective tribal regions.
Indeed, today the Haqqani network is spreading its influence geographically into areas previously dominated by other insurgent groups (such as the Mansoor network in Zurmat district of Paktia). It has also, for the first time since the beginning of the Haqqani-led insurgency in late 2004-early 2005, recently embarked upon the systematic targeting and killing of moderate tribal leaders from within the Zadran tribe. This all looks like succession planning. Tactically, Sirajuddin must know that when his father dies (be it of natural causes or otherwise), the tribes would certainly be better positioned to oppose him, should they choose (and be empowered) to do so.
Added to this equation is the knowledge that U.S. pressure on Islamabad to tackle the Haqqani network could see their safe havens in North Waziristan come under increased pressure in the future. Maulavi Haqqani had the necessary contacts and influence to navigate his way through policy shifts in Islamabad. A question mark remains over whether Siraj, in the absence of his father, would be as adept at maneuvering between possible future policy shifts.
The time is ripe, therefore, for a dialogue to take place, one that will be easier to negotiate while the older generation of fighters that knows the benefits of peace is still alive. From my discussions with representatives of Maulavi Haqqani, he still claims to be fighting in Afghanistan for ‘peace.' Sirajuddin, on the other hand, does not know the meaning of the word. He has been brought up in war, has never lived as a citizen of a functioning nation state, has little to no experience of government, is not a tribal elder and is not even a credible religious leader. In this regard he is motivated more by a radical Islamist ideology than his father, and less obviously constrained by a desire to maintain good relations with the local tribal leaders.
For example, on a visit to Afghanistan this year I met with a prominent Zadran tribesman who had returned from North Waziristan the previous week and had spent the night with Siraj. He had taken a message to the commander that the latter's insurgent activities in the Zadran tribal area were having negative consequences for his fellow tribesman. Upon relaying this message, the elder was informed by Siraj that he was welcome to stay the night and receive his hospitality but that if he ever returned again with such a message he would not leave with his head on his shoulders. Such a blunt message to a respected Zadran tribal elder could not and would not have come from his father.
Despite appearances, my years of working closely with various tribal and religious leaders of the Zadran tribe has convinced me that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process, the military intervention in the region and the insurgency. Sadly, some of the best of these leaders have already been targeted by the insurgents or have wrongfully been detained by the International Military Forces. Unless greater security and political space is afforded to the current Zadran tribal and religious leadership in Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the outcome of the Haqqani network's succession planning will go ahead unchallenged.
In order to prevent this scenario from transpiring the United States must make a clear distinction between the current Haqqani network and al Qaeda. The Haqqani network is an Afghan network focused on Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the objective of the Haqqani network is to support an international jihadist agenda. To this end, Washington and Kabul should embark upon a policy of engagement (as part of a broader political outreach effort to all various elements of the Taliban) to separate the two. Locally, U.S. forces must pay greater attention to the local tribal dynamics as part of its counterinsurgency approach. In the southeast, this should include support to the tribal police (or arbakai) and ensuring that the pro-peace tribal majority is not subjected to intimidation, detention (or worse) by the international military presence.
However, should we fail to capitalize on this opportunity for dialogue, a more radical network, combined with the absence of the tribal and religious constraints that Maulavi Haqqani must regularly negotiate, will mark the beginning of a new, more violent generation of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. And this new insurgency will leave no prospects for dialogue or peace.
What strikes me about this article is the similarities between Pashtun and American politics:
"that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process"
The rational, moderate voices in this country are also being drowned out by extremists.
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Last month Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief Northern Ireland negotiator, argued that "no group should be beyond talking to." In the context of the current crisis and a shift towards seeking a peace deal in Afghanistan, this is particularly salient. President Hamid Karzai has recently announced the creation of a commission to lead talks with the Taliban. There is also emerging consensus in Washington that stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved by reaching some sort of a political settlement with the Taliban. But not talking to particular insurgent groups will not be a good idea, and a reliance on a policy of "decapitating" them is even worse.
One group that should not "be beyond talking to" is the Haqqani network, named for its leader Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now considered one of the most feared insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The network is responsible for attacks against the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps because of this central role in the Afghan insurgency, in July, Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asserted that the Haqqanis are the Taliban network with the closest ties to al Qaeda and that dealing with them is ‘the most pressing task' in combating the insurgency. Despite their alleged links to international terrorists, even Secretary Clinton has not ruled out supporting dialogue with them (with caveats). These comments suggest the door on the U.S. side may soon be slightly ajar. However, having spent the past six years talking with members of the network, including some of its senior members, it would appear that the Haqqani's door is currently open for talks but may soon be firmly shut. The Haqqani network is in the midst of a generational power shift from father to son, which if completed will all but rule out any future talk of peace.
In June 2007, well before the Haqqani terrorist network had found its way into headlines in the western media, chatter spread through the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that the aging and ill Jalaluddin -- insurgent leader, client of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitator of Osama bin Laden's 2001 escape into Pakistan -- had passed away, reportedly due to hepatitis. The intelligence community picked up on this rumor but quickly disproved it. At the time of this report I was living in the tribal areas of southeast Afghanistan and wrote a report titled "Jalaluddin Haqqani: Dead, Alive, Does it Matter?" In short the answer is yes and no. Yes, because had he died at the time, it would have left the network more vulnerable than at anytime since its emergence in late 2004. And no, because today the Haqqanis have nearly completed what could be best described as ‘succession planning' resulting in a powerful network that many believe jeopardizes Afghanistan's stability
It is well known that for almost a decade he has suffered from health problems and requires regular medical attention rendering him relatively inactive in the day-to-day workings of the insurgency. Furthermore, as a senior insurgent commander (and former Taliban Minister), Maulavi Haqqani's profile as a "most wanted" does not permit travel to the Afghan battle space. Consequently, his 36-year-old son Sirajuddin (aka "Khalifa") has increasingly taken over, with gusto, operational command of his father's network.
However, these limitations speak nothing of the influence Maulavi Haqqani continues to enjoy as a tribal leader, religious scholar, ISI associate and close ally of Gulf Arab financiers. Indeed, the success of the Haqqani network rests with these social/religious/political connections that Maulavi Haqqani has carefully nurtured over the past 30-plus years; indeed, it was these very factors that also made him so popular with the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad). It can be assumed that these networks, particularly with Arab financiers and the ISI, have been "inherited" by Sirajuddin. However, the same cannot be said about Maulavi Haqqani's tribal, religious and mujahideen credentials. Sirajuddin is in his early 30's, grew up in Miram Shah, Pakistan and, prior to 2001, only occasionally traveled to his native village of Garde Serai, nestled in the rugged mountains of Paktia province. In Miram Shah he was involved in Islamic Studies but, unlike his father, did not graduate from a prestigious madrassah and is too young to have been a well-known fighter during the anti-Soviet jihad.
Hence, the very elements that have contributed to the success of Maulavi Haqqani's activities in eastern Afghanistan (and that could be used to assist in a peace process) -- his personal influence as a tribal leader, mujahideen commander and religious elder -- will be lost after he dies or passes control to Siraj.
Moreover, the respect of Maulavi Haqqani within Afghanistan as a mujahideen leader is matched by the respect he derives from being a prominent tribal and religious elder. As a result, it has been difficult for the various Zadran sub tribes of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to actively oppose his network's activities in their respective tribal regions.
Indeed, today the Haqqani network is spreading its influence geographically into areas previously dominated by other insurgent groups (such as the Mansoor network in Zurmat district of Paktia). It has also, for the first time since the beginning of the Haqqani-led insurgency in late 2004-early 2005, recently embarked upon the systematic targeting and killing of moderate tribal leaders from within the Zadran tribe. This all looks like succession planning. Tactically, Sirajuddin must know that when his father dies (be it of natural causes or otherwise), the tribes would certainly be better positioned to oppose him, should they choose (and be empowered) to do so.
Added to this equation is the knowledge that U.S. pressure on Islamabad to tackle the Haqqani network could see their safe havens in North Waziristan come under increased pressure in the future. Maulavi Haqqani had the necessary contacts and influence to navigate his way through policy shifts in Islamabad. A question mark remains over whether Siraj, in the absence of his father, would be as adept at maneuvering between possible future policy shifts.
The time is ripe, therefore, for a dialogue to take place, one that will be easier to negotiate while the older generation of fighters that knows the benefits of peace is still alive. From my discussions with representatives of Maulavi Haqqani, he still claims to be fighting in Afghanistan for ‘peace.' Sirajuddin, on the other hand, does not know the meaning of the word. He has been brought up in war, has never lived as a citizen of a functioning nation state, has little to no experience of government, is not a tribal elder and is not even a credible religious leader. In this regard he is motivated more by a radical Islamist ideology than his father, and less obviously constrained by a desire to maintain good relations with the local tribal leaders.
For example, on a visit to Afghanistan this year I met with a prominent Zadran tribesman who had returned from North Waziristan the previous week and had spent the night with Siraj. He had taken a message to the commander that the latter's insurgent activities in the Zadran tribal area were having negative consequences for his fellow tribesman. Upon relaying this message, the elder was informed by Siraj that he was welcome to stay the night and receive his hospitality but that if he ever returned again with such a message he would not leave with his head on his shoulders. Such a blunt message to a respected Zadran tribal elder could not and would not have come from his father.
Despite appearances, my years of working closely with various tribal and religious leaders of the Zadran tribe has convinced me that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process, the military intervention in the region and the insurgency. Sadly, some of the best of these leaders have already been targeted by the insurgents or have wrongfully been detained by the International Military Forces. Unless greater security and political space is afforded to the current Zadran tribal and religious leadership in Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the outcome of the Haqqani network's succession planning will go ahead unchallenged.
In order to prevent this scenario from transpiring the United States must make a clear distinction between the current Haqqani network and al Qaeda. The Haqqani network is an Afghan network focused on Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the objective of the Haqqani network is to support an international jihadist agenda. To this end, Washington and Kabul should embark upon a policy of engagement (as part of a broader political outreach effort to all various elements of the Taliban) to separate the two. Locally, U.S. forces must pay greater attention to the local tribal dynamics as part of its counterinsurgency approach. In the southeast, this should include support to the tribal police (or arbakai) and ensuring that the pro-peace tribal majority is not subjected to intimidation, detention (or worse) by the international military presence.
However, should we fail to capitalize on this opportunity for dialogue, a more radical network, combined with the absence of the tribal and religious constraints that Maulavi Haqqani must regularly negotiate, will mark the beginning of a new, more violent generation of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. And this new insurgency will leave no prospects for dialogue or peace.
What strikes me about this article is the similarities between Pashtun and American politics:
"that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process"
The rational, moderate voices in this country are also being drowned out by extremists.
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CJTF-101 Opens a Can
This a nice summary of recent ground combat against the Haqqani militants in Afghanistan. I'm noticing a trend here...that Haqqani militants don't stand a chance against ISAF troops in a direct action engagement. I'm predicting that they will attempt several more disastrous attacks before winter and then may turn increasingly to al Qaeda style tatctics (eg, suicide bombers).
From the Longwar Journal (September 23, 2010):
US soldiers beat back a massed attack by the Haqqani Network in the eastern Afghan province of Khost yesterday, killing 27 enemy fighters.
The Haqqani Network fighters gathered near Combat Outpost Spera and prepared to open fire on the base "with small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire," Combined Joint Task Force - 101 stated in a press release. But the Haqqani Network fighters were observed as they moved into position to attack.
"Both remotely piloted aircraft and strategically placed surveillance cameras identified the insurgent forces preparing to open fire with a mixture of small arms and rocket propelled grenades," CJTF-101 stated. Helicopters from an Attack Weapons Team from Task Force Viper, 1st Battalion, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, were dispatched and routed the Haqqani Network fighters.
ISAF stated that between 25 to 30 "insurgents" were killed, while CJTF-101 put the number at 27. No US or Afghan troops were reported to have been killed or wounded in the fighting.
The Haqqani Network has carried out four major attacks against heavily defended US outposts in eastern Afghanistan since the end of August.
On Aug. 28, Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
And on Sept. 2, the Haqqani Network attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers; 20 were reported killed.
The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have launched attacks at several major installations across the country this year. In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base; another small team conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July; three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
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From the Longwar Journal (September 23, 2010):
US soldiers beat back a massed attack by the Haqqani Network in the eastern Afghan province of Khost yesterday, killing 27 enemy fighters.
The Haqqani Network fighters gathered near Combat Outpost Spera and prepared to open fire on the base "with small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire," Combined Joint Task Force - 101 stated in a press release. But the Haqqani Network fighters were observed as they moved into position to attack.
"Both remotely piloted aircraft and strategically placed surveillance cameras identified the insurgent forces preparing to open fire with a mixture of small arms and rocket propelled grenades," CJTF-101 stated. Helicopters from an Attack Weapons Team from Task Force Viper, 1st Battalion, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, were dispatched and routed the Haqqani Network fighters.
ISAF stated that between 25 to 30 "insurgents" were killed, while CJTF-101 put the number at 27. No US or Afghan troops were reported to have been killed or wounded in the fighting.
The Haqqani Network has carried out four major attacks against heavily defended US outposts in eastern Afghanistan since the end of August.
On Aug. 28, Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
And on Sept. 2, the Haqqani Network attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers; 20 were reported killed.
The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have launched attacks at several major installations across the country this year. In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base; another small team conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July; three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
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If at First You Don't Succeed...
Try it again until you kill him. The Drone Campaign has claimed a high profile target in South Waziristan. According to Xinhua (September 22, 2010):
A militant commander, Mullah Shamsullah, and 15 militants were killed Tuesday evening as U.S. pilotless drones struck South Waziristan, one of the seven tribal agencies in northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, local sources told Xinhua.
The U.S. pilotless drones fired missiles at the Azam Warsak bazaar, 18 km west of Wana, the administrative headquarters of South Waziristan, hitting the hideouts of the militant commander, witnesses said.
Sources said Mullah Shamsullah was killed in the attack, but official sources could not confirm. He was an important and the strongest Taliban leader in Wana and literally ruled on behalf of Al-Qaida leader Mullah Nazir in the area. Four drones are still taking flight over the area keeping harassment among local residents. Eyewitnesses said that locals are migrating out of the area.
Hours earlier, a vehicle in Ghundo Warsak area was hit by a drone and eight militants were killed, eyewitness Hafiz Wazir told Xinhua. Mullah Shamsullah was said to have been targeted in that attack.
So, Mullah Nazir's second in command, Mullah Shamsullah, was killed outside of Azam Warsak, just across the border from Afghanistan. One would think that if they almost killed you earlier in the day, you might want to lay low until things cool down. By the way, Nazir is a Taliban leader, not an al Qaeda leader, although there isn't much difference these days.
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A militant commander, Mullah Shamsullah, and 15 militants were killed Tuesday evening as U.S. pilotless drones struck South Waziristan, one of the seven tribal agencies in northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, local sources told Xinhua.
The U.S. pilotless drones fired missiles at the Azam Warsak bazaar, 18 km west of Wana, the administrative headquarters of South Waziristan, hitting the hideouts of the militant commander, witnesses said.
Sources said Mullah Shamsullah was killed in the attack, but official sources could not confirm. He was an important and the strongest Taliban leader in Wana and literally ruled on behalf of Al-Qaida leader Mullah Nazir in the area. Four drones are still taking flight over the area keeping harassment among local residents. Eyewitnesses said that locals are migrating out of the area.
Hours earlier, a vehicle in Ghundo Warsak area was hit by a drone and eight militants were killed, eyewitness Hafiz Wazir told Xinhua. Mullah Shamsullah was said to have been targeted in that attack.
So, Mullah Nazir's second in command, Mullah Shamsullah, was killed outside of Azam Warsak, just across the border from Afghanistan. One would think that if they almost killed you earlier in the day, you might want to lay low until things cool down. By the way, Nazir is a Taliban leader, not an al Qaeda leader, although there isn't much difference these days.
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Second Strike in South Waziristan
From the Nation.com (September 22, 2010):
PESHAWAR - At least eight suspected militants were killed and many others sustained injuries in a US drone attack in a remote area of South Waziristan Agency here on Tuesday.
Sources informed that a US unmanned aircraft fired two missiles on a village in Khand Morsak, a locality of Jandola, and as a result eight suspected militants were killed while several others got injured.
They said a vehicle was targeted in the strike by the pilotless plane which fired two missiles on it. They added that the spy planes were seen hovering over the village after the missile strike.
They said identification of those killed in the incident could not be made immediately after the attack.
PESHAWAR - At least eight suspected militants were killed and many others sustained injuries in a US drone attack in a remote area of South Waziristan Agency here on Tuesday.
Sources informed that a US unmanned aircraft fired two missiles on a village in Khand Morsak, a locality of Jandola, and as a result eight suspected militants were killed while several others got injured.
They said a vehicle was targeted in the strike by the pilotless plane which fired two missiles on it. They added that the spy planes were seen hovering over the village after the missile strike.
They said identification of those killed in the incident could not be made immediately after the attack.
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
FATA/NWFP Maps
I suppose I should I have included maps of the region earlier.
Both maps are courtesy of the Longwar Journal.
The first map shows the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in gold, which is considered the Taliban's and al Qaeda's stronghold and the Northwest Frontier Province in purple, which contains a mish-mash of Taliban, al Qaeda, and other groups. About 3.5 million people live in the FATA and 21 million people live in the NWFP. Obviously the dominant religion is Islam and people speak Pashto (closer to Afghanistan) and Urdu (closer to Pakistan).
The second map shows the relative degree of control of each province (or agency in Pakistan-speak). Red indicates total Taliban control, but I would suggest that the gold areas should also be red. Pakistan operates the Frontier Corps (FC) in these areas, a sort of paramilitary security organization, to police the area. In reality, the FC chose to either (1) enforce the law and ultimately die by the hands of the Taliban, or (2) get on the Taliban's payroll and look the other way.
It's interesting (and frightening) to note that Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, is less than 50 miles from the red areas. If one were to make a map of Islamabad itself, I would guess that there would be plenty of red areas within the city.
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Both maps are courtesy of the Longwar Journal.
The first map shows the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in gold, which is considered the Taliban's and al Qaeda's stronghold and the Northwest Frontier Province in purple, which contains a mish-mash of Taliban, al Qaeda, and other groups. About 3.5 million people live in the FATA and 21 million people live in the NWFP. Obviously the dominant religion is Islam and people speak Pashto (closer to Afghanistan) and Urdu (closer to Pakistan).
The second map shows the relative degree of control of each province (or agency in Pakistan-speak). Red indicates total Taliban control, but I would suggest that the gold areas should also be red. Pakistan operates the Frontier Corps (FC) in these areas, a sort of paramilitary security organization, to police the area. In reality, the FC chose to either (1) enforce the law and ultimately die by the hands of the Taliban, or (2) get on the Taliban's payroll and look the other way.
It's interesting (and frightening) to note that Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, is less than 50 miles from the red areas. If one were to make a map of Islamabad itself, I would guess that there would be plenty of red areas within the city.
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