Recently, ISAF Apache helicopters took it to militants belonging to the Haqqani Network. Killing more than 100. Across the border. Several times. In Pakistan.
Although this sounds like a case of “hot pursuit”, this is a BIG deal. Manned incursions into Pakistan are rare (although reliable sources indicate that Special Operation troops routinely operate in Pakistan). Predictably, the Paks were rather upset, publicly and politically.
From the Longwar Journal (September 27, 2010):
The International Security Assistance Force confirmed that its helicopters clashed with the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network near the Pakistani border, but would not confirm the aircraft crossed into Pakistan to conduct attacks.
Ten Haqqani Network fighters fighters were killed during a clash this morning along the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, a US military official told The Long War Journal, but current reports indicate the helicopters did cross into Pakistan to engage Taliban fighters. The military official said that ISAF is still gathering information on the clash.
The fighting took place near Combat Outpost Narizah, an Afghan base just eight miles from the Pakistani border in Khost province, the official said. Khost is a stronghold of the Haqqani Network, an Afghan Taliban subgroup based in North Waziristan, Pakistan.
The statement played down reports from earlier today that indicated US helicopters killed five insurgents as they fled into Pakistan's tribal agency of Kurram, which borders Khost.
In another report, a Pakistani security official claimed that US helicopters crossed the border and struck a local checkpoint manned by members of "noble tribal families."
Combat Outpost Narizah was the scene of two major clashes over the weekend that resulted in US helicopters pursuing Haqqani Network fighters into Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan. Initial reports indicated that more than 30 Haqqani Network fighters were killed in the two cross-border engagements, but later reports state than between 50 to 60 may have been killed.
ISAF has maintained that it legitimately attacked Taliban forces as part of an existing policy of hot pursuit of fighters.
US forces pursued the Taliban into Pakistan "after following the proper rules of engagement under inherent right of self defense," Master Sergeant Matthew Summers, an ISAF spokesman, told The Long War Journal on Sept. 26.
But a spokesman at Pakistan's Foreign Office rejected reports that such an agreement between ISAF and Pakistan exists, and said the incursions are a violation ISAF's mandate.
“These incidents are a clear violation and breach of the UN mandate under which ISAF operates,” spokesman Abdul Basit said in a statement released by the Foreign Office, according to AFP.
“There are no agreed 'hot pursuit' rules," Basit continued. "Any impression to the contrary is not factually correct. Such violations are unacceptable. In the absence of immediate corrective measures, Pakistan will be constrained to consider response options."
Background on agreement on cross-border activities between ISAF and Pakistan
Although the Pakistani Foreign Office denied the existence of any agreement that permits ISAF forces to enter Pakistan while in hot pursuit of Taliban fighters, the details of such an agreement have been known for years. In August 2007, The Associated Press released the text of the agreement.
The agreement between ISAF and Pakistan stipulated the following: US forces must be engaged with the Taliban or al Qaeda as they cross into Pakistan and US forces should not penetrate more than six miles into Pakistani territory. Also, US forces may enter Pakistan if they have identified the location of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al Zawahri, or Mullah Omar.
The US has pursued Taliban fighters across the border multiple times. Two of the most high-profile incidents occurred in 2008. The first took place in June 2008, when US troops pursued a Taliban force from Kunar into Pakistan's tribal agency of Mohmand, and killed 11 fighters. The Pakistani government claimed that the US killed Frontier Corps troops, but the US released video of the incident showing the Taliban being targeted as they fled from Kunar into Mohmand. Pakistan's paramilitary Frontier Corps is known to support the Taliban in Afghanistan.
The second incident took place in Khyber in November 2008, when US forces launched rocket attacks and ground strikes into the Tirah Valley, a known haven for al Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Lashkar-e-Islam. Seven people were reported killed and three were wounded in the strikes.
The US also launches covert airstrikes using unmanned Predators and Reapers against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan's tribal areas. The Pakistani government officially protests the covert strikes but quietly approves. Three such strikes have been launched inside Pakistan over the past three days; all have taken place in North Waziristan.
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Showing posts with label Haqqani. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Haqqani. Show all posts
Tuesday, October 5, 2010
More Proof of al Qaeda in Afghanistan
The Taliban is now using Ford Pintos as suicide vehicles.
The Haqqani Network is not known to use suicide bombers. Not until recently, when ties between the Network and al Qaeda have been strengthened. Suicide bombing is a distinctly Arab phenomenon, not Taliban. To see the more aggressive use of suicide bombing indicates close cooperation between the militants and the global jihadists.
From ISAF (September 24, 2010):
PAKTYA PROVINCE, Afghanistan – At least five insurgents were killed and one captured during a failed attack on Forward Operating Base Gardez in Patkya Province Sept. 24.
The attack began when a vehicle, followed closely by four suicide-vest-wearing insurgents, attempted to breach a fortified area of the base.
Coalition forces engaged the vehicle, destroying it and disrupting the attack. The remaining attackers were killed as they attempted to flee the scene.
In the aftermath of the incident, explosive ordnance disposal Soldiers found and disposed of the suicide vests.
Two Afghan Security Guards were wounded during the attack and an Afghan civilian employed at the base was killed. No coalition forces were killed or injured.
The operation is still ongoing with coalition forces pursuing the remainder of the attacking force, estimated to be around 20.
From the Longwar Journal (September 25, 2010):
Since the end of August, the Haqqani Network has carried out five major attacks against heavily defended US outposts in eastern Afghanistan.
On Aug. 28, Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. During raids in the aftermath of the attacks, US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters.
On Sept. 2, the Haqqani Network attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers; 20 were reported killed.
And in the last attack, on Sept. 21, US troops killed 27 Haqqani Network fighters as they mustered to assault Combat Outpost Spera.
The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have launched attacks at several major installations across the country this year. In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base; another small team conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July; three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
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Saturday, September 25, 2010
Senior Haqqani Member Killed
I wrote a while back that the Haqqani Network was in the process of extending its reach directly into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. An airstrike killed Qari Mansur, a senior leader in the Network, on September 24, 2010.
From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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Thursday, September 23, 2010
Dialogue With the Haqqani Network
A very nice article about establishing dialogue with the Haqqani Network by Tom Gregg at the AfPak Channel (September 22, 2010):
Last month Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief Northern Ireland negotiator, argued that "no group should be beyond talking to." In the context of the current crisis and a shift towards seeking a peace deal in Afghanistan, this is particularly salient. President Hamid Karzai has recently announced the creation of a commission to lead talks with the Taliban. There is also emerging consensus in Washington that stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved by reaching some sort of a political settlement with the Taliban. But not talking to particular insurgent groups will not be a good idea, and a reliance on a policy of "decapitating" them is even worse.
One group that should not "be beyond talking to" is the Haqqani network, named for its leader Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now considered one of the most feared insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The network is responsible for attacks against the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps because of this central role in the Afghan insurgency, in July, Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asserted that the Haqqanis are the Taliban network with the closest ties to al Qaeda and that dealing with them is ‘the most pressing task' in combating the insurgency. Despite their alleged links to international terrorists, even Secretary Clinton has not ruled out supporting dialogue with them (with caveats). These comments suggest the door on the U.S. side may soon be slightly ajar. However, having spent the past six years talking with members of the network, including some of its senior members, it would appear that the Haqqani's door is currently open for talks but may soon be firmly shut. The Haqqani network is in the midst of a generational power shift from father to son, which if completed will all but rule out any future talk of peace.
In June 2007, well before the Haqqani terrorist network had found its way into headlines in the western media, chatter spread through the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that the aging and ill Jalaluddin -- insurgent leader, client of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitator of Osama bin Laden's 2001 escape into Pakistan -- had passed away, reportedly due to hepatitis. The intelligence community picked up on this rumor but quickly disproved it. At the time of this report I was living in the tribal areas of southeast Afghanistan and wrote a report titled "Jalaluddin Haqqani: Dead, Alive, Does it Matter?" In short the answer is yes and no. Yes, because had he died at the time, it would have left the network more vulnerable than at anytime since its emergence in late 2004. And no, because today the Haqqanis have nearly completed what could be best described as ‘succession planning' resulting in a powerful network that many believe jeopardizes Afghanistan's stability
It is well known that for almost a decade he has suffered from health problems and requires regular medical attention rendering him relatively inactive in the day-to-day workings of the insurgency. Furthermore, as a senior insurgent commander (and former Taliban Minister), Maulavi Haqqani's profile as a "most wanted" does not permit travel to the Afghan battle space. Consequently, his 36-year-old son Sirajuddin (aka "Khalifa") has increasingly taken over, with gusto, operational command of his father's network.
However, these limitations speak nothing of the influence Maulavi Haqqani continues to enjoy as a tribal leader, religious scholar, ISI associate and close ally of Gulf Arab financiers. Indeed, the success of the Haqqani network rests with these social/religious/political connections that Maulavi Haqqani has carefully nurtured over the past 30-plus years; indeed, it was these very factors that also made him so popular with the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad). It can be assumed that these networks, particularly with Arab financiers and the ISI, have been "inherited" by Sirajuddin. However, the same cannot be said about Maulavi Haqqani's tribal, religious and mujahideen credentials. Sirajuddin is in his early 30's, grew up in Miram Shah, Pakistan and, prior to 2001, only occasionally traveled to his native village of Garde Serai, nestled in the rugged mountains of Paktia province. In Miram Shah he was involved in Islamic Studies but, unlike his father, did not graduate from a prestigious madrassah and is too young to have been a well-known fighter during the anti-Soviet jihad.
Hence, the very elements that have contributed to the success of Maulavi Haqqani's activities in eastern Afghanistan (and that could be used to assist in a peace process) -- his personal influence as a tribal leader, mujahideen commander and religious elder -- will be lost after he dies or passes control to Siraj.
Moreover, the respect of Maulavi Haqqani within Afghanistan as a mujahideen leader is matched by the respect he derives from being a prominent tribal and religious elder. As a result, it has been difficult for the various Zadran sub tribes of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to actively oppose his network's activities in their respective tribal regions.
Indeed, today the Haqqani network is spreading its influence geographically into areas previously dominated by other insurgent groups (such as the Mansoor network in Zurmat district of Paktia). It has also, for the first time since the beginning of the Haqqani-led insurgency in late 2004-early 2005, recently embarked upon the systematic targeting and killing of moderate tribal leaders from within the Zadran tribe. This all looks like succession planning. Tactically, Sirajuddin must know that when his father dies (be it of natural causes or otherwise), the tribes would certainly be better positioned to oppose him, should they choose (and be empowered) to do so.
Added to this equation is the knowledge that U.S. pressure on Islamabad to tackle the Haqqani network could see their safe havens in North Waziristan come under increased pressure in the future. Maulavi Haqqani had the necessary contacts and influence to navigate his way through policy shifts in Islamabad. A question mark remains over whether Siraj, in the absence of his father, would be as adept at maneuvering between possible future policy shifts.
The time is ripe, therefore, for a dialogue to take place, one that will be easier to negotiate while the older generation of fighters that knows the benefits of peace is still alive. From my discussions with representatives of Maulavi Haqqani, he still claims to be fighting in Afghanistan for ‘peace.' Sirajuddin, on the other hand, does not know the meaning of the word. He has been brought up in war, has never lived as a citizen of a functioning nation state, has little to no experience of government, is not a tribal elder and is not even a credible religious leader. In this regard he is motivated more by a radical Islamist ideology than his father, and less obviously constrained by a desire to maintain good relations with the local tribal leaders.
For example, on a visit to Afghanistan this year I met with a prominent Zadran tribesman who had returned from North Waziristan the previous week and had spent the night with Siraj. He had taken a message to the commander that the latter's insurgent activities in the Zadran tribal area were having negative consequences for his fellow tribesman. Upon relaying this message, the elder was informed by Siraj that he was welcome to stay the night and receive his hospitality but that if he ever returned again with such a message he would not leave with his head on his shoulders. Such a blunt message to a respected Zadran tribal elder could not and would not have come from his father.
Despite appearances, my years of working closely with various tribal and religious leaders of the Zadran tribe has convinced me that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process, the military intervention in the region and the insurgency. Sadly, some of the best of these leaders have already been targeted by the insurgents or have wrongfully been detained by the International Military Forces. Unless greater security and political space is afforded to the current Zadran tribal and religious leadership in Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the outcome of the Haqqani network's succession planning will go ahead unchallenged.
In order to prevent this scenario from transpiring the United States must make a clear distinction between the current Haqqani network and al Qaeda. The Haqqani network is an Afghan network focused on Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the objective of the Haqqani network is to support an international jihadist agenda. To this end, Washington and Kabul should embark upon a policy of engagement (as part of a broader political outreach effort to all various elements of the Taliban) to separate the two. Locally, U.S. forces must pay greater attention to the local tribal dynamics as part of its counterinsurgency approach. In the southeast, this should include support to the tribal police (or arbakai) and ensuring that the pro-peace tribal majority is not subjected to intimidation, detention (or worse) by the international military presence.
However, should we fail to capitalize on this opportunity for dialogue, a more radical network, combined with the absence of the tribal and religious constraints that Maulavi Haqqani must regularly negotiate, will mark the beginning of a new, more violent generation of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. And this new insurgency will leave no prospects for dialogue or peace.
What strikes me about this article is the similarities between Pashtun and American politics:
"that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process"
The rational, moderate voices in this country are also being drowned out by extremists.
Share
Last month Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief Northern Ireland negotiator, argued that "no group should be beyond talking to." In the context of the current crisis and a shift towards seeking a peace deal in Afghanistan, this is particularly salient. President Hamid Karzai has recently announced the creation of a commission to lead talks with the Taliban. There is also emerging consensus in Washington that stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved by reaching some sort of a political settlement with the Taliban. But not talking to particular insurgent groups will not be a good idea, and a reliance on a policy of "decapitating" them is even worse.
One group that should not "be beyond talking to" is the Haqqani network, named for its leader Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now considered one of the most feared insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The network is responsible for attacks against the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps because of this central role in the Afghan insurgency, in July, Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asserted that the Haqqanis are the Taliban network with the closest ties to al Qaeda and that dealing with them is ‘the most pressing task' in combating the insurgency. Despite their alleged links to international terrorists, even Secretary Clinton has not ruled out supporting dialogue with them (with caveats). These comments suggest the door on the U.S. side may soon be slightly ajar. However, having spent the past six years talking with members of the network, including some of its senior members, it would appear that the Haqqani's door is currently open for talks but may soon be firmly shut. The Haqqani network is in the midst of a generational power shift from father to son, which if completed will all but rule out any future talk of peace.
In June 2007, well before the Haqqani terrorist network had found its way into headlines in the western media, chatter spread through the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that the aging and ill Jalaluddin -- insurgent leader, client of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitator of Osama bin Laden's 2001 escape into Pakistan -- had passed away, reportedly due to hepatitis. The intelligence community picked up on this rumor but quickly disproved it. At the time of this report I was living in the tribal areas of southeast Afghanistan and wrote a report titled "Jalaluddin Haqqani: Dead, Alive, Does it Matter?" In short the answer is yes and no. Yes, because had he died at the time, it would have left the network more vulnerable than at anytime since its emergence in late 2004. And no, because today the Haqqanis have nearly completed what could be best described as ‘succession planning' resulting in a powerful network that many believe jeopardizes Afghanistan's stability
It is well known that for almost a decade he has suffered from health problems and requires regular medical attention rendering him relatively inactive in the day-to-day workings of the insurgency. Furthermore, as a senior insurgent commander (and former Taliban Minister), Maulavi Haqqani's profile as a "most wanted" does not permit travel to the Afghan battle space. Consequently, his 36-year-old son Sirajuddin (aka "Khalifa") has increasingly taken over, with gusto, operational command of his father's network.
However, these limitations speak nothing of the influence Maulavi Haqqani continues to enjoy as a tribal leader, religious scholar, ISI associate and close ally of Gulf Arab financiers. Indeed, the success of the Haqqani network rests with these social/religious/political connections that Maulavi Haqqani has carefully nurtured over the past 30-plus years; indeed, it was these very factors that also made him so popular with the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad). It can be assumed that these networks, particularly with Arab financiers and the ISI, have been "inherited" by Sirajuddin. However, the same cannot be said about Maulavi Haqqani's tribal, religious and mujahideen credentials. Sirajuddin is in his early 30's, grew up in Miram Shah, Pakistan and, prior to 2001, only occasionally traveled to his native village of Garde Serai, nestled in the rugged mountains of Paktia province. In Miram Shah he was involved in Islamic Studies but, unlike his father, did not graduate from a prestigious madrassah and is too young to have been a well-known fighter during the anti-Soviet jihad.
Hence, the very elements that have contributed to the success of Maulavi Haqqani's activities in eastern Afghanistan (and that could be used to assist in a peace process) -- his personal influence as a tribal leader, mujahideen commander and religious elder -- will be lost after he dies or passes control to Siraj.
Moreover, the respect of Maulavi Haqqani within Afghanistan as a mujahideen leader is matched by the respect he derives from being a prominent tribal and religious elder. As a result, it has been difficult for the various Zadran sub tribes of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to actively oppose his network's activities in their respective tribal regions.
Indeed, today the Haqqani network is spreading its influence geographically into areas previously dominated by other insurgent groups (such as the Mansoor network in Zurmat district of Paktia). It has also, for the first time since the beginning of the Haqqani-led insurgency in late 2004-early 2005, recently embarked upon the systematic targeting and killing of moderate tribal leaders from within the Zadran tribe. This all looks like succession planning. Tactically, Sirajuddin must know that when his father dies (be it of natural causes or otherwise), the tribes would certainly be better positioned to oppose him, should they choose (and be empowered) to do so.
Added to this equation is the knowledge that U.S. pressure on Islamabad to tackle the Haqqani network could see their safe havens in North Waziristan come under increased pressure in the future. Maulavi Haqqani had the necessary contacts and influence to navigate his way through policy shifts in Islamabad. A question mark remains over whether Siraj, in the absence of his father, would be as adept at maneuvering between possible future policy shifts.
The time is ripe, therefore, for a dialogue to take place, one that will be easier to negotiate while the older generation of fighters that knows the benefits of peace is still alive. From my discussions with representatives of Maulavi Haqqani, he still claims to be fighting in Afghanistan for ‘peace.' Sirajuddin, on the other hand, does not know the meaning of the word. He has been brought up in war, has never lived as a citizen of a functioning nation state, has little to no experience of government, is not a tribal elder and is not even a credible religious leader. In this regard he is motivated more by a radical Islamist ideology than his father, and less obviously constrained by a desire to maintain good relations with the local tribal leaders.
For example, on a visit to Afghanistan this year I met with a prominent Zadran tribesman who had returned from North Waziristan the previous week and had spent the night with Siraj. He had taken a message to the commander that the latter's insurgent activities in the Zadran tribal area were having negative consequences for his fellow tribesman. Upon relaying this message, the elder was informed by Siraj that he was welcome to stay the night and receive his hospitality but that if he ever returned again with such a message he would not leave with his head on his shoulders. Such a blunt message to a respected Zadran tribal elder could not and would not have come from his father.
Despite appearances, my years of working closely with various tribal and religious leaders of the Zadran tribe has convinced me that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process, the military intervention in the region and the insurgency. Sadly, some of the best of these leaders have already been targeted by the insurgents or have wrongfully been detained by the International Military Forces. Unless greater security and political space is afforded to the current Zadran tribal and religious leadership in Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the outcome of the Haqqani network's succession planning will go ahead unchallenged.
In order to prevent this scenario from transpiring the United States must make a clear distinction between the current Haqqani network and al Qaeda. The Haqqani network is an Afghan network focused on Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the objective of the Haqqani network is to support an international jihadist agenda. To this end, Washington and Kabul should embark upon a policy of engagement (as part of a broader political outreach effort to all various elements of the Taliban) to separate the two. Locally, U.S. forces must pay greater attention to the local tribal dynamics as part of its counterinsurgency approach. In the southeast, this should include support to the tribal police (or arbakai) and ensuring that the pro-peace tribal majority is not subjected to intimidation, detention (or worse) by the international military presence.
However, should we fail to capitalize on this opportunity for dialogue, a more radical network, combined with the absence of the tribal and religious constraints that Maulavi Haqqani must regularly negotiate, will mark the beginning of a new, more violent generation of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. And this new insurgency will leave no prospects for dialogue or peace.
What strikes me about this article is the similarities between Pashtun and American politics:
"that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process"
The rational, moderate voices in this country are also being drowned out by extremists.
Share
CJTF-101 Opens a Can
This a nice summary of recent ground combat against the Haqqani militants in Afghanistan. I'm noticing a trend here...that Haqqani militants don't stand a chance against ISAF troops in a direct action engagement. I'm predicting that they will attempt several more disastrous attacks before winter and then may turn increasingly to al Qaeda style tatctics (eg, suicide bombers).
From the Longwar Journal (September 23, 2010):
US soldiers beat back a massed attack by the Haqqani Network in the eastern Afghan province of Khost yesterday, killing 27 enemy fighters.
The Haqqani Network fighters gathered near Combat Outpost Spera and prepared to open fire on the base "with small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire," Combined Joint Task Force - 101 stated in a press release. But the Haqqani Network fighters were observed as they moved into position to attack.
"Both remotely piloted aircraft and strategically placed surveillance cameras identified the insurgent forces preparing to open fire with a mixture of small arms and rocket propelled grenades," CJTF-101 stated. Helicopters from an Attack Weapons Team from Task Force Viper, 1st Battalion, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, were dispatched and routed the Haqqani Network fighters.
ISAF stated that between 25 to 30 "insurgents" were killed, while CJTF-101 put the number at 27. No US or Afghan troops were reported to have been killed or wounded in the fighting.
The Haqqani Network has carried out four major attacks against heavily defended US outposts in eastern Afghanistan since the end of August.
On Aug. 28, Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
And on Sept. 2, the Haqqani Network attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers; 20 were reported killed.
The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have launched attacks at several major installations across the country this year. In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base; another small team conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July; three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
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From the Longwar Journal (September 23, 2010):
US soldiers beat back a massed attack by the Haqqani Network in the eastern Afghan province of Khost yesterday, killing 27 enemy fighters.
The Haqqani Network fighters gathered near Combat Outpost Spera and prepared to open fire on the base "with small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire," Combined Joint Task Force - 101 stated in a press release. But the Haqqani Network fighters were observed as they moved into position to attack.
"Both remotely piloted aircraft and strategically placed surveillance cameras identified the insurgent forces preparing to open fire with a mixture of small arms and rocket propelled grenades," CJTF-101 stated. Helicopters from an Attack Weapons Team from Task Force Viper, 1st Battalion, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, were dispatched and routed the Haqqani Network fighters.
ISAF stated that between 25 to 30 "insurgents" were killed, while CJTF-101 put the number at 27. No US or Afghan troops were reported to have been killed or wounded in the fighting.
The Haqqani Network has carried out four major attacks against heavily defended US outposts in eastern Afghanistan since the end of August.
On Aug. 28, Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
And on Sept. 2, the Haqqani Network attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers; 20 were reported killed.
The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have launched attacks at several major installations across the country this year. In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base; another small team conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July; three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
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Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Background on Datta Khel, North Waziristan
From the Longwar Journal (September 15, 2010):
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. Six out of the last 12 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel. The US has conducted 17 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, or 25 percent of its current total of 67 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 161 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 22 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
Some top al Qaeda leaders have been targeted and killed in Datta Khel. A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
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The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. Six out of the last 12 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel. The US has conducted 17 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, or 25 percent of its current total of 67 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 161 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 22 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
Some top al Qaeda leaders have been targeted and killed in Datta Khel. A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
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Another Strike at the Haqqani Network
From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRANSHAH: A second US drone attack on a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghan border Wednesday killed three rebels, local security officials said.
The strike took place in Payekhel village of Datta Khel district of North Waziristan tribal region, where US missile strikes have increased since early this month.
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MIRANSHAH: A second US drone attack on a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghan border Wednesday killed three rebels, local security officials said.
The strike took place in Payekhel village of Datta Khel district of North Waziristan tribal region, where US missile strikes have increased since early this month.
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A Death in the Haqqani Family
Seems that the Hellfires are getting closer to their ultimate target.
From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Batting 1.000
And another drone strike at Haqqani. I'm predicting one more against Haqqani and then we'll switch back to Bahadur or maybe a new target.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US executed yet another Predator strike in Pakistan's lawless tribal agency of North Waziristan today. The strike is the second today and the 11th this month.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired two missiles at a vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“A US drone fired two missiles on a vehicle carrying militants outside Miramshah,” a senior Pakistan security official told AFP. "At least four militants were killed in the attack.”
No senior terrorist leaders have been reported killed in the strike.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj.
Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US executed yet another Predator strike in Pakistan's lawless tribal agency of North Waziristan today. The strike is the second today and the 11th this month.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired two missiles at a vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“A US drone fired two missiles on a vehicle carrying militants outside Miramshah,” a senior Pakistan security official told AFP. "At least four militants were killed in the attack.”
No senior terrorist leaders have been reported killed in the strike.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj.
Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack.
I Called It!
I swear I didn't read the headlines before I made the last post about the drone strike near Sawal. Another strike at Haqqani near Miram Shah.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US continued its unprecedented pace of airstrikes inside of Pakistan's Taliban-control tribal agency of North Waziristan, launching its third Predator attack in 24 hours.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired five missiles at two compounds in the village of Darga Mandi, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“Several US drones fired seven missiles at two militants compounds early this morning (Wednesday) killing at least five militants,” a senior Pakistani security official told AFP.
No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders have been reported killed in the latest strike.
Darga Mandi is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The US has stepped up its attacks against the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan as part of a "hammer-and-anvil" strategy to hit the al Qaeda-linked terror network in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, The Associate Press reported.
The US has killed 20 terrorists in the three strikes over the past 24 hours. Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack. In the second strike, four "militants" were killed when Predators hit their vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US continued its unprecedented pace of airstrikes inside of Pakistan's Taliban-control tribal agency of North Waziristan, launching its third Predator attack in 24 hours.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired five missiles at two compounds in the village of Darga Mandi, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“Several US drones fired seven missiles at two militants compounds early this morning (Wednesday) killing at least five militants,” a senior Pakistani security official told AFP.
No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders have been reported killed in the latest strike.
Darga Mandi is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The US has stepped up its attacks against the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan as part of a "hammer-and-anvil" strategy to hit the al Qaeda-linked terror network in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, The Associate Press reported.
The US has killed 20 terrorists in the three strikes over the past 24 hours. Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack. In the second strike, four "militants" were killed when Predators hit their vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel.
Sunday, September 12, 2010
Datta Khel
From the Long War Journal:
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan, administers the region, but the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. The US has conducted 13 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, nearly 25 percent of its current total of 58 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 156 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 19 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
Datta Khel borders the Mohammed Khel and Jani Khel regions in the settled district of Bannu. The Jani Khel region has long been a strategic meeting place and safe haven for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Jani Khel was identified as the headquarters for al Qaeda's Shura Majlis back in 2007. Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command, has operated in the Jani Khel region. The US has struck al Qaeda safe houses in Jani Khel twice since last year. These strikes are the only two Predator attacks that have occurred outside of Pakistan's tribal areas since the US airstrikes began in 2004.
The town of Jani Khel is a known haven for al Qaeda leaders and fighters. Senior al Qaeda operative Abdullah Azzam al Saudi was killed in a Predator strike in Jani Khel on Nov. 19, 2008. Azzam served as a liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest.
In addition, Al Qaeda is known to have deposited its donations received from Europe into the Bayt al Mal, or Bank of Money, in Jani Khel, according to a report at the NEFA Foundation. The Bayt al Mal served as al Qaeda's treasury.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan, administers the region, but the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. The US has conducted 13 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, nearly 25 percent of its current total of 58 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 156 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 19 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
Datta Khel borders the Mohammed Khel and Jani Khel regions in the settled district of Bannu. The Jani Khel region has long been a strategic meeting place and safe haven for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Jani Khel was identified as the headquarters for al Qaeda's Shura Majlis back in 2007. Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command, has operated in the Jani Khel region. The US has struck al Qaeda safe houses in Jani Khel twice since last year. These strikes are the only two Predator attacks that have occurred outside of Pakistan's tribal areas since the US airstrikes began in 2004.
The town of Jani Khel is a known haven for al Qaeda leaders and fighters. Senior al Qaeda operative Abdullah Azzam al Saudi was killed in a Predator strike in Jani Khel on Nov. 19, 2008. Azzam served as a liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest.
In addition, Al Qaeda is known to have deposited its donations received from Europe into the Bayt al Mal, or Bank of Money, in Jani Khel, according to a report at the NEFA Foundation. The Bayt al Mal served as al Qaeda's treasury.
Saturday, September 11, 2010
The Long War Journal - Charts on US Strikes in Pakistan
The Long War Journal - Charts on US Strikes in Pakistan
It's not a good time to own real estate in North Waziristan right now.
It's not a good time to own real estate in North Waziristan right now.
Haqqani Network Update 12Sep10
The Pentagon must really like my blog. A drone strike near Miram Shah, home base for the Haqqani Network.
From the AP:
DERA ISMAIL KHAN, Pakistan – A suspected American missile strike killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan early Thursday, an intelligence official said, the fourth such attack on suspected insurgent targets there in 24 hours.
The barrage was one of the most intense since the attacks were stepped up more than two years ago in a bid to keep pressure on al-Qaida and its allies. Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
U.S. officials do not publicly acknowledge the missile strikes but have said privately that they have killed several senior Taliban and al-Qaida militants and scores of foot soldiers in a region largely out of the control of the Pakistani state. Critics say innocents are also killed, fueling support for the insurgency.
The latest attack took place before dawn on a house close to a disused match factory a little more than a mile (three kilometers) west of Miran Shah town, a hub for local and international militants in the North Waziristan region, an intelligence official said. He spoke on condition of anonymity in line with the policy of his agency. Five alleged militants were killed, he said.
Folks, its Miram Shah not Miranshah.
Also from the AP:
MIRANSHAH, Pakistan (AFP) – A US drone attack Thursday killed six militants in Pakistan's rebel-infested northwestern tribal belt, security officials said -- the fourth strike in 24 hours.
The latest strike hit North Waziristan, the same tribal district targeted in three other drone attacks since Wednesday and a renowned hub for Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.
The target of the fourth drone attack was a compound in the outskirts of Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
A total of 24 militants were killed in the four strikes.
"Two US drones fired three missiles. We have reports that six militants were killed," a security official based in Peshawar told AFP.
Residents in Miranshah said they heard three huge explosions and later the villagers started announcements from local mosques asking for help.
"Militants have dug out six dead bodies. Five people were critically wounded," a local resident told AFP, requesting anonymity.
"They are still digging the rubble, two nearby houses were also damaged," he added.
Intelligence officials said they were trying to find out the nationalities of the militants killed, but they had no reports about the presence of any high-value target.
"An informer told us there were some Afghan Taliban among the dead but we are investigating," one intelligence official in Miranshah told AFP.
Two intelligence officials in Miranshah also confirmed the attack and the death toll.
Washington has branded the rugged area on the Afghan border -- part of which has been hit by Pakistan's catastrophic flooding -- a global headquarters of Al-Qaeda and the most dangerous place on Earth.
US forces have been waging a drone war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked commanders in the northwestern tribal belt, where militants have carved out havens in mountains outside direct government control.
Officials in Washington say the drone strikes are a vital tool needed to protect foreign troops in Afghanistan and have killed a number of high-value targets including Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud.
The US military does not as a rule confirm drone attacks, but its armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency operating in Afghanistan are the only forces that deploy pilotless drones in the region.
More than 1,040 people have been killed in over 100 drone strikes in Pakistan since August 2008, including a number of senior militants. However, the attacks fuel anti-American sentiment in the conservative Muslim country.
Al-Qaeda announced in June that its number three leader and Osama bin Laden's one-time treasurer Mustafa Abu al-Yazid had been killed in what security officials said appeared to be a drone strike in North Waziristan.
Under US pressure to crack down on Islamist havens along the Afghan border, Pakistan has in the past year significantly increased operations against militants in the area.
More than 3,700 people have been killed in the past three years in a series of suicide attacks and bomb explosions across Pakistan, many of them carried out by the Taliban and other Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist extremists.
Finally, from the Long War Journal:
US Predators struck yet again in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
Six Taliban fighters, including some possibly from Afghanistan, were killed and five more were critically wounded in an attack on a compound in Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
"Two US drones fired three missiles" at the compound, a Pakistani intelligence official told AFP. "We have reports that six militants were killed."
The Taliban reportedly cordoned off the area and are attempting to recover the dead and wounded from the rubble. No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed at this time.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in Danda Darpa Khel, a village just outside of Miramshah that serves as a hub of activity for the terror group.
The strike is the fourth recorded in the past 24 hours. In the four strikes combined, 24 terrorists were reported killed. Earlier today, US Predators or the more powerful Reapers struck twice in Danda Darpa Khel and once in Datta Khel, a known hub for al Qaeda's leadership.
North Waziristan is a known haven for the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and a host of Pakistani and Central and South Asian terror groups, but the Pakistani military has refused to carry out an operation to root them out. The Pakistani military maintains a garrison in Miramshah, but it is confined to base while the US is forced to carry out airstrikes against the terror groups.
The number of strikes is unprecedented, as the US has yet to carry out four strikes in a 24-hour period since the campaign began in 2004 and was ramped up in July 2008.
With today's strikes, the US has carried out 62 attacks inside Pakistan this year. The US exceeded last year's strike total of 53 with a strike in Kurram late last month. In 2008, the US carried out 36 strikes inside Pakistan.
Note to Haqqani members: stay away from Danda Darpa Khel.
From the AP:
DERA ISMAIL KHAN, Pakistan – A suspected American missile strike killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan early Thursday, an intelligence official said, the fourth such attack on suspected insurgent targets there in 24 hours.
The barrage was one of the most intense since the attacks were stepped up more than two years ago in a bid to keep pressure on al-Qaida and its allies. Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
U.S. officials do not publicly acknowledge the missile strikes but have said privately that they have killed several senior Taliban and al-Qaida militants and scores of foot soldiers in a region largely out of the control of the Pakistani state. Critics say innocents are also killed, fueling support for the insurgency.
The latest attack took place before dawn on a house close to a disused match factory a little more than a mile (three kilometers) west of Miran Shah town, a hub for local and international militants in the North Waziristan region, an intelligence official said. He spoke on condition of anonymity in line with the policy of his agency. Five alleged militants were killed, he said.
Folks, its Miram Shah not Miranshah.
Also from the AP:
MIRANSHAH, Pakistan (AFP) – A US drone attack Thursday killed six militants in Pakistan's rebel-infested northwestern tribal belt, security officials said -- the fourth strike in 24 hours.
The latest strike hit North Waziristan, the same tribal district targeted in three other drone attacks since Wednesday and a renowned hub for Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.
The target of the fourth drone attack was a compound in the outskirts of Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
A total of 24 militants were killed in the four strikes.
"Two US drones fired three missiles. We have reports that six militants were killed," a security official based in Peshawar told AFP.
Residents in Miranshah said they heard three huge explosions and later the villagers started announcements from local mosques asking for help.
"Militants have dug out six dead bodies. Five people were critically wounded," a local resident told AFP, requesting anonymity.
"They are still digging the rubble, two nearby houses were also damaged," he added.
Intelligence officials said they were trying to find out the nationalities of the militants killed, but they had no reports about the presence of any high-value target.
"An informer told us there were some Afghan Taliban among the dead but we are investigating," one intelligence official in Miranshah told AFP.
Two intelligence officials in Miranshah also confirmed the attack and the death toll.
Washington has branded the rugged area on the Afghan border -- part of which has been hit by Pakistan's catastrophic flooding -- a global headquarters of Al-Qaeda and the most dangerous place on Earth.
US forces have been waging a drone war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked commanders in the northwestern tribal belt, where militants have carved out havens in mountains outside direct government control.
Officials in Washington say the drone strikes are a vital tool needed to protect foreign troops in Afghanistan and have killed a number of high-value targets including Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud.
The US military does not as a rule confirm drone attacks, but its armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency operating in Afghanistan are the only forces that deploy pilotless drones in the region.
More than 1,040 people have been killed in over 100 drone strikes in Pakistan since August 2008, including a number of senior militants. However, the attacks fuel anti-American sentiment in the conservative Muslim country.
Al-Qaeda announced in June that its number three leader and Osama bin Laden's one-time treasurer Mustafa Abu al-Yazid had been killed in what security officials said appeared to be a drone strike in North Waziristan.
Under US pressure to crack down on Islamist havens along the Afghan border, Pakistan has in the past year significantly increased operations against militants in the area.
More than 3,700 people have been killed in the past three years in a series of suicide attacks and bomb explosions across Pakistan, many of them carried out by the Taliban and other Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist extremists.
Finally, from the Long War Journal:
US Predators struck yet again in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
Six Taliban fighters, including some possibly from Afghanistan, were killed and five more were critically wounded in an attack on a compound in Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
"Two US drones fired three missiles" at the compound, a Pakistani intelligence official told AFP. "We have reports that six militants were killed."
The Taliban reportedly cordoned off the area and are attempting to recover the dead and wounded from the rubble. No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed at this time.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in Danda Darpa Khel, a village just outside of Miramshah that serves as a hub of activity for the terror group.
The strike is the fourth recorded in the past 24 hours. In the four strikes combined, 24 terrorists were reported killed. Earlier today, US Predators or the more powerful Reapers struck twice in Danda Darpa Khel and once in Datta Khel, a known hub for al Qaeda's leadership.
North Waziristan is a known haven for the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and a host of Pakistani and Central and South Asian terror groups, but the Pakistani military has refused to carry out an operation to root them out. The Pakistani military maintains a garrison in Miramshah, but it is confined to base while the US is forced to carry out airstrikes against the terror groups.
The number of strikes is unprecedented, as the US has yet to carry out four strikes in a 24-hour period since the campaign began in 2004 and was ramped up in July 2008.
With today's strikes, the US has carried out 62 attacks inside Pakistan this year. The US exceeded last year's strike total of 53 with a strike in Kurram late last month. In 2008, the US carried out 36 strikes inside Pakistan.
Note to Haqqani members: stay away from Danda Darpa Khel.
Friday, September 10, 2010
A New Way Forward??? Part 1
So the Afghanistan Study Group (http://www. afghanistanstudygroup.org) recently published a new and revised war strategy going forward in Afghanistan called "A New Way Forward: The Report". It's on the main page of the website, so download it and read it. It won't take long to read, which may or may not be good. Rather than copy and paste the entire report, I decided to carry over the five conclusions of the report and offer an assessment.
"1. Emphasize Power-Sharing and Political Reconciliation. Afghanistan will not achieve a sustainable peace without broader support from the Afghan people themselves. Accordingly, the United States should fast track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and to encourage a power sharing arrangement among all parties.
Under the current Afghanistan Constitution, the President has unchecked authority to appoint provincial governors and hundreds of other positions in government. As David Miliband wrote, in many parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent, half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. As an important start to reform, the Afghan Parliament should be given confirmation authority for major appointments, district councils should be elected, budgeting authority decentralized, and elected provincial representatives should be included in the national level council that determines the portion of funds distributed. The ethnic base of the Afghan army should be broadened. More generally, governance should depend more heavily on local, traditional, and community-based structures.
In contrast to President Karzai’s recent and narrowly conceived “peace jirga,” political outreach should include leaders selected by key tribal and village leaders in all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and regional divisions, including rural Pashtuns. This effort should be open to those among the fragmented Taliban who are willing to engage in genuine reconciliation, a step that can help marginalize those Taliban who remain defiant. Preconditions for negotiations, such as recognizing the existing Afghan Constitution, should not be required."
Fast Tracking the Peace Process
This is an overly simplistic and naive view of the region. The Taliban, with the backing of the local populace (or at least no resistance), al Qaeda, and the Pakistani ISI, have been in control of a majority of Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Maybe it has not been flying flags and sending out notes on official letterhead control, but really "in control" through on-going intimidation, narco-trafficking, and shadow governments. On one side sits the Taliban, for the most part safely ensconced in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who have nothing but time and know that we don't. It's a waiting game to them and with the stomach of the American people turned wretchedly by Iraq, they won't have to wait very long. The so-called 2011 withdrawl schedule announced by President Obama does NOT send a signal to the militants that they already don't know. They are smart, under little military pressure, and know that our stay in AfPak is limited by money and weak morale back at home.
On the other side sit 135,000 ISAF troops whose countries, for the most part, have been there since the beginning in late 2001. Many of these same countries fought in Iraq and their citizens and governments have grown weary and are in debt. ISAF forces, with the exception of small groups of Special Forces, will not bring the fight to the Taliban in the tribal areas due to many practical restraints, such as logistics, politics, and manpower. Thus, the only pressure we can exert on the Taliban is through either 1) face to face (direct action) confrontations or 2) drone strikes in the tribal areas. Our mission in southern Afghanistan has largely revolved around trying to bait the Taliban into the open, but they have learned that no fighting force can defeat the modern U.S. military in a direct action engagement. Consequently, the Taliban have adopted the same strategy that doomed the Soviets in the 1980s, which is to 1) melt into the local population and 2) retreat to the mountainous areas and pick the time and place to fight in small unit engagements. Aside from the rare direct action engagement at places like Marjah and Lashkar Gah, ISAF military power has been relegated to conducting drone strikes in the tribal areas.
There is no doubt that the U.S drone strike campaign has killed a large number of Taliban and other jihadis (virtually every #3 man in every jihadi group has been killed several times), but it is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall number of combatants, which is estimated to be between 30,000 – 60,000. Let me be clear--drone strikes are an indispensible part of the effort as they effectively and (relatively) cheaply destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy. However, they are not mass casualty weapons. Additionally, unlike al Qaeda, the tribal militants have an effective and in-depth leadership and training structure (based on the tribal structure), so that even when drone strikes kill the leadership, the lower echelon troops are well versed in tactics and can still carry on the mission. An unintended effect of the drone strikes has been an increased recruitment of new fighters and increasing resentment towards the Pakistani government and the ISAF effort (TTP bombings in heavily populated areas). Thus, as they wait, they grow stronger while continuing to receive financial and military aid from the narco-trafficking profits (courtesy of American and European drug users) and Gulf State donors.
Which brings me to my point—to fast track anything, ISAF and the Afghan government need leverage. We have little leverage in face to face combat, as the Taliban is reluctant to participate in large scale direct action engagements. We have some leverage with the drone strikes, but their effects are limited and are a double-edged sword. We have no economic leverage because the narco-trade is extremely lucrative and our continuing presence in a Muslim country inspires Islamic donors. We have almost no leverage to force the Taliban to come to the table. The only hope we have is to convince the Taliban leadership that living in Afghanistan and earning an honest day’s wage is better than living in the tribal areas wondering if the next Hellfire missile is aimed at them. There may be some merit to this approach, but it definitely won’t be something that can be accomplished in short order.
A more effective, but probably less realistic solution, is not through military power, but through economic and political pressure. If the U.S, were to cease $5 billion in annual monetary aid to Pakistan (or dole it directly to the humanitarian projects) and military hardware, this would pressure Pakistan to, in turn, pressure the Taliban to come to the table. Pakistan is so insanely paranoid about a conflict with India (most of the financial assistance given to them goes to military efforts in the Kashmir region), that a denial of conventional arms and money, in all likelihood, would pressure them to cooperate. This solution, while effective, would probably never happen from a political standpoint, though. Pakistan is viewed as our "friend", and to deny aid to our "partner" in the war on terror would be viewed as directly aiding the Taliban. This conundrum is similar to our situation with Israel--if we cut off military aid, they would be forced to come to the table and adopt a two-state solution. Any rubbish about this type of move prompting Pakistan to help the Taliban as retribution is just that--rubbish. Pakistan cares first and foremost about it's survival. The government is largely secular and tries to cater to the extremists only to the extent that it serves their own interest. Faced with the option of either losing a war with India or kicking the militants out of the tribal areas, Pakistan would undoubtedly choose the former as its priority.
Decentralization of Power
This is exactly what needs to happen. A federal model of government in Afghanistan is a Soviet relic. The country has existed for centuries as a decentralized series of provinces based on ethnicity, language, tribal and religious affiliation, and geographic location. It was not until the Soviets established a centralized puppet government in the 1980s that the various provinces were "federated". After the pullout in 1989, the Najibullah government collapsed quickly as the various ethnic and tribal groups jockyed for power.
The Bush and Obama administrations have made the centralization of power a focus of their strategies, perhaps because it is the backbone of the American democratic model. Aside from the faulty centralized approach, President Karzai is viewed as extremely corrupt by locals (he's actually fairly honest, but he tolerates rampant corruption, which makes him seen as corrupt) and quite powerless to provide protection or support to areas far away from Kabul. I think our fascination with the centralized model has been championed by the military and CIA, the two entities that should NOT be responsible for a strategic nation building plan. The more effective approach is to have a weak centralized government, designed by the State Department, that does nothing but promote hegemony between the provinces, and allow the power to rest in the hands of the provincial governors. This can only be done by effectively stripping Karzai of his power (through a national referendum) and allowing the provinces to conduct elections with the express intent of strong local governance.
I guess the Taliban thought a direct action assault would turn out differently. Obviously they didn't read my blog. From the Long War Journal (Sep 2nd):
US and Afghan troops have beaten back another attempt by the Haqqani Network to overrun a US base in eastern Afghanistan.
More than 20 members of the Haqqani Network were killed after launching an early morning attack today on Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province.
"The attack began in the early morning with small arms and indirect fire directed against the outpost," the International Security Assistance Forces stated in a press release. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers.
"Aircraft from TF [Task Force] Viper conducted two passes over the area, killing at least 20 insurgents in two separate engagements," ISAF stated. No US or Afghan troops were killed or wounded in the attacks.
Combat Outpost Margah is the third US base to be assaulted by the Haqqani Network since Aug. 28. Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province on Aug. 28.
In the Aug. 28 attacks, US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that the Haqqani Network attacks, and similar assaults carried out against major US bases across the country, are ineffective.
"These sorts of FOB [forward operating base] attacks have become little more than exercises in target practice here," the official said in the aftermath of the Aug. 28 attacks. "They show up, we watch them; we kill them."
But a senior US military intelligence official and several US military officers contacted by The Long War Journal cautioned that the attacks demonstrate that the Haqqani Network still has the capacity to organize and strike just outside the walls of US outposts.
"That they [the Taliban and Haqqani Network] can muster their forces so close to large US bases and launch the attacks shows that their presence is strong just outside the gates of our largest bases," an officer who wished to remain anonymous said. "There is no doubt that these are lopsided battles."
"All they need to do is get their fighters inside the wire and create havoc, and the Taliban score a major propaganda coup," a senior US military intelligence official said. "The Taliban know the worst case scenario for them in these attacks - they lose all of their men - and they are willing to take those losses to achieve that goal."
In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base, and conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July. Three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
"1. Emphasize Power-Sharing and Political Reconciliation. Afghanistan will not achieve a sustainable peace without broader support from the Afghan people themselves. Accordingly, the United States should fast track a peace process designed to decentralize power within Afghanistan and to encourage a power sharing arrangement among all parties.
Under the current Afghanistan Constitution, the President has unchecked authority to appoint provincial governors and hundreds of other positions in government. As David Miliband wrote, in many parts of the country, district governance is almost nonexistent, half the governors do not have an office, fewer than a quarter have electricity, and some receive only six dollars a month in expenses. As an important start to reform, the Afghan Parliament should be given confirmation authority for major appointments, district councils should be elected, budgeting authority decentralized, and elected provincial representatives should be included in the national level council that determines the portion of funds distributed. The ethnic base of the Afghan army should be broadened. More generally, governance should depend more heavily on local, traditional, and community-based structures.
In contrast to President Karzai’s recent and narrowly conceived “peace jirga,” political outreach should include leaders selected by key tribal and village leaders in all of Afghanistan’s ethnic and regional divisions, including rural Pashtuns. This effort should be open to those among the fragmented Taliban who are willing to engage in genuine reconciliation, a step that can help marginalize those Taliban who remain defiant. Preconditions for negotiations, such as recognizing the existing Afghan Constitution, should not be required."
Fast Tracking the Peace Process
This is an overly simplistic and naive view of the region. The Taliban, with the backing of the local populace (or at least no resistance), al Qaeda, and the Pakistani ISI, have been in control of a majority of Afghanistan for the past 15 years. Maybe it has not been flying flags and sending out notes on official letterhead control, but really "in control" through on-going intimidation, narco-trafficking, and shadow governments. On one side sits the Taliban, for the most part safely ensconced in the tribal areas of Pakistan, who have nothing but time and know that we don't. It's a waiting game to them and with the stomach of the American people turned wretchedly by Iraq, they won't have to wait very long. The so-called 2011 withdrawl schedule announced by President Obama does NOT send a signal to the militants that they already don't know. They are smart, under little military pressure, and know that our stay in AfPak is limited by money and weak morale back at home.
On the other side sit 135,000 ISAF troops whose countries, for the most part, have been there since the beginning in late 2001. Many of these same countries fought in Iraq and their citizens and governments have grown weary and are in debt. ISAF forces, with the exception of small groups of Special Forces, will not bring the fight to the Taliban in the tribal areas due to many practical restraints, such as logistics, politics, and manpower. Thus, the only pressure we can exert on the Taliban is through either 1) face to face (direct action) confrontations or 2) drone strikes in the tribal areas. Our mission in southern Afghanistan has largely revolved around trying to bait the Taliban into the open, but they have learned that no fighting force can defeat the modern U.S. military in a direct action engagement. Consequently, the Taliban have adopted the same strategy that doomed the Soviets in the 1980s, which is to 1) melt into the local population and 2) retreat to the mountainous areas and pick the time and place to fight in small unit engagements. Aside from the rare direct action engagement at places like Marjah and Lashkar Gah, ISAF military power has been relegated to conducting drone strikes in the tribal areas.
There is no doubt that the U.S drone strike campaign has killed a large number of Taliban and other jihadis (virtually every #3 man in every jihadi group has been killed several times), but it is a drop in the bucket compared to the overall number of combatants, which is estimated to be between 30,000 – 60,000. Let me be clear--drone strikes are an indispensible part of the effort as they effectively and (relatively) cheaply destroy the command and control capabilities of the enemy. However, they are not mass casualty weapons. Additionally, unlike al Qaeda, the tribal militants have an effective and in-depth leadership and training structure (based on the tribal structure), so that even when drone strikes kill the leadership, the lower echelon troops are well versed in tactics and can still carry on the mission. An unintended effect of the drone strikes has been an increased recruitment of new fighters and increasing resentment towards the Pakistani government and the ISAF effort (TTP bombings in heavily populated areas). Thus, as they wait, they grow stronger while continuing to receive financial and military aid from the narco-trafficking profits (courtesy of American and European drug users) and Gulf State donors.
Which brings me to my point—to fast track anything, ISAF and the Afghan government need leverage. We have little leverage in face to face combat, as the Taliban is reluctant to participate in large scale direct action engagements. We have some leverage with the drone strikes, but their effects are limited and are a double-edged sword. We have no economic leverage because the narco-trade is extremely lucrative and our continuing presence in a Muslim country inspires Islamic donors. We have almost no leverage to force the Taliban to come to the table. The only hope we have is to convince the Taliban leadership that living in Afghanistan and earning an honest day’s wage is better than living in the tribal areas wondering if the next Hellfire missile is aimed at them. There may be some merit to this approach, but it definitely won’t be something that can be accomplished in short order.
A more effective, but probably less realistic solution, is not through military power, but through economic and political pressure. If the U.S, were to cease $5 billion in annual monetary aid to Pakistan (or dole it directly to the humanitarian projects) and military hardware, this would pressure Pakistan to, in turn, pressure the Taliban to come to the table. Pakistan is so insanely paranoid about a conflict with India (most of the financial assistance given to them goes to military efforts in the Kashmir region), that a denial of conventional arms and money, in all likelihood, would pressure them to cooperate. This solution, while effective, would probably never happen from a political standpoint, though. Pakistan is viewed as our "friend", and to deny aid to our "partner" in the war on terror would be viewed as directly aiding the Taliban. This conundrum is similar to our situation with Israel--if we cut off military aid, they would be forced to come to the table and adopt a two-state solution. Any rubbish about this type of move prompting Pakistan to help the Taliban as retribution is just that--rubbish. Pakistan cares first and foremost about it's survival. The government is largely secular and tries to cater to the extremists only to the extent that it serves their own interest. Faced with the option of either losing a war with India or kicking the militants out of the tribal areas, Pakistan would undoubtedly choose the former as its priority.
Decentralization of Power
This is exactly what needs to happen. A federal model of government in Afghanistan is a Soviet relic. The country has existed for centuries as a decentralized series of provinces based on ethnicity, language, tribal and religious affiliation, and geographic location. It was not until the Soviets established a centralized puppet government in the 1980s that the various provinces were "federated". After the pullout in 1989, the Najibullah government collapsed quickly as the various ethnic and tribal groups jockyed for power.
The Bush and Obama administrations have made the centralization of power a focus of their strategies, perhaps because it is the backbone of the American democratic model. Aside from the faulty centralized approach, President Karzai is viewed as extremely corrupt by locals (he's actually fairly honest, but he tolerates rampant corruption, which makes him seen as corrupt) and quite powerless to provide protection or support to areas far away from Kabul. I think our fascination with the centralized model has been championed by the military and CIA, the two entities that should NOT be responsible for a strategic nation building plan. The more effective approach is to have a weak centralized government, designed by the State Department, that does nothing but promote hegemony between the provinces, and allow the power to rest in the hands of the provincial governors. This can only be done by effectively stripping Karzai of his power (through a national referendum) and allowing the provinces to conduct elections with the express intent of strong local governance.
I guess the Taliban thought a direct action assault would turn out differently. Obviously they didn't read my blog. From the Long War Journal (Sep 2nd):
US and Afghan troops have beaten back another attempt by the Haqqani Network to overrun a US base in eastern Afghanistan.
More than 20 members of the Haqqani Network were killed after launching an early morning attack today on Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province.
"The attack began in the early morning with small arms and indirect fire directed against the outpost," the International Security Assistance Forces stated in a press release. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers.
"Aircraft from TF [Task Force] Viper conducted two passes over the area, killing at least 20 insurgents in two separate engagements," ISAF stated. No US or Afghan troops were killed or wounded in the attacks.
Combat Outpost Margah is the third US base to be assaulted by the Haqqani Network since Aug. 28. Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province on Aug. 28.
In the Aug. 28 attacks, US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
A US intelligence official told The Long War Journal that the Haqqani Network attacks, and similar assaults carried out against major US bases across the country, are ineffective.
"These sorts of FOB [forward operating base] attacks have become little more than exercises in target practice here," the official said in the aftermath of the Aug. 28 attacks. "They show up, we watch them; we kill them."
But a senior US military intelligence official and several US military officers contacted by The Long War Journal cautioned that the attacks demonstrate that the Haqqani Network still has the capacity to organize and strike just outside the walls of US outposts.
"That they [the Taliban and Haqqani Network] can muster their forces so close to large US bases and launch the attacks shows that their presence is strong just outside the gates of our largest bases," an officer who wished to remain anonymous said. "There is no doubt that these are lopsided battles."
"All they need to do is get their fighters inside the wire and create havoc, and the Taliban score a major propaganda coup," a senior US military intelligence official said. "The Taliban know the worst case scenario for them in these attacks - they lose all of their men - and they are willing to take those losses to achieve that goal."
In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base, and conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July. Three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
Wednesday, September 1, 2010
Hafiz Gul Bahadur
Background
Hafiz Gul Bahadur was born around 1961 and belongs to the Madda Khel clan of the Uthmanzai Wazir tribe, which is located near Lwara, North Waziristan (between Miram Shah and the Afghan border). He annointed himself “Hafiz”, which means one who mastered the entire Qur’an. Bahadur may have fought with the mujahedeen against the Soviets, but certainly fought with QST in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. He is reported to have received his religious education from a Deobandi madrassa in Punjab. Not surprisingly, Bahadur subscribes to the Deobandi Islamic revivalist ideology and maintains a political affiliation with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F), a Deobandi political party. Deobandism, a branch of Sunni Islam, promotes the belief that, instead of following a single school of Islam throughout one’s life, one could employ any one of the four principal schools. Deobandism eventually became the force behind the Jamiaat Ulema Islam (JUI), founded in 1947 first as a religious movement, which helped to set up popular mosques across Pakistan. He maintains a private profile, avoiding any direct contact with journalists in recent years and putting out statements only through his spokesman, Ahmadullah Ahmadi.
The Bahadur Militant Network
Gul Bahadur is considered one of the most important militant leaders in North Waziristan, is known for hosting al-Qaeda and other militant Arab groups, and enjoys close ties with the Haqqani Network. Bahadur currently leads a force of more than 1,500 militants. He rose to fame in 2005, when the Pakistani military initiated combat operations to evict foreign militants from the Tochi River Valley in North Waziristan. The Valley was an operating safe haven for al Qaeda militants forced out of South Waziristan by Pakistani troops, which launched offensives in October 2003 and in April 2004. During the offensives, Bahadur led his men against the Pakistani military alongside troops led by Saddiq Noor and Jalaluddin Haqqani.
After taking a considerable beating by Pakistani troops, Bahadur entered into a ceasefire with the Pakistani government, which resulted in the September 2006 North Waziristan Peace Agreement. The Agreement, facilitated by Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Dadullah (now dead), called for the eviction of foreign militants from North Waziristan, who had been interfering in the local affairs of the region. The interference created tension between the foreign militants, local Taliban leaders from the Mirali area who supported the foreign militants, and Bahadur. The expulsion of certain foreign militants, mostly non-al Qaeda Arabs (Iraqis) and Central Asian militants (Uzbeks) was, however, supported by both Saddiq Noor and Haqqani.
Before the Agreement was implemented, the Uzbek militants expressed their disapproval and refused to comply with Bahadur’s terms. This led Bahadur to assemble a five-member jirga comprised of senior Taliban commanders, which sent a clear message that the militants had no other choice but to honor the truce. Ultimately, politics won over principle and the militants were able to stay in the Mirali area due to strong support from local Taliban leaders such as Manzoor Daur, who openly opposed Bahadur’s decision to expel the foreign militants.
After the signing of the 2006 Peace Agreement, Bahadur became the emir (leader) of the newly formed North Waziristan Taliban and set up a government that paralleled the QST. Unlike South Waziristan, where the Taliban is divided on a tribal basis, the North Waziristan Taliban remained somewhat united. In October 2006, Bahadur’s Taliban took a major step towards “Talibanization” when it issued a pamphlet in which they outlined the levy of new taxes and prescribed harsh penalties for various offenses, such as listening to CDs or shaving beards.
Not surprisingly, the fragile peace agreement broke down in mid-2007 amid acrimony. Pakistani checkpoints in his territory and the Red Mosque Raid were a few of many gripes. Just a few months later, a new peace initiative was launched by a tribal jirga from the Orakzai Agency. While negotiations proceeded Bahadur joined several other FATA/NWFP Taliban commanders to form the TTP. Baitullah Mehsud (responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) was chosen as emir and Bahadur as deputy, but Bahadur quickly (and unofficially) distanced himself from the TTP after Mullah Omar opposed its formation based on military philosophy. Unlike Mehsud, Bahadur supports the Pakistani government (more likely the ISI) and avoids attacks on it or personnel in the FATA. As negotiations drew to a close at the beginning of 2008, the Pakistani military initiated an offensive against Mehsud. To ward off the onslaught, Mehsud attempted to attack Pakistani forces through the Razmak area of North Waziristan. Bahadur, however, barred his axis of attack, saying that any attack would jeopardize his peace agreement, which was finalized in February of 2008.
Partly as a response to Bahadur’s rebuff, Mehsud expanded his TTP influence in the FATA and attempted to eliminate or assimilate rival Taliban commanders. This alarmed many Waziri leaders, who formed the Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (Local Taliban Movement), or the “Waziri Alliance”, with Bahadur as emir and Mullah Nazir (a South Waziristan leader) as his deputy. The Waziri Alliance, backed by the Haqqanis, deterred Mehsud, as he was encircled on all sides by the coalition. Not surprisingly, the Bahadur-Nazir alliance did not last long. In February 2009, Bahadur, Mehsud, and Nazir declared that they had overcome their differences and formed the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahedeen (Council for United Holy Warriors). The SIM focused military actions against Western forces in Afghanistan rather than oppose Pakistan, but fell apart in mid-2009 when tribal tensions sky rocketed and a U.S. drone strike killed Mehsud. Bahadur’s approach closely resembles the Haqqani philosophy, which favors the ISI, and as of 2010, both are free to conduct attacks into Afghanistan and to “Talibanize” their tribal lands. Bahadur usually conducts attacks against Pakistan immediately following U.S. drone strikes, claiming that they violate the terms of their peace agreement.
Leadership
Bahadur’s most important commander is Maulana Saddiq Noor of the Daur tribe who commands about 800 militants. Noor was born around 1955 and has been intimately involved with the QST since 1996. Like Bahadur, Saddiq Noor is based near Miram Shah, where he directed the Mamba-ul-Uloom madrassa, originally built by Jalaluddin Haqqani to support the jihad against the Soviets. The madrassa served as Noor’s headquarters until a U.S. drone strike destroyed it in September 2008. Although Saddiq Noor was left unscathed, it was reported that either nine of his family members or nine members of the Haqqani family were killed in the attack.
Noor’s deputy is Sayeed Khan Daur, who is also from Miram Shah. Although he is younger than either Noor or Bahadur, Khan Daur has a university degree and is known as a computer expert. Abdul Khaliq Haqqani, who commands about 500 militants (and not related to the Haqqani Network as he is Pakistani), is a former Bahadur commander, but was exiled after charges of embezzlement and collaboration with the Uzbeks.
Other close allies of Bahadur are: 1) Wahidullah Wazir, who leads a militant group of 200 Waziri tribesmen around Miram Shah; 2) Halim Khan Daur, who leads about 150 militants: and 3) Saifullah Wazir, who leads about 400 militants. All groups are primarily involved in cross-border attacks on Western forces, but also engage the Pakistani army from time to time.
Western Efforts
U.S. drone strikes have killed several associates of Bahadur and include: al Qaeda leader Abu Laith al-Libbi in January 2008 near Mir Ali, former Egyptian Islamic Group Leader and reported chief al Qaeda propagandist Abu Jihad al-Masri in October 2008, senior al Qaeda member Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi on November 19, 2008, Rashid Rauf, the organizer of the plot to bring down trans-Atlantic flights, on November 22, 2008, al Qaeda member Asad al-Misri (along with twenty-three militants loyal to Bahadur) on May 16, 2009, and a September 4, 2008 drone strike near Miranshah that killed two Arab fighters along with four Daur tribesmen.
Legacy
Bahadur is committed first to his own survival, second to Afghanistan, third to Mehsud, and last to his vision of an Islamist Pakistani state. His political and ideological backgrounds allow him to continue supporting the fight against Western troops while compromising on almost everything else. He will likely continue to direct some level of violence, but will probably avoid unchecked hostilities with the Pakistani government, which both seem to believe would be harmful to their respective interests. His ability to effectively engage Western troops is most likely somewhat limited by the political games he plays with Mehsud and and the ISI. Peace between Bahadur and Pakistan may boost Islamabad’s (ISI’s) interests in the short term, but will hurt Western interests in the long term.
Selected Sources:
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com
http://www.criticalthreats.org
http://www.jamestown.org
http://www.nytimes.com
http://www.merip.org/
Hafiz Gul Bahadur was born around 1961 and belongs to the Madda Khel clan of the Uthmanzai Wazir tribe, which is located near Lwara, North Waziristan (between Miram Shah and the Afghan border). He annointed himself “Hafiz”, which means one who mastered the entire Qur’an. Bahadur may have fought with the mujahedeen against the Soviets, but certainly fought with QST in Afghanistan following the Soviet withdrawal. He is reported to have received his religious education from a Deobandi madrassa in Punjab. Not surprisingly, Bahadur subscribes to the Deobandi Islamic revivalist ideology and maintains a political affiliation with the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F), a Deobandi political party. Deobandism, a branch of Sunni Islam, promotes the belief that, instead of following a single school of Islam throughout one’s life, one could employ any one of the four principal schools. Deobandism eventually became the force behind the Jamiaat Ulema Islam (JUI), founded in 1947 first as a religious movement, which helped to set up popular mosques across Pakistan. He maintains a private profile, avoiding any direct contact with journalists in recent years and putting out statements only through his spokesman, Ahmadullah Ahmadi.
The Bahadur Militant Network
Gul Bahadur is considered one of the most important militant leaders in North Waziristan, is known for hosting al-Qaeda and other militant Arab groups, and enjoys close ties with the Haqqani Network. Bahadur currently leads a force of more than 1,500 militants. He rose to fame in 2005, when the Pakistani military initiated combat operations to evict foreign militants from the Tochi River Valley in North Waziristan. The Valley was an operating safe haven for al Qaeda militants forced out of South Waziristan by Pakistani troops, which launched offensives in October 2003 and in April 2004. During the offensives, Bahadur led his men against the Pakistani military alongside troops led by Saddiq Noor and Jalaluddin Haqqani.
After taking a considerable beating by Pakistani troops, Bahadur entered into a ceasefire with the Pakistani government, which resulted in the September 2006 North Waziristan Peace Agreement. The Agreement, facilitated by Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Dadullah (now dead), called for the eviction of foreign militants from North Waziristan, who had been interfering in the local affairs of the region. The interference created tension between the foreign militants, local Taliban leaders from the Mirali area who supported the foreign militants, and Bahadur. The expulsion of certain foreign militants, mostly non-al Qaeda Arabs (Iraqis) and Central Asian militants (Uzbeks) was, however, supported by both Saddiq Noor and Haqqani.
Before the Agreement was implemented, the Uzbek militants expressed their disapproval and refused to comply with Bahadur’s terms. This led Bahadur to assemble a five-member jirga comprised of senior Taliban commanders, which sent a clear message that the militants had no other choice but to honor the truce. Ultimately, politics won over principle and the militants were able to stay in the Mirali area due to strong support from local Taliban leaders such as Manzoor Daur, who openly opposed Bahadur’s decision to expel the foreign militants.
After the signing of the 2006 Peace Agreement, Bahadur became the emir (leader) of the newly formed North Waziristan Taliban and set up a government that paralleled the QST. Unlike South Waziristan, where the Taliban is divided on a tribal basis, the North Waziristan Taliban remained somewhat united. In October 2006, Bahadur’s Taliban took a major step towards “Talibanization” when it issued a pamphlet in which they outlined the levy of new taxes and prescribed harsh penalties for various offenses, such as listening to CDs or shaving beards.
Not surprisingly, the fragile peace agreement broke down in mid-2007 amid acrimony. Pakistani checkpoints in his territory and the Red Mosque Raid were a few of many gripes. Just a few months later, a new peace initiative was launched by a tribal jirga from the Orakzai Agency. While negotiations proceeded Bahadur joined several other FATA/NWFP Taliban commanders to form the TTP. Baitullah Mehsud (responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto) was chosen as emir and Bahadur as deputy, but Bahadur quickly (and unofficially) distanced himself from the TTP after Mullah Omar opposed its formation based on military philosophy. Unlike Mehsud, Bahadur supports the Pakistani government (more likely the ISI) and avoids attacks on it or personnel in the FATA. As negotiations drew to a close at the beginning of 2008, the Pakistani military initiated an offensive against Mehsud. To ward off the onslaught, Mehsud attempted to attack Pakistani forces through the Razmak area of North Waziristan. Bahadur, however, barred his axis of attack, saying that any attack would jeopardize his peace agreement, which was finalized in February of 2008.
Partly as a response to Bahadur’s rebuff, Mehsud expanded his TTP influence in the FATA and attempted to eliminate or assimilate rival Taliban commanders. This alarmed many Waziri leaders, who formed the Muqami Tehrik-e-Taliban (Local Taliban Movement), or the “Waziri Alliance”, with Bahadur as emir and Mullah Nazir (a South Waziristan leader) as his deputy. The Waziri Alliance, backed by the Haqqanis, deterred Mehsud, as he was encircled on all sides by the coalition. Not surprisingly, the Bahadur-Nazir alliance did not last long. In February 2009, Bahadur, Mehsud, and Nazir declared that they had overcome their differences and formed the Shura Ittihad-ul-Mujahedeen (Council for United Holy Warriors). The SIM focused military actions against Western forces in Afghanistan rather than oppose Pakistan, but fell apart in mid-2009 when tribal tensions sky rocketed and a U.S. drone strike killed Mehsud. Bahadur’s approach closely resembles the Haqqani philosophy, which favors the ISI, and as of 2010, both are free to conduct attacks into Afghanistan and to “Talibanize” their tribal lands. Bahadur usually conducts attacks against Pakistan immediately following U.S. drone strikes, claiming that they violate the terms of their peace agreement.
Leadership
Bahadur’s most important commander is Maulana Saddiq Noor of the Daur tribe who commands about 800 militants. Noor was born around 1955 and has been intimately involved with the QST since 1996. Like Bahadur, Saddiq Noor is based near Miram Shah, where he directed the Mamba-ul-Uloom madrassa, originally built by Jalaluddin Haqqani to support the jihad against the Soviets. The madrassa served as Noor’s headquarters until a U.S. drone strike destroyed it in September 2008. Although Saddiq Noor was left unscathed, it was reported that either nine of his family members or nine members of the Haqqani family were killed in the attack.
Noor’s deputy is Sayeed Khan Daur, who is also from Miram Shah. Although he is younger than either Noor or Bahadur, Khan Daur has a university degree and is known as a computer expert. Abdul Khaliq Haqqani, who commands about 500 militants (and not related to the Haqqani Network as he is Pakistani), is a former Bahadur commander, but was exiled after charges of embezzlement and collaboration with the Uzbeks.
Other close allies of Bahadur are: 1) Wahidullah Wazir, who leads a militant group of 200 Waziri tribesmen around Miram Shah; 2) Halim Khan Daur, who leads about 150 militants: and 3) Saifullah Wazir, who leads about 400 militants. All groups are primarily involved in cross-border attacks on Western forces, but also engage the Pakistani army from time to time.
Western Efforts
U.S. drone strikes have killed several associates of Bahadur and include: al Qaeda leader Abu Laith al-Libbi in January 2008 near Mir Ali, former Egyptian Islamic Group Leader and reported chief al Qaeda propagandist Abu Jihad al-Masri in October 2008, senior al Qaeda member Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi on November 19, 2008, Rashid Rauf, the organizer of the plot to bring down trans-Atlantic flights, on November 22, 2008, al Qaeda member Asad al-Misri (along with twenty-three militants loyal to Bahadur) on May 16, 2009, and a September 4, 2008 drone strike near Miranshah that killed two Arab fighters along with four Daur tribesmen.
Legacy
Bahadur is committed first to his own survival, second to Afghanistan, third to Mehsud, and last to his vision of an Islamist Pakistani state. His political and ideological backgrounds allow him to continue supporting the fight against Western troops while compromising on almost everything else. He will likely continue to direct some level of violence, but will probably avoid unchecked hostilities with the Pakistani government, which both seem to believe would be harmful to their respective interests. His ability to effectively engage Western troops is most likely somewhat limited by the political games he plays with Mehsud and and the ISI. Peace between Bahadur and Pakistan may boost Islamabad’s (ISI’s) interests in the short term, but will hurt Western interests in the long term.
Selected Sources:
http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com
http://www.criticalthreats.org
http://www.jamestown.org
http://www.nytimes.com
http://www.merip.org/
Monday, July 19, 2010
The Haqqani Network--Post 9/11 (Updated 9/2010)
Organization and Leadership
The Haqqani network is divided into four distinct groups based on social and military status: 1) those who fought against the Soviets; 2) those from the Loya Paktiya (Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces); 3) those from North Waziristan or local madrassas; and 4) foreign fighters (Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks). Members of the last group are considered “bottom of the barrel” as they are foreign and not considered trustworthy. Ironically, they are most often “volunteered” for martyrdom operations. Turnover is high in all four groups due to frequent drone strikes. Attacks in rural areas are accomplished with IEDs/roadside bombs and urban attacks are accomplished with VBEIDs and suicide bombers. The section that performs suicide and commando-style attacks is known as the “Hamza Brigade.”
The network is headquartered in Miram Shah, also known as the Miram Shah Shura, but also has large compounds in Sarai Darpa Khel and Danday Darpa Khel. All three locations are closely monitored by ISAF and are the frequent recipients of drone strikes. The network operates primarily in the Loya Paktiya, but they also have a strong presence in the Logar and Wardak Provinces. The network issues press releases under the title of “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”
Although labeled “Taliban”, the network operates autonomously, most likely because the QST needs them more, although both Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin hold positions in the Taliban’s Quetta Shura. The local Afghan and Waziri populace view the Haqqani militants as more moderate and fair than the mainstream QST, which can often use heavy-handed tactics. In Logar Province, for example, the QST was so despised by the locals that they were evicted and eventually replaced by the Haqqani network. Both groups will often mutually support each other, however, as evidenced by recent Haqqani attacks in Kabul (new territory for the network).
Jalaluddin Haqqani was the founder of the network and, on paper, remains so. But his son, Sirajuddin, runs the show these days. He is, by most accounts, more charismatic, violent, and devout than his father, which may explain the growing radicalization of the network. The vast majority of higher echelon commanders are from the Zardan Tribe in Afghanistan. Notable commanders include Nai Arsallah, Maulavi Noor Kasim, Muhammad Amin, Mira Jan, and Bahram Jan, who are all from the Paktiya/Khost area. Local commanders’ lineage varies depending on the location and they receive some support from headquarters, but are required to raise their own money through "donations", taxes, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and narco-trafficking. Notable local field commanders include Mullah Sangin (kidnapped a private from the 82nd Airborne) and Zakim Shah, the shadow governor of Khost, although they typically lack the apparatus to act as shadow governments. The network has a distant contact well to the north—Mullah Inayatullah in the Kunduz Province, who is also from the Zardan Tribe).
The network, which is known for its fairness and adherence to Pashtunwali, has acted as the mediator between many warring parties in the past several years (usually performed by Sirajuddin and Bakhti Jan). It helped negotiate a peace treaty between Pakistan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in South Waziristan in 2006 and a peace treaty between the late Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistan in 2008. The network also negotiated a truce between Mullah Nazir and Uzbek foreigners in 2007 (Pashtuns tend to despise foreign fighters). And what may have been considered a stroke of political deftness, the network unified the rival militant groups led by Bahadur, Nazir, and Mehsud in the spring of 2009. A fatal drone strike on Mehsud in August 2009, however, destroyed the coalition.
Jalaluddin Haqqani
Jalaluddin Haqqani was born around 1950 in Srani, Paktiya and lived near Khost until the Soviet invasion when he moved to Miram Shah, North Waziristan. He is from the Mezi Clan of the Zardan Tribe. He has (at least) two wives, one who is Pashtun and one who is Arab. Although he is close to bin Laden, who espouses extreme global views, his politics are somewhat progressive (by Pashtun standards), as he supports social and civil rights for women and a fair application of Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal code). He was appointed Justice Minister by the mujahedeen in 1992 and was even offered the Prime Minster position by Hamid Karzai. It is rumored that he enjoys a closer relationship with bin Laden than Mullah Omar, which is surprising due to the wide divergence of political and social views between the two. This may be partially due to their shared experiences during the Soviet occupation when he helped build, staff, and protect bin Laden’s training camps in Paktiya and Nangarhar between 1986 and 2001. When he is not trying to kill Americans, he runs several madrassas (religious indoctrination schools) in and around Miram Shah.
Jalaluddin also enjoys a cozy relationship with Pakistan’s ISI, which provides him with weapons, money, intelligence, and a “heads up” any time the Pakistani army is about to raid one of his facilities. While he receives tremendous assistance from ISI, he is constantly being targeted by ISAF forces. He was badly wounded on November 13, 2001 in an airstrike and a good chunk of his family was killed (32 KIA) in a drone strike on September 8, 2008 near Dandi Darpa Khail, North Waziristan.
Jalaluddin has at least two brothers, Haji Khalil and Ibrahim, and at least five sons, Sirajuddin, Badruddin, Nasiruddin, Omar, and Mohammed. All of his sons travel to the Gulf to raise money, but Nasiruddin is half-Arab, thus making him an ideal liaison for al Qaeda and wealthy financial sponsors in the Gulf. Omar was killed by ISAF forces in Paktiya in July 2008 and Mohammed was killed in a Predator drone strike on February 18, 2010.
He has no strong tribal ties to North Waziristan, but enjoys tremendous respect throughout the FATA by both civilians and militants. Part of his popularity stems from his wisdom and sense of fairness. He is often called to mediate disputes between civilians and between rival militant groups in North and South Waziristan. But, because he has no local tribal ties, he does have rivals in North Waziristan, the most powerful of which is Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
Sirajuddin Haqqani
Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, was born around 1979 and grew up in the Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa near Peshawar, NWFP. He is considered more devout and radical than his father. His father is the leader of the network in name only as Sirajuddin oversees all political and military activities. He also serves as the official liaison with QST and al Qaeda. Sirajuddin’s deputy commander is Bakhti Jan and his political deputy is Jan Baz Zadran, who has no military experience. Notably, Bakhti Jan has close ties with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan, a militant group that is a sworn enemy of Pakistan.
**It will be interesting to see if Sirajuddin burns his bridges with Pakistan/ISI in favor of supporting the TTP.**
Sirajuddin enjoys a $5 million bounty on his head and is the frequent target of drone strikes.
Radicalization
**This is purely conjecture on my part, but it makes sense**
There is increasing evidence that the network is cooperating more with al Qaeda. The network facilitates suicide attacks in urban areas and al Qaeda provides the bodies. Although the relationship is “strained” because of Haqqani’s support of Pakistan (al Qaeda does not like Pakistan), there is evidence that the newer, younger members (who tend to be Arab and not Pashtun) definitely favor the global jihadist philosophy of al Qaeda. This can be observed in the closer military and financial cooperation between the two groups, the growing use of suicide attacks, and closer ties with the TTP in North and South Waziristan. The network also appears to be isolating itself from the QST based on its recent target list. The Taliban favors not attacking United Nations/international organizations in order to increase its “legitimacy” as an actual government, whereas the network has stepped up its attacks on international targets. And what strikes me most important, network members now spend all of their “down time” in madrassas rather than farming/working at home, which is typical fare for most Taliban members.
For some strange reason (well, not really since the US is a lackey to Pakistan), the Haqqani network has escaped the US State Department’s list of foreign terror groups. In May 2010, however, the “flaming liberal” Senator Diane Feinstein from California lobbied to place the group on the list.
Notable Attacks
January 2008-Bombing of Serena Hotel in Kabul
March 2008-Kidnapping of British journalist Sean Langan
April 2008—Asassination attempt on Hamid Karzai
July 2008—Bombing of Indian Embassy in Kabul
November 2008—Kidnapping of Time magazine journalist David Rohde
December 2009-Attack on Camp Chapman
May 2010-Sucide bombing in Kabul
9/2010 Update
The U.S. State Department finally designated the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization, subject to sanctions under Executive Order 13224:
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg782.htm
The Haqqani network is divided into four distinct groups based on social and military status: 1) those who fought against the Soviets; 2) those from the Loya Paktiya (Paktiya, Paktika, and Khost Provinces); 3) those from North Waziristan or local madrassas; and 4) foreign fighters (Arabs, Chechens, and Uzbeks). Members of the last group are considered “bottom of the barrel” as they are foreign and not considered trustworthy. Ironically, they are most often “volunteered” for martyrdom operations. Turnover is high in all four groups due to frequent drone strikes. Attacks in rural areas are accomplished with IEDs/roadside bombs and urban attacks are accomplished with VBEIDs and suicide bombers. The section that performs suicide and commando-style attacks is known as the “Hamza Brigade.”
The network is headquartered in Miram Shah, also known as the Miram Shah Shura, but also has large compounds in Sarai Darpa Khel and Danday Darpa Khel. All three locations are closely monitored by ISAF and are the frequent recipients of drone strikes. The network operates primarily in the Loya Paktiya, but they also have a strong presence in the Logar and Wardak Provinces. The network issues press releases under the title of “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.”
Although labeled “Taliban”, the network operates autonomously, most likely because the QST needs them more, although both Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin hold positions in the Taliban’s Quetta Shura. The local Afghan and Waziri populace view the Haqqani militants as more moderate and fair than the mainstream QST, which can often use heavy-handed tactics. In Logar Province, for example, the QST was so despised by the locals that they were evicted and eventually replaced by the Haqqani network. Both groups will often mutually support each other, however, as evidenced by recent Haqqani attacks in Kabul (new territory for the network).
Jalaluddin Haqqani was the founder of the network and, on paper, remains so. But his son, Sirajuddin, runs the show these days. He is, by most accounts, more charismatic, violent, and devout than his father, which may explain the growing radicalization of the network. The vast majority of higher echelon commanders are from the Zardan Tribe in Afghanistan. Notable commanders include Nai Arsallah, Maulavi Noor Kasim, Muhammad Amin, Mira Jan, and Bahram Jan, who are all from the Paktiya/Khost area. Local commanders’ lineage varies depending on the location and they receive some support from headquarters, but are required to raise their own money through "donations", taxes, extortion, robbery, kidnapping, and narco-trafficking. Notable local field commanders include Mullah Sangin (kidnapped a private from the 82nd Airborne) and Zakim Shah, the shadow governor of Khost, although they typically lack the apparatus to act as shadow governments. The network has a distant contact well to the north—Mullah Inayatullah in the Kunduz Province, who is also from the Zardan Tribe).
The network, which is known for its fairness and adherence to Pashtunwali, has acted as the mediator between many warring parties in the past several years (usually performed by Sirajuddin and Bakhti Jan). It helped negotiate a peace treaty between Pakistan and Hafiz Gul Bahadur in South Waziristan in 2006 and a peace treaty between the late Baitullah Mehsud and Pakistan in 2008. The network also negotiated a truce between Mullah Nazir and Uzbek foreigners in 2007 (Pashtuns tend to despise foreign fighters). And what may have been considered a stroke of political deftness, the network unified the rival militant groups led by Bahadur, Nazir, and Mehsud in the spring of 2009. A fatal drone strike on Mehsud in August 2009, however, destroyed the coalition.
Jalaluddin Haqqani
Jalaluddin Haqqani was born around 1950 in Srani, Paktiya and lived near Khost until the Soviet invasion when he moved to Miram Shah, North Waziristan. He is from the Mezi Clan of the Zardan Tribe. He has (at least) two wives, one who is Pashtun and one who is Arab. Although he is close to bin Laden, who espouses extreme global views, his politics are somewhat progressive (by Pashtun standards), as he supports social and civil rights for women and a fair application of Pashtunwali (Pashtun tribal code). He was appointed Justice Minister by the mujahedeen in 1992 and was even offered the Prime Minster position by Hamid Karzai. It is rumored that he enjoys a closer relationship with bin Laden than Mullah Omar, which is surprising due to the wide divergence of political and social views between the two. This may be partially due to their shared experiences during the Soviet occupation when he helped build, staff, and protect bin Laden’s training camps in Paktiya and Nangarhar between 1986 and 2001. When he is not trying to kill Americans, he runs several madrassas (religious indoctrination schools) in and around Miram Shah.
Jalaluddin also enjoys a cozy relationship with Pakistan’s ISI, which provides him with weapons, money, intelligence, and a “heads up” any time the Pakistani army is about to raid one of his facilities. While he receives tremendous assistance from ISI, he is constantly being targeted by ISAF forces. He was badly wounded on November 13, 2001 in an airstrike and a good chunk of his family was killed (32 KIA) in a drone strike on September 8, 2008 near Dandi Darpa Khail, North Waziristan.
Jalaluddin has at least two brothers, Haji Khalil and Ibrahim, and at least five sons, Sirajuddin, Badruddin, Nasiruddin, Omar, and Mohammed. All of his sons travel to the Gulf to raise money, but Nasiruddin is half-Arab, thus making him an ideal liaison for al Qaeda and wealthy financial sponsors in the Gulf. Omar was killed by ISAF forces in Paktiya in July 2008 and Mohammed was killed in a Predator drone strike on February 18, 2010.
He has no strong tribal ties to North Waziristan, but enjoys tremendous respect throughout the FATA by both civilians and militants. Part of his popularity stems from his wisdom and sense of fairness. He is often called to mediate disputes between civilians and between rival militant groups in North and South Waziristan. But, because he has no local tribal ties, he does have rivals in North Waziristan, the most powerful of which is Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
Sirajuddin Haqqani
Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, was born around 1979 and grew up in the Darul Uloom Haqqania madrassa near Peshawar, NWFP. He is considered more devout and radical than his father. His father is the leader of the network in name only as Sirajuddin oversees all political and military activities. He also serves as the official liaison with QST and al Qaeda. Sirajuddin’s deputy commander is Bakhti Jan and his political deputy is Jan Baz Zadran, who has no military experience. Notably, Bakhti Jan has close ties with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in North Waziristan, a militant group that is a sworn enemy of Pakistan.
**It will be interesting to see if Sirajuddin burns his bridges with Pakistan/ISI in favor of supporting the TTP.**
Sirajuddin enjoys a $5 million bounty on his head and is the frequent target of drone strikes.
Radicalization
**This is purely conjecture on my part, but it makes sense**
There is increasing evidence that the network is cooperating more with al Qaeda. The network facilitates suicide attacks in urban areas and al Qaeda provides the bodies. Although the relationship is “strained” because of Haqqani’s support of Pakistan (al Qaeda does not like Pakistan), there is evidence that the newer, younger members (who tend to be Arab and not Pashtun) definitely favor the global jihadist philosophy of al Qaeda. This can be observed in the closer military and financial cooperation between the two groups, the growing use of suicide attacks, and closer ties with the TTP in North and South Waziristan. The network also appears to be isolating itself from the QST based on its recent target list. The Taliban favors not attacking United Nations/international organizations in order to increase its “legitimacy” as an actual government, whereas the network has stepped up its attacks on international targets. And what strikes me most important, network members now spend all of their “down time” in madrassas rather than farming/working at home, which is typical fare for most Taliban members.
For some strange reason (well, not really since the US is a lackey to Pakistan), the Haqqani network has escaped the US State Department’s list of foreign terror groups. In May 2010, however, the “flaming liberal” Senator Diane Feinstein from California lobbied to place the group on the list.
Notable Attacks
January 2008-Bombing of Serena Hotel in Kabul
March 2008-Kidnapping of British journalist Sean Langan
April 2008—Asassination attempt on Hamid Karzai
July 2008—Bombing of Indian Embassy in Kabul
November 2008—Kidnapping of Time magazine journalist David Rohde
December 2009-Attack on Camp Chapman
May 2010-Sucide bombing in Kabul
9/2010 Update
The U.S. State Department finally designated the Haqqani Network as a terrorist organization, subject to sanctions under Executive Order 13224:
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg782.htm
The Haqqani Network--A Brief History up to 2001
The Haqqani Network is a semi-autonomous group of Sunni Muslim militants based out of the North Waziristan Province in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Their primary mission is to expel (kill) all Western and non-Muslim people from the country of Afghanistan. They share somewhat close ties to the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST) led by Mullah Omar (eye-patch guy) and the al Qaeda global terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden. Additionally, they enjoy preferential treatment and protection by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the ISI. Consequently, they publicly support the country of Pakistan and reject the goals of anti-Pakistan militant groups, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). They have been euphemistically labeled a “moderate” militant group, but have become increasingly radicalized in the past few years.
**I call them militants and not insurgents because they were in Afghanistan/North Waziristan long before NATO "occupied" Afghanistan.**
The Haqqani "network" formed in the early 1980s as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its founder and current figurehead, Jalaluddin Haqqani, is from the town of Khost in the Paktiya Province of eastern Afghanistan. To counter the Soviet occupation from a safe haven, Haqqani relocated to the North Waziristan and set up operating bases near the capital of Miram Shah, where he could safely launch cross border raids. The group was originally comprised mainly of fellow Zardani Tribesmen. Haqqani joined the Khalis offshoot of the Hezb-i-Islami organization (he had issues with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who enjoyed support from Iran) and worked in close concert with other mujahedeen groups, which were collectively known as the Peshawar Seven.
Jalaluddin Haqqani was a natural born military leader and went on to become the most successful and well respected mujahedeen commander during the Soviet occupation. Part of his success was due, however, to the generous support bestowed upon them by the Pakistani ISI (an organization that is widely known to suffer widespread corruption) and the American CIA. Both organizations funneled in millions of dollars in aid and weapons. Along with the ISI and CIA, a tall, lanky fellow from Saudi Arabia also played a hand in Haqqani's (and the rest of the mujahedeen's) success. While fighting in Afghanistan, Haqqani met Osama bin Laden, where the two formed a professional and personal relationship around 1986. Bin Laden was not known for his military prowess, but had access to vast amounts of funding and was charismatic, thus he made an excellent recruiter of foreign fighters. Presumably in exchange for money and weapons, Haqqani offered his men to protect bin Laden’s training camps (in the Khost area).
After the pullout of Soviet troops in 1989, a civil war erupted in Afghanistan. The "network" became amorphorous, as a safe haven was not needed, but Haqqani continued to rely on the Khost and North Waziristan areas for support. Haqqani continued to lead his men in combat, this time against the pro-Soviet puppet government headed by Dr. Mohammad Najibullah. In 1991, his troops captured the City of Khost and after the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992, he continued fighting against other mujahedeen factions, which were primarily comprised of non-Pashtun ethnic groups from central and northern Afghanistan. As the free for all civil war continued into 1995, Haqqani came under increasing pressure by the Pakistani ISI and bin Laden to join a new group called the Taliban (formed to unify the like-minded miltant groups and impose strict Sharia law throughout the country) in order to help take Kabul and defeat the Northern Alliance (mostly non-Pashtun). His troops eventually joined the Taliban, but never professed allegiance to or took orders from Mullah Omar (the guy with an eye patch) or bin Laden. After the fall of Kabul, Haqqani's militants continued to fight the Northern Alliance where they (and many, many other groups)committed atrocities against the local populace.
Haqqani could do no wrong in the eyes of America prior to approximately 1998. He had helped win the war, which was distantly related to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Empire. Charlie Wilson (yes, that one) even said of him that he was "goodness personified". President Bill Clinton apparently disagreed and launched more than 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles in 1998 at the Haqqani sponsored al Qaeda training camps near Khost. While the primary objective was a response to the Tanzania bombings, the Haqqani-bin Laden link finally appeared on the United States' radar screen.
The Taliban had the Northern Alliance on the ropes just prior to the September 11th attacks. Their hugely popular leader, Ahmad Shah Massood, was killed by Taliban/al Qaeda asassins (exploding video camera) just days before and the entire Alliance was backed into a small corner of northern Afghanistan. In late September 2001, Mullah Omar appointed Haqqani commander in chief of all armed Taliban forces. But, within a month, the tables were completely turned. USASOC troops arrived in October and by November, the Taliban and al Qaeda were in full scale retreat towards the Pakistani border. Along the way, Jalaluddin Haqqani survived several deliberate missile and air strikes. Having operated in the area for decades and resurrecting the "network", Haqqani secured safe passage of many key al Qaeda and Taliban personnel across the border into North Waziristan from the Tora Bora/Nangarhar area.
Would you buy a used car from these guys? Only if you check to see if it's wired first. Sirajuddin Haqqani (Jal's son) on the left, Jalaluddin Haqqani in the middle, and some Pashtun guy on the right.
**I call them militants and not insurgents because they were in Afghanistan/North Waziristan long before NATO "occupied" Afghanistan.**
The Haqqani "network" formed in the early 1980s as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Its founder and current figurehead, Jalaluddin Haqqani, is from the town of Khost in the Paktiya Province of eastern Afghanistan. To counter the Soviet occupation from a safe haven, Haqqani relocated to the North Waziristan and set up operating bases near the capital of Miram Shah, where he could safely launch cross border raids. The group was originally comprised mainly of fellow Zardani Tribesmen. Haqqani joined the Khalis offshoot of the Hezb-i-Islami organization (he had issues with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who enjoyed support from Iran) and worked in close concert with other mujahedeen groups, which were collectively known as the Peshawar Seven.
Jalaluddin Haqqani was a natural born military leader and went on to become the most successful and well respected mujahedeen commander during the Soviet occupation. Part of his success was due, however, to the generous support bestowed upon them by the Pakistani ISI (an organization that is widely known to suffer widespread corruption) and the American CIA. Both organizations funneled in millions of dollars in aid and weapons. Along with the ISI and CIA, a tall, lanky fellow from Saudi Arabia also played a hand in Haqqani's (and the rest of the mujahedeen's) success. While fighting in Afghanistan, Haqqani met Osama bin Laden, where the two formed a professional and personal relationship around 1986. Bin Laden was not known for his military prowess, but had access to vast amounts of funding and was charismatic, thus he made an excellent recruiter of foreign fighters. Presumably in exchange for money and weapons, Haqqani offered his men to protect bin Laden’s training camps (in the Khost area).
After the pullout of Soviet troops in 1989, a civil war erupted in Afghanistan. The "network" became amorphorous, as a safe haven was not needed, but Haqqani continued to rely on the Khost and North Waziristan areas for support. Haqqani continued to lead his men in combat, this time against the pro-Soviet puppet government headed by Dr. Mohammad Najibullah. In 1991, his troops captured the City of Khost and after the fall of the Najibullah regime in 1992, he continued fighting against other mujahedeen factions, which were primarily comprised of non-Pashtun ethnic groups from central and northern Afghanistan. As the free for all civil war continued into 1995, Haqqani came under increasing pressure by the Pakistani ISI and bin Laden to join a new group called the Taliban (formed to unify the like-minded miltant groups and impose strict Sharia law throughout the country) in order to help take Kabul and defeat the Northern Alliance (mostly non-Pashtun). His troops eventually joined the Taliban, but never professed allegiance to or took orders from Mullah Omar (the guy with an eye patch) or bin Laden. After the fall of Kabul, Haqqani's militants continued to fight the Northern Alliance where they (and many, many other groups)committed atrocities against the local populace.
Haqqani could do no wrong in the eyes of America prior to approximately 1998. He had helped win the war, which was distantly related to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Empire. Charlie Wilson (yes, that one) even said of him that he was "goodness personified". President Bill Clinton apparently disagreed and launched more than 70 Tomahawk cruise missiles in 1998 at the Haqqani sponsored al Qaeda training camps near Khost. While the primary objective was a response to the Tanzania bombings, the Haqqani-bin Laden link finally appeared on the United States' radar screen.
The Taliban had the Northern Alliance on the ropes just prior to the September 11th attacks. Their hugely popular leader, Ahmad Shah Massood, was killed by Taliban/al Qaeda asassins (exploding video camera) just days before and the entire Alliance was backed into a small corner of northern Afghanistan. In late September 2001, Mullah Omar appointed Haqqani commander in chief of all armed Taliban forces. But, within a month, the tables were completely turned. USASOC troops arrived in October and by November, the Taliban and al Qaeda were in full scale retreat towards the Pakistani border. Along the way, Jalaluddin Haqqani survived several deliberate missile and air strikes. Having operated in the area for decades and resurrecting the "network", Haqqani secured safe passage of many key al Qaeda and Taliban personnel across the border into North Waziristan from the Tora Bora/Nangarhar area.
Would you buy a used car from these guys? Only if you check to see if it's wired first. Sirajuddin Haqqani (Jal's son) on the left, Jalaluddin Haqqani in the middle, and some Pashtun guy on the right.
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