A short article from the Longwar Journal describing the senior leadership of al Qaeda in Pakistan:
Al Qaeda has a deep bench inside Pakistan and relies on highly-skilled operatives from other like-minded jihadist organizations in plotting against the West. Members of various terror groups allied with al Qaeda, including Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), work with al Qaeda’s external operations committee.
Al Qaeda shares a safe haven in northern Pakistan with these groups, and this allows the organization to regenerate its external operations network despite being heavily targeted by the covert US air campaign in the tribal areas.
No terrorist better typifies this phenomenon than Rashid Rauf. A senior member of JeM, which was founded by the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment, Rauf has a long pedigree in Pakistan's terror circles. He is a relative of Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of JeM. His father founded Crescent Relief, a Muslim charity that collected funds for earthquake relief and is currently under investigation for funding the failed 2006 London airliner plot.
Rauf and senior al Qaeda leader Matiur Rehman were the architects of the 2006 London airline plot. The foiled attack, which has been called the "son of Bojinka," was modeled after the 1995 Bojinka plot devised by Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and his nephew Ramzi Yousef. Rauf also assisted Adnan el Shukrijumah in training the al Qaeda operatives who planned to attack trains in the New York City area last year.
Ilyas Kasmiri, like Rauf, is a good example of how al Qaeda fills leadership voids by hand-selecting members from allied terror groups. Kashmiri is one of al Qaeda's top military leaders and the architect of al Qaeda's terror assaults utilizing coordinated suicide attack teams in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.
Kashmiri is the operational commander of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI), a terror group backed by Pakistan's military and Inter-Service Intelligence directorate. He is also the leader of Brigade 313, al Qaeda's military organization in Pakistan. His training camp in Miramshah is hosted in a region administered by Siraj Haqqani, a top Taliban and al Qaeda leader.
Kashmiri has organized multiple attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India, including the November 2008 terror assault on the Indian city of Mumbai, in collaboration with the Lashkar-e-Taiba. He has also attempted to execute attacks in the US and in Denmark, and was indicted by the US in 2009 along with David Coleman Headley, his point man. In Pakistan, he masterminded the assassination of the former commander of the Pakistani Special Services Group, and organized attacks on the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) headquarters and Pakistani police headquarters in Lahore.
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Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Pakistan. Show all posts
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
Newton's Third Law (of Geopolitics)
Newtown's third law states that for every action, there is an equal and opposite reaction. So when ISAF crosses the Pakistani border and kills a boatload of insurgents and "Frontier Corps", Pakistan is obliged to repond in a quid pro quo fashion. Frontier Corps (FC) troops are like mall cops in the FATA areas and notoriously cowardly and on the take.
You have to wonder why the FC were in the immediate vicinity of Haqqani militants in the first place (and not engaging them).
From the Longwar Journal (October 3, 2010):
The Taliban destroyed 28 NATO fuel tankers bound for Afghanistan in an attack near Islamabad. The attack is the second of its kind since Pakistan closed down the Khyber Pass on Sept. 30 in protest against US cross-border attacks on Haqqani Network fighters fleeing from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
Suspected Taliban fighters hit the fuel tankers during a midnight raid on a compound on the outskirts of Pakistan's capital. Three people were reported killed and 28 tankers burned in the aftermath of the attack. The suspected Taliban fighters escaped. It is unclear if Pakistani security forces provided any security for the fuel tankers.
The Taliban, commanded by Hakeemullah Mehsud, claimed the Islamabad attack and vowed to carry out further attacks on convoys in Pakistan.
“We will carry out more such attacks in future," Azam Tariq, Hakeemullah's spokesman, told AFP. We will not allow the use of Pakistani soil as a supply route for NATO troops based in Afghanistan."
Tariq also stated the attacks on NATO convoys were designed "to avenge drone attacks" from US Predators and Reapers that have been pounding Taliban and al Qaeda operatives in North Waziristan.
The Islamabad attack took place just two days after a nearly identical raid by the Taliban in the city of Shikarpur in Sindh province in the Afghan south. More than 36 fuel tankers and several container trucks were destroyed.
The Taliban spokesman Tariq also claimed the Shikarpur attack, and said a group based in Sindh known as the Siyara Group carried out the attack.
“They were local militants and had acquired training in South Waziristan and returned to their native towns to start attacks on government and security installations,” Tariq told The News.
The Taliban struck at a NATO convoy outside Islamabad earlier this year, when a 15-man squad of Taliban hit a truck stop in Tarnol on June 9. Eight people, including two drivers, were killed in the attack, while more than 30 NATO fuel and supply trucks were destroyed. The Taliban have consistently hit NATO convoys and trucks in Peshawar, Khyber, and Quetta.
The latest two strikes took place after the Pakistani government angrily shut down NATO's supply route through the Khyber Pass, the main passage to NATO troops in Kabul and the surrounding areas. The Pakistan government closed the Khyber Pass after US helicopters pursued Haqqani Network fighters across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan three times last week. The Pakistani military claimed that three Frontier Corps troops had been killed in the attacks, and the US military apologized for the attack before an investigation into the incident began.
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You have to wonder why the FC were in the immediate vicinity of Haqqani militants in the first place (and not engaging them).
From the Longwar Journal (October 3, 2010):
The Taliban destroyed 28 NATO fuel tankers bound for Afghanistan in an attack near Islamabad. The attack is the second of its kind since Pakistan closed down the Khyber Pass on Sept. 30 in protest against US cross-border attacks on Haqqani Network fighters fleeing from Afghanistan into Pakistan.
Suspected Taliban fighters hit the fuel tankers during a midnight raid on a compound on the outskirts of Pakistan's capital. Three people were reported killed and 28 tankers burned in the aftermath of the attack. The suspected Taliban fighters escaped. It is unclear if Pakistani security forces provided any security for the fuel tankers.
The Taliban, commanded by Hakeemullah Mehsud, claimed the Islamabad attack and vowed to carry out further attacks on convoys in Pakistan.
“We will carry out more such attacks in future," Azam Tariq, Hakeemullah's spokesman, told AFP. We will not allow the use of Pakistani soil as a supply route for NATO troops based in Afghanistan."
Tariq also stated the attacks on NATO convoys were designed "to avenge drone attacks" from US Predators and Reapers that have been pounding Taliban and al Qaeda operatives in North Waziristan.
The Islamabad attack took place just two days after a nearly identical raid by the Taliban in the city of Shikarpur in Sindh province in the Afghan south. More than 36 fuel tankers and several container trucks were destroyed.
The Taliban spokesman Tariq also claimed the Shikarpur attack, and said a group based in Sindh known as the Siyara Group carried out the attack.
“They were local militants and had acquired training in South Waziristan and returned to their native towns to start attacks on government and security installations,” Tariq told The News.
The Taliban struck at a NATO convoy outside Islamabad earlier this year, when a 15-man squad of Taliban hit a truck stop in Tarnol on June 9. Eight people, including two drivers, were killed in the attack, while more than 30 NATO fuel and supply trucks were destroyed. The Taliban have consistently hit NATO convoys and trucks in Peshawar, Khyber, and Quetta.
The latest two strikes took place after the Pakistani government angrily shut down NATO's supply route through the Khyber Pass, the main passage to NATO troops in Kabul and the surrounding areas. The Pakistan government closed the Khyber Pass after US helicopters pursued Haqqani Network fighters across the border from Afghanistan into Pakistan three times last week. The Pakistani military claimed that three Frontier Corps troops had been killed in the attacks, and the US military apologized for the attack before an investigation into the incident began.
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Thursday, September 23, 2010
Dialogue With the Haqqani Network
A very nice article about establishing dialogue with the Haqqani Network by Tom Gregg at the AfPak Channel (September 22, 2010):
Last month Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief Northern Ireland negotiator, argued that "no group should be beyond talking to." In the context of the current crisis and a shift towards seeking a peace deal in Afghanistan, this is particularly salient. President Hamid Karzai has recently announced the creation of a commission to lead talks with the Taliban. There is also emerging consensus in Washington that stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved by reaching some sort of a political settlement with the Taliban. But not talking to particular insurgent groups will not be a good idea, and a reliance on a policy of "decapitating" them is even worse.
One group that should not "be beyond talking to" is the Haqqani network, named for its leader Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now considered one of the most feared insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The network is responsible for attacks against the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps because of this central role in the Afghan insurgency, in July, Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asserted that the Haqqanis are the Taliban network with the closest ties to al Qaeda and that dealing with them is ‘the most pressing task' in combating the insurgency. Despite their alleged links to international terrorists, even Secretary Clinton has not ruled out supporting dialogue with them (with caveats). These comments suggest the door on the U.S. side may soon be slightly ajar. However, having spent the past six years talking with members of the network, including some of its senior members, it would appear that the Haqqani's door is currently open for talks but may soon be firmly shut. The Haqqani network is in the midst of a generational power shift from father to son, which if completed will all but rule out any future talk of peace.
In June 2007, well before the Haqqani terrorist network had found its way into headlines in the western media, chatter spread through the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that the aging and ill Jalaluddin -- insurgent leader, client of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitator of Osama bin Laden's 2001 escape into Pakistan -- had passed away, reportedly due to hepatitis. The intelligence community picked up on this rumor but quickly disproved it. At the time of this report I was living in the tribal areas of southeast Afghanistan and wrote a report titled "Jalaluddin Haqqani: Dead, Alive, Does it Matter?" In short the answer is yes and no. Yes, because had he died at the time, it would have left the network more vulnerable than at anytime since its emergence in late 2004. And no, because today the Haqqanis have nearly completed what could be best described as ‘succession planning' resulting in a powerful network that many believe jeopardizes Afghanistan's stability
It is well known that for almost a decade he has suffered from health problems and requires regular medical attention rendering him relatively inactive in the day-to-day workings of the insurgency. Furthermore, as a senior insurgent commander (and former Taliban Minister), Maulavi Haqqani's profile as a "most wanted" does not permit travel to the Afghan battle space. Consequently, his 36-year-old son Sirajuddin (aka "Khalifa") has increasingly taken over, with gusto, operational command of his father's network.
However, these limitations speak nothing of the influence Maulavi Haqqani continues to enjoy as a tribal leader, religious scholar, ISI associate and close ally of Gulf Arab financiers. Indeed, the success of the Haqqani network rests with these social/religious/political connections that Maulavi Haqqani has carefully nurtured over the past 30-plus years; indeed, it was these very factors that also made him so popular with the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad). It can be assumed that these networks, particularly with Arab financiers and the ISI, have been "inherited" by Sirajuddin. However, the same cannot be said about Maulavi Haqqani's tribal, religious and mujahideen credentials. Sirajuddin is in his early 30's, grew up in Miram Shah, Pakistan and, prior to 2001, only occasionally traveled to his native village of Garde Serai, nestled in the rugged mountains of Paktia province. In Miram Shah he was involved in Islamic Studies but, unlike his father, did not graduate from a prestigious madrassah and is too young to have been a well-known fighter during the anti-Soviet jihad.
Hence, the very elements that have contributed to the success of Maulavi Haqqani's activities in eastern Afghanistan (and that could be used to assist in a peace process) -- his personal influence as a tribal leader, mujahideen commander and religious elder -- will be lost after he dies or passes control to Siraj.
Moreover, the respect of Maulavi Haqqani within Afghanistan as a mujahideen leader is matched by the respect he derives from being a prominent tribal and religious elder. As a result, it has been difficult for the various Zadran sub tribes of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to actively oppose his network's activities in their respective tribal regions.
Indeed, today the Haqqani network is spreading its influence geographically into areas previously dominated by other insurgent groups (such as the Mansoor network in Zurmat district of Paktia). It has also, for the first time since the beginning of the Haqqani-led insurgency in late 2004-early 2005, recently embarked upon the systematic targeting and killing of moderate tribal leaders from within the Zadran tribe. This all looks like succession planning. Tactically, Sirajuddin must know that when his father dies (be it of natural causes or otherwise), the tribes would certainly be better positioned to oppose him, should they choose (and be empowered) to do so.
Added to this equation is the knowledge that U.S. pressure on Islamabad to tackle the Haqqani network could see their safe havens in North Waziristan come under increased pressure in the future. Maulavi Haqqani had the necessary contacts and influence to navigate his way through policy shifts in Islamabad. A question mark remains over whether Siraj, in the absence of his father, would be as adept at maneuvering between possible future policy shifts.
The time is ripe, therefore, for a dialogue to take place, one that will be easier to negotiate while the older generation of fighters that knows the benefits of peace is still alive. From my discussions with representatives of Maulavi Haqqani, he still claims to be fighting in Afghanistan for ‘peace.' Sirajuddin, on the other hand, does not know the meaning of the word. He has been brought up in war, has never lived as a citizen of a functioning nation state, has little to no experience of government, is not a tribal elder and is not even a credible religious leader. In this regard he is motivated more by a radical Islamist ideology than his father, and less obviously constrained by a desire to maintain good relations with the local tribal leaders.
For example, on a visit to Afghanistan this year I met with a prominent Zadran tribesman who had returned from North Waziristan the previous week and had spent the night with Siraj. He had taken a message to the commander that the latter's insurgent activities in the Zadran tribal area were having negative consequences for his fellow tribesman. Upon relaying this message, the elder was informed by Siraj that he was welcome to stay the night and receive his hospitality but that if he ever returned again with such a message he would not leave with his head on his shoulders. Such a blunt message to a respected Zadran tribal elder could not and would not have come from his father.
Despite appearances, my years of working closely with various tribal and religious leaders of the Zadran tribe has convinced me that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process, the military intervention in the region and the insurgency. Sadly, some of the best of these leaders have already been targeted by the insurgents or have wrongfully been detained by the International Military Forces. Unless greater security and political space is afforded to the current Zadran tribal and religious leadership in Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the outcome of the Haqqani network's succession planning will go ahead unchallenged.
In order to prevent this scenario from transpiring the United States must make a clear distinction between the current Haqqani network and al Qaeda. The Haqqani network is an Afghan network focused on Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the objective of the Haqqani network is to support an international jihadist agenda. To this end, Washington and Kabul should embark upon a policy of engagement (as part of a broader political outreach effort to all various elements of the Taliban) to separate the two. Locally, U.S. forces must pay greater attention to the local tribal dynamics as part of its counterinsurgency approach. In the southeast, this should include support to the tribal police (or arbakai) and ensuring that the pro-peace tribal majority is not subjected to intimidation, detention (or worse) by the international military presence.
However, should we fail to capitalize on this opportunity for dialogue, a more radical network, combined with the absence of the tribal and religious constraints that Maulavi Haqqani must regularly negotiate, will mark the beginning of a new, more violent generation of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. And this new insurgency will leave no prospects for dialogue or peace.
What strikes me about this article is the similarities between Pashtun and American politics:
"that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process"
The rational, moderate voices in this country are also being drowned out by extremists.
Share
Last month Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief Northern Ireland negotiator, argued that "no group should be beyond talking to." In the context of the current crisis and a shift towards seeking a peace deal in Afghanistan, this is particularly salient. President Hamid Karzai has recently announced the creation of a commission to lead talks with the Taliban. There is also emerging consensus in Washington that stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved by reaching some sort of a political settlement with the Taliban. But not talking to particular insurgent groups will not be a good idea, and a reliance on a policy of "decapitating" them is even worse.
One group that should not "be beyond talking to" is the Haqqani network, named for its leader Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now considered one of the most feared insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The network is responsible for attacks against the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps because of this central role in the Afghan insurgency, in July, Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asserted that the Haqqanis are the Taliban network with the closest ties to al Qaeda and that dealing with them is ‘the most pressing task' in combating the insurgency. Despite their alleged links to international terrorists, even Secretary Clinton has not ruled out supporting dialogue with them (with caveats). These comments suggest the door on the U.S. side may soon be slightly ajar. However, having spent the past six years talking with members of the network, including some of its senior members, it would appear that the Haqqani's door is currently open for talks but may soon be firmly shut. The Haqqani network is in the midst of a generational power shift from father to son, which if completed will all but rule out any future talk of peace.
In June 2007, well before the Haqqani terrorist network had found its way into headlines in the western media, chatter spread through the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that the aging and ill Jalaluddin -- insurgent leader, client of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitator of Osama bin Laden's 2001 escape into Pakistan -- had passed away, reportedly due to hepatitis. The intelligence community picked up on this rumor but quickly disproved it. At the time of this report I was living in the tribal areas of southeast Afghanistan and wrote a report titled "Jalaluddin Haqqani: Dead, Alive, Does it Matter?" In short the answer is yes and no. Yes, because had he died at the time, it would have left the network more vulnerable than at anytime since its emergence in late 2004. And no, because today the Haqqanis have nearly completed what could be best described as ‘succession planning' resulting in a powerful network that many believe jeopardizes Afghanistan's stability
It is well known that for almost a decade he has suffered from health problems and requires regular medical attention rendering him relatively inactive in the day-to-day workings of the insurgency. Furthermore, as a senior insurgent commander (and former Taliban Minister), Maulavi Haqqani's profile as a "most wanted" does not permit travel to the Afghan battle space. Consequently, his 36-year-old son Sirajuddin (aka "Khalifa") has increasingly taken over, with gusto, operational command of his father's network.
However, these limitations speak nothing of the influence Maulavi Haqqani continues to enjoy as a tribal leader, religious scholar, ISI associate and close ally of Gulf Arab financiers. Indeed, the success of the Haqqani network rests with these social/religious/political connections that Maulavi Haqqani has carefully nurtured over the past 30-plus years; indeed, it was these very factors that also made him so popular with the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad). It can be assumed that these networks, particularly with Arab financiers and the ISI, have been "inherited" by Sirajuddin. However, the same cannot be said about Maulavi Haqqani's tribal, religious and mujahideen credentials. Sirajuddin is in his early 30's, grew up in Miram Shah, Pakistan and, prior to 2001, only occasionally traveled to his native village of Garde Serai, nestled in the rugged mountains of Paktia province. In Miram Shah he was involved in Islamic Studies but, unlike his father, did not graduate from a prestigious madrassah and is too young to have been a well-known fighter during the anti-Soviet jihad.
Hence, the very elements that have contributed to the success of Maulavi Haqqani's activities in eastern Afghanistan (and that could be used to assist in a peace process) -- his personal influence as a tribal leader, mujahideen commander and religious elder -- will be lost after he dies or passes control to Siraj.
Moreover, the respect of Maulavi Haqqani within Afghanistan as a mujahideen leader is matched by the respect he derives from being a prominent tribal and religious elder. As a result, it has been difficult for the various Zadran sub tribes of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to actively oppose his network's activities in their respective tribal regions.
Indeed, today the Haqqani network is spreading its influence geographically into areas previously dominated by other insurgent groups (such as the Mansoor network in Zurmat district of Paktia). It has also, for the first time since the beginning of the Haqqani-led insurgency in late 2004-early 2005, recently embarked upon the systematic targeting and killing of moderate tribal leaders from within the Zadran tribe. This all looks like succession planning. Tactically, Sirajuddin must know that when his father dies (be it of natural causes or otherwise), the tribes would certainly be better positioned to oppose him, should they choose (and be empowered) to do so.
Added to this equation is the knowledge that U.S. pressure on Islamabad to tackle the Haqqani network could see their safe havens in North Waziristan come under increased pressure in the future. Maulavi Haqqani had the necessary contacts and influence to navigate his way through policy shifts in Islamabad. A question mark remains over whether Siraj, in the absence of his father, would be as adept at maneuvering between possible future policy shifts.
The time is ripe, therefore, for a dialogue to take place, one that will be easier to negotiate while the older generation of fighters that knows the benefits of peace is still alive. From my discussions with representatives of Maulavi Haqqani, he still claims to be fighting in Afghanistan for ‘peace.' Sirajuddin, on the other hand, does not know the meaning of the word. He has been brought up in war, has never lived as a citizen of a functioning nation state, has little to no experience of government, is not a tribal elder and is not even a credible religious leader. In this regard he is motivated more by a radical Islamist ideology than his father, and less obviously constrained by a desire to maintain good relations with the local tribal leaders.
For example, on a visit to Afghanistan this year I met with a prominent Zadran tribesman who had returned from North Waziristan the previous week and had spent the night with Siraj. He had taken a message to the commander that the latter's insurgent activities in the Zadran tribal area were having negative consequences for his fellow tribesman. Upon relaying this message, the elder was informed by Siraj that he was welcome to stay the night and receive his hospitality but that if he ever returned again with such a message he would not leave with his head on his shoulders. Such a blunt message to a respected Zadran tribal elder could not and would not have come from his father.
Despite appearances, my years of working closely with various tribal and religious leaders of the Zadran tribe has convinced me that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process, the military intervention in the region and the insurgency. Sadly, some of the best of these leaders have already been targeted by the insurgents or have wrongfully been detained by the International Military Forces. Unless greater security and political space is afforded to the current Zadran tribal and religious leadership in Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the outcome of the Haqqani network's succession planning will go ahead unchallenged.
In order to prevent this scenario from transpiring the United States must make a clear distinction between the current Haqqani network and al Qaeda. The Haqqani network is an Afghan network focused on Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the objective of the Haqqani network is to support an international jihadist agenda. To this end, Washington and Kabul should embark upon a policy of engagement (as part of a broader political outreach effort to all various elements of the Taliban) to separate the two. Locally, U.S. forces must pay greater attention to the local tribal dynamics as part of its counterinsurgency approach. In the southeast, this should include support to the tribal police (or arbakai) and ensuring that the pro-peace tribal majority is not subjected to intimidation, detention (or worse) by the international military presence.
However, should we fail to capitalize on this opportunity for dialogue, a more radical network, combined with the absence of the tribal and religious constraints that Maulavi Haqqani must regularly negotiate, will mark the beginning of a new, more violent generation of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. And this new insurgency will leave no prospects for dialogue or peace.
What strikes me about this article is the similarities between Pashtun and American politics:
"that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process"
The rational, moderate voices in this country are also being drowned out by extremists.
Share
Second Strike in South Waziristan
From the Nation.com (September 22, 2010):
PESHAWAR - At least eight suspected militants were killed and many others sustained injuries in a US drone attack in a remote area of South Waziristan Agency here on Tuesday.
Sources informed that a US unmanned aircraft fired two missiles on a village in Khand Morsak, a locality of Jandola, and as a result eight suspected militants were killed while several others got injured.
They said a vehicle was targeted in the strike by the pilotless plane which fired two missiles on it. They added that the spy planes were seen hovering over the village after the missile strike.
They said identification of those killed in the incident could not be made immediately after the attack.
PESHAWAR - At least eight suspected militants were killed and many others sustained injuries in a US drone attack in a remote area of South Waziristan Agency here on Tuesday.
Sources informed that a US unmanned aircraft fired two missiles on a village in Khand Morsak, a locality of Jandola, and as a result eight suspected militants were killed while several others got injured.
They said a vehicle was targeted in the strike by the pilotless plane which fired two missiles on it. They added that the spy planes were seen hovering over the village after the missile strike.
They said identification of those killed in the incident could not be made immediately after the attack.
Labels:
drone,
Khand Morsak,
Pakistan,
South Waziristan,
Taliban
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
FATA/NWFP Maps
I suppose I should I have included maps of the region earlier.
Both maps are courtesy of the Longwar Journal.
The first map shows the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in gold, which is considered the Taliban's and al Qaeda's stronghold and the Northwest Frontier Province in purple, which contains a mish-mash of Taliban, al Qaeda, and other groups. About 3.5 million people live in the FATA and 21 million people live in the NWFP. Obviously the dominant religion is Islam and people speak Pashto (closer to Afghanistan) and Urdu (closer to Pakistan).
The second map shows the relative degree of control of each province (or agency in Pakistan-speak). Red indicates total Taliban control, but I would suggest that the gold areas should also be red. Pakistan operates the Frontier Corps (FC) in these areas, a sort of paramilitary security organization, to police the area. In reality, the FC chose to either (1) enforce the law and ultimately die by the hands of the Taliban, or (2) get on the Taliban's payroll and look the other way.
It's interesting (and frightening) to note that Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, is less than 50 miles from the red areas. If one were to make a map of Islamabad itself, I would guess that there would be plenty of red areas within the city.


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Both maps are courtesy of the Longwar Journal.
The first map shows the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in gold, which is considered the Taliban's and al Qaeda's stronghold and the Northwest Frontier Province in purple, which contains a mish-mash of Taliban, al Qaeda, and other groups. About 3.5 million people live in the FATA and 21 million people live in the NWFP. Obviously the dominant religion is Islam and people speak Pashto (closer to Afghanistan) and Urdu (closer to Pakistan).
The second map shows the relative degree of control of each province (or agency in Pakistan-speak). Red indicates total Taliban control, but I would suggest that the gold areas should also be red. Pakistan operates the Frontier Corps (FC) in these areas, a sort of paramilitary security organization, to police the area. In reality, the FC chose to either (1) enforce the law and ultimately die by the hands of the Taliban, or (2) get on the Taliban's payroll and look the other way.
It's interesting (and frightening) to note that Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, is less than 50 miles from the red areas. If one were to make a map of Islamabad itself, I would guess that there would be plenty of red areas within the city.


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Change in Pace: Drone Strike in South Waziristan
Something/someone big must have been spotted in South Waziristan today to divert our focus from North Waziristan. Perhaps it was Mullah Nazir himself? It's probably a good time to provide a little write up on Nazir and South Waziristan. Stay tuned.
From AFP and Dawn.com (September 21, 2010):
MIRAM SHAH: A US drone on Tuesday fired three missiles at a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt near the Afghan border, killing six militants, officials said.
“At least six militants were killed and five others were wounded when a US drone fired three missiles at a militant compound,” a senior security official told AFP.
The attack took place in Azam Warsak village, some 25 kilometres (15 miles) west of Wana, the main town in South Waziristan tribal district, the official said.
An intelligence official and a South Waziristan administration official confirmed the attack and death toll to AFP via phone in Miram Shah, the capital of neighbouring North Waziristan tribal district.
Another security official in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province also confirmed that the unmanned US aircraft killed at least six militants.
The Nation.com (September 22, 2010) reports that 12 militants were killed in total.
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From AFP and Dawn.com (September 21, 2010):
MIRAM SHAH: A US drone on Tuesday fired three missiles at a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt near the Afghan border, killing six militants, officials said.
“At least six militants were killed and five others were wounded when a US drone fired three missiles at a militant compound,” a senior security official told AFP.
The attack took place in Azam Warsak village, some 25 kilometres (15 miles) west of Wana, the main town in South Waziristan tribal district, the official said.
An intelligence official and a South Waziristan administration official confirmed the attack and death toll to AFP via phone in Miram Shah, the capital of neighbouring North Waziristan tribal district.
Another security official in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province also confirmed that the unmanned US aircraft killed at least six militants.
The Nation.com (September 22, 2010) reports that 12 militants were killed in total.
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Labels:
Azam Warsak,
drone,
Pakistan,
South Waziristan,
Taliban,
Wana
Monday, September 20, 2010
Another Bahadur Drone Strike
I think this is a separate attack from the September 19th strike...it was near Dara Zinda, it's close to Datta Khel, which is controlled by Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
From the AFP and Dawn.com (September 20, 2010):
MIRAM SHAH: Four militants were killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt near the Afghan border on Monday, security officials said.
A drone fired three missiles at Darazinda village, 40 kilometres northeast of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan region, they said.
“The drone fired one missile on two militants riding on a motorbike and when two of their colleagues rushed towards them, two more missiles were fired,” a security official told AFP.
“All four militants were killed.”
Two other security officials confirmed the casualties, saying the missiles were fired by the pilotless aircraft.
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From the AFP and Dawn.com (September 20, 2010):
MIRAM SHAH: Four militants were killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt near the Afghan border on Monday, security officials said.
A drone fired three missiles at Darazinda village, 40 kilometres northeast of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan region, they said.
“The drone fired one missile on two militants riding on a motorbike and when two of their colleagues rushed towards them, two more missiles were fired,” a security official told AFP.
“All four militants were killed.”
Two other security officials confirmed the casualties, saying the missiles were fired by the pilotless aircraft.
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Labels:
Bahadur,
Dara Zinda,
drone,
North Waziristan,
Pakistan
Sunday, September 19, 2010
Drones Strikes Switch Back to Bahadur
From the AP (September 19, 2010):
MIR ALI, Pakistan – Intelligence officials say a suspected U.S. missile strike has killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan.
The officials say Sunday's strike targeted a house belonging to a local militant in the town of Datta Khel in the North Waziristan tribal area. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.
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MIR ALI, Pakistan – Intelligence officials say a suspected U.S. missile strike has killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan.
The officials say Sunday's strike targeted a house belonging to a local militant in the town of Datta Khel in the North Waziristan tribal area. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.
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Wednesday, September 15, 2010
A Death in the Haqqani Family
Seems that the Hellfires are getting closer to their ultimate target.
From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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Monday, September 13, 2010
Just What Afghanistan Needs...
Another Pakistan-based militant group to join in the fray.
From Time Magazine (September 10, 2010):
There was nothing unfamiliar about last month's hours-long gun battle between Afghan security forces and insurgents in Nuristan province — except the identity of some of the militants. Of the 40 or so fighters killed, Gen. Mohammad Zaman Mahmoodzai, head of Afghanistan's border security force, says about a quarter had carried documents implicating them as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based outfit better known for its role in the Kashmir insurgency and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.
The general claims that recent months have seen a steady increase of violent clashes in the east that have yielded a higher ratio of Pakistanis and other foreigners among the insurgent casualties. That, he says, is proof of the nominally Kashmir-oriented group's growing involvement in Afghanistan. The trend is confirmed by U.S. military officials, who say that well-trained LeT fighters are bringing deadlier tools and tactics to the war's second-fiercest front.
With NATO's attention fixed on the southern battle zone where the Taliban is strongest, the LeT, or "Army of the Pure," has aligned with a host of militant groups that have ramped up attacks against Afghan and U.S. forces in the borderlands and beyond. Since they began tracking the group's involvement in Afghanistan in 2008, U.S. officials say the LeT has expanded from a small presence in Kunar province to multiple cells in at least five provinces, actively collaborating with everyone from the Afghan Taliban to the Haqqani network. Kunar and Nuristan remain their focal point, provinces where the U.S. military shut down several remote, heavily targeted bases in the past year. But when NATO in July announced the arrest of two Taliban commanders accused of aiding the LeT, a statement noted the influx of LeT foot soldiers in Nangarhar province, an important commercial center and military supply route. A spike in suicide- and roadside bomb attacks against convoys and government officials have disrupted the once stable area, and Afghan security officials allege the LeT is providing fake documents to attackers.
Originally nurtured by Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as a proxy force to drive India out of Kashmir, the LeT has since raised its profile with spectacular strikes on India's parliament and commercial capital. It was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002 under pressure from the U.S., although the organization continues to operate freely there via thinly disguised front organizations.
But according to Stephen Tankel, a U.S.-based analyst and author of the book Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, "Lashkar was never just a Kashmir-centric organization and always had ambitions beyond the region." Today, he explains, some cadres are motivated by anti-Indian sentiment; others want to wage war against America. Because of increased Indian influence in the government of post-Taliban Afghanistan, these jihadist desires converge. And while India remains its main enemy, anti-Western activity by the LeT is nothing new — as the arrest of operatives as far away as the United States shows. "What we're seeing now is an acceleration of trends that have been in place," Tankel says, "rather than Lashkar trying to go in a new direction."
The LeT's presence in Afghanistan has coincided with mounting Pakistani concern that India's influence in Kabul represents an Indian strategy of encirclement. Ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul was the reason for the ISI helping the Taliban seize power in Afghanistan in 1996, and U.S. officials suspect ongoing Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban since the movement's ouster by U.S.-led forces in 2001. U.S. intelligence officials also suspect a direct Pakistani hand in some attacks in Afghanistan, notably the mid-2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul that left 58 people dead. More recently, Afghan intelligence officials blamed a Feb. 26 attack on a guesthouse in the capital on LeT operatives. (Half of the 18 killed were Indian nationals.) Pakistan, for its part, has denied any responsibility, insisting that its priority is its battle with its domestic Taliban insurgency. But in light of its long-standing reluctance to crack down on the LeT — and alleged involvement in attacks in Afghanistan — Tankel says we "must take seriously" the possibility that elements within the ISI are making use of LeT militants in Afghanistan, even if "there's no smoking gun."
While there's some dispute over just how substantial the LeT presence in Afghanistan really is, Afghan and U.S. officials agree that the group's role is likely to escalate as Western forces begin to withdraw and Pakistan tries to strengthen its influence. What's more, some contend, the LeT's threat should not be measured in numbers. Given that its training program was developed by the Pakistani army, its operatives are still considered among the most capable at small-unit tactics and explosives, making them ideally suited to the low-intensity Afghan conflict. "A few well-equipped pros who go around teaching and coordinating can do a lot more damage" than your average Taliban guerrilla, says the senior U.S. military official, noting the increased level of cooperation. "They're already having a big impact."
From Time Magazine (September 10, 2010):
There was nothing unfamiliar about last month's hours-long gun battle between Afghan security forces and insurgents in Nuristan province — except the identity of some of the militants. Of the 40 or so fighters killed, Gen. Mohammad Zaman Mahmoodzai, head of Afghanistan's border security force, says about a quarter had carried documents implicating them as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based outfit better known for its role in the Kashmir insurgency and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.
The general claims that recent months have seen a steady increase of violent clashes in the east that have yielded a higher ratio of Pakistanis and other foreigners among the insurgent casualties. That, he says, is proof of the nominally Kashmir-oriented group's growing involvement in Afghanistan. The trend is confirmed by U.S. military officials, who say that well-trained LeT fighters are bringing deadlier tools and tactics to the war's second-fiercest front.
With NATO's attention fixed on the southern battle zone where the Taliban is strongest, the LeT, or "Army of the Pure," has aligned with a host of militant groups that have ramped up attacks against Afghan and U.S. forces in the borderlands and beyond. Since they began tracking the group's involvement in Afghanistan in 2008, U.S. officials say the LeT has expanded from a small presence in Kunar province to multiple cells in at least five provinces, actively collaborating with everyone from the Afghan Taliban to the Haqqani network. Kunar and Nuristan remain their focal point, provinces where the U.S. military shut down several remote, heavily targeted bases in the past year. But when NATO in July announced the arrest of two Taliban commanders accused of aiding the LeT, a statement noted the influx of LeT foot soldiers in Nangarhar province, an important commercial center and military supply route. A spike in suicide- and roadside bomb attacks against convoys and government officials have disrupted the once stable area, and Afghan security officials allege the LeT is providing fake documents to attackers.
Originally nurtured by Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as a proxy force to drive India out of Kashmir, the LeT has since raised its profile with spectacular strikes on India's parliament and commercial capital. It was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002 under pressure from the U.S., although the organization continues to operate freely there via thinly disguised front organizations.
But according to Stephen Tankel, a U.S.-based analyst and author of the book Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, "Lashkar was never just a Kashmir-centric organization and always had ambitions beyond the region." Today, he explains, some cadres are motivated by anti-Indian sentiment; others want to wage war against America. Because of increased Indian influence in the government of post-Taliban Afghanistan, these jihadist desires converge. And while India remains its main enemy, anti-Western activity by the LeT is nothing new — as the arrest of operatives as far away as the United States shows. "What we're seeing now is an acceleration of trends that have been in place," Tankel says, "rather than Lashkar trying to go in a new direction."
The LeT's presence in Afghanistan has coincided with mounting Pakistani concern that India's influence in Kabul represents an Indian strategy of encirclement. Ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul was the reason for the ISI helping the Taliban seize power in Afghanistan in 1996, and U.S. officials suspect ongoing Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban since the movement's ouster by U.S.-led forces in 2001. U.S. intelligence officials also suspect a direct Pakistani hand in some attacks in Afghanistan, notably the mid-2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul that left 58 people dead. More recently, Afghan intelligence officials blamed a Feb. 26 attack on a guesthouse in the capital on LeT operatives. (Half of the 18 killed were Indian nationals.) Pakistan, for its part, has denied any responsibility, insisting that its priority is its battle with its domestic Taliban insurgency. But in light of its long-standing reluctance to crack down on the LeT — and alleged involvement in attacks in Afghanistan — Tankel says we "must take seriously" the possibility that elements within the ISI are making use of LeT militants in Afghanistan, even if "there's no smoking gun."
While there's some dispute over just how substantial the LeT presence in Afghanistan really is, Afghan and U.S. officials agree that the group's role is likely to escalate as Western forces begin to withdraw and Pakistan tries to strengthen its influence. What's more, some contend, the LeT's threat should not be measured in numbers. Given that its training program was developed by the Pakistani army, its operatives are still considered among the most capable at small-unit tactics and explosives, making them ideally suited to the low-intensity Afghan conflict. "A few well-equipped pros who go around teaching and coordinating can do a lot more damage" than your average Taliban guerrilla, says the senior U.S. military official, noting the increased level of cooperation. "They're already having a big impact."
Saturday, September 11, 2010
Hafiz Gul Bahadur Update 12Sep10
It seems that the Pentagon has been reading my blog and decided to send Gul a care package...
From the AP:
MIR ALI, Pakistan – A suspected U.S. missile strike early Sunday killed at least four suspected associates of a warlord who is fighting Western troops in Afghanistan, intelligence officials said.
Powerful militant leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur struck a truce with the Pakistani military and agreed to stay on the sidelines last year as it waged an offensive in the South Waziristan tribal area against the Pakistani Taliban, a group dedicated to attacking the Pakistani state, among other targets.
Bahadur has focused instead on battling U.S. and NATO troops across the border in Afghanistan
Two Pakistan intelligence officials told The Associated Press that two missiles targeted a home in the village of Tata Khel in the North Waziristan tribal area where Gul's associates were believed to be staying. They said three men were believed to be wounded.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.
A steady series of suspected U.S. missile attacks have happened in North Waziristan, a lawless region home to al-Qaida leaders plotting attacks in the West, insurgents battling foreign troops in Afghanistan and extremists behind bombings in Pakistan.
Four airstrikes pounded the area over 24 hours this past week, the last killing five suspected militants early Thursday, officials said.
There were at least four other attacks earlier in the week.
Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
Pakistan has condemned the American missile strikes as violations of its sovereignty, warning that the civilian casualties they cause deepen anti-U.S. sentiment and complicate the fight against terrorism.
But many suspect the two countries have a deal allowing the drone-fired attacks.
And from the Long War Journal:
The US killed 18 "militants" in three Predator airstrikes today in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
The first strike took place just outside of Miramshah in the town of Danda Darpa Khel. The strike targeted a compound, killing 10 "militants," Pakistani security officials told AFP. The US Predators returned to Danda Darpa Khel and struck again at another compound, killing four more Haqqani Network fighters, according to Dawn.
The village of Danda Darpa Khel is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in the village of Danda Darpa Khel, a hub of activity for the terror group. The US has struck at targets in Danda Darpa Khel seven times since Aug. 20, 2009, and nine times since September 2008.
The other strike took place in the town of Ambor Shaga in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan. Three missiles were fired at a vehicle, killing four more "militants."
No senior Taliban or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed in any of the three strikes, and the targets of the attacks are not known.
Datta Khel is the stronghold of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a Taliban commander who is viewed as "good Taliban" by the Pakistani military as he does not advocate attacks on the Pakistani state. Bahadar supports attacks in Afghanistan and shelters al Qaeda fighters in tribal areas under his control.
Datta Khel also serves as a headquarters for al Qaeda. The US has killed top al Qaeda leaders Mustafa Abu Yazid, Abdullah Said al Libi, and Zuhaib al Zahib in strikes in the area over the past year.
Four of the last six Predator strikes in Pakistan have all taken place in Datta Khel. Five Taliban were killed in a strike on Sept. 6. Nine Taliban fighters, including a commander known as Inayatullah, were killed in a strike on a compound in Datta Khel on Sept. 3. And eight Taliban fighters were killed in a strike on a compound and a vehicle in Datta Khel on Sept. 4.
From the AP:
MIR ALI, Pakistan – A suspected U.S. missile strike early Sunday killed at least four suspected associates of a warlord who is fighting Western troops in Afghanistan, intelligence officials said.
Powerful militant leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur struck a truce with the Pakistani military and agreed to stay on the sidelines last year as it waged an offensive in the South Waziristan tribal area against the Pakistani Taliban, a group dedicated to attacking the Pakistani state, among other targets.
Bahadur has focused instead on battling U.S. and NATO troops across the border in Afghanistan
Two Pakistan intelligence officials told The Associated Press that two missiles targeted a home in the village of Tata Khel in the North Waziristan tribal area where Gul's associates were believed to be staying. They said three men were believed to be wounded.
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak to the media.
A steady series of suspected U.S. missile attacks have happened in North Waziristan, a lawless region home to al-Qaida leaders plotting attacks in the West, insurgents battling foreign troops in Afghanistan and extremists behind bombings in Pakistan.
Four airstrikes pounded the area over 24 hours this past week, the last killing five suspected militants early Thursday, officials said.
There were at least four other attacks earlier in the week.
Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
Pakistan has condemned the American missile strikes as violations of its sovereignty, warning that the civilian casualties they cause deepen anti-U.S. sentiment and complicate the fight against terrorism.
But many suspect the two countries have a deal allowing the drone-fired attacks.
And from the Long War Journal:
The US killed 18 "militants" in three Predator airstrikes today in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
The first strike took place just outside of Miramshah in the town of Danda Darpa Khel. The strike targeted a compound, killing 10 "militants," Pakistani security officials told AFP. The US Predators returned to Danda Darpa Khel and struck again at another compound, killing four more Haqqani Network fighters, according to Dawn.
The village of Danda Darpa Khel is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in the village of Danda Darpa Khel, a hub of activity for the terror group. The US has struck at targets in Danda Darpa Khel seven times since Aug. 20, 2009, and nine times since September 2008.
The other strike took place in the town of Ambor Shaga in the Datta Khel area of North Waziristan. Three missiles were fired at a vehicle, killing four more "militants."
No senior Taliban or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed in any of the three strikes, and the targets of the attacks are not known.
Datta Khel is the stronghold of Hafiz Gul Bahadar, a Taliban commander who is viewed as "good Taliban" by the Pakistani military as he does not advocate attacks on the Pakistani state. Bahadar supports attacks in Afghanistan and shelters al Qaeda fighters in tribal areas under his control.
Datta Khel also serves as a headquarters for al Qaeda. The US has killed top al Qaeda leaders Mustafa Abu Yazid, Abdullah Said al Libi, and Zuhaib al Zahib in strikes in the area over the past year.
Four of the last six Predator strikes in Pakistan have all taken place in Datta Khel. Five Taliban were killed in a strike on Sept. 6. Nine Taliban fighters, including a commander known as Inayatullah, were killed in a strike on a compound in Datta Khel on Sept. 3. And eight Taliban fighters were killed in a strike on a compound and a vehicle in Datta Khel on Sept. 4.
Friday, September 10, 2010
A New Way Forward??? Part 1
So the Afghanistan Study Group (http://www. afghanistanstudygroup.org) recently published a new and revised war strategy going forward in Afghanistan called "A New Way Forward: The Report". It's on the main page of the website, so download it and read it. It won't take long to read, which may or may not be good. Rather than copy and paste the entire report, I decided to carry over the five conclusions of the report and offer an assessment.
"1. Emphasize Power-Sharing and Political Reconciliation. Afghanistan will not achieve a sustainable peace without broader support from the Afghan people themselves. Accordingly, the United States should fast track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and to encourage a power sharing arrangement among all parties.
Under the current Afghanistan Constitution, the President has unchecked authority to appoint provincial governors and hundreds of other positions in government. As David Miliband wrote, in many parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent, half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. As an important start to reform, the Afghan Parliament should be given confirmation authority for major appointments, district councils should be elected, budgeting authority decentralized, and elected provincial representatives should be included in the national level council that determines the portion of funds distributed. The ethnic base of the Afghan army should be broadened. More generally, governance should depend more heavily on local, traditional, and community-based structures.
In contrast to President Karzai’s recent and narrowly conceived “peace jirga,” political outreach should include leaders selected by key tribal and village leaders in all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and regional divisions, including rural Pashtuns. This effort should be open to those among the fragmented Taliban who are willing to engage in genuine reconciliation, a step that can help marginalize those Taliban who remain defiant. Preconditions for negotiations, such as recognizing the existing Afghan Constitution, should not be required."
Fast Tracking the Peace Process
This is an overly simplistic and naive view of the region. The Taliban, with the backing of the local populace (or at least no resistance), al Qaeda, and the Pakistani ISI, have been in control of a majority of Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Maybe it has not been flying flags and sending out notes on official letterhead control, but really "in control" through on-going intimidation, narco-trafficking, and shadow governments. On one side sits the Taliban, for the most part safely ensconced in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who have nothing but time and know that we don't. It's a waiting game to them and with the stomach of the American people turned wretchedly by Iraq, they won't have to wait very long. The so-called 2011 withdrawl schedule announced by President Obama does NOT send a signal to the militants that they already don't know. They are smart, under little military pressure, and know that our stay in AfPak is limited by money and weak morale back at home.
On the other side sit 135,000 ISAF troops whose countries, for the most part, have been there since the beginning in late 2001. Many of these same countries fought in Iraq and their citizens and governments have grown weary and are in debt. ISAF forces, with the exception of small groups of Special Forces, will not bring the fight to the Taliban in the tribal areas due to many practical restraints, such as logistics, politics, and manpower. Thus, the only pressure we can exert on the Taliban is through either 1) face to face (direct action) confrontations or 2) drone strikes in the tribal areas. Our mission in southern Afghanistan has largely revolved around trying to bait the Taliban into the open, but they have learned that no fighting force can defeat the modern U.S. military in a direct action engagement. Consequently, the Taliban have adopted the same strategy that doomed the Soviets in the 1980s, which is to 1) melt into the local population and 2) retreat to the mountainous areas and pick the time and place to fight in small unit engagements. Aside from the rare direct action engagement at places like Marjah and Lashkar Gah, ISAF military power has been relegated to conducting drone strikes in the tribal areas.
There is no doubt that the U.S drone strike campaign has killed a large number of Taliban and other jihadis (virtually every #3 man in every jihadi group has been killed several times), but it is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall number of combatants, which is estimated to be between 30,000 – 60,000. Let me be clear--drone strikes are an indispensible part of the effort as they effectively and (relatively) cheaply destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy. However, they are not mass casualty weapons. Additionally, unlike al Qaeda, the tribal militants have an effective and in-depth leadership and training structure (based on the tribal structure), so that even when drone strikes kill the leadership, the lower echelon troops are well versed in tactics and can still carry on the mission. An unintended effect of the drone strikes has been an increased recruitment of new fighters and increasing resentment towards the Pakistani government and the ISAF effort (TTP bombings in heavily populated areas). Thus, as they wait, they grow stronger while continuing to receive financial and military aid from the narco-trafficking profits (courtesy of American and European drug users) and Gulf State donors.
Which brings me to my point—to fast track anything, ISAF and the Afghan government need leverage. We have little leverage in face to face combat, as the Taliban is reluctant to participate in large scale direct action engagements. We have some leverage with the drone strikes, but their effects are limited and are a double-edged sword. We have no economic leverage because the narco-trade is extremely lucrative and our continuing presence in a Muslim country inspires Islamic donors. We have almost no leverage to force the Taliban to come to the table. The only hope we have is to convince the Taliban leadership that living in Afghanistan and earning an honest day’s wage is better than living in the tribal areas wondering if the next Hellfire missile is aimed at them. There may be some merit to this approach, but it definitely won’t be something that can be accomplished in short order.
A more effective, but probably less realistic solution, is not through military power, but through economic and political pressure. If the U.S, were to cease $5 billion in annual monetary aid to Pakistan (or dole it directly to the humanitarian projects) and military hardware, this would pressure Pakistan to, in turn, pressure the Taliban to come to the table. Pakistan is so insanely paranoid about a conflict with India (most of the financial assistance given to them goes to military efforts in the Kashmir region), that a denial of conventional arms and money, in all likelihood, would pressure them to cooperate. This solution, while effective, would probably never happen from a political standpoint, though. Pakistan is viewed as our "friend", and to deny aid to our "partner" in the war on terror would be viewed as directly aiding the Taliban. This conundrum is similar to our situation with Israel--if we cut off military aid, they would be forced to come to the table and adopt a two-state solution. Any rubbish about this type of move prompting Pakistan to help the Taliban as retribution is just that--rubbish. Pakistan cares first and foremost about it's survival. The government is largely secular and tries to cater to the extremists only to the extent that it serves their own interest. Faced with the option of either losing a war with India or kicking the militants out of the tribal areas, Pakistan would undoubtedly choose the former as its priority.
Decentralization of Power
This is exactly what needs to happen. A federal model of government in Afghanistan is a Soviet relic. The country has existed for centuries as a decentralized series of provinces based on ethnicity, language, tribal and religious affiliation, and geographic location. It was not until the Soviets established a centralized puppet government in the 1980s that the various provinces were "federated". After the pullout in 1989, the Najibullah government collapsed quickly as the various ethnic and tribal groups jockyed for power.
The Bush and Obama administrations have made the centralization of power a focus of their strategies, perhaps because it is the backbone of the American democratic model. Aside from the faulty centralized approach, President Karzai is viewed as extremely corrupt by locals (he's actually fairly honest, but he tolerates rampant corruption, which makes him seen as corrupt) and quite powerless to provide protection or support to areas far away from Kabul. I think our fascination with the centralized model has been championed by the military and CIA, the two entities that should NOT be responsible for a strategic nation building plan. The more effective approach is to have a weak centralized government, designed by the State Department, that does nothing but promote hegemony between the provinces, and allow the power to rest in the hands of the provincial governors. This can only be done by effectively stripping Karzai of his power (through a national referendum) and allowing the provinces to conduct elections with the express intent of strong local governance.
I guess the Taliban thought a direct action assault would turn out differently. Obviously they didn't read my blog. From the Long War Journal (Sep 2nd):
US and Afghan troops have beaten back another attempt by the Haqqani Network to overrun a US base in eastern Afghanistan.
More than 20 members of the Haqqani Network were killed after launching an early morning attack today on Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province.
"The attack began in the early morning with small arms and indirect fire directed against the outpost," the International Security Assistance Forces stated in a press release. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers.
"Aircraft from TF [Task Force] Viper conducted two passes over the area, killing at least 20 insurgents in two separate engagements," ISAF stated. No US or Afghan troops were killed or wounded in the attacks.
Combat Outpost Margah is the third US base to be assaulted by the Haqqani Network since Aug. 28. Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province on Aug. 28.
In the Aug. 28 attacks, US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that the Haqqani Network attacks, and similar assaults carried out against major US bases across the country, are ineffective.
"These sorts of FOB [forward operating base] attacks have become little more than exercises in target practice here," the official said in the aftermath of the Aug. 28 attacks. "They show up, we watch them; we kill them."
But a senior US military intelligence official and several US military officers contacted by The Long War Journal cautioned that the attacks demonstrate that the Haqqani Network still has the capacity to organize and strike just outside the walls of US outposts.
"That they [the Taliban and Haqqani Network] can muster their forces so close to large US bases and launch the attacks shows that their presence is strong just outside the gates of our largest bases," an officer who wished to remain anonymous said. "There is no doubt that these are lopsided battles."
"All they need to do is get their fighters inside the wire and create havoc, and the Taliban score a major propaganda coup," a senior US military intelligence official said. "The Taliban know the worst case scenario for them in these attacks - they lose all of their men - and they are willing to take those losses to achieve that goal."
In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base, and conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July. Three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
"1. Emphasize Power-Sharing and Political Reconciliation. Afghanistan will not achieve a sustainable peace without broader support from the Afghan people themselves. Accordingly, the United States should fast track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and to encourage a power sharing arrangement among all parties.
Under the current Afghanistan Constitution, the President has unchecked authority to appoint provincial governors and hundreds of other positions in government. As David Miliband wrote, in many parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent, half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. As an important start to reform, the Afghan Parliament should be given confirmation authority for major appointments, district councils should be elected, budgeting authority decentralized, and elected provincial representatives should be included in the national level council that determines the portion of funds distributed. The ethnic base of the Afghan army should be broadened. More generally, governance should depend more heavily on local, traditional, and community-based structures.
In contrast to President Karzai’s recent and narrowly conceived “peace jirga,” political outreach should include leaders selected by key tribal and village leaders in all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and regional divisions, including rural Pashtuns. This effort should be open to those among the fragmented Taliban who are willing to engage in genuine reconciliation, a step that can help marginalize those Taliban who remain defiant. Preconditions for negotiations, such as recognizing the existing Afghan Constitution, should not be required."
Fast Tracking the Peace Process
This is an overly simplistic and naive view of the region. The Taliban, with the backing of the local populace (or at least no resistance), al Qaeda, and the Pakistani ISI, have been in control of a majority of Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Maybe it has not been flying flags and sending out notes on official letterhead control, but really "in control" through on-going intimidation, narco-trafficking, and shadow governments. On one side sits the Taliban, for the most part safely ensconced in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who have nothing but time and know that we don't. It's a waiting game to them and with the stomach of the American people turned wretchedly by Iraq, they won't have to wait very long. The so-called 2011 withdrawl schedule announced by President Obama does NOT send a signal to the militants that they already don't know. They are smart, under little military pressure, and know that our stay in AfPak is limited by money and weak morale back at home.
On the other side sit 135,000 ISAF troops whose countries, for the most part, have been there since the beginning in late 2001. Many of these same countries fought in Iraq and their citizens and governments have grown weary and are in debt. ISAF forces, with the exception of small groups of Special Forces, will not bring the fight to the Taliban in the tribal areas due to many practical restraints, such as logistics, politics, and manpower. Thus, the only pressure we can exert on the Taliban is through either 1) face to face (direct action) confrontations or 2) drone strikes in the tribal areas. Our mission in southern Afghanistan has largely revolved around trying to bait the Taliban into the open, but they have learned that no fighting force can defeat the modern U.S. military in a direct action engagement. Consequently, the Taliban have adopted the same strategy that doomed the Soviets in the 1980s, which is to 1) melt into the local population and 2) retreat to the mountainous areas and pick the time and place to fight in small unit engagements. Aside from the rare direct action engagement at places like Marjah and Lashkar Gah, ISAF military power has been relegated to conducting drone strikes in the tribal areas.
There is no doubt that the U.S drone strike campaign has killed a large number of Taliban and other jihadis (virtually every #3 man in every jihadi group has been killed several times), but it is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall number of combatants, which is estimated to be between 30,000 – 60,000. Let me be clear--drone strikes are an indispensible part of the effort as they effectively and (relatively) cheaply destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy. However, they are not mass casualty weapons. Additionally, unlike al Qaeda, the tribal militants have an effective and in-depth leadership and training structure (based on the tribal structure), so that even when drone strikes kill the leadership, the lower echelon troops are well versed in tactics and can still carry on the mission. An unintended effect of the drone strikes has been an increased recruitment of new fighters and increasing resentment towards the Pakistani government and the ISAF effort (TTP bombings in heavily populated areas). Thus, as they wait, they grow stronger while continuing to receive financial and military aid from the narco-trafficking profits (courtesy of American and European drug users) and Gulf State donors.
Which brings me to my point—to fast track anything, ISAF and the Afghan government need leverage. We have little leverage in face to face combat, as the Taliban is reluctant to participate in large scale direct action engagements. We have some leverage with the drone strikes, but their effects are limited and are a double-edged sword. We have no economic leverage because the narco-trade is extremely lucrative and our continuing presence in a Muslim country inspires Islamic donors. We have almost no leverage to force the Taliban to come to the table. The only hope we have is to convince the Taliban leadership that living in Afghanistan and earning an honest day’s wage is better than living in the tribal areas wondering if the next Hellfire missile is aimed at them. There may be some merit to this approach, but it definitely won’t be something that can be accomplished in short order.
A more effective, but probably less realistic solution, is not through military power, but through economic and political pressure. If the U.S, were to cease $5 billion in annual monetary aid to Pakistan (or dole it directly to the humanitarian projects) and military hardware, this would pressure Pakistan to, in turn, pressure the Taliban to come to the table. Pakistan is so insanely paranoid about a conflict with India (most of the financial assistance given to them goes to military efforts in the Kashmir region), that a denial of conventional arms and money, in all likelihood, would pressure them to cooperate. This solution, while effective, would probably never happen from a political standpoint, though. Pakistan is viewed as our "friend", and to deny aid to our "partner" in the war on terror would be viewed as directly aiding the Taliban. This conundrum is similar to our situation with Israel--if we cut off military aid, they would be forced to come to the table and adopt a two-state solution. Any rubbish about this type of move prompting Pakistan to help the Taliban as retribution is just that--rubbish. Pakistan cares first and foremost about it's survival. The government is largely secular and tries to cater to the extremists only to the extent that it serves their own interest. Faced with the option of either losing a war with India or kicking the militants out of the tribal areas, Pakistan would undoubtedly choose the former as its priority.
Decentralization of Power
This is exactly what needs to happen. A federal model of government in Afghanistan is a Soviet relic. The country has existed for centuries as a decentralized series of provinces based on ethnicity, language, tribal and religious affiliation, and geographic location. It was not until the Soviets established a centralized puppet government in the 1980s that the various provinces were "federated". After the pullout in 1989, the Najibullah government collapsed quickly as the various ethnic and tribal groups jockyed for power.
The Bush and Obama administrations have made the centralization of power a focus of their strategies, perhaps because it is the backbone of the American democratic model. Aside from the faulty centralized approach, President Karzai is viewed as extremely corrupt by locals (he's actually fairly honest, but he tolerates rampant corruption, which makes him seen as corrupt) and quite powerless to provide protection or support to areas far away from Kabul. I think our fascination with the centralized model has been championed by the military and CIA, the two entities that should NOT be responsible for a strategic nation building plan. The more effective approach is to have a weak centralized government, designed by the State Department, that does nothing but promote hegemony between the provinces, and allow the power to rest in the hands of the provincial governors. This can only be done by effectively stripping Karzai of his power (through a national referendum) and allowing the provinces to conduct elections with the express intent of strong local governance.
I guess the Taliban thought a direct action assault would turn out differently. Obviously they didn't read my blog. From the Long War Journal (Sep 2nd):
US and Afghan troops have beaten back another attempt by the Haqqani Network to overrun a US base in eastern Afghanistan.
More than 20 members of the Haqqani Network were killed after launching an early morning attack today on Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province.
"The attack began in the early morning with small arms and indirect fire directed against the outpost," the International Security Assistance Forces stated in a press release. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers.
"Aircraft from TF [Task Force] Viper conducted two passes over the area, killing at least 20 insurgents in two separate engagements," ISAF stated. No US or Afghan troops were killed or wounded in the attacks.
Combat Outpost Margah is the third US base to be assaulted by the Haqqani Network since Aug. 28. Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province on Aug. 28.
In the Aug. 28 attacks, US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that the Haqqani Network attacks, and similar assaults carried out against major US bases across the country, are ineffective.
"These sorts of FOB [forward operating base] attacks have become little more than exercises in target practice here," the official said in the aftermath of the Aug. 28 attacks. "They show up, we watch them; we kill them."
But a senior US military intelligence official and several US military officers contacted by The Long War Journal cautioned that the attacks demonstrate that the Haqqani Network still has the capacity to organize and strike just outside the walls of US outposts.
"That they [the Taliban and Haqqani Network] can muster their forces so close to large US bases and launch the attacks shows that their presence is strong just outside the gates of our largest bases," an officer who wished to remain anonymous said. "There is no doubt that these are lopsided battles."
"All they need to do is get their fighters inside the wire and create havoc, and the Taliban score a major propaganda coup," a senior US military intelligence official said. "The Taliban know the worst case scenario for them in these attacks - they lose all of their men - and they are willing to take those losses to achieve that goal."
In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base, and conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July. Three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
Hafiz Gul Bahadur
Background
Hafiz Gul Bahadur was born around 1961 and belongs to the Madda Khel clan of the Uthmanzai Wazir tribe, which is located near Lwara, North Waziristan (between Miram Shah and the Afghan border). He annointed himself “Hafiz”, which means one who mastered the entire Qur’an. Bahadur may have fought with the mujahedeen against the Soviets, but certainly fought with QST in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. He is reported to have received his religious education from a Deobandi madrassa in Punjab. Not surprisingly, Bahadur subscribes to the Deobandi Islamic revivalist ideology and maintains a political affiliation with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F), a Deobandi political party. Deobandism, a branch of Sunni Islam, promotes the belief that, instead of following a single school of Islam throughout one’s life, one could employ any one of the four principal schools. Deobandism eventually became the force behind the Jamiaat Ulema Islam (JUI), founded in 1947 first as a religious movement, which helped to set up popular mosques across Pakistan. He maintains a private profile, avoiding any direct contact with journalists in recent years and putting out statements only through his spokesman, Ahmadullah Ahmadi.
The Bahadur Militant Network
Gul Bahadur is considered one of the most important militant leaders in North Waziristan, is known for hosting al-Qaeda and other militant Arab groups, and enjoys close ties with the Haqqani Network. Bahadur currently leads a force of more than 1,500 militants. He rose to fame in 2005, when the Pakistani military initiated combat operations to evict foreign militants from the Tochi River Valley in North Waziristan. The Valley was an operating safe haven for al Qaeda militants forced out of South Waziristan by Pakistani troops, which launched offensives in October 2003 and in April 2004. During the offensives, Bahadur led his men against the Pakistani military alongside troops led by Saddiq Noor and Jalaluddin Haqqani.
After taking a considerable beating by Pakistani troops, Bahadur entered into a ceasefire with the Pakistani government, which resulted in the September 2006 North Waziristan Peace Agreement. The Agreement, facilitated by Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Dadullah (now dead), called for the eviction of foreign militants from North Waziristan, who had been interfering in the local affairs of the region. The interference created tension between the foreign militants, local Taliban leaders from the Mirali area who supported the foreign militants, and Bahadur. The expulsion of certain foreign militants, mostly non-al Qaeda Arabs (Iraqis) and Central Asian militants (Uzbeks) was, however, supported by both Saddiq Noor and Haqqani.
Before the Agreement was implemented, the Uzbek militants expressed their disapproval and refused to comply with Bahadur’s terms. This led Bahadur to assemble a five-member jirga comprised of senior Taliban commanders, which sent a clear message that the militants had no other choice but to honor the truce. Ultimately, politics won over principle and the militants were able to stay in the Mirali area due to strong support from local Taliban leaders such as Manzoor Daur, who openly opposed Bahadur’s decision to expel the foreign militants.
After the signing of the 2006 Peace Agreement, Bahadur became the emir (leader) of the newly formed North Waziristan Taliban and set up a government that paralleled the QST. Unlike South Waziristan, where the Taliban is divided on a tribal basis, the North Waziristan Taliban remained somewhat united. In October 2006, Bahadur’s Taliban took a major step towards “Talibanization” when it issued a pamphlet in which they outlined the levy of new taxes and prescribed harsh penalties for various offenses, such as listening to CDs or shaving beards.
Not surprisingly, the fragile peace agreement broke down in mid-2007 amid acrimony. Pakistani checkpoints in his territory and the Red Mosque Raid were a few of many gripes. Just a few months later, a new peace initiative was launched by a tribal jirga from the Orakzai Agency. While negotiations proceeded Bahadur joined several other FATA/NWFP Taliban commanders to form the TTP. Baitullah Mehsud (responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) was chosen as emir and Bahadur as deputy, but Bahadur quickly (and unofficially) distanced himself from the TTP after Mullah Omar opposed its formation based on military philosophy. Unlike Mehsud, Bahadur supports the Pakistani government (more likely the ISI) and avoids attacks on it or personnel in the FATA. As negotiations drew to a close at the beginning of 2008, the Pakistani military initiated an offensive against Mehsud. To ward off the onslaught, Mehsud attempted to attack Pakistani forces through the Razmak area of North Waziristan. Bahadur, however, barred his axis of attack, saying that any attack would jeopardize his peace agreement, which was finalized in February of 2008.
Partly as a response to Bahadur’s rebuff, Mehsud expanded his TTP influence in the FATA and attempted to eliminate or assimilate rival Taliban commanders. This alarmed many Waziri leaders, who formed the Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (Local Taliban Movement), or the “Waziri Alliance”, with Bahadur as emir and Mullah Nazir (a South Waziristan leader) as his deputy. The Waziri Alliance, backed by the Haqqanis, deterred Mehsud, as he was encircled on all sides by the coalition. Not surprisingly, the Bahadur-Nazir alliance did not last long. In February 2009, Bahadur, Mehsud, and Nazir declared that they had overcome their differences and formed the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahedeen (Council for United Holy Warriors). The SIM focused military actions against Western forces in Afghanistan rather than oppose Pakistan, but fell apart in mid-2009 when tribal tensions sky rocketed and a U.S. drone strike killed Mehsud. Bahadur’s approach closely resembles the Haqqani philosophy, which favors the ISI, and as of 2010, both are free to conduct attacks into Afghanistan and to “Talibanize” their tribal lands. Bahadur usually conducts attacks against Pakistan immediately following U.S. drone strikes, claiming that they violate the terms of their peace agreement.
Leadership
Bahadur’s most important commander is Maulana Saddiq Noor of the Daur tribe who commands about 800 militants. Noor was born around 1955 and has been intimately involved with the QST since 1996. Like Bahadur, Saddiq Noor is based near Miram Shah, where he directed the Mamba-ul-Uloom madrassa, originally built by Jalaluddin Haqqani to support the jihad against the Soviets. The madrassa served as Noor’s headquarters until a U.S. drone strike destroyed it in September 2008. Although Saddiq Noor was left unscathed, it was reported that either nine of his family members or nine members of the Haqqani family were killed in the attack.
Noor’s deputy is Sayeed Khan Daur, who is also from Miram Shah. Although he is younger than either Noor or Bahadur, Khan Daur has a university degree and is known as a computer expert. Abdul Khaliq Haqqani, who commands about 500 militants (and not related to the Haqqani Network as he is Pakistani), is a former Bahadur commander, but was exiled after charges of embezzlement and collaboration with the Uzbeks.
Other close allies of Bahadur are: 1) Wahidullah Wazir, who leads a militant group of 200 Waziri tribesmen around Miram Shah; 2) Halim Khan Daur, who leads about 150 militants: and 3) Saifullah Wazir, who leads about 400 militants. All groups are primarily involved in cross-border attacks on Western forces, but also engage the Pakistani army from time to time.
Western Efforts
U.S. drone strikes have killed several associates of Bahadur and include: al Qaeda leader Abu Laith al-Libbi in January 2008 near Mir Ali, former Egyptian Islamic Group Leader and reported chief al Qaeda propagandist Abu Jihad al-Masri in October 2008, senior al Qaeda member Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi on November 19, 2008, Rashid Rauf, the organizer of the plot to bring down trans-Atlantic flights, on November 22, 2008, al Qaeda member Asad al-Misri (along with twenty-three militants loyal to Bahadur) on May 16, 2009, and a September 4, 2008 drone strike near Miranshah that killed two Arab fighters along with four Daur tribesmen.
Legacy
Bahadur is committed first to his own survival, second to Afghanistan, third to Mehsud, and last to his vision of an Islamist Pakistani state. His political and ideological backgrounds allow him to continue supporting the fight against Western troops while compromising on almost everything else. He will likely continue to direct some level of violence, but will probably avoid unchecked hostilities with the Pakistani government, which both seem to believe would be harmful to their respective interests. His ability to effectively engage Western troops is most likely somewhat limited by the political games he plays with Mehsud and and the ISI. Peace between Bahadur and Pakistan may boost Islamabad’s (ISI’s) interests in the short term, but will hurt Western interests in the long term.
Selected Sources:
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com
http://www.criticalthreats.org
http://www.jamestown.org
http://www.nytimes.com
http://www.merip.org/
Hafiz Gul Bahadur was born around 1961 and belongs to the Madda Khel clan of the Uthmanzai Wazir tribe, which is located near Lwara, North Waziristan (between Miram Shah and the Afghan border). He annointed himself “Hafiz”, which means one who mastered the entire Qur’an. Bahadur may have fought with the mujahedeen against the Soviets, but certainly fought with QST in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. He is reported to have received his religious education from a Deobandi madrassa in Punjab. Not surprisingly, Bahadur subscribes to the Deobandi Islamic revivalist ideology and maintains a political affiliation with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F), a Deobandi political party. Deobandism, a branch of Sunni Islam, promotes the belief that, instead of following a single school of Islam throughout one’s life, one could employ any one of the four principal schools. Deobandism eventually became the force behind the Jamiaat Ulema Islam (JUI), founded in 1947 first as a religious movement, which helped to set up popular mosques across Pakistan. He maintains a private profile, avoiding any direct contact with journalists in recent years and putting out statements only through his spokesman, Ahmadullah Ahmadi.
The Bahadur Militant Network
Gul Bahadur is considered one of the most important militant leaders in North Waziristan, is known for hosting al-Qaeda and other militant Arab groups, and enjoys close ties with the Haqqani Network. Bahadur currently leads a force of more than 1,500 militants. He rose to fame in 2005, when the Pakistani military initiated combat operations to evict foreign militants from the Tochi River Valley in North Waziristan. The Valley was an operating safe haven for al Qaeda militants forced out of South Waziristan by Pakistani troops, which launched offensives in October 2003 and in April 2004. During the offensives, Bahadur led his men against the Pakistani military alongside troops led by Saddiq Noor and Jalaluddin Haqqani.
After taking a considerable beating by Pakistani troops, Bahadur entered into a ceasefire with the Pakistani government, which resulted in the September 2006 North Waziristan Peace Agreement. The Agreement, facilitated by Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Dadullah (now dead), called for the eviction of foreign militants from North Waziristan, who had been interfering in the local affairs of the region. The interference created tension between the foreign militants, local Taliban leaders from the Mirali area who supported the foreign militants, and Bahadur. The expulsion of certain foreign militants, mostly non-al Qaeda Arabs (Iraqis) and Central Asian militants (Uzbeks) was, however, supported by both Saddiq Noor and Haqqani.
Before the Agreement was implemented, the Uzbek militants expressed their disapproval and refused to comply with Bahadur’s terms. This led Bahadur to assemble a five-member jirga comprised of senior Taliban commanders, which sent a clear message that the militants had no other choice but to honor the truce. Ultimately, politics won over principle and the militants were able to stay in the Mirali area due to strong support from local Taliban leaders such as Manzoor Daur, who openly opposed Bahadur’s decision to expel the foreign militants.
After the signing of the 2006 Peace Agreement, Bahadur became the emir (leader) of the newly formed North Waziristan Taliban and set up a government that paralleled the QST. Unlike South Waziristan, where the Taliban is divided on a tribal basis, the North Waziristan Taliban remained somewhat united. In October 2006, Bahadur’s Taliban took a major step towards “Talibanization” when it issued a pamphlet in which they outlined the levy of new taxes and prescribed harsh penalties for various offenses, such as listening to CDs or shaving beards.
Not surprisingly, the fragile peace agreement broke down in mid-2007 amid acrimony. Pakistani checkpoints in his territory and the Red Mosque Raid were a few of many gripes. Just a few months later, a new peace initiative was launched by a tribal jirga from the Orakzai Agency. While negotiations proceeded Bahadur joined several other FATA/NWFP Taliban commanders to form the TTP. Baitullah Mehsud (responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) was chosen as emir and Bahadur as deputy, but Bahadur quickly (and unofficially) distanced himself from the TTP after Mullah Omar opposed its formation based on military philosophy. Unlike Mehsud, Bahadur supports the Pakistani government (more likely the ISI) and avoids attacks on it or personnel in the FATA. As negotiations drew to a close at the beginning of 2008, the Pakistani military initiated an offensive against Mehsud. To ward off the onslaught, Mehsud attempted to attack Pakistani forces through the Razmak area of North Waziristan. Bahadur, however, barred his axis of attack, saying that any attack would jeopardize his peace agreement, which was finalized in February of 2008.
Partly as a response to Bahadur’s rebuff, Mehsud expanded his TTP influence in the FATA and attempted to eliminate or assimilate rival Taliban commanders. This alarmed many Waziri leaders, who formed the Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (Local Taliban Movement), or the “Waziri Alliance”, with Bahadur as emir and Mullah Nazir (a South Waziristan leader) as his deputy. The Waziri Alliance, backed by the Haqqanis, deterred Mehsud, as he was encircled on all sides by the coalition. Not surprisingly, the Bahadur-Nazir alliance did not last long. In February 2009, Bahadur, Mehsud, and Nazir declared that they had overcome their differences and formed the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahedeen (Council for United Holy Warriors). The SIM focused military actions against Western forces in Afghanistan rather than oppose Pakistan, but fell apart in mid-2009 when tribal tensions sky rocketed and a U.S. drone strike killed Mehsud. Bahadur’s approach closely resembles the Haqqani philosophy, which favors the ISI, and as of 2010, both are free to conduct attacks into Afghanistan and to “Talibanize” their tribal lands. Bahadur usually conducts attacks against Pakistan immediately following U.S. drone strikes, claiming that they violate the terms of their peace agreement.
Leadership
Bahadur’s most important commander is Maulana Saddiq Noor of the Daur tribe who commands about 800 militants. Noor was born around 1955 and has been intimately involved with the QST since 1996. Like Bahadur, Saddiq Noor is based near Miram Shah, where he directed the Mamba-ul-Uloom madrassa, originally built by Jalaluddin Haqqani to support the jihad against the Soviets. The madrassa served as Noor’s headquarters until a U.S. drone strike destroyed it in September 2008. Although Saddiq Noor was left unscathed, it was reported that either nine of his family members or nine members of the Haqqani family were killed in the attack.
Noor’s deputy is Sayeed Khan Daur, who is also from Miram Shah. Although he is younger than either Noor or Bahadur, Khan Daur has a university degree and is known as a computer expert. Abdul Khaliq Haqqani, who commands about 500 militants (and not related to the Haqqani Network as he is Pakistani), is a former Bahadur commander, but was exiled after charges of embezzlement and collaboration with the Uzbeks.
Other close allies of Bahadur are: 1) Wahidullah Wazir, who leads a militant group of 200 Waziri tribesmen around Miram Shah; 2) Halim Khan Daur, who leads about 150 militants: and 3) Saifullah Wazir, who leads about 400 militants. All groups are primarily involved in cross-border attacks on Western forces, but also engage the Pakistani army from time to time.
Western Efforts
U.S. drone strikes have killed several associates of Bahadur and include: al Qaeda leader Abu Laith al-Libbi in January 2008 near Mir Ali, former Egyptian Islamic Group Leader and reported chief al Qaeda propagandist Abu Jihad al-Masri in October 2008, senior al Qaeda member Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi on November 19, 2008, Rashid Rauf, the organizer of the plot to bring down trans-Atlantic flights, on November 22, 2008, al Qaeda member Asad al-Misri (along with twenty-three militants loyal to Bahadur) on May 16, 2009, and a September 4, 2008 drone strike near Miranshah that killed two Arab fighters along with four Daur tribesmen.
Legacy
Bahadur is committed first to his own survival, second to Afghanistan, third to Mehsud, and last to his vision of an Islamist Pakistani state. His political and ideological backgrounds allow him to continue supporting the fight against Western troops while compromising on almost everything else. He will likely continue to direct some level of violence, but will probably avoid unchecked hostilities with the Pakistani government, which both seem to believe would be harmful to their respective interests. His ability to effectively engage Western troops is most likely somewhat limited by the political games he plays with Mehsud and and the ISI. Peace between Bahadur and Pakistan may boost Islamabad’s (ISI’s) interests in the short term, but will hurt Western interests in the long term.
Selected Sources:
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com
http://www.criticalthreats.org
http://www.jamestown.org
http://www.nytimes.com
http://www.merip.org/
Monday, July 19, 2010
The Haqqani Network--Post 9/11 (Updated 9/2010)
Organization and Leadership
The Haqqani network is divided into four distinct groups based on social and military status: 1) those who fought against the Soviets; 2) those from the Loya Paktiya (Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces); 3) those from North Waziristan or local madrassas; and 4) foreign fighters (Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks). Members of the last group are considered “bottom of the barrel” as they are foreign and not considered trustworthy. Ironically, they are most often “volunteered” for martyrdom operations. Turnover is high in all four groups due to frequent drone strikes. Attacks in rural areas are accomplished with IEDs/roadside bombs and urban attacks are accomplished with VBEIDs and suicide bombers. The section that performs suicide and commando-style attacks is known as the “Hamza Brigade.”
The network is headquartered in Miram Shah, also known as the Miram Shah Shura, but also has large compounds in Sarai Darpa Khel and Danday Darpa Khel. All three locations are closely monitored by ISAF and are the frequent recipients of drone strikes. The network operates primarily in the Loya Paktiya, but they also have a strong presence in the Logar and Wardak Provinces. The network issues press releases under the title of “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”
Although labeled “Taliban”, the network operates autonomously, most likely because the QST needs them more, although both Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin hold positions in the Taliban’s Quetta Shura. The local Afghan and Waziri populace view the Haqqani militants as more moderate and fair than the mainstream QST, which can often use heavy-handed tactics. In Logar Province, for example, the QST was so despised by the locals that they were evicted and eventually replaced by the Haqqani network. Both groups will often mutually support each other, however, as evidenced by recent Haqqani attacks in Kabul (new territory for the network).
Jalaluddin Haqqani was the founder of the network and, on paper, remains so. But his son, Sirajuddin, runs the show these days. He is, by most accounts, more charismatic, violent, and devout than his father, which may explain the growing radicalization of the network. The vast majority of higher echelon commanders are from the Zardan Tribe in Afghanistan. Notable commanders include Nai Arsallah, Maulavi Noor Kasim, Muhammad Amin, Mira Jan, and Bahram Jan, who are all from the Paktiya/Khost area. Local commanders’ lineage varies depending on the location and they receive some support from headquarters, but are required to raise their own money through "donations", taxes, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and narco-trafficking. Notable local field commanders include Mullah Sangin (kidnapped a private from the 82nd Airborne) and Zakim Shah, the shadow governor of Khost, although they typically lack the apparatus to act as shadow governments. The network has a distant contact well to the north—Mullah Inayatullah in the Kunduz Province, who is also from the Zardan Tribe).
The network, which is known for its fairness and adherence to Pashtunwali, has acted as the mediator between many warring parties in the past several years (usually performed by Sirajuddin and Bakhti Jan). It helped negotiate a peace treaty between Pakistan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in South Waziristan in 2006 and a peace treaty between the late Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistan in 2008. The network also negotiated a truce between Mullah Nazir and Uzbek foreigners in 2007 (Pashtuns tend to despise foreign fighters). And what may have been considered a stroke of political deftness, the network unified the rival militant groups led by Bahadur, Nazir, and Mehsud in the spring of 2009. A fatal drone strike on Mehsud in August 2009, however, destroyed the coalition.
Jalaluddin Haqqani
Jalaluddin Haqqani was born around 1950 in Srani, Paktiya and lived near Khost until the Soviet invasion when he moved to Miram Shah, North Waziristan. He is from the Mezi Clan of the Zardan Tribe. He has (at least) two wives, one who is Pashtun and one who is Arab. Although he is close to bin Laden, who espouses extreme global views, his politics are somewhat progressive (by Pashtun standards), as he supports social and civil rights for women and a fair application of Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal code). He was appointed Justice Minister by the mujahedeen in 1992 and was even offered the Prime Minster position by Hamid Karzai. It is rumored that he enjoys a closer relationship with bin Laden than Mullah Omar, which is surprising due to the wide divergence of political and social views between the two. This may be partially due to their shared experiences during the Soviet occupation when he helped build, staff, and protect bin Laden’s training camps in Paktiya and Nangarhar between 1986 and 2001. When he is not trying to kill Americans, he runs several madrassas (religious indoctrination schools) in and around Miram Shah.
Jalaluddin also enjoys a cozy relationship with Pakistan’s ISI, which provides him with weapons, money, intelligence, and a “heads up” any time the Pakistani army is about to raid one of his facilities. While he receives tremendous assistance from ISI, he is constantly being targeted by ISAF forces. He was badly wounded on November 13, 2001 in an airstrike and a good chunk of his family was killed (32 KIA) in a drone strike on September 8, 2008 near Dandi Darpa Khail, North Waziristan.
Jalaluddin has at least two brothers, Haji Khalil and Ibrahim, and at least five sons, Sirajuddin, Badruddin, Nasiruddin, Omar, and Mohammed. All of his sons travel to the Gulf to raise money, but Nasiruddin is half-Arab, thus making him an ideal liaison for al Qaeda and wealthy financial sponsors in the Gulf. Omar was killed by ISAF forces in Paktiya in July 2008 and Mohammed was killed in a Predator drone strike on February 18, 2010.
He has no strong tribal ties to North Waziristan, but enjoys tremendous respect throughout the FATA by both civilians and militants. Part of his popularity stems from his wisdom and sense of fairness. He is often called to mediate disputes between civilians and between rival militant groups in North and South Waziristan. But, because he has no local tribal ties, he does have rivals in North Waziristan, the most powerful of which is Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
Sirajuddin Haqqani
Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, was born around 1979 and grew up in the Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa near Peshawar, NWFP. He is considered more devout and radical than his father. His father is the leader of the network in name only as Sirajuddin oversees all political and military activities. He also serves as the official liaison with QST and al Qaeda. Sirajuddin’s deputy commander is Bakhti Jan and his political deputy is Jan Baz Zadran, who has no military experience. Notably, Bakhti Jan has close ties with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan, a militant group that is a sworn enemy of Pakistan.
**It will be interesting to see if Sirajuddin burns his bridges with Pakistan/ISI in favor of supporting the TTP.**
Sirajuddin enjoys a $5 million bounty on his head and is the frequent target of drone strikes.
Radicalization
**This is purely conjecture on my part, but it makes sense**
There is increasing evidence that the network is cooperating more with al Qaeda. The network facilitates suicide attacks in urban areas and al Qaeda provides the bodies. Although the relationship is “strained” because of Haqqani’s support of Pakistan (al Qaeda does not like Pakistan), there is evidence that the newer, younger members (who tend to be Arab and not Pashtun) definitely favor the global jihadist philosophy of al Qaeda. This can be observed in the closer military and financial cooperation between the two groups, the growing use of suicide attacks, and closer ties with the TTP in North and South Waziristan. The network also appears to be isolating itself from the QST based on its recent target list. The Taliban favors not attacking United Nations/international organizations in order to increase its “legitimacy” as an actual government, whereas the network has stepped up its attacks on international targets. And what strikes me most important, network members now spend all of their “down time” in madrassas rather than farming/working at home, which is typical fare for most Taliban members.
For some strange reason (well, not really since the US is a lackey to Pakistan), the Haqqani network has escaped the US State Department’s list of foreign terror groups. In May 2010, however, the “flaming liberal” Senator Diane Feinstein from California lobbied to place the group on the list.
Notable Attacks
January 2008-Bombing of Serena Hotel in Kabul
March 2008-Kidnapping of British journalist Sean Langan
April 2008—Asassination attempt on Hamid Karzai
July 2008—Bombing of Indian Embassy in Kabul
November 2008—Kidnapping of Time magazine journalist David Rohde
December 2009-Attack on Camp Chapman
May 2010-Sucide bombing in Kabul
9/2010 Update
The U.S. State Department finally designated the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization, subject to sanctions under Executive Order 13224:
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg782.htm
The Haqqani network is divided into four distinct groups based on social and military status: 1) those who fought against the Soviets; 2) those from the Loya Paktiya (Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces); 3) those from North Waziristan or local madrassas; and 4) foreign fighters (Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks). Members of the last group are considered “bottom of the barrel” as they are foreign and not considered trustworthy. Ironically, they are most often “volunteered” for martyrdom operations. Turnover is high in all four groups due to frequent drone strikes. Attacks in rural areas are accomplished with IEDs/roadside bombs and urban attacks are accomplished with VBEIDs and suicide bombers. The section that performs suicide and commando-style attacks is known as the “Hamza Brigade.”
The network is headquartered in Miram Shah, also known as the Miram Shah Shura, but also has large compounds in Sarai Darpa Khel and Danday Darpa Khel. All three locations are closely monitored by ISAF and are the frequent recipients of drone strikes. The network operates primarily in the Loya Paktiya, but they also have a strong presence in the Logar and Wardak Provinces. The network issues press releases under the title of “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”
Although labeled “Taliban”, the network operates autonomously, most likely because the QST needs them more, although both Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin hold positions in the Taliban’s Quetta Shura. The local Afghan and Waziri populace view the Haqqani militants as more moderate and fair than the mainstream QST, which can often use heavy-handed tactics. In Logar Province, for example, the QST was so despised by the locals that they were evicted and eventually replaced by the Haqqani network. Both groups will often mutually support each other, however, as evidenced by recent Haqqani attacks in Kabul (new territory for the network).
Jalaluddin Haqqani was the founder of the network and, on paper, remains so. But his son, Sirajuddin, runs the show these days. He is, by most accounts, more charismatic, violent, and devout than his father, which may explain the growing radicalization of the network. The vast majority of higher echelon commanders are from the Zardan Tribe in Afghanistan. Notable commanders include Nai Arsallah, Maulavi Noor Kasim, Muhammad Amin, Mira Jan, and Bahram Jan, who are all from the Paktiya/Khost area. Local commanders’ lineage varies depending on the location and they receive some support from headquarters, but are required to raise their own money through "donations", taxes, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and narco-trafficking. Notable local field commanders include Mullah Sangin (kidnapped a private from the 82nd Airborne) and Zakim Shah, the shadow governor of Khost, although they typically lack the apparatus to act as shadow governments. The network has a distant contact well to the north—Mullah Inayatullah in the Kunduz Province, who is also from the Zardan Tribe).
The network, which is known for its fairness and adherence to Pashtunwali, has acted as the mediator between many warring parties in the past several years (usually performed by Sirajuddin and Bakhti Jan). It helped negotiate a peace treaty between Pakistan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in South Waziristan in 2006 and a peace treaty between the late Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistan in 2008. The network also negotiated a truce between Mullah Nazir and Uzbek foreigners in 2007 (Pashtuns tend to despise foreign fighters). And what may have been considered a stroke of political deftness, the network unified the rival militant groups led by Bahadur, Nazir, and Mehsud in the spring of 2009. A fatal drone strike on Mehsud in August 2009, however, destroyed the coalition.
Jalaluddin Haqqani
Jalaluddin Haqqani was born around 1950 in Srani, Paktiya and lived near Khost until the Soviet invasion when he moved to Miram Shah, North Waziristan. He is from the Mezi Clan of the Zardan Tribe. He has (at least) two wives, one who is Pashtun and one who is Arab. Although he is close to bin Laden, who espouses extreme global views, his politics are somewhat progressive (by Pashtun standards), as he supports social and civil rights for women and a fair application of Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal code). He was appointed Justice Minister by the mujahedeen in 1992 and was even offered the Prime Minster position by Hamid Karzai. It is rumored that he enjoys a closer relationship with bin Laden than Mullah Omar, which is surprising due to the wide divergence of political and social views between the two. This may be partially due to their shared experiences during the Soviet occupation when he helped build, staff, and protect bin Laden’s training camps in Paktiya and Nangarhar between 1986 and 2001. When he is not trying to kill Americans, he runs several madrassas (religious indoctrination schools) in and around Miram Shah.
Jalaluddin also enjoys a cozy relationship with Pakistan’s ISI, which provides him with weapons, money, intelligence, and a “heads up” any time the Pakistani army is about to raid one of his facilities. While he receives tremendous assistance from ISI, he is constantly being targeted by ISAF forces. He was badly wounded on November 13, 2001 in an airstrike and a good chunk of his family was killed (32 KIA) in a drone strike on September 8, 2008 near Dandi Darpa Khail, North Waziristan.
Jalaluddin has at least two brothers, Haji Khalil and Ibrahim, and at least five sons, Sirajuddin, Badruddin, Nasiruddin, Omar, and Mohammed. All of his sons travel to the Gulf to raise money, but Nasiruddin is half-Arab, thus making him an ideal liaison for al Qaeda and wealthy financial sponsors in the Gulf. Omar was killed by ISAF forces in Paktiya in July 2008 and Mohammed was killed in a Predator drone strike on February 18, 2010.
He has no strong tribal ties to North Waziristan, but enjoys tremendous respect throughout the FATA by both civilians and militants. Part of his popularity stems from his wisdom and sense of fairness. He is often called to mediate disputes between civilians and between rival militant groups in North and South Waziristan. But, because he has no local tribal ties, he does have rivals in North Waziristan, the most powerful of which is Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
Sirajuddin Haqqani
Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, was born around 1979 and grew up in the Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa near Peshawar, NWFP. He is considered more devout and radical than his father. His father is the leader of the network in name only as Sirajuddin oversees all political and military activities. He also serves as the official liaison with QST and al Qaeda. Sirajuddin’s deputy commander is Bakhti Jan and his political deputy is Jan Baz Zadran, who has no military experience. Notably, Bakhti Jan has close ties with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan, a militant group that is a sworn enemy of Pakistan.
**It will be interesting to see if Sirajuddin burns his bridges with Pakistan/ISI in favor of supporting the TTP.**
Sirajuddin enjoys a $5 million bounty on his head and is the frequent target of drone strikes.
Radicalization
**This is purely conjecture on my part, but it makes sense**
There is increasing evidence that the network is cooperating more with al Qaeda. The network facilitates suicide attacks in urban areas and al Qaeda provides the bodies. Although the relationship is “strained” because of Haqqani’s support of Pakistan (al Qaeda does not like Pakistan), there is evidence that the newer, younger members (who tend to be Arab and not Pashtun) definitely favor the global jihadist philosophy of al Qaeda. This can be observed in the closer military and financial cooperation between the two groups, the growing use of suicide attacks, and closer ties with the TTP in North and South Waziristan. The network also appears to be isolating itself from the QST based on its recent target list. The Taliban favors not attacking United Nations/international organizations in order to increase its “legitimacy” as an actual government, whereas the network has stepped up its attacks on international targets. And what strikes me most important, network members now spend all of their “down time” in madrassas rather than farming/working at home, which is typical fare for most Taliban members.
For some strange reason (well, not really since the US is a lackey to Pakistan), the Haqqani network has escaped the US State Department’s list of foreign terror groups. In May 2010, however, the “flaming liberal” Senator Diane Feinstein from California lobbied to place the group on the list.
Notable Attacks
January 2008-Bombing of Serena Hotel in Kabul
March 2008-Kidnapping of British journalist Sean Langan
April 2008—Asassination attempt on Hamid Karzai
July 2008—Bombing of Indian Embassy in Kabul
November 2008—Kidnapping of Time magazine journalist David Rohde
December 2009-Attack on Camp Chapman
May 2010-Sucide bombing in Kabul
9/2010 Update
The U.S. State Department finally designated the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization, subject to sanctions under Executive Order 13224:
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg782.htm
North Waziristan Map
Tuesday, June 1, 2010
Greetings!
The Global War on/of Terror can be a bit confusing--a drone missile strike in North Whatistan killed Muhammed al-Somebody--you get the point. There are literally hundreds of sites out there that paint a picture of our enemies, but few choose to consolidate all of that information into one spot into a manageable mess. The South Asian sub-continent has become a hobby of mine, so here's my attempt at creating a somewhat coherent mosaic.
My focus is mostly on Afghanistan and Pakistan (the FATA and NWFP areas) and to a lesser extent, Kashmir, Chechnya, Balochistan, and the four "Stans" of Central Asia, which produce some really bad dudes, to the extent that "moderate" militants, like the Haqqani Network, (used to) try to distance themselves.
I will always do my best to credit information/photos when possible. My commentary will be duly noted. If I get any facts wrong, please drop me a line and a source so that I may correct it.
**DISCLAIMER**
I'm not a foreign policy "expert", just a guy that reads a lot about AfPak issues and has some insight to offer. I won't even try to pretend that I understand the tribal and religious dynamics of the region, but human nature being what it is, I think that quite a bit of what is going on over there is not so foreign.
Enjoy!
My focus is mostly on Afghanistan and Pakistan (the FATA and NWFP areas) and to a lesser extent, Kashmir, Chechnya, Balochistan, and the four "Stans" of Central Asia, which produce some really bad dudes, to the extent that "moderate" militants, like the Haqqani Network, (used to) try to distance themselves.
I will always do my best to credit information/photos when possible. My commentary will be duly noted. If I get any facts wrong, please drop me a line and a source so that I may correct it.
**DISCLAIMER**
I'm not a foreign policy "expert", just a guy that reads a lot about AfPak issues and has some insight to offer. I won't even try to pretend that I understand the tribal and religious dynamics of the region, but human nature being what it is, I think that quite a bit of what is going on over there is not so foreign.
Enjoy!
Labels:
Afghanistan,
Central Asia,
FATA,
GWOT,
NWFP,
Pakistan,
South Asia,
Taliban,
Terrorism
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