A further analysis of the recent plan offered by the Afghanistan Study Group:
3. Keep the Focus on Al Qaeda and Domestic Security. The U.S. should redirect some part of the savings from this troop reduction toward improved counter-terrorism efforts and protecting U.S. citizens from terrorist attacks. Special forces, intelligence assets, and other U.S. capabilities should continue to seek out and target known Al Qaeda cells in the region. They can be ready to go after them should they attempt to relocate elsewhere. The Study Group also believes that more effort should be made to exploit potential cleavages among different radical groups in the region, a goal that would be facilitated as the U.S. military presence declines.
Extra Cash Laying Around
I think keeping the focus on al Qaeda is obviously the proper course to follow. It's just too bad we took it off for so many years because of Iraq. However, the Department of Homeland Security and its satellite agencies already have way too much money. So much in fact, that the national security apparatus has become bloated and inefficient. I think this outstanding investigation by the Washington Post says it all:
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/
Our intelligence apparatus needs better communications and a stream-lined process of information sharing. Had that been in place, the dots might have been connected and 9/11 averted. The dots were there, but pissing contests and jostling for importance and funding prevented critical information sharing.
If we were to scale back troop deployments (and presumably save money), we should either (1) keep the money and use it reduce the national debt or (2) reinvest the money back into the conventional military forces.
Nearly 10 years of unconventional warfare has relegated our nuclear-triad forces (land based ICBMs, submarine-based SLBMs, and bomber aircraft nuclear delivery capabilities) to take a backseat. ICBMs (Minuteman III) and SLBMs (Trident II) need to undergo modernization and warheads need to be tested and upgraded for reliability, B-52 bomber aircraft need to be upgraded for extended service life (coming up on 60 years), B-2 bomber numbers need to be doubled (to 50), and ramp up production of the AGM-129 stealth air launched cruise missile which carries the W-80 150 kT warhead.
Additionally, our air and naval aircraft need modernization. The only major tactical aircraft modernization done in the past 15 years is the F-18F Super Hornet. F-15Es and F-16Fs are great for home defense, but they are aging and, most importantly, not stealth, making their offensive capabilities somewhat limited against technological foes. The F-22 Raptor aircraft, perhaps the most fearsome fighter aircraft ever to be built, should be resurrected, but with a cheaper price tag. The F-35 JSF development needs to be accelerated and adapted for carrier deployment. Finally, additional Aegis Class destroyers need to be built. The latest version of Aegis operates a powerful radar and the SM-3 missile system which, to date, works infinitely better than any land-based defensive missile systems. Aegis also gives operational flexibility of balistic missile defense because it can be deployed anywhere in the world rather than being stuck in just Alaska and Poland.
The reason for this Cold War focused strategy is that (1) we will avoid "fighting the last war" curse that we always seem to be stuck in, and (2) with the emergence of China and resurgence of Russia as military superpowers, we need to be able to deal with either country in a long-range conventional and nuclear way. I don't say this to scare folks, but we can improve our future capabilities while not sacrifcing our current ability to fight the insurgency in South Asia.
Cleavage
No, not that cleavage. Cleavage between militant groups based on goals and politics. I think this is extremely arrogant and naive. The Taliban are masters of this game. If it could be done, Pakistan would have already tried it with the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban) who are hell bent on destroying Pakistan. I think it's worth a try, but don't hold your breath. Militant Muslim groups are bound not only by their hatred of the West, but more importantly, by religion. As history has sadly proven, extreme religious beliefs can motivate humans to do some really ugly things, without remorse, and without division. The only thing that defeats such zealotry is time.
Friday, September 17, 2010
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
A New Way Forward??? Part 2
Continuing my analysis of the Afghanistan Study Group's new proposal...
2. Scale Back and Eventually Suspend Combat Operations in the South and Reduce the U.S. Military Footprint. Simultaneous to these efforts at achieving a new, more stable political equilibrium in the country, the U.S. should downsize and eventually discontinue combat operations in southern Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to draw down its military presence, which radicalizes many Pashtuns and often aids the Taliban’s recruitment effort.
The Study Group recommends that President Obama firmly stick to his pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in the summer of 2011—and earlier if possible. U.S. force levels should decline to the minimum level needed to help train Afghan security forces, prevent massive human rights atrocities, resist an expansion of Taliban control beyond the Pashtun south, and engage in robust counter-terrorism operations as needed. We recommend a decrease to 68,000 troops by October 2011, and 30,000 by July 2012. These residual force levels should be reviewed as to whether they are contributing to our broader strategic objectives in the fall of 2012 – and if not, withdrawn in full over time.
This step would save the U.S. at least $60 billion to $80 billion per year and reduce local resentment at our large and intrusive military presence.
Southern Withdrawl
There's no doubt that the presence of Western combat troops in southern Pashtun areas piss off the local populace, but their reaction is based not on our presence per se, but on our presence without providing security and development. The southern portion of Afghanistan, mainly the Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, have been largely neglected since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. The region is mostly vastly flat desert (except the "green zone" surrounding the Helmand River) with a low population density. This region served, and continues to serve, as the main artery of transport of opium to Pakistan and Iran and transport of weapons and supplies for the Taliban and al Qaeda located inside Afghanistan. Until 2009, British and American forces adopted a "hands off" approach and did not interdict drug or weapons shipments.
The US must adopt a three pronged strategy for the south.
First, the US must adopt a comprehensive and sensible opium policy. Rather than destroy the crops, the US should purchase the opium directly from the farmers and adopt a phased-in approach of conversion to food crops. Farmers get paid market price for their opium in exchange that they convert 20% of their arable land each year.
Second, the US must adopt an Iraq-based strategy on a much larger scale. Becasue inhabitants are widely spread out, company-sized units must deploy to small villages so that their spheres of influence cover the majority of each province. Fire support bases will be strategically located to provide indirect fire support. The localized combat units will be assigned NGO and State Department personnel, so that civilian reconstruction projects may proceed with security. The key to winning support is security and development on the local scale, not on the national scale. The goals of the development teams (similar to the PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan) is to align with the provincial governors (not Kabul).
Third, the US must establish a substantial forward operating base in the south. This would provide logistical support and air support assets (A-10/Apaches/etc.) for localized combat units. Additionally, it would provide advanced medical support for civilians and a staging point for airstrikes into South Waziristan and Balochistan in the FATA. The presence of a large FOB would assuredly draw militants into an open confrontation. With the decreased chance of civilian casualties (sparsely populated region), this would provide military units the opportunity to bring all assets to bear in a direct action confrontation.
2. Scale Back and Eventually Suspend Combat Operations in the South and Reduce the U.S. Military Footprint. Simultaneous to these efforts at achieving a new, more stable political equilibrium in the country, the U.S. should downsize and eventually discontinue combat operations in southern Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to draw down its military presence, which radicalizes many Pashtuns and often aids the Taliban’s recruitment effort.
The Study Group recommends that President Obama firmly stick to his pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in the summer of 2011—and earlier if possible. U.S. force levels should decline to the minimum level needed to help train Afghan security forces, prevent massive human rights atrocities, resist an expansion of Taliban control beyond the Pashtun south, and engage in robust counter-terrorism operations as needed. We recommend a decrease to 68,000 troops by October 2011, and 30,000 by July 2012. These residual force levels should be reviewed as to whether they are contributing to our broader strategic objectives in the fall of 2012 – and if not, withdrawn in full over time.
This step would save the U.S. at least $60 billion to $80 billion per year and reduce local resentment at our large and intrusive military presence.
Southern Withdrawl
There's no doubt that the presence of Western combat troops in southern Pashtun areas piss off the local populace, but their reaction is based not on our presence per se, but on our presence without providing security and development. The southern portion of Afghanistan, mainly the Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, have been largely neglected since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. The region is mostly vastly flat desert (except the "green zone" surrounding the Helmand River) with a low population density. This region served, and continues to serve, as the main artery of transport of opium to Pakistan and Iran and transport of weapons and supplies for the Taliban and al Qaeda located inside Afghanistan. Until 2009, British and American forces adopted a "hands off" approach and did not interdict drug or weapons shipments.
The US must adopt a three pronged strategy for the south.
First, the US must adopt a comprehensive and sensible opium policy. Rather than destroy the crops, the US should purchase the opium directly from the farmers and adopt a phased-in approach of conversion to food crops. Farmers get paid market price for their opium in exchange that they convert 20% of their arable land each year.
Second, the US must adopt an Iraq-based strategy on a much larger scale. Becasue inhabitants are widely spread out, company-sized units must deploy to small villages so that their spheres of influence cover the majority of each province. Fire support bases will be strategically located to provide indirect fire support. The localized combat units will be assigned NGO and State Department personnel, so that civilian reconstruction projects may proceed with security. The key to winning support is security and development on the local scale, not on the national scale. The goals of the development teams (similar to the PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan) is to align with the provincial governors (not Kabul).
Third, the US must establish a substantial forward operating base in the south. This would provide logistical support and air support assets (A-10/Apaches/etc.) for localized combat units. Additionally, it would provide advanced medical support for civilians and a staging point for airstrikes into South Waziristan and Balochistan in the FATA. The presence of a large FOB would assuredly draw militants into an open confrontation. With the decreased chance of civilian casualties (sparsely populated region), this would provide military units the opportunity to bring all assets to bear in a direct action confrontation.
Background on Datta Khel, North Waziristan
From the Longwar Journal (September 15, 2010):
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. Six out of the last 12 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel. The US has conducted 17 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, or 25 percent of its current total of 67 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 161 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 22 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
Some top al Qaeda leaders have been targeted and killed in Datta Khel. A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
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The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. Six out of the last 12 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel. The US has conducted 17 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, or 25 percent of its current total of 67 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 161 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 22 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
Some top al Qaeda leaders have been targeted and killed in Datta Khel. A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
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Another Strike at the Haqqani Network
From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRANSHAH: A second US drone attack on a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghan border Wednesday killed three rebels, local security officials said.
The strike took place in Payekhel village of Datta Khel district of North Waziristan tribal region, where US missile strikes have increased since early this month.
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MIRANSHAH: A second US drone attack on a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghan border Wednesday killed three rebels, local security officials said.
The strike took place in Payekhel village of Datta Khel district of North Waziristan tribal region, where US missile strikes have increased since early this month.
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A Death in the Haqqani Family
Seems that the Hellfires are getting closer to their ultimate target.
From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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Tuesday, September 14, 2010
The Obama Administration Seems to be Deadly Wrong
I have ALWAYS doubted the claim that only a "handful" of al Qaeda operate in Afghanistan. And I am getting rather suspicious of the dubious claim that the Taliban and al Qaeda won't work together.
From Central Asia Online (September 8, 2010):
KABUL – Al-Qaeda is blocking Taliban fighters who favour peace talks from negotiating with Kabul.
The terror movement has disarmed two Taliban commanders, Mullah Laal Muhammad and Mullah Alaoddin of the Haqqani network, who were interested in starting peace talks with the Afghan government, Kunduz Provincial Governor Engineer Muhammad Omar said.
“Al-Qaeda has disarmed two prominent commanders of the Haqqani Network in Kunduz in the past two weeks, and nine others in fear of being disarmed have buried their weapons and fled to Pakistan,” Omar told Central Asia Online.
“The Afghan Taliban (have accepted) reality now and want to participate in peace talks with the Afghan government, but the Pakistani, Uzbek and Chechen militants don’t want the reconciliation process to start," he said.
After President Hamid Karzai’s election to a second term, he expressed willingness to talk to those who lay down their arms and accept the Afghan constitution.
Kunduz representative to the Afghan parliament Moyeen Merastyal confirmed the governor’s statement.
“The groups that are supporting the Taliban from outside don’t want peace talks in Afghanistan as they consider stability detrimental to their interests,” Merastyal said. “They want terrorism in the region, not only in Afghanistan, so anyone who looks interested in peace talks is being disarmed or captured,” he said, referring to the arrest of some Taliban figures in Pakistan.
“Those prominent Taliban commanders who have been captured in Pakistan in the past few months were interested in starting peace talks, but they were stopped as well,” he added.
On the other hand, since the arrest of the Taliban’s chief military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Karachi last February, some disagreements between Taliban factions and al-Qaeda have been visible, Omar said.
The reconciliation and reintegration plan is aimed at encouraging the Taliban’s followers, estimated by NATO officials at 25,000 to 30,000 active fighters, to renounce violence, sever ties with al-Qaeda and respect the constitution.
Taliban leaders and spokesmen have said negotiations can begin only after international forces leave Afghanistan.
AND
From the Longwar Journal (July 29, 2010):
On May 21 there was a suicide attack in Paktia province in Afghanistan that was initially claimed by the Taliban, but was later traced back to al Qaeda. The facts surrounding that strike and others, as well as information gleaned from US military press releases, paint a picture of al Qaeda that contradicts recent statements by top US intelligence officials who estimated al Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan as being limited to between 50 and 100 operatives.
"I think at most, we're looking at maybe 50 to 100 [al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan], maybe less," Panetta said on ABC News This Week on June 27. "It's in that vicinity. There's no question that the main location of al-Qaeda is in tribal areas of Pakistan."
Explicit confirmation of al Qaeda's recent activity in Afghanistan came in a propaganda video released by As Sahab, al Qaeda's media arm, stating that the May 21 suicide assault against an Afghan border police outpost in Urgun in Paktia province was carried out by four al Qaeda operatives.
The video, titled "The Raid of the Two Sheikhs; Abu Hamza al Muhajir and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, may Allah have mercy on them," shows the four al Qaeda operatives giving their martyrdom statements before carrying out the assault. The four al Qaeda operatives are identified as Luqman al Makki, from Mecca in Saudi Arabia; Na'imallah al Swati from the district of Swat in Pakistan; Mus'ab al Turki, from Turkey; and Musa al Afghani, from Afghanistan.
While the attack by the four al Qaeda operatives was a failure, as three of the suicide bombers were killed in a firefight with Afghan police and only one policeman was killed, the attack demonstrates that al Qaeda is still actively conducting operations inside Afghanistan.
Within the past eight months, Al Qaeda is known to have carried out several suicide attacks along the border. The most prominent attack was executed by Humam Khalil Muhammed Abu Mulal al Balawi, a Jordanian who was also known as Abu Dujanah al Khurasani, on Dec. 30, 2009. The Jordanian suicide bomber killed seven CIA agents and security guards and a Jordanian intelligence official at Combat Outpost Chapman in Khost. COP Chapman was used to aid in the covert US Predator campaign that targets al Qaeda and Taliban operatives inside Pakistan's tribal areas.
Other recent attacks that can be directly traced to al Qaeda include an attack in the spring by Abi Zaid al Makki (another Saudi) on a Afghan outpost in Khost, and a failed attack by Abu Dijana San'aani, a Yemeni who served as a bomb maker for al Qaeda, near Kabul on May 9.
Further demonstrating al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan, over the past year Coalition and Afghan forces have killed numerous al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, as well as several other commanders who fought in Afghanistan but were based in Pakistan.
On May 25, Coalition and Afghan forces killed a "key al Qaeda leader" during a clash in the eastern province of Paktia. On Jan. 19, the Turkistan Islamic Party admitted that 15 of its members, including 13 Uighurs and two Turks, were killed during a Predator airstrike in Badghis province in northwestern Afghanistan. The group, which is closely allied to al Qaeda (Abdul Haq al Turkistani, the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party, sits on al Qaeda's top shura), issued a statement confirming their deaths. And on Oct. 6, 2009, three al Qaeda embedded military trainers (these are al Qaeda operatives sent to Taliban units to impart tactics and skills) were killed in Herat.
As recently as June 27, in a single incident a total of 15 al Qaeda operatives, "including eight Arabs, five Pakistanis and two Afghans," were killed after an IED detonated prematurely in a compound in Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan.
In an attempt to disrupt al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan, the US has also utilized targeted Predator strikes in Pakistan's bordering tribal areas to kill several top al Qaeda military leaders who fight in Afghanistan. Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's top leader for Afghanistan, was killed in a strike in North Waziristan on May 21. Al Qaeda quickly replaced Yazid by naming Sheikh Fateh al Masri as the new commander af Afghanistan.
More recently, on June 10, two Arab al Qaeda military commanders and a Turkish foreign fighter were killed in North Waziristan. Sheikh Ihsanullah was an "Arab al Qaeda military commander"; Ibrahim was the commander of the Fursan-i-Mohammed Group. On June 19, an al Qaeda commander named Abu Ahmed and 11 members of the Islamic Jihad Union were killed in North Waziristan.
Al Qaeda's extensive reach in Afghanistan is documented in the body of press releases issued in recent years by the International Security Assistance Force. Looking at press releases dating back to March 2007, The Long War Journal has been able to detect the presence of al Qaeda and affiliated groups such as the Islamic Jihad Union in 46 different districts in 16 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
Al Qaeda operates in conjunction with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hizb-i-Islami Guldbuddin network throughout Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives often serve as embedded military trainers for Taliban field units and impart tactics and bomb-making skills to these forces. Al Qaeda often supports the Taliban by funding operations and providing weapons and other aid, according to classified military memos released by Wikileaks.
This picture is vastly different from the one painted by top Obama administration intelligence officials including CIA Director Leon Panetta and Nation Counterterrorism Center Director Michal Leiter.
From Central Asia Online (September 8, 2010):
KABUL – Al-Qaeda is blocking Taliban fighters who favour peace talks from negotiating with Kabul.
The terror movement has disarmed two Taliban commanders, Mullah Laal Muhammad and Mullah Alaoddin of the Haqqani network, who were interested in starting peace talks with the Afghan government, Kunduz Provincial Governor Engineer Muhammad Omar said.
“Al-Qaeda has disarmed two prominent commanders of the Haqqani Network in Kunduz in the past two weeks, and nine others in fear of being disarmed have buried their weapons and fled to Pakistan,” Omar told Central Asia Online.
“The Afghan Taliban (have accepted) reality now and want to participate in peace talks with the Afghan government, but the Pakistani, Uzbek and Chechen militants don’t want the reconciliation process to start," he said.
After President Hamid Karzai’s election to a second term, he expressed willingness to talk to those who lay down their arms and accept the Afghan constitution.
Kunduz representative to the Afghan parliament Moyeen Merastyal confirmed the governor’s statement.
“The groups that are supporting the Taliban from outside don’t want peace talks in Afghanistan as they consider stability detrimental to their interests,” Merastyal said. “They want terrorism in the region, not only in Afghanistan, so anyone who looks interested in peace talks is being disarmed or captured,” he said, referring to the arrest of some Taliban figures in Pakistan.
“Those prominent Taliban commanders who have been captured in Pakistan in the past few months were interested in starting peace talks, but they were stopped as well,” he added.
On the other hand, since the arrest of the Taliban’s chief military commander, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Karachi last February, some disagreements between Taliban factions and al-Qaeda have been visible, Omar said.
The reconciliation and reintegration plan is aimed at encouraging the Taliban’s followers, estimated by NATO officials at 25,000 to 30,000 active fighters, to renounce violence, sever ties with al-Qaeda and respect the constitution.
Taliban leaders and spokesmen have said negotiations can begin only after international forces leave Afghanistan.
AND
From the Longwar Journal (July 29, 2010):
On May 21 there was a suicide attack in Paktia province in Afghanistan that was initially claimed by the Taliban, but was later traced back to al Qaeda. The facts surrounding that strike and others, as well as information gleaned from US military press releases, paint a picture of al Qaeda that contradicts recent statements by top US intelligence officials who estimated al Qaeda's strength in Afghanistan as being limited to between 50 and 100 operatives.
"I think at most, we're looking at maybe 50 to 100 [al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan], maybe less," Panetta said on ABC News This Week on June 27. "It's in that vicinity. There's no question that the main location of al-Qaeda is in tribal areas of Pakistan."
Explicit confirmation of al Qaeda's recent activity in Afghanistan came in a propaganda video released by As Sahab, al Qaeda's media arm, stating that the May 21 suicide assault against an Afghan border police outpost in Urgun in Paktia province was carried out by four al Qaeda operatives.
The video, titled "The Raid of the Two Sheikhs; Abu Hamza al Muhajir and Abu Omar al Baghdadi, may Allah have mercy on them," shows the four al Qaeda operatives giving their martyrdom statements before carrying out the assault. The four al Qaeda operatives are identified as Luqman al Makki, from Mecca in Saudi Arabia; Na'imallah al Swati from the district of Swat in Pakistan; Mus'ab al Turki, from Turkey; and Musa al Afghani, from Afghanistan.
While the attack by the four al Qaeda operatives was a failure, as three of the suicide bombers were killed in a firefight with Afghan police and only one policeman was killed, the attack demonstrates that al Qaeda is still actively conducting operations inside Afghanistan.
Within the past eight months, Al Qaeda is known to have carried out several suicide attacks along the border. The most prominent attack was executed by Humam Khalil Muhammed Abu Mulal al Balawi, a Jordanian who was also known as Abu Dujanah al Khurasani, on Dec. 30, 2009. The Jordanian suicide bomber killed seven CIA agents and security guards and a Jordanian intelligence official at Combat Outpost Chapman in Khost. COP Chapman was used to aid in the covert US Predator campaign that targets al Qaeda and Taliban operatives inside Pakistan's tribal areas.
Other recent attacks that can be directly traced to al Qaeda include an attack in the spring by Abi Zaid al Makki (another Saudi) on a Afghan outpost in Khost, and a failed attack by Abu Dijana San'aani, a Yemeni who served as a bomb maker for al Qaeda, near Kabul on May 9.
Further demonstrating al Qaeda's presence in Afghanistan, over the past year Coalition and Afghan forces have killed numerous al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan, as well as several other commanders who fought in Afghanistan but were based in Pakistan.
On May 25, Coalition and Afghan forces killed a "key al Qaeda leader" during a clash in the eastern province of Paktia. On Jan. 19, the Turkistan Islamic Party admitted that 15 of its members, including 13 Uighurs and two Turks, were killed during a Predator airstrike in Badghis province in northwestern Afghanistan. The group, which is closely allied to al Qaeda (Abdul Haq al Turkistani, the leader of the Turkistan Islamic Party, sits on al Qaeda's top shura), issued a statement confirming their deaths. And on Oct. 6, 2009, three al Qaeda embedded military trainers (these are al Qaeda operatives sent to Taliban units to impart tactics and skills) were killed in Herat.
As recently as June 27, in a single incident a total of 15 al Qaeda operatives, "including eight Arabs, five Pakistanis and two Afghans," were killed after an IED detonated prematurely in a compound in Paktika province in eastern Afghanistan.
In an attempt to disrupt al Qaeda's operations in Afghanistan, the US has also utilized targeted Predator strikes in Pakistan's bordering tribal areas to kill several top al Qaeda military leaders who fight in Afghanistan. Mustafa Abu Yazid, al Qaeda's top leader for Afghanistan, was killed in a strike in North Waziristan on May 21. Al Qaeda quickly replaced Yazid by naming Sheikh Fateh al Masri as the new commander af Afghanistan.
More recently, on June 10, two Arab al Qaeda military commanders and a Turkish foreign fighter were killed in North Waziristan. Sheikh Ihsanullah was an "Arab al Qaeda military commander"; Ibrahim was the commander of the Fursan-i-Mohammed Group. On June 19, an al Qaeda commander named Abu Ahmed and 11 members of the Islamic Jihad Union were killed in North Waziristan.
Al Qaeda's extensive reach in Afghanistan is documented in the body of press releases issued in recent years by the International Security Assistance Force. Looking at press releases dating back to March 2007, The Long War Journal has been able to detect the presence of al Qaeda and affiliated groups such as the Islamic Jihad Union in 46 different districts in 16 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.
Al Qaeda operates in conjunction with the Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and the Hizb-i-Islami Guldbuddin network throughout Afghanistan. Al Qaeda operatives often serve as embedded military trainers for Taliban field units and impart tactics and bomb-making skills to these forces. Al Qaeda often supports the Taliban by funding operations and providing weapons and other aid, according to classified military memos released by Wikileaks.
This picture is vastly different from the one painted by top Obama administration intelligence officials including CIA Director Leon Panetta and Nation Counterterrorism Center Director Michal Leiter.
Batting 1.000
And another drone strike at Haqqani. I'm predicting one more against Haqqani and then we'll switch back to Bahadur or maybe a new target.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US executed yet another Predator strike in Pakistan's lawless tribal agency of North Waziristan today. The strike is the second today and the 11th this month.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired two missiles at a vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“A US drone fired two missiles on a vehicle carrying militants outside Miramshah,” a senior Pakistan security official told AFP. "At least four militants were killed in the attack.”
No senior terrorist leaders have been reported killed in the strike.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj.
Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack.
From the Longwar Journal (September 14, 2010):
The US executed yet another Predator strike in Pakistan's lawless tribal agency of North Waziristan today. The strike is the second today and the 11th this month.
Unmanned US Predators, or the more deadly Reapers, fired two missiles at a vehicle in the village of Qutabkhel, which is on the outskirts of Miramshah, the main town in North Waziristan.
“A US drone fired two missiles on a vehicle carrying militants outside Miramshah,” a senior Pakistan security official told AFP. "At least four militants were killed in the attack.”
No senior terrorist leaders have been reported killed in the strike.
Miramshah is in the sphere of influence of the Haqqani Network, a Taliban group led by mujahedeen commander Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Siraj.
Earlier today, US Predators fired three missiles at a compound in the village of of Bushnarai in the Shawal area of North Waziristan. Eleven terrorists, including several "foreigners," a term reserved for al Qaeda operatives, were killed in the attack.
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