The long-promised ground offensive in Khandahar (not Kandahar) inauspiciously started earlier this week. Not much in the media about the largest military offensive since 2001.
Khandahar is significant for a couple of reasons. First, it is the "spiritual birthplace" of the Taliban. The Taliban (in Pashto, Talib means "student" and the -an suffix pluralizes it, so "students") is the brain child of Mullah Mohammed Omar. After the fall of the Najibullah regine in 1993, the entire country was in chaos. Omar (and others) decided to offer a program of law and order supposedly based on the Qur'an. It was an easy sell in the land of decades of war and corrupt warlords. Second, having such a legacy, Khandahar is the Taliban-esque ideological stronghold today--similar to the Ba'athist stronghold of Tikrit (Saddaam's birthplace). Third, along with Helmand Province, Khandahar Province, located in the southern portion of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan, is THE main thoroughfare for militants, weapons, and narcotics. The city of Khandahar is a south Asian cross-roads, with major roadways connecting it to Kabul, Herat, and Ghazni in Afghanistan and Quetta in Pakistan (which is the relocated home base of the Afghan Taliban). Thus, Khandahar is a very important societal, economic, political, and military target.
Tyler Hicks from the New York Times gives a brief account of this week's ground combat involving the 101st Airborne (affectionately known by the Army Rangers as the "Screaming Chickens"):
NOTE: I rib the Screaming Chickens, but 16 hard-charging grunts died this week. Infantry is infantry, no matter the unit or service branch, and my condolences go out to their loved ones. You did us proud, HUAH!
ARGHANDAB, Afghanistan — American and Afghan troops began active combat last week in an offensive to drive the Taliban out of their strongholds surrounding the city of Kandahar, military officials said Sunday.
In the last several days, soldiers shifted from guarding aid workers and sipping tea with village elders to actively hunting down Taliban fighters in marijuana fields and pomegranate orchards laced with booby traps.
Sixteen Americans have died in the push so far, including two killed by a roadside bomb on Sunday.
The combat phase began five or six days ago in the Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwai Districts, Brig. Gen. Josef Blotz, a NATO spokesman in Kabul, said, defining the current phase for the first time.
“We expect hard fighting,” he said of the offensive, whose objective is to clear the Taliban from three districts to the west and south of the city.
Winning over Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban, is considered crucial to President Obama’s efforts to shift the balance of power in Afghanistan after the militants’ comeback of recent years.
“This is the most significant military operation ongoing in Afghanistan,” General Blotz, who is with the International Security Assistance Force of NATO, said, calling it the “top operational priority now.”
This is the first large-scale combat operation involving multiple objectives in Kandahar Province, where a military offensive was originally expected to begin in June. That offensive was downgraded to more of a joint civil-military effort after the military encountered problems containing the Taliban in the much smaller city of Marja and because Afghan leaders feared high civilian casualties.
During the last week of August, at the instigation of Afghan authorities, American troops supported a major push into the Mehlajat area on the southwest edge of Kandahar City, driving the Taliban from that area with few casualties on either side.
At the time, military officials said that was the beginning of what would be an increase in active combat around Kandahar.
Bismillah Khan, the police chief in the Zhari District, confirmed that the combat operation there began on Saturday, but he declined to give further details. Some of the heaviest fighting has been in Zhari, where troops have been told to avoid contact with local people because of widespread hostility toward foreign forces there.
Zhari is the hometown of the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, and it also sits astride the strategic Highway 1, connecting Kandahar with Helmand Province to the west.
Often the soldiers there run what are known as “move to contact” patrols that have no goal but to draw fire from the Taliban so aircraft can find and kill them.
Last Tuesday, a United States Army platoon left Forward Operating Base Wilson early in the morning and within 10 minutes, Taliban insurgents had opened fire with small arms, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.
Although helicopter gunships were soon overhead to support the ground forces, the insurgents continued to fire on the patrol throughout the day as the troops made their way through vineyards and fields of marijuana plants 10 feet high.
None of the Americans were wounded or killed on that patrol.
Journalists from The New York Times, during a weeklong stay there, observed that every time soldiers left their bases, they were either shot at or hit with bombs, often hidden or booby-trapped.
Frequently, the Taliban did not — as they normally would — stop shooting once air support arrived.
Soldiers on a recent patrol, clearing up after one bomb explosion, discovered that a piece of debris lodged in a tree had itself been rigged with a tripwire, practically under their noses.
Here in Arghandab, the flow of troops has made it possible to begin trying to take control of an area where thick vegetation, irrigation canals and pomegranate orchards provide good cover for the Taliban, according to Lt. Col. Joseph Krebs, deputy commander for the Second Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, but the results have been mixed.
No sooner had the First Battalion of the 22nd Armored Regiment of the Army arrived here than five soldiers were killed on Aug. 30, by a roadside bomb directed at their convoy. The dead included the first Army chaplain to be killed in active duty during the Afghan conflict.
The chaplain, Capt. Dale A. Goetz, 43, had been on a tour of some of the 18 combat outposts the military has established in the Arghandab District.
Three days later, rockets fired from orchards just outside the district center hit the dining tent at the main American base, slightly wounding five soldiers.
While no official casualty totals have been released for the recent operations in the Kandahar districts, American military reports list 16 American fatalities in the Kandahar area since Aug. 30, at least 10 of which were in the Arghandab or Zhari Districts.
An effort to bring all of the heavily Pashtun south under coalition control began on Feb. 14 with an attempt to suppress the Taliban in and around Marja. Kandahar was to be the next target.
But the Taliban in Marja have still not been subdued, so officials decided to concentrate first on bringing economic development to some districts around Kandahar city, then on gradually stepping up military operations.
“I look at each one of my 13 combat platoons as a development team,” said Lt. Col. Rodger Lemons, commander of the First Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, stationed at the district headquarters here.
“I’m not going to tell you the population is fully in support, but they are much more in support of the government and the coalition than they are of the Taliban,” he said. Along with the military buildup has come a similar effort to increase the presence of State Department employees, along with aid contractors paid by the Americans, who would serve as stabilization teams in those areas.
Although some 300 American civilian staff members have arrived in Kandahar Province, at the district levels there are only a few, mainly because of security concerns.
In Arghandab, where the civilian effort is deemed to have been the most successful, the district team consists of two Americans in addition to contractors and local employees. “It’s hard to get people to come here,” said Kevin Melton, who is finishing up a yearlong tour running the State Department team in Arghandab.
When Mr. Melton arrived, the district government was not functioning. Now, there is an active shura or village council, with people coming to the district government’s building regularly, attracted by generous aid programs.
“Five dead and that’s the news that gets out,” Mr. Melton said, referring to the first fatalities in Arghandab. “Yeah, we know what’s going wrong, but look what’s going right. If we had done this eight years ago, would we have been here now?”
By comparison, other districts like Zhari and Panjwai are just getting started, he said.
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Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Saturday, September 25, 2010
Taliban Strategy Comes Full Circle
A very interesting article published at the AfPak Channel by Imtiaz Gul on September 22, 2010. I have his book "The Most Dangerous Place" on my list of books to read.
Late last week, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, General David Petraeus, and American AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrook descended on Islamabad to jointly think a way out of the Afghan imbroglio.
Officials touted their meetings with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, ISI officials and civilian Pakistani leaders as routine brainstorming sessions. Yet Afghanistan's surge in violence and its extremely low turnout in the Afghan parliamentary election two days later on Saturday, betray the bitter truth: the region is in crisis. Afghans are fear-stricken, the American top brass is frustrated by its failure in showcasing any tangible success back home, Karzai is resentful of Washington's high-handed approach and Pakistan itself is struggling with the consequences of an over-bearing counter-insurgency campaign, complicated by recent devastating floods. Not only do the stakeholders feel they're getting nowhere -- they feel like they're moving deeper into chaos.
This frustration essentially stems from an approach that from the first day centered more on money and military muscle than on long-term strategies.
Indeed, only two days before the big heads gathered in Islamabad, the National Security Archive (NSA) in Washington released several previously secret U.S. government documents which shed considerable light on the strategic missteps of the current war.
Contents of some of the memos suggest that despite joining hands in the anti-terror war in Afghanistan, there was little love lost between Washington and Islamabad in the aftermath of 9/11 - and that their differences centered on the question of how to best counter the Taliban
"We will not flinch from a military victory... but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men, it will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now," former ISI chief Gen. Mahmud Ahmed had told U.S. ambassador to Islamabad Wendy Chamberlin on September 23, 2001, according to a 12-page document titled "Islamabad 5337."
General Mahmud expressed these reservations after Chamberlin had "bluntly" ruled out a dialogue with the Taliban. The United States responded by pressuring Pakistan to sideline Mahmud (President Musharraf forced him to retire not long thereafter.)
Nine years since the U.S. and its allies unleashed war, the approach to Taliban has now come full circle. Where United States officials were once snubbing Pakistani requests for patience and dialogue, they are now seeking to "flip" Taliban militants.
The consequences of this long delay for Pakistan have been nightmarish. Particularly since 2007, thousands of angry young Muslims, inspired by al Qaeda's pan-Islamist revolutionary and anti-American appeals and trained in the remote tribal regions, have swelled the ranks of Pakistan's domestic radical outfits such as the TTP and Lashkare Jhangvi. Hundreds have blown themselves up in suicide bombings across Pakistan, killing thousands of innocent women and children as well as security personnel -- all in the name of Jihad against the "infidels occupying Afghanistan."
In another memo by NSA, Ronald E. Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, had warned Washington in 2005 that "if the (al Qaeda ) sanctuary in Pakistan were not addressed it would lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our (Operation Enduring Freedom] intervention in 2001."
"The 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government," Neumann wrote.
The sanctuary Neumann alluded to in his dispatches to Washington was obviously the Waziri border lands where Osama bin Laden and his cohorts settled down after their defeat by the U.S.-led coalition. The memos clearly explain how a porous and mountainous region spread over 27,200 square kilometers turned into a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and its Afghan affiliates. Initially "the tribes in [FATA regions] were overawed by U.S. firepower" after 9/11, which provided the Pakistan army a window of opportunity to march in, but the areas quickly became "no-go areas" where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, the NSA papers quote Neumann as saying.
And, as the events suggest, FATA did turn into a haven for al Qaeda, where it found local and foreign allies and facilitators to launch attacks on the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Not only that; FATA also became the birthplace for the Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a vicious al-Qaeda auxiliary that rose in the mountains of the Waziristan region, where Faisal Shehzad, the man behind the May One botched Times Square bombing attempt , received his terrorist training.
For FATA and its residents, it has been both a painful as well as a frightening ordeal; the Operation Enduring Freedom and the hunt for al Qaeda plucked these ultra-conservative and practically lawless regions from obscurity and brought them into the international limelight. Not only because of bin Laden but also because the Waziristan region became the breeding ground for future terrorists, something many in Pakistan including Gen. Mahmud Ahmed and Masood Sharif Khattak, former head of the Intelligence Bureau had warned about in September 2001.
The latest round of general elections in Afghanistan, accompanied by widespread violence and intimidation, doesn't inspire much hope for the future. The dire straits require all stake-holders to take a broader view of the situation, one embedded in ground truths, rather than driven by selfish concerns and considerations.
While I don't doubt the sincerity of General Mahmud, he was, after all, the head of ISI, which, at the time, was more interested in self-serving goals than in ridding the region of extremists. Between 2001 and 2007, ISI played both sides of the game, pitting Taliban groups against Western forces, internally hoping that the Taliban would be weakened and the US would withdraw. It wasn't until the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) was formed and began its brutal terror campaign against Pakistan, that the ISI "woke up" and realized that their pet project had turned against its master.
Gul, however, is right. We should have immediately eganged with moderate Taliban groups from the outset. Instead, we adopted a neanderthalic, "let god sort them out" mentality, which did nothing but recruit new Taliban and al Qaeda members and put a viable long term strategy on the back burner. This pragmatic, black and white approach is, unfortunately, not how the real world works.
While it may be too late to convince some Taliban groups to come to the table, it is still worth the effort to establish a dialogue and focus on the fact that neither side is winning. But, the Taliban have the trump card--as long as Pakistan refuses to effectively engage the militants in combat and kick them out of the Tribal Areas, all they have to do is wait until we pull out. Thus, this dialogue has to include Pakistan and Pakistan must demonstrate a willingness to not tolerate the presence of the Taliban. There has to be three-party talks, but each party has to be engaged in the process for it to work.
Share
Late last week, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, General David Petraeus, and American AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrook descended on Islamabad to jointly think a way out of the Afghan imbroglio.
Officials touted their meetings with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, ISI officials and civilian Pakistani leaders as routine brainstorming sessions. Yet Afghanistan's surge in violence and its extremely low turnout in the Afghan parliamentary election two days later on Saturday, betray the bitter truth: the region is in crisis. Afghans are fear-stricken, the American top brass is frustrated by its failure in showcasing any tangible success back home, Karzai is resentful of Washington's high-handed approach and Pakistan itself is struggling with the consequences of an over-bearing counter-insurgency campaign, complicated by recent devastating floods. Not only do the stakeholders feel they're getting nowhere -- they feel like they're moving deeper into chaos.
This frustration essentially stems from an approach that from the first day centered more on money and military muscle than on long-term strategies.
Indeed, only two days before the big heads gathered in Islamabad, the National Security Archive (NSA) in Washington released several previously secret U.S. government documents which shed considerable light on the strategic missteps of the current war.
Contents of some of the memos suggest that despite joining hands in the anti-terror war in Afghanistan, there was little love lost between Washington and Islamabad in the aftermath of 9/11 - and that their differences centered on the question of how to best counter the Taliban
"We will not flinch from a military victory... but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men, it will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now," former ISI chief Gen. Mahmud Ahmed had told U.S. ambassador to Islamabad Wendy Chamberlin on September 23, 2001, according to a 12-page document titled "Islamabad 5337."
General Mahmud expressed these reservations after Chamberlin had "bluntly" ruled out a dialogue with the Taliban. The United States responded by pressuring Pakistan to sideline Mahmud (President Musharraf forced him to retire not long thereafter.)
Nine years since the U.S. and its allies unleashed war, the approach to Taliban has now come full circle. Where United States officials were once snubbing Pakistani requests for patience and dialogue, they are now seeking to "flip" Taliban militants.
The consequences of this long delay for Pakistan have been nightmarish. Particularly since 2007, thousands of angry young Muslims, inspired by al Qaeda's pan-Islamist revolutionary and anti-American appeals and trained in the remote tribal regions, have swelled the ranks of Pakistan's domestic radical outfits such as the TTP and Lashkare Jhangvi. Hundreds have blown themselves up in suicide bombings across Pakistan, killing thousands of innocent women and children as well as security personnel -- all in the name of Jihad against the "infidels occupying Afghanistan."
In another memo by NSA, Ronald E. Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, had warned Washington in 2005 that "if the (al Qaeda ) sanctuary in Pakistan were not addressed it would lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our (Operation Enduring Freedom] intervention in 2001."
"The 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government," Neumann wrote.
The sanctuary Neumann alluded to in his dispatches to Washington was obviously the Waziri border lands where Osama bin Laden and his cohorts settled down after their defeat by the U.S.-led coalition. The memos clearly explain how a porous and mountainous region spread over 27,200 square kilometers turned into a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and its Afghan affiliates. Initially "the tribes in [FATA regions] were overawed by U.S. firepower" after 9/11, which provided the Pakistan army a window of opportunity to march in, but the areas quickly became "no-go areas" where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, the NSA papers quote Neumann as saying.
And, as the events suggest, FATA did turn into a haven for al Qaeda, where it found local and foreign allies and facilitators to launch attacks on the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Not only that; FATA also became the birthplace for the Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a vicious al-Qaeda auxiliary that rose in the mountains of the Waziristan region, where Faisal Shehzad, the man behind the May One botched Times Square bombing attempt , received his terrorist training.
For FATA and its residents, it has been both a painful as well as a frightening ordeal; the Operation Enduring Freedom and the hunt for al Qaeda plucked these ultra-conservative and practically lawless regions from obscurity and brought them into the international limelight. Not only because of bin Laden but also because the Waziristan region became the breeding ground for future terrorists, something many in Pakistan including Gen. Mahmud Ahmed and Masood Sharif Khattak, former head of the Intelligence Bureau had warned about in September 2001.
The latest round of general elections in Afghanistan, accompanied by widespread violence and intimidation, doesn't inspire much hope for the future. The dire straits require all stake-holders to take a broader view of the situation, one embedded in ground truths, rather than driven by selfish concerns and considerations.
While I don't doubt the sincerity of General Mahmud, he was, after all, the head of ISI, which, at the time, was more interested in self-serving goals than in ridding the region of extremists. Between 2001 and 2007, ISI played both sides of the game, pitting Taliban groups against Western forces, internally hoping that the Taliban would be weakened and the US would withdraw. It wasn't until the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) was formed and began its brutal terror campaign against Pakistan, that the ISI "woke up" and realized that their pet project had turned against its master.
Gul, however, is right. We should have immediately eganged with moderate Taliban groups from the outset. Instead, we adopted a neanderthalic, "let god sort them out" mentality, which did nothing but recruit new Taliban and al Qaeda members and put a viable long term strategy on the back burner. This pragmatic, black and white approach is, unfortunately, not how the real world works.
While it may be too late to convince some Taliban groups to come to the table, it is still worth the effort to establish a dialogue and focus on the fact that neither side is winning. But, the Taliban have the trump card--as long as Pakistan refuses to effectively engage the militants in combat and kick them out of the Tribal Areas, all they have to do is wait until we pull out. Thus, this dialogue has to include Pakistan and Pakistan must demonstrate a willingness to not tolerate the presence of the Taliban. There has to be three-party talks, but each party has to be engaged in the process for it to work.
Share
Senior Haqqani Member Killed
I wrote a while back that the Haqqani Network was in the process of extending its reach directly into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. An airstrike killed Qari Mansur, a senior leader in the Network, on September 24, 2010.
From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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Thursday, September 23, 2010
Dialogue With the Haqqani Network
A very nice article about establishing dialogue with the Haqqani Network by Tom Gregg at the AfPak Channel (September 22, 2010):
Last month Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief Northern Ireland negotiator, argued that "no group should be beyond talking to." In the context of the current crisis and a shift towards seeking a peace deal in Afghanistan, this is particularly salient. President Hamid Karzai has recently announced the creation of a commission to lead talks with the Taliban. There is also emerging consensus in Washington that stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved by reaching some sort of a political settlement with the Taliban. But not talking to particular insurgent groups will not be a good idea, and a reliance on a policy of "decapitating" them is even worse.
One group that should not "be beyond talking to" is the Haqqani network, named for its leader Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now considered one of the most feared insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The network is responsible for attacks against the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps because of this central role in the Afghan insurgency, in July, Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asserted that the Haqqanis are the Taliban network with the closest ties to al Qaeda and that dealing with them is ‘the most pressing task' in combating the insurgency. Despite their alleged links to international terrorists, even Secretary Clinton has not ruled out supporting dialogue with them (with caveats). These comments suggest the door on the U.S. side may soon be slightly ajar. However, having spent the past six years talking with members of the network, including some of its senior members, it would appear that the Haqqani's door is currently open for talks but may soon be firmly shut. The Haqqani network is in the midst of a generational power shift from father to son, which if completed will all but rule out any future talk of peace.
In June 2007, well before the Haqqani terrorist network had found its way into headlines in the western media, chatter spread through the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that the aging and ill Jalaluddin -- insurgent leader, client of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitator of Osama bin Laden's 2001 escape into Pakistan -- had passed away, reportedly due to hepatitis. The intelligence community picked up on this rumor but quickly disproved it. At the time of this report I was living in the tribal areas of southeast Afghanistan and wrote a report titled "Jalaluddin Haqqani: Dead, Alive, Does it Matter?" In short the answer is yes and no. Yes, because had he died at the time, it would have left the network more vulnerable than at anytime since its emergence in late 2004. And no, because today the Haqqanis have nearly completed what could be best described as ‘succession planning' resulting in a powerful network that many believe jeopardizes Afghanistan's stability
It is well known that for almost a decade he has suffered from health problems and requires regular medical attention rendering him relatively inactive in the day-to-day workings of the insurgency. Furthermore, as a senior insurgent commander (and former Taliban Minister), Maulavi Haqqani's profile as a "most wanted" does not permit travel to the Afghan battle space. Consequently, his 36-year-old son Sirajuddin (aka "Khalifa") has increasingly taken over, with gusto, operational command of his father's network.
However, these limitations speak nothing of the influence Maulavi Haqqani continues to enjoy as a tribal leader, religious scholar, ISI associate and close ally of Gulf Arab financiers. Indeed, the success of the Haqqani network rests with these social/religious/political connections that Maulavi Haqqani has carefully nurtured over the past 30-plus years; indeed, it was these very factors that also made him so popular with the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad). It can be assumed that these networks, particularly with Arab financiers and the ISI, have been "inherited" by Sirajuddin. However, the same cannot be said about Maulavi Haqqani's tribal, religious and mujahideen credentials. Sirajuddin is in his early 30's, grew up in Miram Shah, Pakistan and, prior to 2001, only occasionally traveled to his native village of Garde Serai, nestled in the rugged mountains of Paktia province. In Miram Shah he was involved in Islamic Studies but, unlike his father, did not graduate from a prestigious madrassah and is too young to have been a well-known fighter during the anti-Soviet jihad.
Hence, the very elements that have contributed to the success of Maulavi Haqqani's activities in eastern Afghanistan (and that could be used to assist in a peace process) -- his personal influence as a tribal leader, mujahideen commander and religious elder -- will be lost after he dies or passes control to Siraj.
Moreover, the respect of Maulavi Haqqani within Afghanistan as a mujahideen leader is matched by the respect he derives from being a prominent tribal and religious elder. As a result, it has been difficult for the various Zadran sub tribes of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to actively oppose his network's activities in their respective tribal regions.
Indeed, today the Haqqani network is spreading its influence geographically into areas previously dominated by other insurgent groups (such as the Mansoor network in Zurmat district of Paktia). It has also, for the first time since the beginning of the Haqqani-led insurgency in late 2004-early 2005, recently embarked upon the systematic targeting and killing of moderate tribal leaders from within the Zadran tribe. This all looks like succession planning. Tactically, Sirajuddin must know that when his father dies (be it of natural causes or otherwise), the tribes would certainly be better positioned to oppose him, should they choose (and be empowered) to do so.
Added to this equation is the knowledge that U.S. pressure on Islamabad to tackle the Haqqani network could see their safe havens in North Waziristan come under increased pressure in the future. Maulavi Haqqani had the necessary contacts and influence to navigate his way through policy shifts in Islamabad. A question mark remains over whether Siraj, in the absence of his father, would be as adept at maneuvering between possible future policy shifts.
The time is ripe, therefore, for a dialogue to take place, one that will be easier to negotiate while the older generation of fighters that knows the benefits of peace is still alive. From my discussions with representatives of Maulavi Haqqani, he still claims to be fighting in Afghanistan for ‘peace.' Sirajuddin, on the other hand, does not know the meaning of the word. He has been brought up in war, has never lived as a citizen of a functioning nation state, has little to no experience of government, is not a tribal elder and is not even a credible religious leader. In this regard he is motivated more by a radical Islamist ideology than his father, and less obviously constrained by a desire to maintain good relations with the local tribal leaders.
For example, on a visit to Afghanistan this year I met with a prominent Zadran tribesman who had returned from North Waziristan the previous week and had spent the night with Siraj. He had taken a message to the commander that the latter's insurgent activities in the Zadran tribal area were having negative consequences for his fellow tribesman. Upon relaying this message, the elder was informed by Siraj that he was welcome to stay the night and receive his hospitality but that if he ever returned again with such a message he would not leave with his head on his shoulders. Such a blunt message to a respected Zadran tribal elder could not and would not have come from his father.
Despite appearances, my years of working closely with various tribal and religious leaders of the Zadran tribe has convinced me that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process, the military intervention in the region and the insurgency. Sadly, some of the best of these leaders have already been targeted by the insurgents or have wrongfully been detained by the International Military Forces. Unless greater security and political space is afforded to the current Zadran tribal and religious leadership in Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the outcome of the Haqqani network's succession planning will go ahead unchallenged.
In order to prevent this scenario from transpiring the United States must make a clear distinction between the current Haqqani network and al Qaeda. The Haqqani network is an Afghan network focused on Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the objective of the Haqqani network is to support an international jihadist agenda. To this end, Washington and Kabul should embark upon a policy of engagement (as part of a broader political outreach effort to all various elements of the Taliban) to separate the two. Locally, U.S. forces must pay greater attention to the local tribal dynamics as part of its counterinsurgency approach. In the southeast, this should include support to the tribal police (or arbakai) and ensuring that the pro-peace tribal majority is not subjected to intimidation, detention (or worse) by the international military presence.
However, should we fail to capitalize on this opportunity for dialogue, a more radical network, combined with the absence of the tribal and religious constraints that Maulavi Haqqani must regularly negotiate, will mark the beginning of a new, more violent generation of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. And this new insurgency will leave no prospects for dialogue or peace.
What strikes me about this article is the similarities between Pashtun and American politics:
"that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process"
The rational, moderate voices in this country are also being drowned out by extremists.
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Last month Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair's chief Northern Ireland negotiator, argued that "no group should be beyond talking to." In the context of the current crisis and a shift towards seeking a peace deal in Afghanistan, this is particularly salient. President Hamid Karzai has recently announced the creation of a commission to lead talks with the Taliban. There is also emerging consensus in Washington that stability in Afghanistan can only be achieved by reaching some sort of a political settlement with the Taliban. But not talking to particular insurgent groups will not be a good idea, and a reliance on a policy of "decapitating" them is even worse.
One group that should not "be beyond talking to" is the Haqqani network, named for its leader Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, and now considered one of the most feared insurgent groups in Afghanistan. The network is responsible for attacks against the Afghan government, the U.S. military, and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Perhaps because of this central role in the Afghan insurgency, in July, Special Envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asserted that the Haqqanis are the Taliban network with the closest ties to al Qaeda and that dealing with them is ‘the most pressing task' in combating the insurgency. Despite their alleged links to international terrorists, even Secretary Clinton has not ruled out supporting dialogue with them (with caveats). These comments suggest the door on the U.S. side may soon be slightly ajar. However, having spent the past six years talking with members of the network, including some of its senior members, it would appear that the Haqqani's door is currently open for talks but may soon be firmly shut. The Haqqani network is in the midst of a generational power shift from father to son, which if completed will all but rule out any future talk of peace.
In June 2007, well before the Haqqani terrorist network had found its way into headlines in the western media, chatter spread through the mountainous tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan that the aging and ill Jalaluddin -- insurgent leader, client of the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), facilitator of Osama bin Laden's 2001 escape into Pakistan -- had passed away, reportedly due to hepatitis. The intelligence community picked up on this rumor but quickly disproved it. At the time of this report I was living in the tribal areas of southeast Afghanistan and wrote a report titled "Jalaluddin Haqqani: Dead, Alive, Does it Matter?" In short the answer is yes and no. Yes, because had he died at the time, it would have left the network more vulnerable than at anytime since its emergence in late 2004. And no, because today the Haqqanis have nearly completed what could be best described as ‘succession planning' resulting in a powerful network that many believe jeopardizes Afghanistan's stability
It is well known that for almost a decade he has suffered from health problems and requires regular medical attention rendering him relatively inactive in the day-to-day workings of the insurgency. Furthermore, as a senior insurgent commander (and former Taliban Minister), Maulavi Haqqani's profile as a "most wanted" does not permit travel to the Afghan battle space. Consequently, his 36-year-old son Sirajuddin (aka "Khalifa") has increasingly taken over, with gusto, operational command of his father's network.
However, these limitations speak nothing of the influence Maulavi Haqqani continues to enjoy as a tribal leader, religious scholar, ISI associate and close ally of Gulf Arab financiers. Indeed, the success of the Haqqani network rests with these social/religious/political connections that Maulavi Haqqani has carefully nurtured over the past 30-plus years; indeed, it was these very factors that also made him so popular with the CIA during the anti-Soviet jihad). It can be assumed that these networks, particularly with Arab financiers and the ISI, have been "inherited" by Sirajuddin. However, the same cannot be said about Maulavi Haqqani's tribal, religious and mujahideen credentials. Sirajuddin is in his early 30's, grew up in Miram Shah, Pakistan and, prior to 2001, only occasionally traveled to his native village of Garde Serai, nestled in the rugged mountains of Paktia province. In Miram Shah he was involved in Islamic Studies but, unlike his father, did not graduate from a prestigious madrassah and is too young to have been a well-known fighter during the anti-Soviet jihad.
Hence, the very elements that have contributed to the success of Maulavi Haqqani's activities in eastern Afghanistan (and that could be used to assist in a peace process) -- his personal influence as a tribal leader, mujahideen commander and religious elder -- will be lost after he dies or passes control to Siraj.
Moreover, the respect of Maulavi Haqqani within Afghanistan as a mujahideen leader is matched by the respect he derives from being a prominent tribal and religious elder. As a result, it has been difficult for the various Zadran sub tribes of Paktia, Paktika and Khost to actively oppose his network's activities in their respective tribal regions.
Indeed, today the Haqqani network is spreading its influence geographically into areas previously dominated by other insurgent groups (such as the Mansoor network in Zurmat district of Paktia). It has also, for the first time since the beginning of the Haqqani-led insurgency in late 2004-early 2005, recently embarked upon the systematic targeting and killing of moderate tribal leaders from within the Zadran tribe. This all looks like succession planning. Tactically, Sirajuddin must know that when his father dies (be it of natural causes or otherwise), the tribes would certainly be better positioned to oppose him, should they choose (and be empowered) to do so.
Added to this equation is the knowledge that U.S. pressure on Islamabad to tackle the Haqqani network could see their safe havens in North Waziristan come under increased pressure in the future. Maulavi Haqqani had the necessary contacts and influence to navigate his way through policy shifts in Islamabad. A question mark remains over whether Siraj, in the absence of his father, would be as adept at maneuvering between possible future policy shifts.
The time is ripe, therefore, for a dialogue to take place, one that will be easier to negotiate while the older generation of fighters that knows the benefits of peace is still alive. From my discussions with representatives of Maulavi Haqqani, he still claims to be fighting in Afghanistan for ‘peace.' Sirajuddin, on the other hand, does not know the meaning of the word. He has been brought up in war, has never lived as a citizen of a functioning nation state, has little to no experience of government, is not a tribal elder and is not even a credible religious leader. In this regard he is motivated more by a radical Islamist ideology than his father, and less obviously constrained by a desire to maintain good relations with the local tribal leaders.
For example, on a visit to Afghanistan this year I met with a prominent Zadran tribesman who had returned from North Waziristan the previous week and had spent the night with Siraj. He had taken a message to the commander that the latter's insurgent activities in the Zadran tribal area were having negative consequences for his fellow tribesman. Upon relaying this message, the elder was informed by Siraj that he was welcome to stay the night and receive his hospitality but that if he ever returned again with such a message he would not leave with his head on his shoulders. Such a blunt message to a respected Zadran tribal elder could not and would not have come from his father.
Despite appearances, my years of working closely with various tribal and religious leaders of the Zadran tribe has convinced me that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process, the military intervention in the region and the insurgency. Sadly, some of the best of these leaders have already been targeted by the insurgents or have wrongfully been detained by the International Military Forces. Unless greater security and political space is afforded to the current Zadran tribal and religious leadership in Paktia, Paktika and Khost, the outcome of the Haqqani network's succession planning will go ahead unchallenged.
In order to prevent this scenario from transpiring the United States must make a clear distinction between the current Haqqani network and al Qaeda. The Haqqani network is an Afghan network focused on Afghanistan. There is no evidence that the objective of the Haqqani network is to support an international jihadist agenda. To this end, Washington and Kabul should embark upon a policy of engagement (as part of a broader political outreach effort to all various elements of the Taliban) to separate the two. Locally, U.S. forces must pay greater attention to the local tribal dynamics as part of its counterinsurgency approach. In the southeast, this should include support to the tribal police (or arbakai) and ensuring that the pro-peace tribal majority is not subjected to intimidation, detention (or worse) by the international military presence.
However, should we fail to capitalize on this opportunity for dialogue, a more radical network, combined with the absence of the tribal and religious constraints that Maulavi Haqqani must regularly negotiate, will mark the beginning of a new, more violent generation of the insurgency in eastern Afghanistan. And this new insurgency will leave no prospects for dialogue or peace.
What strikes me about this article is the similarities between Pashtun and American politics:
"that there is a pro-peace middle majority that has hitherto been marginalized by the political process"
The rational, moderate voices in this country are also being drowned out by extremists.
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CJTF-101 Opens a Can
This a nice summary of recent ground combat against the Haqqani militants in Afghanistan. I'm noticing a trend here...that Haqqani militants don't stand a chance against ISAF troops in a direct action engagement. I'm predicting that they will attempt several more disastrous attacks before winter and then may turn increasingly to al Qaeda style tatctics (eg, suicide bombers).
From the Longwar Journal (September 23, 2010):
US soldiers beat back a massed attack by the Haqqani Network in the eastern Afghan province of Khost yesterday, killing 27 enemy fighters.
The Haqqani Network fighters gathered near Combat Outpost Spera and prepared to open fire on the base "with small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire," Combined Joint Task Force - 101 stated in a press release. But the Haqqani Network fighters were observed as they moved into position to attack.
"Both remotely piloted aircraft and strategically placed surveillance cameras identified the insurgent forces preparing to open fire with a mixture of small arms and rocket propelled grenades," CJTF-101 stated. Helicopters from an Attack Weapons Team from Task Force Viper, 1st Battalion, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, were dispatched and routed the Haqqani Network fighters.
ISAF stated that between 25 to 30 "insurgents" were killed, while CJTF-101 put the number at 27. No US or Afghan troops were reported to have been killed or wounded in the fighting.
The Haqqani Network has carried out four major attacks against heavily defended US outposts in eastern Afghanistan since the end of August.
On Aug. 28, Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
And on Sept. 2, the Haqqani Network attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers; 20 were reported killed.
The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have launched attacks at several major installations across the country this year. In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base; another small team conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July; three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
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From the Longwar Journal (September 23, 2010):
US soldiers beat back a massed attack by the Haqqani Network in the eastern Afghan province of Khost yesterday, killing 27 enemy fighters.
The Haqqani Network fighters gathered near Combat Outpost Spera and prepared to open fire on the base "with small arms and rocket propelled grenade fire," Combined Joint Task Force - 101 stated in a press release. But the Haqqani Network fighters were observed as they moved into position to attack.
"Both remotely piloted aircraft and strategically placed surveillance cameras identified the insurgent forces preparing to open fire with a mixture of small arms and rocket propelled grenades," CJTF-101 stated. Helicopters from an Attack Weapons Team from Task Force Viper, 1st Battalion, 3rd Combat Aviation Brigade, were dispatched and routed the Haqqani Network fighters.
ISAF stated that between 25 to 30 "insurgents" were killed, while CJTF-101 put the number at 27. No US or Afghan troops were reported to have been killed or wounded in the fighting.
The Haqqani Network has carried out four major attacks against heavily defended US outposts in eastern Afghanistan since the end of August.
On Aug. 28, Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters during raids in the aftermath of the attacks.
And on Sept. 2, the Haqqani Network attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers; 20 were reported killed.
The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have launched attacks at several major installations across the country this year. In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base; another small team conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July; three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
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If at First You Don't Succeed...
Try it again until you kill him. The Drone Campaign has claimed a high profile target in South Waziristan. According to Xinhua (September 22, 2010):
A militant commander, Mullah Shamsullah, and 15 militants were killed Tuesday evening as U.S. pilotless drones struck South Waziristan, one of the seven tribal agencies in northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, local sources told Xinhua.
The U.S. pilotless drones fired missiles at the Azam Warsak bazaar, 18 km west of Wana, the administrative headquarters of South Waziristan, hitting the hideouts of the militant commander, witnesses said.
Sources said Mullah Shamsullah was killed in the attack, but official sources could not confirm. He was an important and the strongest Taliban leader in Wana and literally ruled on behalf of Al-Qaida leader Mullah Nazir in the area. Four drones are still taking flight over the area keeping harassment among local residents. Eyewitnesses said that locals are migrating out of the area.
Hours earlier, a vehicle in Ghundo Warsak area was hit by a drone and eight militants were killed, eyewitness Hafiz Wazir told Xinhua. Mullah Shamsullah was said to have been targeted in that attack.
So, Mullah Nazir's second in command, Mullah Shamsullah, was killed outside of Azam Warsak, just across the border from Afghanistan. One would think that if they almost killed you earlier in the day, you might want to lay low until things cool down. By the way, Nazir is a Taliban leader, not an al Qaeda leader, although there isn't much difference these days.
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A militant commander, Mullah Shamsullah, and 15 militants were killed Tuesday evening as U.S. pilotless drones struck South Waziristan, one of the seven tribal agencies in northwest Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, local sources told Xinhua.
The U.S. pilotless drones fired missiles at the Azam Warsak bazaar, 18 km west of Wana, the administrative headquarters of South Waziristan, hitting the hideouts of the militant commander, witnesses said.
Sources said Mullah Shamsullah was killed in the attack, but official sources could not confirm. He was an important and the strongest Taliban leader in Wana and literally ruled on behalf of Al-Qaida leader Mullah Nazir in the area. Four drones are still taking flight over the area keeping harassment among local residents. Eyewitnesses said that locals are migrating out of the area.
Hours earlier, a vehicle in Ghundo Warsak area was hit by a drone and eight militants were killed, eyewitness Hafiz Wazir told Xinhua. Mullah Shamsullah was said to have been targeted in that attack.
So, Mullah Nazir's second in command, Mullah Shamsullah, was killed outside of Azam Warsak, just across the border from Afghanistan. One would think that if they almost killed you earlier in the day, you might want to lay low until things cool down. By the way, Nazir is a Taliban leader, not an al Qaeda leader, although there isn't much difference these days.
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Second Strike in South Waziristan
From the Nation.com (September 22, 2010):
PESHAWAR - At least eight suspected militants were killed and many others sustained injuries in a US drone attack in a remote area of South Waziristan Agency here on Tuesday.
Sources informed that a US unmanned aircraft fired two missiles on a village in Khand Morsak, a locality of Jandola, and as a result eight suspected militants were killed while several others got injured.
They said a vehicle was targeted in the strike by the pilotless plane which fired two missiles on it. They added that the spy planes were seen hovering over the village after the missile strike.
They said identification of those killed in the incident could not be made immediately after the attack.
PESHAWAR - At least eight suspected militants were killed and many others sustained injuries in a US drone attack in a remote area of South Waziristan Agency here on Tuesday.
Sources informed that a US unmanned aircraft fired two missiles on a village in Khand Morsak, a locality of Jandola, and as a result eight suspected militants were killed while several others got injured.
They said a vehicle was targeted in the strike by the pilotless plane which fired two missiles on it. They added that the spy planes were seen hovering over the village after the missile strike.
They said identification of those killed in the incident could not be made immediately after the attack.
Tuesday, September 21, 2010
FATA/NWFP Maps
I suppose I should I have included maps of the region earlier.
Both maps are courtesy of the Longwar Journal.
The first map shows the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in gold, which is considered the Taliban's and al Qaeda's stronghold and the Northwest Frontier Province in purple, which contains a mish-mash of Taliban, al Qaeda, and other groups. About 3.5 million people live in the FATA and 21 million people live in the NWFP. Obviously the dominant religion is Islam and people speak Pashto (closer to Afghanistan) and Urdu (closer to Pakistan).
The second map shows the relative degree of control of each province (or agency in Pakistan-speak). Red indicates total Taliban control, but I would suggest that the gold areas should also be red. Pakistan operates the Frontier Corps (FC) in these areas, a sort of paramilitary security organization, to police the area. In reality, the FC chose to either (1) enforce the law and ultimately die by the hands of the Taliban, or (2) get on the Taliban's payroll and look the other way.
It's interesting (and frightening) to note that Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, is less than 50 miles from the red areas. If one were to make a map of Islamabad itself, I would guess that there would be plenty of red areas within the city.
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Both maps are courtesy of the Longwar Journal.
The first map shows the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in gold, which is considered the Taliban's and al Qaeda's stronghold and the Northwest Frontier Province in purple, which contains a mish-mash of Taliban, al Qaeda, and other groups. About 3.5 million people live in the FATA and 21 million people live in the NWFP. Obviously the dominant religion is Islam and people speak Pashto (closer to Afghanistan) and Urdu (closer to Pakistan).
The second map shows the relative degree of control of each province (or agency in Pakistan-speak). Red indicates total Taliban control, but I would suggest that the gold areas should also be red. Pakistan operates the Frontier Corps (FC) in these areas, a sort of paramilitary security organization, to police the area. In reality, the FC chose to either (1) enforce the law and ultimately die by the hands of the Taliban, or (2) get on the Taliban's payroll and look the other way.
It's interesting (and frightening) to note that Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, is less than 50 miles from the red areas. If one were to make a map of Islamabad itself, I would guess that there would be plenty of red areas within the city.
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Wow
Photo: Associated Press (Mehsud on the left)
Sorry for the dated story, but I just stumbled on it.
I'm not rying to make light of the seven dead CIA personnel who died in Khost, Afghanistan last December, but this seems a little silly. I am sure Hakimullah Mehsud is phoning his lawyer right now to seek a plea deal...
From Dawn.com (September 1, 2010):
WASHINGTON: US prosecutors have charged the leader of the Pakistani Taliban, Hakimullah Mehsud, for the plot that killed seven CIA employees at an American base in Afghanistan last December, the US Justice Department said on Wednesday.
Mehsud was charged with conspiracy to kill Americans overseas and conspiracy to use a weapon of mass destruction.
On Dec. 30, a Jordanian doctor who had gained the trust of the CIA employees detonated a bomb hidden under his clothing after entering the heavily fortified compound outside Khost. It was the second-most deadly attack in CIA history.
“Criminal charges are meant to deal with Hakimullah if he's captured,” said one US official who declined to be further identified. “He can face justice in other ways, too. That hasn't changed.”
US military forces have tried to kill Mehsud since the attack with strikes by unmanned aerial drones. The State Department is offering a reward of up to $5 million for information leading to his location.
After the attack, a video surfaced in which the bomber, identified as Jordanian Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, appeared with Mehsud claiming responsibility for the suicide bombing and stating that it was revenge for the killing of the group's leader Baitullah Mehsud.
Al-Balawi's legs were recovered from the scene of the blast and DNA testing helped identify him, according to the criminal complaint filed in US District Court for the District of Columbia. Six Americans were also injured in the attack
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Tensions in South Waziristan
This is VERY interesting. Maulana Noor Muhammed, a founding member of the JUI (an old-school Pakistani militant group)and influential cleric in South Waziristan was blown up today. He was notably against the involvement of central asian militant groups in the insurgency inside Afghanistan. I'm wondering if the Uzbeks are making a power move.
From AFP and Dawn.com (September 21, 2010):
WANA / PARACHINAR: Thirty-two people, a former parliamentarian among them, were killed and at least 42 others injured in two terrorist attacks in tribal areas on Monday.
In the South Waziristan town of Wana, a suicide bomber blew himself up at the seminary of Maulana Noor Mohammad, former MNA of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazl) from Fata, killing the cleric and 24 others, local people said.
Thirty-six people were injured and five of them who had suffered critical injuries were airlifted to Rawalpindi.
An eyewitness said Maulana Noor Mohmmad was about to leave the Jamia mosque near Wana bazaar after Zohr prayers when a boy in his teens approached him to shake hands.
At that moment a huge blast took place. The mosque was badly damaged. People rushed to the seminary to rescue the injured and retrieve bodies from the rubble.
Official sources said the head and legs of the suicide bomber had been found.
Maulana Noor Mohammad was elected to the National Assembly in 1997 from South Waziristan.
He was an influential figure and brokered several deals between Taliban militants and the local administration. He was reported to have opposed the presence of Uzbek militants in the tribal region.
Our correspondent in Parachinar adds: Seven people were killed and six others wounded when an improvised explosive device planted near a government school exploded at a time when a jirga of elders of Khomasa area of Kurram tribal region was in progress.
The jirga was held to sort out a dispute between two groups over the ownership of the school. The powerful blast made a three to four feet crater.
The Assistant Political Agent of Kurram said the blast might have been caused by a time-bomb.
An eyewitness reported seeing thick smoke billowing from the place after the explosion and people running towards the area. Seven bodies lay on the ground while the injured cried for help.
Administration personnel cordoned off the area and launched search operation. No group claimed responsibility for any of the explosions till Monday evening.
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From AFP and Dawn.com (September 21, 2010):
WANA / PARACHINAR: Thirty-two people, a former parliamentarian among them, were killed and at least 42 others injured in two terrorist attacks in tribal areas on Monday.
In the South Waziristan town of Wana, a suicide bomber blew himself up at the seminary of Maulana Noor Mohammad, former MNA of Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazl) from Fata, killing the cleric and 24 others, local people said.
Thirty-six people were injured and five of them who had suffered critical injuries were airlifted to Rawalpindi.
An eyewitness said Maulana Noor Mohmmad was about to leave the Jamia mosque near Wana bazaar after Zohr prayers when a boy in his teens approached him to shake hands.
At that moment a huge blast took place. The mosque was badly damaged. People rushed to the seminary to rescue the injured and retrieve bodies from the rubble.
Official sources said the head and legs of the suicide bomber had been found.
Maulana Noor Mohammad was elected to the National Assembly in 1997 from South Waziristan.
He was an influential figure and brokered several deals between Taliban militants and the local administration. He was reported to have opposed the presence of Uzbek militants in the tribal region.
Our correspondent in Parachinar adds: Seven people were killed and six others wounded when an improvised explosive device planted near a government school exploded at a time when a jirga of elders of Khomasa area of Kurram tribal region was in progress.
The jirga was held to sort out a dispute between two groups over the ownership of the school. The powerful blast made a three to four feet crater.
The Assistant Political Agent of Kurram said the blast might have been caused by a time-bomb.
An eyewitness reported seeing thick smoke billowing from the place after the explosion and people running towards the area. Seven bodies lay on the ground while the injured cried for help.
Administration personnel cordoned off the area and launched search operation. No group claimed responsibility for any of the explosions till Monday evening.
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Change in Pace: Drone Strike in South Waziristan
Something/someone big must have been spotted in South Waziristan today to divert our focus from North Waziristan. Perhaps it was Mullah Nazir himself? It's probably a good time to provide a little write up on Nazir and South Waziristan. Stay tuned.
From AFP and Dawn.com (September 21, 2010):
MIRAM SHAH: A US drone on Tuesday fired three missiles at a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt near the Afghan border, killing six militants, officials said.
“At least six militants were killed and five others were wounded when a US drone fired three missiles at a militant compound,” a senior security official told AFP.
The attack took place in Azam Warsak village, some 25 kilometres (15 miles) west of Wana, the main town in South Waziristan tribal district, the official said.
An intelligence official and a South Waziristan administration official confirmed the attack and death toll to AFP via phone in Miram Shah, the capital of neighbouring North Waziristan tribal district.
Another security official in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province also confirmed that the unmanned US aircraft killed at least six militants.
The Nation.com (September 22, 2010) reports that 12 militants were killed in total.
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From AFP and Dawn.com (September 21, 2010):
MIRAM SHAH: A US drone on Tuesday fired three missiles at a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt near the Afghan border, killing six militants, officials said.
“At least six militants were killed and five others were wounded when a US drone fired three missiles at a militant compound,” a senior security official told AFP.
The attack took place in Azam Warsak village, some 25 kilometres (15 miles) west of Wana, the main town in South Waziristan tribal district, the official said.
An intelligence official and a South Waziristan administration official confirmed the attack and death toll to AFP via phone in Miram Shah, the capital of neighbouring North Waziristan tribal district.
Another security official in Peshawar, the capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province also confirmed that the unmanned US aircraft killed at least six militants.
The Nation.com (September 22, 2010) reports that 12 militants were killed in total.
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Map of North Waziristan (Western Portion)
This map represents the western portion of North Waziristan. North Waziristan is located in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which technically is part of Pakistan, but is nestled between Afghanistan on the North and West and Pakistan on the East and South.
The larger villages are accurately located (in bigger text), but the smaller ones are just a guesstimate.
Thanks to Google Earth.
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Monday, September 20, 2010
Another Bahadur Drone Strike
I think this is a separate attack from the September 19th strike...it was near Dara Zinda, it's close to Datta Khel, which is controlled by Hafiz Gul Bahadur.
From the AFP and Dawn.com (September 20, 2010):
MIRAM SHAH: Four militants were killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt near the Afghan border on Monday, security officials said.
A drone fired three missiles at Darazinda village, 40 kilometres northeast of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan region, they said.
“The drone fired one missile on two militants riding on a motorbike and when two of their colleagues rushed towards them, two more missiles were fired,” a security official told AFP.
“All four militants were killed.”
Two other security officials confirmed the casualties, saying the missiles were fired by the pilotless aircraft.
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From the AFP and Dawn.com (September 20, 2010):
MIRAM SHAH: Four militants were killed in a US drone strike in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt near the Afghan border on Monday, security officials said.
A drone fired three missiles at Darazinda village, 40 kilometres northeast of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan region, they said.
“The drone fired one missile on two militants riding on a motorbike and when two of their colleagues rushed towards them, two more missiles were fired,” a security official told AFP.
“All four militants were killed.”
Two other security officials confirmed the casualties, saying the missiles were fired by the pilotless aircraft.
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Sunday, September 19, 2010
Drones Strikes Switch Back to Bahadur
From the AP (September 19, 2010):
MIR ALI, Pakistan – Intelligence officials say a suspected U.S. missile strike has killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan.
The officials say Sunday's strike targeted a house belonging to a local militant in the town of Datta Khel in the North Waziristan tribal area. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.
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MIR ALI, Pakistan – Intelligence officials say a suspected U.S. missile strike has killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan.
The officials say Sunday's strike targeted a house belonging to a local militant in the town of Datta Khel in the North Waziristan tribal area. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.
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No al Qaeda in Afghanistan?
An interesting article from the Longwar Journal (September 18, 2010). This is not too much of a stretch to believe since Kunar and Nuristan Provinces are so close to the Bajur in the FATA. Keep in mind that we pulled out of Nuristan last year when 8 our troops were killed at the remote outpost attack in 2009. How is SecDef Gates claiming progress when we are ceding entire provinces to the Taliban and al Qaeda?
A Taliban commander with links to al Qaeda was killed while plotting to attack a polling station in the northeastern province of Kunar today. Haji Mohammad, the Taliban's shadow governor for the district of Shigal, was killed by Coalition forces "in a precision airstrike," the International Security Assistance Force stated.
Mohammed was described as "a key insurgent leader" in Kunar who was behind multiple attacks against US and Afghan forces. "Mohammad orchestrated attacks on Afghans who opposed his tactics, conducted illegal checkpoints intended to intimidate local Afghans, and kidnapped wealthy individuals in order to finance his activities," ISAF said.
ISAF linked Mohammed to two attacks in June, both which killed US soldiers: the June 7 IED attack that killed five US soldiers; and the June 21 suicide attack that killed two US soldiers and wounded 18 Afghans, including eight children.
The suicide attack on June 21 was the first in Afghanistan to have been carried out by a woman. ISAF directly linked the June 21 suicide attack to Qai Zia Rahman, one of the senior most terrorist leaders in northeastern Afghanistan. Qari Zia took credit for the suicide attack.
Qari Zia Rahman is the Taliban's top regional commander as well as a senior member of al Qaeda. He operates in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan province in Afghanistan, and he also operates across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. Earlier this year, the Pakistani government claimed they killed Qari Zia in an airstrike, but he later spoke to the media and mocked Pakistan's interior minister for wrongly reporting his death.
Qari Zia is closely allied with Faqir Mohammed as well as with Osama bin Laden. Qari Zia's fighters are from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and various Arab nations. He commands a brigade in al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army, or the Lashkar al Zil, US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal.
The US has targeted Qari Zai in three raids over the past summer. On June 29, the US launched a battalion-sized operation in Kunar's Marawara district. Move than 150 Taliban fighters were reported killed in the operation. On July 20, US and Afghan forces launched another battalion-sized operation in Marawara to flush out Qari Zia. And on Aug. 2, combined forces conducted a raid, again in Marawara, that targeted the al Qaeda leader.
The top al Qaeda commander in Kunar province is Abu Ikhlas al Masri, an Egyptian who has spent years in Afghanistan and has intermarried with the local tribes. Abu Ikhlas is al Qaeda's operations chief for Kunar province, having assumed command after Abu Ubaidah al Masri was promoted to take over al Qaeda's external operations branch (Abu Ubaidah died in early 2008 of a disease).
Kunar province is a known sanctuary for al Qaeda and allied terror groups. The presence of al Qaeda cells has been detected in the districts of Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Dangam, Asmar, Asadabad, Shigal, and Marawana; or eight of Kunar's 12districts, according to an investigation by The Long War Journal.
ISAF has ceded ground to al Qaeda and the Taliban over the past year when it withdrew from outposts in remote districts in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan as part of its population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. The Taliban and al Qaeda have taken advantage of these new safe havens to strike at neighboring districts and provinces.
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A Taliban commander with links to al Qaeda was killed while plotting to attack a polling station in the northeastern province of Kunar today. Haji Mohammad, the Taliban's shadow governor for the district of Shigal, was killed by Coalition forces "in a precision airstrike," the International Security Assistance Force stated.
Mohammed was described as "a key insurgent leader" in Kunar who was behind multiple attacks against US and Afghan forces. "Mohammad orchestrated attacks on Afghans who opposed his tactics, conducted illegal checkpoints intended to intimidate local Afghans, and kidnapped wealthy individuals in order to finance his activities," ISAF said.
ISAF linked Mohammed to two attacks in June, both which killed US soldiers: the June 7 IED attack that killed five US soldiers; and the June 21 suicide attack that killed two US soldiers and wounded 18 Afghans, including eight children.
The suicide attack on June 21 was the first in Afghanistan to have been carried out by a woman. ISAF directly linked the June 21 suicide attack to Qai Zia Rahman, one of the senior most terrorist leaders in northeastern Afghanistan. Qari Zia took credit for the suicide attack.
Qari Zia Rahman is the Taliban's top regional commander as well as a senior member of al Qaeda. He operates in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan province in Afghanistan, and he also operates across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. Earlier this year, the Pakistani government claimed they killed Qari Zia in an airstrike, but he later spoke to the media and mocked Pakistan's interior minister for wrongly reporting his death.
Qari Zia is closely allied with Faqir Mohammed as well as with Osama bin Laden. Qari Zia's fighters are from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and various Arab nations. He commands a brigade in al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army, or the Lashkar al Zil, US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal.
The US has targeted Qari Zai in three raids over the past summer. On June 29, the US launched a battalion-sized operation in Kunar's Marawara district. Move than 150 Taliban fighters were reported killed in the operation. On July 20, US and Afghan forces launched another battalion-sized operation in Marawara to flush out Qari Zia. And on Aug. 2, combined forces conducted a raid, again in Marawara, that targeted the al Qaeda leader.
The top al Qaeda commander in Kunar province is Abu Ikhlas al Masri, an Egyptian who has spent years in Afghanistan and has intermarried with the local tribes. Abu Ikhlas is al Qaeda's operations chief for Kunar province, having assumed command after Abu Ubaidah al Masri was promoted to take over al Qaeda's external operations branch (Abu Ubaidah died in early 2008 of a disease).
Kunar province is a known sanctuary for al Qaeda and allied terror groups. The presence of al Qaeda cells has been detected in the districts of Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Dangam, Asmar, Asadabad, Shigal, and Marawana; or eight of Kunar's 12districts, according to an investigation by The Long War Journal.
ISAF has ceded ground to al Qaeda and the Taliban over the past year when it withdrew from outposts in remote districts in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan as part of its population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. The Taliban and al Qaeda have taken advantage of these new safe havens to strike at neighboring districts and provinces.
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Friday, September 17, 2010
A New Way Forward??? Part 3
A further analysis of the recent plan offered by the Afghanistan Study Group:
3. Keep the Focus on Al Qaeda and Domestic Security. The U.S. should redirect some part of the savings from this troop reduction toward improved counter-terrorism efforts and protecting U.S. citizens from terrorist attacks. Special forces, intelligence assets, and other U.S. capabilities should continue to seek out and target known Al Qaeda cells in the region. They can be ready to go after them should they attempt to relocate elsewhere. The Study Group also believes that more effort should be made to exploit potential cleavages among different radical groups in the region, a goal that would be facilitated as the U.S. military presence declines.
Extra Cash Laying Around
I think keeping the focus on al Qaeda is obviously the proper course to follow. It's just too bad we took it off for so many years because of Iraq. However, the Department of Homeland Security and its satellite agencies already have way too much money. So much in fact, that the national security apparatus has become bloated and inefficient. I think this outstanding investigation by the Washington Post says it all:
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/
Our intelligence apparatus needs better communications and a stream-lined process of information sharing. Had that been in place, the dots might have been connected and 9/11 averted. The dots were there, but pissing contests and jostling for importance and funding prevented critical information sharing.
If we were to scale back troop deployments (and presumably save money), we should either (1) keep the money and use it reduce the national debt or (2) reinvest the money back into the conventional military forces.
Nearly 10 years of unconventional warfare has relegated our nuclear-triad forces (land based ICBMs, submarine-based SLBMs, and bomber aircraft nuclear delivery capabilities) to take a backseat. ICBMs (Minuteman III) and SLBMs (Trident II) need to undergo modernization and warheads need to be tested and upgraded for reliability, B-52 bomber aircraft need to be upgraded for extended service life (coming up on 60 years), B-2 bomber numbers need to be doubled (to 50), and ramp up production of the AGM-129 stealth air launched cruise missile which carries the W-80 150 kT warhead.
Additionally, our air and naval aircraft need modernization. The only major tactical aircraft modernization done in the past 15 years is the F-18F Super Hornet. F-15Es and F-16Fs are great for home defense, but they are aging and, most importantly, not stealth, making their offensive capabilities somewhat limited against technological foes. The F-22 Raptor aircraft, perhaps the most fearsome fighter aircraft ever to be built, should be resurrected, but with a cheaper price tag. The F-35 JSF development needs to be accelerated and adapted for carrier deployment. Finally, additional Aegis Class destroyers need to be built. The latest version of Aegis operates a powerful radar and the SM-3 missile system which, to date, works infinitely better than any land-based defensive missile systems. Aegis also gives operational flexibility of balistic missile defense because it can be deployed anywhere in the world rather than being stuck in just Alaska and Poland.
The reason for this Cold War focused strategy is that (1) we will avoid "fighting the last war" curse that we always seem to be stuck in, and (2) with the emergence of China and resurgence of Russia as military superpowers, we need to be able to deal with either country in a long-range conventional and nuclear way. I don't say this to scare folks, but we can improve our future capabilities while not sacrifcing our current ability to fight the insurgency in South Asia.
Cleavage
No, not that cleavage. Cleavage between militant groups based on goals and politics. I think this is extremely arrogant and naive. The Taliban are masters of this game. If it could be done, Pakistan would have already tried it with the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban) who are hell bent on destroying Pakistan. I think it's worth a try, but don't hold your breath. Militant Muslim groups are bound not only by their hatred of the West, but more importantly, by religion. As history has sadly proven, extreme religious beliefs can motivate humans to do some really ugly things, without remorse, and without division. The only thing that defeats such zealotry is time.
3. Keep the Focus on Al Qaeda and Domestic Security. The U.S. should redirect some part of the savings from this troop reduction toward improved counter-terrorism efforts and protecting U.S. citizens from terrorist attacks. Special forces, intelligence assets, and other U.S. capabilities should continue to seek out and target known Al Qaeda cells in the region. They can be ready to go after them should they attempt to relocate elsewhere. The Study Group also believes that more effort should be made to exploit potential cleavages among different radical groups in the region, a goal that would be facilitated as the U.S. military presence declines.
Extra Cash Laying Around
I think keeping the focus on al Qaeda is obviously the proper course to follow. It's just too bad we took it off for so many years because of Iraq. However, the Department of Homeland Security and its satellite agencies already have way too much money. So much in fact, that the national security apparatus has become bloated and inefficient. I think this outstanding investigation by the Washington Post says it all:
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/
Our intelligence apparatus needs better communications and a stream-lined process of information sharing. Had that been in place, the dots might have been connected and 9/11 averted. The dots were there, but pissing contests and jostling for importance and funding prevented critical information sharing.
If we were to scale back troop deployments (and presumably save money), we should either (1) keep the money and use it reduce the national debt or (2) reinvest the money back into the conventional military forces.
Nearly 10 years of unconventional warfare has relegated our nuclear-triad forces (land based ICBMs, submarine-based SLBMs, and bomber aircraft nuclear delivery capabilities) to take a backseat. ICBMs (Minuteman III) and SLBMs (Trident II) need to undergo modernization and warheads need to be tested and upgraded for reliability, B-52 bomber aircraft need to be upgraded for extended service life (coming up on 60 years), B-2 bomber numbers need to be doubled (to 50), and ramp up production of the AGM-129 stealth air launched cruise missile which carries the W-80 150 kT warhead.
Additionally, our air and naval aircraft need modernization. The only major tactical aircraft modernization done in the past 15 years is the F-18F Super Hornet. F-15Es and F-16Fs are great for home defense, but they are aging and, most importantly, not stealth, making their offensive capabilities somewhat limited against technological foes. The F-22 Raptor aircraft, perhaps the most fearsome fighter aircraft ever to be built, should be resurrected, but with a cheaper price tag. The F-35 JSF development needs to be accelerated and adapted for carrier deployment. Finally, additional Aegis Class destroyers need to be built. The latest version of Aegis operates a powerful radar and the SM-3 missile system which, to date, works infinitely better than any land-based defensive missile systems. Aegis also gives operational flexibility of balistic missile defense because it can be deployed anywhere in the world rather than being stuck in just Alaska and Poland.
The reason for this Cold War focused strategy is that (1) we will avoid "fighting the last war" curse that we always seem to be stuck in, and (2) with the emergence of China and resurgence of Russia as military superpowers, we need to be able to deal with either country in a long-range conventional and nuclear way. I don't say this to scare folks, but we can improve our future capabilities while not sacrifcing our current ability to fight the insurgency in South Asia.
Cleavage
No, not that cleavage. Cleavage between militant groups based on goals and politics. I think this is extremely arrogant and naive. The Taliban are masters of this game. If it could be done, Pakistan would have already tried it with the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban) who are hell bent on destroying Pakistan. I think it's worth a try, but don't hold your breath. Militant Muslim groups are bound not only by their hatred of the West, but more importantly, by religion. As history has sadly proven, extreme religious beliefs can motivate humans to do some really ugly things, without remorse, and without division. The only thing that defeats such zealotry is time.
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
A New Way Forward??? Part 2
Continuing my analysis of the Afghanistan Study Group's new proposal...
2. Scale Back and Eventually Suspend Combat Operations in the South and Reduce the U.S. Military Footprint. Simultaneous to these efforts at achieving a new, more stable political equilibrium in the country, the U.S. should downsize and eventually discontinue combat operations in southern Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to draw down its military presence, which radicalizes many Pashtuns and often aids the Taliban’s recruitment effort.
The Study Group recommends that President Obama firmly stick to his pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in the summer of 2011—and earlier if possible. U.S. force levels should decline to the minimum level needed to help train Afghan security forces, prevent massive human rights atrocities, resist an expansion of Taliban control beyond the Pashtun south, and engage in robust counter-terrorism operations as needed. We recommend a decrease to 68,000 troops by October 2011, and 30,000 by July 2012. These residual force levels should be reviewed as to whether they are contributing to our broader strategic objectives in the fall of 2012 – and if not, withdrawn in full over time.
This step would save the U.S. at least $60 billion to $80 billion per year and reduce local resentment at our large and intrusive military presence.
Southern Withdrawl
There's no doubt that the presence of Western combat troops in southern Pashtun areas piss off the local populace, but their reaction is based not on our presence per se, but on our presence without providing security and development. The southern portion of Afghanistan, mainly the Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, have been largely neglected since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. The region is mostly vastly flat desert (except the "green zone" surrounding the Helmand River) with a low population density. This region served, and continues to serve, as the main artery of transport of opium to Pakistan and Iran and transport of weapons and supplies for the Taliban and al Qaeda located inside Afghanistan. Until 2009, British and American forces adopted a "hands off" approach and did not interdict drug or weapons shipments.
The US must adopt a three pronged strategy for the south.
First, the US must adopt a comprehensive and sensible opium policy. Rather than destroy the crops, the US should purchase the opium directly from the farmers and adopt a phased-in approach of conversion to food crops. Farmers get paid market price for their opium in exchange that they convert 20% of their arable land each year.
Second, the US must adopt an Iraq-based strategy on a much larger scale. Becasue inhabitants are widely spread out, company-sized units must deploy to small villages so that their spheres of influence cover the majority of each province. Fire support bases will be strategically located to provide indirect fire support. The localized combat units will be assigned NGO and State Department personnel, so that civilian reconstruction projects may proceed with security. The key to winning support is security and development on the local scale, not on the national scale. The goals of the development teams (similar to the PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan) is to align with the provincial governors (not Kabul).
Third, the US must establish a substantial forward operating base in the south. This would provide logistical support and air support assets (A-10/Apaches/etc.) for localized combat units. Additionally, it would provide advanced medical support for civilians and a staging point for airstrikes into South Waziristan and Balochistan in the FATA. The presence of a large FOB would assuredly draw militants into an open confrontation. With the decreased chance of civilian casualties (sparsely populated region), this would provide military units the opportunity to bring all assets to bear in a direct action confrontation.
2. Scale Back and Eventually Suspend Combat Operations in the South and Reduce the U.S. Military Footprint. Simultaneous to these efforts at achieving a new, more stable political equilibrium in the country, the U.S. should downsize and eventually discontinue combat operations in southern Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to draw down its military presence, which radicalizes many Pashtuns and often aids the Taliban’s recruitment effort.
The Study Group recommends that President Obama firmly stick to his pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in the summer of 2011—and earlier if possible. U.S. force levels should decline to the minimum level needed to help train Afghan security forces, prevent massive human rights atrocities, resist an expansion of Taliban control beyond the Pashtun south, and engage in robust counter-terrorism operations as needed. We recommend a decrease to 68,000 troops by October 2011, and 30,000 by July 2012. These residual force levels should be reviewed as to whether they are contributing to our broader strategic objectives in the fall of 2012 – and if not, withdrawn in full over time.
This step would save the U.S. at least $60 billion to $80 billion per year and reduce local resentment at our large and intrusive military presence.
Southern Withdrawl
There's no doubt that the presence of Western combat troops in southern Pashtun areas piss off the local populace, but their reaction is based not on our presence per se, but on our presence without providing security and development. The southern portion of Afghanistan, mainly the Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, have been largely neglected since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. The region is mostly vastly flat desert (except the "green zone" surrounding the Helmand River) with a low population density. This region served, and continues to serve, as the main artery of transport of opium to Pakistan and Iran and transport of weapons and supplies for the Taliban and al Qaeda located inside Afghanistan. Until 2009, British and American forces adopted a "hands off" approach and did not interdict drug or weapons shipments.
The US must adopt a three pronged strategy for the south.
First, the US must adopt a comprehensive and sensible opium policy. Rather than destroy the crops, the US should purchase the opium directly from the farmers and adopt a phased-in approach of conversion to food crops. Farmers get paid market price for their opium in exchange that they convert 20% of their arable land each year.
Second, the US must adopt an Iraq-based strategy on a much larger scale. Becasue inhabitants are widely spread out, company-sized units must deploy to small villages so that their spheres of influence cover the majority of each province. Fire support bases will be strategically located to provide indirect fire support. The localized combat units will be assigned NGO and State Department personnel, so that civilian reconstruction projects may proceed with security. The key to winning support is security and development on the local scale, not on the national scale. The goals of the development teams (similar to the PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan) is to align with the provincial governors (not Kabul).
Third, the US must establish a substantial forward operating base in the south. This would provide logistical support and air support assets (A-10/Apaches/etc.) for localized combat units. Additionally, it would provide advanced medical support for civilians and a staging point for airstrikes into South Waziristan and Balochistan in the FATA. The presence of a large FOB would assuredly draw militants into an open confrontation. With the decreased chance of civilian casualties (sparsely populated region), this would provide military units the opportunity to bring all assets to bear in a direct action confrontation.
Background on Datta Khel, North Waziristan
From the Longwar Journal (September 15, 2010):
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. Six out of the last 12 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel. The US has conducted 17 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, or 25 percent of its current total of 67 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 161 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 22 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
Some top al Qaeda leaders have been targeted and killed in Datta Khel. A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
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The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. Six out of the last 12 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel. The US has conducted 17 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, or 25 percent of its current total of 67 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 161 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 22 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
Some top al Qaeda leaders have been targeted and killed in Datta Khel. A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
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Another Strike at the Haqqani Network
From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRANSHAH: A second US drone attack on a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghan border Wednesday killed three rebels, local security officials said.
The strike took place in Payekhel village of Datta Khel district of North Waziristan tribal region, where US missile strikes have increased since early this month.
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MIRANSHAH: A second US drone attack on a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghan border Wednesday killed three rebels, local security officials said.
The strike took place in Payekhel village of Datta Khel district of North Waziristan tribal region, where US missile strikes have increased since early this month.
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A Death in the Haqqani Family
Seems that the Hellfires are getting closer to their ultimate target.
From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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Tuesday, September 14, 2010
The Obama Administration Seems to be Deadly Wrong
I have ALWAYS doubted the claim that only a "handful" of al Qaeda operate in Afghanistan. And I am getting rather suspicious of the dubious claim that the Taliban and al Qaeda won't work together.
From Central Asia Online (September 8, 2010):
KABUL – Al-Qaeda is blocking Taliban fighters who favour peace talks from negotiating with Kabul.
The terror movement has disarmed two Taliban commanders, Mullah Laal Muhammad and Mullah Alaoddin of the Haqqani network, who were interested in starting peace talks with the Afghan government, Kunduz Provincial Governor Engineer Muhammad Omar said.
“Al-Qaeda has disarmed two prominent commanders of the Haqqani Network in Kunduz in the past two weeks, and nine others in fear of being disarmed have buried their weapons and fled to Pakistan,” Omar told Central Asia Online.
“The Afghan Taliban (have accepted) reality now and want to participate in peace talks with the Afghan government, but the Pakistani, Uzbek and Chechen militants don’t want the reconciliation process to start," he said.
After President Hamid Karzai’s election to a second term, he expressed willingness to talk to those who lay down their arms and accept the Afghan constitution.
Kunduz representative to the Afghan parliament Moyeen Merastyal confirmed the governor’s statement.
“The groups that are supporting the Taliban from outside don’t want peace talks in Afghanistan as they consider stability detrimental to their interests,” Merastyal said. “They want terrorism in the region, not only in Afghanistan, so anyone who looks interested in peace talks is being disarmed or captured,” he said, referring to the arrest of some Taliban figures in Pakistan.
“Those prominent Taliban commanders who have been captured in Pakistan in the past few months were interested in starting peace talks, but they were stopped as well,” he added.
On the other hand, since the arrest of the Taliban’s chief military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Karachi last February, some disagreements between Taliban factions and al-Qaeda have been visible, Omar said.
The reconciliation and reintegration plan is aimed at encouraging the Taliban’s followers, estimated by NATO officials at 25,000 to 30,000 active fighters, to renounce violence, sever ties with al-Qaeda and respect the constitution.
Taliban leaders and spokesmen have said negotiations can begin only after international forces leave Afghanistan.
AND
From the Longwar Journal (July 29, 2010):
On May 21 there was a suicide attack in Paktia province in Afghanistan that was initially claimed by the Taliban, but was later traced back to al Qaeda. The facts surrounding that strike and others, as well as information gleaned from US military press releases, paint a picture of al Qaeda that contradicts recent statements by top US intelligence officials who estimated al Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan as being limited to between 50 and 100 operatives.
"I think at most, we're looking at maybe 50 to 100 [al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan], maybe less," Panetta said on ABC News This Week on June 27. "It's in that vicinity. There's no question that the main location of al-Qaeda is in tribal areas of Pakistan."
Explicit confirmation of al Qaeda's recent activity in Afghanistan came in a propaganda video released by As Sahab, al Qaeda's media arm, stating that the May 21 suicide assault against an Afghan border police outpost in Urgun in Paktia province was carried out by four al Qaeda operatives.
The video, titled "The Raid of the Two Sheikhs; Abu Hamza al Muhajir and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, may Allah have mercy on them," shows the four al Qaeda operatives giving their martyrdom statements before carrying out the assault. The four al Qaeda operatives are identified as Luqman al Makki, from Mecca in Saudi Arabia; Na'imallah al Swati from the district of Swat in Pakistan; Mus'ab al Turki, from Turkey; and Musa al Afghani, from Afghanistan.
While the attack by the four al Qaeda operatives was a failure, as three of the suicide bombers were killed in a firefight with Afghan police and only one policeman was killed, the attack demonstrates that al Qaeda is still actively conducting operations inside Afghanistan.
Within the past eight months, Al Qaeda is known to have carried out several suicide attacks along the border. The most prominent attack was executed by Humam Khalil Muhammed Abu Mulal al Balawi, a Jordanian who was also known as Abu Dujanah al Khurasani, on Dec. 30, 2009. The Jordanian suicide bomber killed seven CIA agents and security guards and a Jordanian intelligence official at Combat Outpost Chapman in Khost. COP Chapman was used to aid in the covert US Predator campaign that targets al Qaeda and Taliban operatives inside Pakistan's tribal areas.
Other recent attacks that can be directly traced to al Qaeda include an attack in the spring by Abi Zaid al Makki (another Saudi) on a Afghan outpost in Khost, and a failed attack by Abu Dijana San'aani, a Yemeni who served as a bomb maker for al Qaeda, near Kabul on May 9.
Further demonstrating al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan, over the past year Coalition and Afghan forces have killed numerous al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, as well as several other commanders who fought in Afghanistan but were based in Pakistan.
On May 25, Coalition and Afghan forces killed a "key al Qaeda leader" during a clash in the eastern province of Paktia. On Jan. 19, the Turkistan Islamic Party admitted that 15 of its members, including 13 Uighurs and two Turks, were killed during a Predator airstrike in Badghis province in northwestern Afghanistan. The group, which is closely allied to al Qaeda (Abdul Haq al Turkistani, the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party, sits on al Qaeda's top shura), issued a statement confirming their deaths. And on Oct. 6, 2009, three al Qaeda embedded military trainers (these are al Qaeda operatives sent to Taliban units to impart tactics and skills) were killed in Herat.
As recently as June 27, in a single incident a total of 15 al Qaeda operatives, "including eight Arabs, five Pakistanis and two Afghans," were killed after an IED detonated prematurely in a compound in Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan.
In an attempt to disrupt al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan, the US has also utilized targeted Predator strikes in Pakistan's bordering tribal areas to kill several top al Qaeda military leaders who fight in Afghanistan. Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's top leader for Afghanistan, was killed in a strike in North Waziristan on May 21. Al Qaeda quickly replaced Yazid by naming Sheikh Fateh al Masri as the new commander af Afghanistan.
More recently, on June 10, two Arab al Qaeda military commanders and a Turkish foreign fighter were killed in North Waziristan. Sheikh Ihsanullah was an "Arab al Qaeda military commander"; Ibrahim was the commander of the Fursan-i-Mohammed Group. On June 19, an al Qaeda commander named Abu Ahmed and 11 members of the Islamic Jihad Union were killed in North Waziristan.
Al Qaeda's extensive reach in Afghanistan is documented in the body of press releases issued in recent years by the International Security Assistance Force. Looking at press releases dating back to March 2007, The Long War Journal has been able to detect the presence of al Qaeda and affiliated groups such as the Islamic Jihad Union in 46 different districts in 16 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
Al Qaeda operates in conjunction with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hizb-i-Islami Guldbuddin network throughout Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives often serve as embedded military trainers for Taliban field units and impart tactics and bomb-making skills to these forces. Al Qaeda often supports the Taliban by funding operations and providing weapons and other aid, according to classified military memos released by Wikileaks.
This picture is vastly different from the one painted by top Obama administration intelligence officials including CIA Director Leon Panetta and Nation Counterterrorism Center Director Michal Leiter.
From Central Asia Online (September 8, 2010):
KABUL – Al-Qaeda is blocking Taliban fighters who favour peace talks from negotiating with Kabul.
The terror movement has disarmed two Taliban commanders, Mullah Laal Muhammad and Mullah Alaoddin of the Haqqani network, who were interested in starting peace talks with the Afghan government, Kunduz Provincial Governor Engineer Muhammad Omar said.
“Al-Qaeda has disarmed two prominent commanders of the Haqqani Network in Kunduz in the past two weeks, and nine others in fear of being disarmed have buried their weapons and fled to Pakistan,” Omar told Central Asia Online.
“The Afghan Taliban (have accepted) reality now and want to participate in peace talks with the Afghan government, but the Pakistani, Uzbek and Chechen militants don’t want the reconciliation process to start," he said.
After President Hamid Karzai’s election to a second term, he expressed willingness to talk to those who lay down their arms and accept the Afghan constitution.
Kunduz representative to the Afghan parliament Moyeen Merastyal confirmed the governor’s statement.
“The groups that are supporting the Taliban from outside don’t want peace talks in Afghanistan as they consider stability detrimental to their interests,” Merastyal said. “They want terrorism in the region, not only in Afghanistan, so anyone who looks interested in peace talks is being disarmed or captured,” he said, referring to the arrest of some Taliban figures in Pakistan.
“Those prominent Taliban commanders who have been captured in Pakistan in the past few months were interested in starting peace talks, but they were stopped as well,” he added.
On the other hand, since the arrest of the Taliban’s chief military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Karachi last February, some disagreements between Taliban factions and al-Qaeda have been visible, Omar said.
The reconciliation and reintegration plan is aimed at encouraging the Taliban’s followers, estimated by NATO officials at 25,000 to 30,000 active fighters, to renounce violence, sever ties with al-Qaeda and respect the constitution.
Taliban leaders and spokesmen have said negotiations can begin only after international forces leave Afghanistan.
AND
From the Longwar Journal (July 29, 2010):
On May 21 there was a suicide attack in Paktia province in Afghanistan that was initially claimed by the Taliban, but was later traced back to al Qaeda. The facts surrounding that strike and others, as well as information gleaned from US military press releases, paint a picture of al Qaeda that contradicts recent statements by top US intelligence officials who estimated al Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan as being limited to between 50 and 100 operatives.
"I think at most, we're looking at maybe 50 to 100 [al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan], maybe less," Panetta said on ABC News This Week on June 27. "It's in that vicinity. There's no question that the main location of al-Qaeda is in tribal areas of Pakistan."
Explicit confirmation of al Qaeda's recent activity in Afghanistan came in a propaganda video released by As Sahab, al Qaeda's media arm, stating that the May 21 suicide assault against an Afghan border police outpost in Urgun in Paktia province was carried out by four al Qaeda operatives.
The video, titled "The Raid of the Two Sheikhs; Abu Hamza al Muhajir and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, may Allah have mercy on them," shows the four al Qaeda operatives giving their martyrdom statements before carrying out the assault. The four al Qaeda operatives are identified as Luqman al Makki, from Mecca in Saudi Arabia; Na'imallah al Swati from the district of Swat in Pakistan; Mus'ab al Turki, from Turkey; and Musa al Afghani, from Afghanistan.
While the attack by the four al Qaeda operatives was a failure, as three of the suicide bombers were killed in a firefight with Afghan police and only one policeman was killed, the attack demonstrates that al Qaeda is still actively conducting operations inside Afghanistan.
Within the past eight months, Al Qaeda is known to have carried out several suicide attacks along the border. The most prominent attack was executed by Humam Khalil Muhammed Abu Mulal al Balawi, a Jordanian who was also known as Abu Dujanah al Khurasani, on Dec. 30, 2009. The Jordanian suicide bomber killed seven CIA agents and security guards and a Jordanian intelligence official at Combat Outpost Chapman in Khost. COP Chapman was used to aid in the covert US Predator campaign that targets al Qaeda and Taliban operatives inside Pakistan's tribal areas.
Other recent attacks that can be directly traced to al Qaeda include an attack in the spring by Abi Zaid al Makki (another Saudi) on a Afghan outpost in Khost, and a failed attack by Abu Dijana San'aani, a Yemeni who served as a bomb maker for al Qaeda, near Kabul on May 9.
Further demonstrating al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan, over the past year Coalition and Afghan forces have killed numerous al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, as well as several other commanders who fought in Afghanistan but were based in Pakistan.
On May 25, Coalition and Afghan forces killed a "key al Qaeda leader" during a clash in the eastern province of Paktia. On Jan. 19, the Turkistan Islamic Party admitted that 15 of its members, including 13 Uighurs and two Turks, were killed during a Predator airstrike in Badghis province in northwestern Afghanistan. The group, which is closely allied to al Qaeda (Abdul Haq al Turkistani, the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party, sits on al Qaeda's top shura), issued a statement confirming their deaths. And on Oct. 6, 2009, three al Qaeda embedded military trainers (these are al Qaeda operatives sent to Taliban units to impart tactics and skills) were killed in Herat.
As recently as June 27, in a single incident a total of 15 al Qaeda operatives, "including eight Arabs, five Pakistanis and two Afghans," were killed after an IED detonated prematurely in a compound in Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan.
In an attempt to disrupt al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan, the US has also utilized targeted Predator strikes in Pakistan's bordering tribal areas to kill several top al Qaeda military leaders who fight in Afghanistan. Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's top leader for Afghanistan, was killed in a strike in North Waziristan on May 21. Al Qaeda quickly replaced Yazid by naming Sheikh Fateh al Masri as the new commander af Afghanistan.
More recently, on June 10, two Arab al Qaeda military commanders and a Turkish foreign fighter were killed in North Waziristan. Sheikh Ihsanullah was an "Arab al Qaeda military commander"; Ibrahim was the commander of the Fursan-i-Mohammed Group. On June 19, an al Qaeda commander named Abu Ahmed and 11 members of the Islamic Jihad Union were killed in North Waziristan.
Al Qaeda's extensive reach in Afghanistan is documented in the body of press releases issued in recent years by the International Security Assistance Force. Looking at press releases dating back to March 2007, The Long War Journal has been able to detect the presence of al Qaeda and affiliated groups such as the Islamic Jihad Union in 46 different districts in 16 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
Al Qaeda operates in conjunction with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hizb-i-Islami Guldbuddin network throughout Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives often serve as embedded military trainers for Taliban field units and impart tactics and bomb-making skills to these forces. Al Qaeda often supports the Taliban by funding operations and providing weapons and other aid, according to classified military memos released by Wikileaks.
This picture is vastly different from the one painted by top Obama administration intelligence officials including CIA Director Leon Panetta and Nation Counterterrorism Center Director Michal Leiter.
Batting 1.000
And another drone strike at Haqqani. I'm predicting one more against Haqqani and then we'll switch back to Bahadur or maybe a new target.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US executed yet another Predator strike in Pakistan's lawless tribal agency of North Waziristan today. The strike is the second today and the 11th this month.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired two missiles at a vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“A US drone fired two missiles on a vehicle carrying militants outside Miramshah,” a senior Pakistan security official told AFP. "At least four militants were killed in the attack.”
No senior terrorist leaders have been reported killed in the strike.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj.
Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US executed yet another Predator strike in Pakistan's lawless tribal agency of North Waziristan today. The strike is the second today and the 11th this month.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired two missiles at a vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“A US drone fired two missiles on a vehicle carrying militants outside Miramshah,” a senior Pakistan security official told AFP. "At least four militants were killed in the attack.”
No senior terrorist leaders have been reported killed in the strike.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj.
Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack.
I Called It!
I swear I didn't read the headlines before I made the last post about the drone strike near Sawal. Another strike at Haqqani near Miram Shah.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US continued its unprecedented pace of airstrikes inside of Pakistan's Taliban-control tribal agency of North Waziristan, launching its third Predator attack in 24 hours.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired five missiles at two compounds in the village of Darga Mandi, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“Several US drones fired seven missiles at two militants compounds early this morning (Wednesday) killing at least five militants,” a senior Pakistani security official told AFP.
No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders have been reported killed in the latest strike.
Darga Mandi is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The US has stepped up its attacks against the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan as part of a "hammer-and-anvil" strategy to hit the al Qaeda-linked terror network in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, The Associate Press reported.
The US has killed 20 terrorists in the three strikes over the past 24 hours. Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack. In the second strike, four "militants" were killed when Predators hit their vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US continued its unprecedented pace of airstrikes inside of Pakistan's Taliban-control tribal agency of North Waziristan, launching its third Predator attack in 24 hours.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired five missiles at two compounds in the village of Darga Mandi, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“Several US drones fired seven missiles at two militants compounds early this morning (Wednesday) killing at least five militants,” a senior Pakistani security official told AFP.
No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, or allied terror group leaders have been reported killed in the latest strike.
Darga Mandi is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The US has stepped up its attacks against the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan as part of a "hammer-and-anvil" strategy to hit the al Qaeda-linked terror network in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, The Associate Press reported.
The US has killed 20 terrorists in the three strikes over the past 24 hours. Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack. In the second strike, four "militants" were killed when Predators hit their vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel.
The Hits Keep on Coming
Drone strikes seem to be alternating between Haqqani and Bahadur strongholds. I wonder if Haqqani will be next, perhaps somewhere near Miram Shah or Darpa Khel? Only time will tell, but it doesn't sound like it will take very long to find out.
From the AFP (September 13, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: A salvo of missiles fired by US drones killed 11 militants in Pakistan's tribal badlands on Tuesday, the 10th strike targeting the lawless Afghan border area in 11 days, officials said.
The Pakistani officials said four missiles hit a militant compound in Bushnarai village in Shawal district of North Waziristan, where Al-Qaeda-linked and Taliban fighters have carved out strongholds beyond government control.
A fresh surge in US missile strikes has killed more than 60 militants since September 3 in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt.
“Eleven militants were killed in today's drone attack,” a senior Pakistani security official in the area told AFP on condition of anonymity, updating an initial death toll of seven.
He described the area as a stronghold of Arab militants and said there were reports that foreigners - a byword for Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan - were among the dead but said the nationalities of the dead were not yet confirmed.
Another security official confirmed that the remains of 11 people had been pulled out of the wreckage of the compound.
“US drones are still carrying out low-level flights in different areas of North Waziristan, including Shawal where the strike took place this morning,”the second security official told AFP.
Shawal district is more than 300 kilometres (190 miles) from Pakistan's capital Islamabad, headquarters of the country's civilian government.
The area is a stronghold of Pakistani Taliban warlord Hafiz Gul Bahadur and is also populated by Arab fighters.
From the AFP (September 13, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: A salvo of missiles fired by US drones killed 11 militants in Pakistan's tribal badlands on Tuesday, the 10th strike targeting the lawless Afghan border area in 11 days, officials said.
The Pakistani officials said four missiles hit a militant compound in Bushnarai village in Shawal district of North Waziristan, where Al-Qaeda-linked and Taliban fighters have carved out strongholds beyond government control.
A fresh surge in US missile strikes has killed more than 60 militants since September 3 in Pakistan's northwestern tribal belt.
“Eleven militants were killed in today's drone attack,” a senior Pakistani security official in the area told AFP on condition of anonymity, updating an initial death toll of seven.
He described the area as a stronghold of Arab militants and said there were reports that foreigners - a byword for Al-Qaeda operatives in Pakistan - were among the dead but said the nationalities of the dead were not yet confirmed.
Another security official confirmed that the remains of 11 people had been pulled out of the wreckage of the compound.
“US drones are still carrying out low-level flights in different areas of North Waziristan, including Shawal where the strike took place this morning,”the second security official told AFP.
Shawal district is more than 300 kilometres (190 miles) from Pakistan's capital Islamabad, headquarters of the country's civilian government.
The area is a stronghold of Pakistani Taliban warlord Hafiz Gul Bahadur and is also populated by Arab fighters.
Monday, September 13, 2010
Just What Afghanistan Needs...
Another Pakistan-based militant group to join in the fray.
From Time Magazine (September 10, 2010):
There was nothing unfamiliar about last month's hours-long gun battle between Afghan security forces and insurgents in Nuristan province — except the identity of some of the militants. Of the 40 or so fighters killed, Gen. Mohammad Zaman Mahmoodzai, head of Afghanistan's border security force, says about a quarter had carried documents implicating them as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based outfit better known for its role in the Kashmir insurgency and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.
The general claims that recent months have seen a steady increase of violent clashes in the east that have yielded a higher ratio of Pakistanis and other foreigners among the insurgent casualties. That, he says, is proof of the nominally Kashmir-oriented group's growing involvement in Afghanistan. The trend is confirmed by U.S. military officials, who say that well-trained LeT fighters are bringing deadlier tools and tactics to the war's second-fiercest front.
With NATO's attention fixed on the southern battle zone where the Taliban is strongest, the LeT, or "Army of the Pure," has aligned with a host of militant groups that have ramped up attacks against Afghan and U.S. forces in the borderlands and beyond. Since they began tracking the group's involvement in Afghanistan in 2008, U.S. officials say the LeT has expanded from a small presence in Kunar province to multiple cells in at least five provinces, actively collaborating with everyone from the Afghan Taliban to the Haqqani network. Kunar and Nuristan remain their focal point, provinces where the U.S. military shut down several remote, heavily targeted bases in the past year. But when NATO in July announced the arrest of two Taliban commanders accused of aiding the LeT, a statement noted the influx of LeT foot soldiers in Nangarhar province, an important commercial center and military supply route. A spike in suicide- and roadside bomb attacks against convoys and government officials have disrupted the once stable area, and Afghan security officials allege the LeT is providing fake documents to attackers.
Originally nurtured by Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as a proxy force to drive India out of Kashmir, the LeT has since raised its profile with spectacular strikes on India's parliament and commercial capital. It was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002 under pressure from the U.S., although the organization continues to operate freely there via thinly disguised front organizations.
But according to Stephen Tankel, a U.S.-based analyst and author of the book Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, "Lashkar was never just a Kashmir-centric organization and always had ambitions beyond the region." Today, he explains, some cadres are motivated by anti-Indian sentiment; others want to wage war against America. Because of increased Indian influence in the government of post-Taliban Afghanistan, these jihadist desires converge. And while India remains its main enemy, anti-Western activity by the LeT is nothing new — as the arrest of operatives as far away as the United States shows. "What we're seeing now is an acceleration of trends that have been in place," Tankel says, "rather than Lashkar trying to go in a new direction."
The LeT's presence in Afghanistan has coincided with mounting Pakistani concern that India's influence in Kabul represents an Indian strategy of encirclement. Ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul was the reason for the ISI helping the Taliban seize power in Afghanistan in 1996, and U.S. officials suspect ongoing Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban since the movement's ouster by U.S.-led forces in 2001. U.S. intelligence officials also suspect a direct Pakistani hand in some attacks in Afghanistan, notably the mid-2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul that left 58 people dead. More recently, Afghan intelligence officials blamed a Feb. 26 attack on a guesthouse in the capital on LeT operatives. (Half of the 18 killed were Indian nationals.) Pakistan, for its part, has denied any responsibility, insisting that its priority is its battle with its domestic Taliban insurgency. But in light of its long-standing reluctance to crack down on the LeT — and alleged involvement in attacks in Afghanistan — Tankel says we "must take seriously" the possibility that elements within the ISI are making use of LeT militants in Afghanistan, even if "there's no smoking gun."
While there's some dispute over just how substantial the LeT presence in Afghanistan really is, Afghan and U.S. officials agree that the group's role is likely to escalate as Western forces begin to withdraw and Pakistan tries to strengthen its influence. What's more, some contend, the LeT's threat should not be measured in numbers. Given that its training program was developed by the Pakistani army, its operatives are still considered among the most capable at small-unit tactics and explosives, making them ideally suited to the low-intensity Afghan conflict. "A few well-equipped pros who go around teaching and coordinating can do a lot more damage" than your average Taliban guerrilla, says the senior U.S. military official, noting the increased level of cooperation. "They're already having a big impact."
From Time Magazine (September 10, 2010):
There was nothing unfamiliar about last month's hours-long gun battle between Afghan security forces and insurgents in Nuristan province — except the identity of some of the militants. Of the 40 or so fighters killed, Gen. Mohammad Zaman Mahmoodzai, head of Afghanistan's border security force, says about a quarter had carried documents implicating them as members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Pakistan-based outfit better known for its role in the Kashmir insurgency and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.
The general claims that recent months have seen a steady increase of violent clashes in the east that have yielded a higher ratio of Pakistanis and other foreigners among the insurgent casualties. That, he says, is proof of the nominally Kashmir-oriented group's growing involvement in Afghanistan. The trend is confirmed by U.S. military officials, who say that well-trained LeT fighters are bringing deadlier tools and tactics to the war's second-fiercest front.
With NATO's attention fixed on the southern battle zone where the Taliban is strongest, the LeT, or "Army of the Pure," has aligned with a host of militant groups that have ramped up attacks against Afghan and U.S. forces in the borderlands and beyond. Since they began tracking the group's involvement in Afghanistan in 2008, U.S. officials say the LeT has expanded from a small presence in Kunar province to multiple cells in at least five provinces, actively collaborating with everyone from the Afghan Taliban to the Haqqani network. Kunar and Nuristan remain their focal point, provinces where the U.S. military shut down several remote, heavily targeted bases in the past year. But when NATO in July announced the arrest of two Taliban commanders accused of aiding the LeT, a statement noted the influx of LeT foot soldiers in Nangarhar province, an important commercial center and military supply route. A spike in suicide- and roadside bomb attacks against convoys and government officials have disrupted the once stable area, and Afghan security officials allege the LeT is providing fake documents to attackers.
Originally nurtured by Pakistan's spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), as a proxy force to drive India out of Kashmir, the LeT has since raised its profile with spectacular strikes on India's parliament and commercial capital. It was banned by the Pakistani government in 2002 under pressure from the U.S., although the organization continues to operate freely there via thinly disguised front organizations.
But according to Stephen Tankel, a U.S.-based analyst and author of the book Storming the World Stage: The Story of Lashkar-e-Taiba, "Lashkar was never just a Kashmir-centric organization and always had ambitions beyond the region." Today, he explains, some cadres are motivated by anti-Indian sentiment; others want to wage war against America. Because of increased Indian influence in the government of post-Taliban Afghanistan, these jihadist desires converge. And while India remains its main enemy, anti-Western activity by the LeT is nothing new — as the arrest of operatives as far away as the United States shows. "What we're seeing now is an acceleration of trends that have been in place," Tankel says, "rather than Lashkar trying to go in a new direction."
The LeT's presence in Afghanistan has coincided with mounting Pakistani concern that India's influence in Kabul represents an Indian strategy of encirclement. Ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul was the reason for the ISI helping the Taliban seize power in Afghanistan in 1996, and U.S. officials suspect ongoing Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban since the movement's ouster by U.S.-led forces in 2001. U.S. intelligence officials also suspect a direct Pakistani hand in some attacks in Afghanistan, notably the mid-2008 Indian embassy bombing in Kabul that left 58 people dead. More recently, Afghan intelligence officials blamed a Feb. 26 attack on a guesthouse in the capital on LeT operatives. (Half of the 18 killed were Indian nationals.) Pakistan, for its part, has denied any responsibility, insisting that its priority is its battle with its domestic Taliban insurgency. But in light of its long-standing reluctance to crack down on the LeT — and alleged involvement in attacks in Afghanistan — Tankel says we "must take seriously" the possibility that elements within the ISI are making use of LeT militants in Afghanistan, even if "there's no smoking gun."
While there's some dispute over just how substantial the LeT presence in Afghanistan really is, Afghan and U.S. officials agree that the group's role is likely to escalate as Western forces begin to withdraw and Pakistan tries to strengthen its influence. What's more, some contend, the LeT's threat should not be measured in numbers. Given that its training program was developed by the Pakistani army, its operatives are still considered among the most capable at small-unit tactics and explosives, making them ideally suited to the low-intensity Afghan conflict. "A few well-equipped pros who go around teaching and coordinating can do a lot more damage" than your average Taliban guerrilla, says the senior U.S. military official, noting the increased level of cooperation. "They're already having a big impact."
Sunday, September 12, 2010
Datta Khel
From the Long War Journal:
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan, administers the region, but the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. The US has conducted 13 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, nearly 25 percent of its current total of 58 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 156 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 19 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
Datta Khel borders the Mohammed Khel and Jani Khel regions in the settled district of Bannu. The Jani Khel region has long been a strategic meeting place and safe haven for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Jani Khel was identified as the headquarters for al Qaeda's Shura Majlis back in 2007. Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command, has operated in the Jani Khel region. The US has struck al Qaeda safe houses in Jani Khel twice since last year. These strikes are the only two Predator attacks that have occurred outside of Pakistan's tribal areas since the US airstrikes began in 2004.
The town of Jani Khel is a known haven for al Qaeda leaders and fighters. Senior al Qaeda operative Abdullah Azzam al Saudi was killed in a Predator strike in Jani Khel on Nov. 19, 2008. Azzam served as a liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest.
In addition, Al Qaeda is known to have deposited its donations received from Europe into the Bayt al Mal, or Bank of Money, in Jani Khel, according to a report at the NEFA Foundation. The Bayt al Mal served as al Qaeda's treasury.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. Hafiz Gul Bahadar, the Taliban commander for North Waziristan, administers the region, but the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. The US has conducted 13 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, nearly 25 percent of its current total of 58 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 156 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 19 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
Datta Khel borders the Mohammed Khel and Jani Khel regions in the settled district of Bannu. The Jani Khel region has long been a strategic meeting place and safe haven for al Qaeda and the Taliban. Jani Khel was identified as the headquarters for al Qaeda's Shura Majlis back in 2007. Ayman al Zawahiri, al Qaeda's second in command, has operated in the Jani Khel region. The US has struck al Qaeda safe houses in Jani Khel twice since last year. These strikes are the only two Predator attacks that have occurred outside of Pakistan's tribal areas since the US airstrikes began in 2004.
The town of Jani Khel is a known haven for al Qaeda leaders and fighters. Senior al Qaeda operative Abdullah Azzam al Saudi was killed in a Predator strike in Jani Khel on Nov. 19, 2008. Azzam served as a liaison between al Qaeda and the Taliban operating in Pakistan's northwest.
In addition, Al Qaeda is known to have deposited its donations received from Europe into the Bayt al Mal, or Bank of Money, in Jani Khel, according to a report at the NEFA Foundation. The Bayt al Mal served as al Qaeda's treasury.
Saturday, September 11, 2010
The Long War Journal - Charts on US Strikes in Pakistan
The Long War Journal - Charts on US Strikes in Pakistan
It's not a good time to own real estate in North Waziristan right now.
It's not a good time to own real estate in North Waziristan right now.
Haqqani Network Update 12Sep10
The Pentagon must really like my blog. A drone strike near Miram Shah, home base for the Haqqani Network.
From the AP:
DERA ISMAIL KHAN, Pakistan – A suspected American missile strike killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan early Thursday, an intelligence official said, the fourth such attack on suspected insurgent targets there in 24 hours.
The barrage was one of the most intense since the attacks were stepped up more than two years ago in a bid to keep pressure on al-Qaida and its allies. Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
U.S. officials do not publicly acknowledge the missile strikes but have said privately that they have killed several senior Taliban and al-Qaida militants and scores of foot soldiers in a region largely out of the control of the Pakistani state. Critics say innocents are also killed, fueling support for the insurgency.
The latest attack took place before dawn on a house close to a disused match factory a little more than a mile (three kilometers) west of Miran Shah town, a hub for local and international militants in the North Waziristan region, an intelligence official said. He spoke on condition of anonymity in line with the policy of his agency. Five alleged militants were killed, he said.
Folks, its Miram Shah not Miranshah.
Also from the AP:
MIRANSHAH, Pakistan (AFP) – A US drone attack Thursday killed six militants in Pakistan's rebel-infested northwestern tribal belt, security officials said -- the fourth strike in 24 hours.
The latest strike hit North Waziristan, the same tribal district targeted in three other drone attacks since Wednesday and a renowned hub for Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.
The target of the fourth drone attack was a compound in the outskirts of Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
A total of 24 militants were killed in the four strikes.
"Two US drones fired three missiles. We have reports that six militants were killed," a security official based in Peshawar told AFP.
Residents in Miranshah said they heard three huge explosions and later the villagers started announcements from local mosques asking for help.
"Militants have dug out six dead bodies. Five people were critically wounded," a local resident told AFP, requesting anonymity.
"They are still digging the rubble, two nearby houses were also damaged," he added.
Intelligence officials said they were trying to find out the nationalities of the militants killed, but they had no reports about the presence of any high-value target.
"An informer told us there were some Afghan Taliban among the dead but we are investigating," one intelligence official in Miranshah told AFP.
Two intelligence officials in Miranshah also confirmed the attack and the death toll.
Washington has branded the rugged area on the Afghan border -- part of which has been hit by Pakistan's catastrophic flooding -- a global headquarters of Al-Qaeda and the most dangerous place on Earth.
US forces have been waging a drone war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked commanders in the northwestern tribal belt, where militants have carved out havens in mountains outside direct government control.
Officials in Washington say the drone strikes are a vital tool needed to protect foreign troops in Afghanistan and have killed a number of high-value targets including Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud.
The US military does not as a rule confirm drone attacks, but its armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency operating in Afghanistan are the only forces that deploy pilotless drones in the region.
More than 1,040 people have been killed in over 100 drone strikes in Pakistan since August 2008, including a number of senior militants. However, the attacks fuel anti-American sentiment in the conservative Muslim country.
Al-Qaeda announced in June that its number three leader and Osama bin Laden's one-time treasurer Mustafa Abu al-Yazid had been killed in what security officials said appeared to be a drone strike in North Waziristan.
Under US pressure to crack down on Islamist havens along the Afghan border, Pakistan has in the past year significantly increased operations against militants in the area.
More than 3,700 people have been killed in the past three years in a series of suicide attacks and bomb explosions across Pakistan, many of them carried out by the Taliban and other Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist extremists.
Finally, from the Long War Journal:
US Predators struck yet again in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
Six Taliban fighters, including some possibly from Afghanistan, were killed and five more were critically wounded in an attack on a compound in Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
"Two US drones fired three missiles" at the compound, a Pakistani intelligence official told AFP. "We have reports that six militants were killed."
The Taliban reportedly cordoned off the area and are attempting to recover the dead and wounded from the rubble. No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed at this time.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in Danda Darpa Khel, a village just outside of Miramshah that serves as a hub of activity for the terror group.
The strike is the fourth recorded in the past 24 hours. In the four strikes combined, 24 terrorists were reported killed. Earlier today, US Predators or the more powerful Reapers struck twice in Danda Darpa Khel and once in Datta Khel, a known hub for al Qaeda's leadership.
North Waziristan is a known haven for the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and a host of Pakistani and Central and South Asian terror groups, but the Pakistani military has refused to carry out an operation to root them out. The Pakistani military maintains a garrison in Miramshah, but it is confined to base while the US is forced to carry out airstrikes against the terror groups.
The number of strikes is unprecedented, as the US has yet to carry out four strikes in a 24-hour period since the campaign began in 2004 and was ramped up in July 2008.
With today's strikes, the US has carried out 62 attacks inside Pakistan this year. The US exceeded last year's strike total of 53 with a strike in Kurram late last month. In 2008, the US carried out 36 strikes inside Pakistan.
Note to Haqqani members: stay away from Danda Darpa Khel.
From the AP:
DERA ISMAIL KHAN, Pakistan – A suspected American missile strike killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan early Thursday, an intelligence official said, the fourth such attack on suspected insurgent targets there in 24 hours.
The barrage was one of the most intense since the attacks were stepped up more than two years ago in a bid to keep pressure on al-Qaida and its allies. Most are believed to be fired from unmanned, remote-controlled planes that can hover for hours above the area.
U.S. officials do not publicly acknowledge the missile strikes but have said privately that they have killed several senior Taliban and al-Qaida militants and scores of foot soldiers in a region largely out of the control of the Pakistani state. Critics say innocents are also killed, fueling support for the insurgency.
The latest attack took place before dawn on a house close to a disused match factory a little more than a mile (three kilometers) west of Miran Shah town, a hub for local and international militants in the North Waziristan region, an intelligence official said. He spoke on condition of anonymity in line with the policy of his agency. Five alleged militants were killed, he said.
Folks, its Miram Shah not Miranshah.
Also from the AP:
MIRANSHAH, Pakistan (AFP) – A US drone attack Thursday killed six militants in Pakistan's rebel-infested northwestern tribal belt, security officials said -- the fourth strike in 24 hours.
The latest strike hit North Waziristan, the same tribal district targeted in three other drone attacks since Wednesday and a renowned hub for Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.
The target of the fourth drone attack was a compound in the outskirts of Miranshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
A total of 24 militants were killed in the four strikes.
"Two US drones fired three missiles. We have reports that six militants were killed," a security official based in Peshawar told AFP.
Residents in Miranshah said they heard three huge explosions and later the villagers started announcements from local mosques asking for help.
"Militants have dug out six dead bodies. Five people were critically wounded," a local resident told AFP, requesting anonymity.
"They are still digging the rubble, two nearby houses were also damaged," he added.
Intelligence officials said they were trying to find out the nationalities of the militants killed, but they had no reports about the presence of any high-value target.
"An informer told us there were some Afghan Taliban among the dead but we are investigating," one intelligence official in Miranshah told AFP.
Two intelligence officials in Miranshah also confirmed the attack and the death toll.
Washington has branded the rugged area on the Afghan border -- part of which has been hit by Pakistan's catastrophic flooding -- a global headquarters of Al-Qaeda and the most dangerous place on Earth.
US forces have been waging a drone war against Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked commanders in the northwestern tribal belt, where militants have carved out havens in mountains outside direct government control.
Officials in Washington say the drone strikes are a vital tool needed to protect foreign troops in Afghanistan and have killed a number of high-value targets including Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud.
The US military does not as a rule confirm drone attacks, but its armed forces and the Central Intelligence Agency operating in Afghanistan are the only forces that deploy pilotless drones in the region.
More than 1,040 people have been killed in over 100 drone strikes in Pakistan since August 2008, including a number of senior militants. However, the attacks fuel anti-American sentiment in the conservative Muslim country.
Al-Qaeda announced in June that its number three leader and Osama bin Laden's one-time treasurer Mustafa Abu al-Yazid had been killed in what security officials said appeared to be a drone strike in North Waziristan.
Under US pressure to crack down on Islamist havens along the Afghan border, Pakistan has in the past year significantly increased operations against militants in the area.
More than 3,700 people have been killed in the past three years in a series of suicide attacks and bomb explosions across Pakistan, many of them carried out by the Taliban and other Al-Qaeda-linked Islamist extremists.
Finally, from the Long War Journal:
US Predators struck yet again in Pakistan's Taliban-controlled tribal agency of North Waziristan.
Six Taliban fighters, including some possibly from Afghanistan, were killed and five more were critically wounded in an attack on a compound in Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
"Two US drones fired three missiles" at the compound, a Pakistani intelligence official told AFP. "We have reports that six militants were killed."
The Taliban reportedly cordoned off the area and are attempting to recover the dead and wounded from the rubble. No senior Taliban, Haqqani Network, or al Qaeda commanders have been reported killed at this time.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, the al Qaeda-linked Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj. The Haqqani family runs the Manba Ulom madrassa in Danda Darpa Khel, a village just outside of Miramshah that serves as a hub of activity for the terror group.
The strike is the fourth recorded in the past 24 hours. In the four strikes combined, 24 terrorists were reported killed. Earlier today, US Predators or the more powerful Reapers struck twice in Danda Darpa Khel and once in Datta Khel, a known hub for al Qaeda's leadership.
North Waziristan is a known haven for the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and a host of Pakistani and Central and South Asian terror groups, but the Pakistani military has refused to carry out an operation to root them out. The Pakistani military maintains a garrison in Miramshah, but it is confined to base while the US is forced to carry out airstrikes against the terror groups.
The number of strikes is unprecedented, as the US has yet to carry out four strikes in a 24-hour period since the campaign began in 2004 and was ramped up in July 2008.
With today's strikes, the US has carried out 62 attacks inside Pakistan this year. The US exceeded last year's strike total of 53 with a strike in Kurram late last month. In 2008, the US carried out 36 strikes inside Pakistan.
Note to Haqqani members: stay away from Danda Darpa Khel.
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