The Datta Khel area of North Waziristan, Pakistan is the territory of Hafiz Gul Bahadur (see my profile for more information).
From GEO Pakistan (September 25, 2010):
MIRANSHAH: A US missile strike targeting a vehicle killed four militants in Pakistan's rugged tribal region, near the Afghan border on Sunday, Geo News reported.
The attack took place in Asar village of Datta Khel town, some 50 kilometres (31 miles) west of Miranshah, the main district of North Waziristan tribal region, also known as a hub for Taliban and Al-Qaeda-linked militants.
and
MIRANSHAH: A second US missile strike targeting a vehicle killed three rebels Sunday in Pakistan's rugged mountainous tribal belt near the Afghan border, Geo News reported.
The attack took place in Asar village, also the site of an earlier drone strike Sunday, some 50 kilometres (31 miles) west of Miranshah, the main town in the North Waziristan tribal district.
The US drone fired four missiles, targeting a vehicle which was going to the site of the first attack for rescue work, killing three militants, sources said.
UPDATE:
The International Security Assistance Force confirmed that it killed a top al Qaeda leader who was targeted in an airstrike over the weekend. A senior al Qaeda IED facilitator and several al Qaeda operatives were also killed in the Sept. 25 airstrike.
Abdallah Umar al Qurayshi, a senior al Qaeda commander "who coordinated the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan provinces," was killed after being tracked to "a remote compound in the Korengal Valley" in the district of Pech, ISAF stated in a press release.
"The Al Qaeda facilitators and extremists he works with throughout the Middle East directly threaten the safety and security of Afghan government officials and civilians," ISAF continued. "He routinely facilitates the travel of foreign fighters into the region."
Also killed in the "precision air strike" were an al Qaeda "explosives expert" named Abu Atta al Kuwaiti "and several Arabic foreign fighters." The deaths of Qurayshi, al Kuwati, and other al Qaeda and Taliban leaders occurred while they were in a meeting.
"ISAF is working to confirm the exact identities of other high-level insurgent commanders, who were meeting when the strike was conducted," the press release stated.
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Tuesday, October 5, 2010
al Qaeda in Afghanistan? I'm Shocked!
Punching another hole in the Obama administration's assertion that there are only a "handful" of al Qaeda in Afghanistan...
From ISAF (September 25, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kunar province last night targeting an Al Qaida senior commander who coordinates the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan province. The Al Qaida facilitators and extremists he works with throughout the Middle East directly threaten the safety and security of Afghan government officials and civilians. He routinely facilitates the travel of foreign fighters into the region.
The commander's older brother was killed in a coalition force precision strike in March 2009. The brothers worked in tandem for several years facilitating for the Al Qaida network.
"These operations prevent violent extremists from being able to threaten Afghan sovereignty or maintain safe havens from which they can threaten the security of people around the world," said U.S. Air Force Col. James Dawkins, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "We deliberately targeted a major threat last night, which will significantly degrade the Al Qaeda activities throughout the region."
Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked the commander to a remote compound in Darah-ye Pech District. After verifying his location and careful planning to help reduce the collateral damage, coalition forces conducted a precision air strike on the targeted compound, which was subsequently destroyed. The International Security Assistance Force is still gathering information to assess the results of the strike.
"Just like we do with all of our precision air strikes, we balanced the possible risks posed by precision air strikes with the dangers posed by the targeted individual. In this instance we decided we could not let this opportunity pass us by," said Dawkins. "Careful planning, de-confliction with Afghan authorities and intelligence gathering helped ensure collateral damage was kept to a minimum."
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From ISAF (September 25, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kunar province last night targeting an Al Qaida senior commander who coordinates the attacks of a group of Arab fighters in Kunar and Nuristan province. The Al Qaida facilitators and extremists he works with throughout the Middle East directly threaten the safety and security of Afghan government officials and civilians. He routinely facilitates the travel of foreign fighters into the region.
The commander's older brother was killed in a coalition force precision strike in March 2009. The brothers worked in tandem for several years facilitating for the Al Qaida network.
"These operations prevent violent extremists from being able to threaten Afghan sovereignty or maintain safe havens from which they can threaten the security of people around the world," said U.S. Air Force Col. James Dawkins, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "We deliberately targeted a major threat last night, which will significantly degrade the Al Qaeda activities throughout the region."
Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked the commander to a remote compound in Darah-ye Pech District. After verifying his location and careful planning to help reduce the collateral damage, coalition forces conducted a precision air strike on the targeted compound, which was subsequently destroyed. The International Security Assistance Force is still gathering information to assess the results of the strike.
"Just like we do with all of our precision air strikes, we balanced the possible risks posed by precision air strikes with the dangers posed by the targeted individual. In this instance we decided we could not let this opportunity pass us by," said Dawkins. "Careful planning, de-confliction with Afghan authorities and intelligence gathering helped ensure collateral damage was kept to a minimum."
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More Proof of al Qaeda in Afghanistan
The Taliban is now using Ford Pintos as suicide vehicles.
The Haqqani Network is not known to use suicide bombers. Not until recently, when ties between the Network and al Qaeda have been strengthened. Suicide bombing is a distinctly Arab phenomenon, not Taliban. To see the more aggressive use of suicide bombing indicates close cooperation between the militants and the global jihadists.
From ISAF (September 24, 2010):
PAKTYA PROVINCE, Afghanistan – At least five insurgents were killed and one captured during a failed attack on Forward Operating Base Gardez in Patkya Province Sept. 24.
The attack began when a vehicle, followed closely by four suicide-vest-wearing insurgents, attempted to breach a fortified area of the base.
Coalition forces engaged the vehicle, destroying it and disrupting the attack. The remaining attackers were killed as they attempted to flee the scene.
In the aftermath of the incident, explosive ordnance disposal Soldiers found and disposed of the suicide vests.
Two Afghan Security Guards were wounded during the attack and an Afghan civilian employed at the base was killed. No coalition forces were killed or injured.
The operation is still ongoing with coalition forces pursuing the remainder of the attacking force, estimated to be around 20.
From the Longwar Journal (September 25, 2010):
Since the end of August, the Haqqani Network has carried out five major attacks against heavily defended US outposts in eastern Afghanistan.
On Aug. 28, Haqqani Network fighters launched coordinated attacks against Forward Operating Bases Salerno and Chapman in Khost province. US and Afghan troops routed the Haqqani Network fighters, killing more than 35, including a commander, during and after the attacks. Several of the fighters were wearing US Army uniforms, and 13 were armed with suicide vests. During raids in the aftermath of the attacks, US forces killed and captured several commanders and fighters.
On Sept. 2, the Haqqani Network attempted to storm Combat Outpost Margah in the Bermel district of Paktika province. US troops repelled the attack with mortar and small-arms fire, then called in helicopter gunships to finish off the attackers; 20 were reported killed.
And in the last attack, on Sept. 21, US troops killed 27 Haqqani Network fighters as they mustered to assault Combat Outpost Spera.
The Taliban and the Haqqani Network have launched attacks at several major installations across the country this year. In May, a small team attempted to breach security at Kandahar Airfield after launching a rocket attack on the base; another small team conducted a suicide assault at the main gate at Bagram Airbase in Parwan province. In June, the Taliban launched an assault against Jalalabad Airfield in Nangarhar province. The Taliban carried out a suicide assault against the Afghan National Civil Order Police headquarters in Kandahar City in July; three US soldiers were killed in the attack, which included a suicide car bomber and a follow-on assault team. And in early August, the Taliban again conducted a complex attack at Kandahar Airfield. All of the attacks were successfully repelled by Coalition and Afghan forces.
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Ground Combat in Laghman Kills 30
I’ve been a way for a couple of days and boy did I miss some important events in AfPak. First, a nice-sized direct action engagement in Laghman Province in Afghanistan.
From the Longwar Journal (September 25, 2010):
A combined Coalition and Afghan force killed more than 30 Taliban fighters during an air assault in the eastern Afghan province of Laghman.
A 250-man force of Coalition and Afghan troops as well as Afghan police air assaulted into the Alishang district in Laghman to conduct "security and clearing patrols" when they took fire from Taliban forces in the area, the International Secuirty Assistance Force stated in a press release.
ISAF claimed that more than 30 "enemy fighters" were killed during the clashes, and that there were no reports of civilian casualties.
Muhammad Iqbal Azizi, the Governor of Laghman, told Pajwok Afghan News that 31 Taliban were killed; he also denied reports that civilians were killed.
Local Afghans in Alishang claimed that some civilians were among those killed, and one even claimed that all of those killed were civilians. More than 200 people protested the operations, according to Pajwok.
Laghman was the scene of the Aug. 4 clash between Afghan forces and the Taliban and allied terror groups. A battalion of Afghan troops air assaulted into the Badpakh area and were stopped cold by a coordinated ambush. Thirteen Afghan troops and two policemen were killed and more than 10 were captured. At one point in the battle, the Afghan Army Corps headquarters lost communications with the battalion.
During the fighting in August, the Taliban were supported by the Lashkar al Zil, or the Shadow Army, al Qaeda's paramilitary force. One Arab and one Chechen were reported killed in the fighting in Laghman.
The Lashkar al Zil has been involved in some of the more high-profile, complex assaults in Afghanistan over the past several years, including an assault on a US outpost in Wanat in Nuristan in July 2008, the deadly ambush of a French battalion in Kabul province in August 2008, assaults on two combat outposts in Kamdesh in Nuristan in October 2009, and most recently, a sustained assault in the district of Barg-e-Matal in Nuristan in July 2010.
The Taliban and al Qaeda have been stepping up efforts in eastern Afghanistan as ISAF and Afghan forces focus on tamping down the insurgency in Kandahar and Helmand in the south, General Mohammad Zaman Mamozai, the commander of the Afghan Border Police in the east said in August. The Afghan Taliban "are being supported by other terrorist networks including Al Qaeda, Tajikistani, Chechen, and Pakistani Taliban," as well as Taliban fighters from Waziristan, Mamozai told Larawbar and BBC Urdu. According to Mamozai, the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters stage across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. The top commanders are Arab, Pakistan, Chechen, or Tajiks, Mamozai said.
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From the Longwar Journal (September 25, 2010):
A combined Coalition and Afghan force killed more than 30 Taliban fighters during an air assault in the eastern Afghan province of Laghman.
A 250-man force of Coalition and Afghan troops as well as Afghan police air assaulted into the Alishang district in Laghman to conduct "security and clearing patrols" when they took fire from Taliban forces in the area, the International Secuirty Assistance Force stated in a press release.
ISAF claimed that more than 30 "enemy fighters" were killed during the clashes, and that there were no reports of civilian casualties.
Muhammad Iqbal Azizi, the Governor of Laghman, told Pajwok Afghan News that 31 Taliban were killed; he also denied reports that civilians were killed.
Local Afghans in Alishang claimed that some civilians were among those killed, and one even claimed that all of those killed were civilians. More than 200 people protested the operations, according to Pajwok.
Laghman was the scene of the Aug. 4 clash between Afghan forces and the Taliban and allied terror groups. A battalion of Afghan troops air assaulted into the Badpakh area and were stopped cold by a coordinated ambush. Thirteen Afghan troops and two policemen were killed and more than 10 were captured. At one point in the battle, the Afghan Army Corps headquarters lost communications with the battalion.
During the fighting in August, the Taliban were supported by the Lashkar al Zil, or the Shadow Army, al Qaeda's paramilitary force. One Arab and one Chechen were reported killed in the fighting in Laghman.
The Lashkar al Zil has been involved in some of the more high-profile, complex assaults in Afghanistan over the past several years, including an assault on a US outpost in Wanat in Nuristan in July 2008, the deadly ambush of a French battalion in Kabul province in August 2008, assaults on two combat outposts in Kamdesh in Nuristan in October 2009, and most recently, a sustained assault in the district of Barg-e-Matal in Nuristan in July 2010.
The Taliban and al Qaeda have been stepping up efforts in eastern Afghanistan as ISAF and Afghan forces focus on tamping down the insurgency in Kandahar and Helmand in the south, General Mohammad Zaman Mamozai, the commander of the Afghan Border Police in the east said in August. The Afghan Taliban "are being supported by other terrorist networks including Al Qaeda, Tajikistani, Chechen, and Pakistani Taliban," as well as Taliban fighters from Waziristan, Mamozai told Larawbar and BBC Urdu. According to Mamozai, the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters stage across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. The top commanders are Arab, Pakistan, Chechen, or Tajiks, Mamozai said.
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Wednesday, September 29, 2010
Update on the Ground War
The long-promised ground offensive in Khandahar (not Kandahar) inauspiciously started earlier this week. Not much in the media about the largest military offensive since 2001.
Khandahar is significant for a couple of reasons. First, it is the "spiritual birthplace" of the Taliban. The Taliban (in Pashto, Talib means "student" and the -an suffix pluralizes it, so "students") is the brain child of Mullah Mohammed Omar. After the fall of the Najibullah regine in 1993, the entire country was in chaos. Omar (and others) decided to offer a program of law and order supposedly based on the Qur'an. It was an easy sell in the land of decades of war and corrupt warlords. Second, having such a legacy, Khandahar is the Taliban-esque ideological stronghold today--similar to the Ba'athist stronghold of Tikrit (Saddaam's birthplace). Third, along with Helmand Province, Khandahar Province, located in the southern portion of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan, is THE main thoroughfare for militants, weapons, and narcotics. The city of Khandahar is a south Asian cross-roads, with major roadways connecting it to Kabul, Herat, and Ghazni in Afghanistan and Quetta in Pakistan (which is the relocated home base of the Afghan Taliban). Thus, Khandahar is a very important societal, economic, political, and military target.
Tyler Hicks from the New York Times gives a brief account of this week's ground combat involving the 101st Airborne (affectionately known by the Army Rangers as the "Screaming Chickens"):
NOTE: I rib the Screaming Chickens, but 16 hard-charging grunts died this week. Infantry is infantry, no matter the unit or service branch, and my condolences go out to their loved ones. You did us proud, HUAH!
ARGHANDAB, Afghanistan — American and Afghan troops began active combat last week in an offensive to drive the Taliban out of their strongholds surrounding the city of Kandahar, military officials said Sunday.
In the last several days, soldiers shifted from guarding aid workers and sipping tea with village elders to actively hunting down Taliban fighters in marijuana fields and pomegranate orchards laced with booby traps.
Sixteen Americans have died in the push so far, including two killed by a roadside bomb on Sunday.
The combat phase began five or six days ago in the Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwai Districts, Brig. Gen. Josef Blotz, a NATO spokesman in Kabul, said, defining the current phase for the first time.
“We expect hard fighting,” he said of the offensive, whose objective is to clear the Taliban from three districts to the west and south of the city.
Winning over Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban, is considered crucial to President Obama’s efforts to shift the balance of power in Afghanistan after the militants’ comeback of recent years.
“This is the most significant military operation ongoing in Afghanistan,” General Blotz, who is with the International Security Assistance Force of NATO, said, calling it the “top operational priority now.”
This is the first large-scale combat operation involving multiple objectives in Kandahar Province, where a military offensive was originally expected to begin in June. That offensive was downgraded to more of a joint civil-military effort after the military encountered problems containing the Taliban in the much smaller city of Marja and because Afghan leaders feared high civilian casualties.
During the last week of August, at the instigation of Afghan authorities, American troops supported a major push into the Mehlajat area on the southwest edge of Kandahar City, driving the Taliban from that area with few casualties on either side.
At the time, military officials said that was the beginning of what would be an increase in active combat around Kandahar.
Bismillah Khan, the police chief in the Zhari District, confirmed that the combat operation there began on Saturday, but he declined to give further details. Some of the heaviest fighting has been in Zhari, where troops have been told to avoid contact with local people because of widespread hostility toward foreign forces there.
Zhari is the hometown of the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, and it also sits astride the strategic Highway 1, connecting Kandahar with Helmand Province to the west.
Often the soldiers there run what are known as “move to contact” patrols that have no goal but to draw fire from the Taliban so aircraft can find and kill them.
Last Tuesday, a United States Army platoon left Forward Operating Base Wilson early in the morning and within 10 minutes, Taliban insurgents had opened fire with small arms, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.
Although helicopter gunships were soon overhead to support the ground forces, the insurgents continued to fire on the patrol throughout the day as the troops made their way through vineyards and fields of marijuana plants 10 feet high.
None of the Americans were wounded or killed on that patrol.
Journalists from The New York Times, during a weeklong stay there, observed that every time soldiers left their bases, they were either shot at or hit with bombs, often hidden or booby-trapped.
Frequently, the Taliban did not — as they normally would — stop shooting once air support arrived.
Soldiers on a recent patrol, clearing up after one bomb explosion, discovered that a piece of debris lodged in a tree had itself been rigged with a tripwire, practically under their noses.
Here in Arghandab, the flow of troops has made it possible to begin trying to take control of an area where thick vegetation, irrigation canals and pomegranate orchards provide good cover for the Taliban, according to Lt. Col. Joseph Krebs, deputy commander for the Second Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, but the results have been mixed.
No sooner had the First Battalion of the 22nd Armored Regiment of the Army arrived here than five soldiers were killed on Aug. 30, by a roadside bomb directed at their convoy. The dead included the first Army chaplain to be killed in active duty during the Afghan conflict.
The chaplain, Capt. Dale A. Goetz, 43, had been on a tour of some of the 18 combat outposts the military has established in the Arghandab District.
Three days later, rockets fired from orchards just outside the district center hit the dining tent at the main American base, slightly wounding five soldiers.
While no official casualty totals have been released for the recent operations in the Kandahar districts, American military reports list 16 American fatalities in the Kandahar area since Aug. 30, at least 10 of which were in the Arghandab or Zhari Districts.
An effort to bring all of the heavily Pashtun south under coalition control began on Feb. 14 with an attempt to suppress the Taliban in and around Marja. Kandahar was to be the next target.
But the Taliban in Marja have still not been subdued, so officials decided to concentrate first on bringing economic development to some districts around Kandahar city, then on gradually stepping up military operations.
“I look at each one of my 13 combat platoons as a development team,” said Lt. Col. Rodger Lemons, commander of the First Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, stationed at the district headquarters here.
“I’m not going to tell you the population is fully in support, but they are much more in support of the government and the coalition than they are of the Taliban,” he said. Along with the military buildup has come a similar effort to increase the presence of State Department employees, along with aid contractors paid by the Americans, who would serve as stabilization teams in those areas.
Although some 300 American civilian staff members have arrived in Kandahar Province, at the district levels there are only a few, mainly because of security concerns.
In Arghandab, where the civilian effort is deemed to have been the most successful, the district team consists of two Americans in addition to contractors and local employees. “It’s hard to get people to come here,” said Kevin Melton, who is finishing up a yearlong tour running the State Department team in Arghandab.
When Mr. Melton arrived, the district government was not functioning. Now, there is an active shura or village council, with people coming to the district government’s building regularly, attracted by generous aid programs.
“Five dead and that’s the news that gets out,” Mr. Melton said, referring to the first fatalities in Arghandab. “Yeah, we know what’s going wrong, but look what’s going right. If we had done this eight years ago, would we have been here now?”
By comparison, other districts like Zhari and Panjwai are just getting started, he said.
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Khandahar is significant for a couple of reasons. First, it is the "spiritual birthplace" of the Taliban. The Taliban (in Pashto, Talib means "student" and the -an suffix pluralizes it, so "students") is the brain child of Mullah Mohammed Omar. After the fall of the Najibullah regine in 1993, the entire country was in chaos. Omar (and others) decided to offer a program of law and order supposedly based on the Qur'an. It was an easy sell in the land of decades of war and corrupt warlords. Second, having such a legacy, Khandahar is the Taliban-esque ideological stronghold today--similar to the Ba'athist stronghold of Tikrit (Saddaam's birthplace). Third, along with Helmand Province, Khandahar Province, located in the southern portion of Afghanistan bordering Pakistan, is THE main thoroughfare for militants, weapons, and narcotics. The city of Khandahar is a south Asian cross-roads, with major roadways connecting it to Kabul, Herat, and Ghazni in Afghanistan and Quetta in Pakistan (which is the relocated home base of the Afghan Taliban). Thus, Khandahar is a very important societal, economic, political, and military target.
Tyler Hicks from the New York Times gives a brief account of this week's ground combat involving the 101st Airborne (affectionately known by the Army Rangers as the "Screaming Chickens"):
NOTE: I rib the Screaming Chickens, but 16 hard-charging grunts died this week. Infantry is infantry, no matter the unit or service branch, and my condolences go out to their loved ones. You did us proud, HUAH!
ARGHANDAB, Afghanistan — American and Afghan troops began active combat last week in an offensive to drive the Taliban out of their strongholds surrounding the city of Kandahar, military officials said Sunday.
In the last several days, soldiers shifted from guarding aid workers and sipping tea with village elders to actively hunting down Taliban fighters in marijuana fields and pomegranate orchards laced with booby traps.
Sixteen Americans have died in the push so far, including two killed by a roadside bomb on Sunday.
The combat phase began five or six days ago in the Arghandab, Zhari and Panjwai Districts, Brig. Gen. Josef Blotz, a NATO spokesman in Kabul, said, defining the current phase for the first time.
“We expect hard fighting,” he said of the offensive, whose objective is to clear the Taliban from three districts to the west and south of the city.
Winning over Kandahar, the birthplace of the Taliban, is considered crucial to President Obama’s efforts to shift the balance of power in Afghanistan after the militants’ comeback of recent years.
“This is the most significant military operation ongoing in Afghanistan,” General Blotz, who is with the International Security Assistance Force of NATO, said, calling it the “top operational priority now.”
This is the first large-scale combat operation involving multiple objectives in Kandahar Province, where a military offensive was originally expected to begin in June. That offensive was downgraded to more of a joint civil-military effort after the military encountered problems containing the Taliban in the much smaller city of Marja and because Afghan leaders feared high civilian casualties.
During the last week of August, at the instigation of Afghan authorities, American troops supported a major push into the Mehlajat area on the southwest edge of Kandahar City, driving the Taliban from that area with few casualties on either side.
At the time, military officials said that was the beginning of what would be an increase in active combat around Kandahar.
Bismillah Khan, the police chief in the Zhari District, confirmed that the combat operation there began on Saturday, but he declined to give further details. Some of the heaviest fighting has been in Zhari, where troops have been told to avoid contact with local people because of widespread hostility toward foreign forces there.
Zhari is the hometown of the Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Omar, and it also sits astride the strategic Highway 1, connecting Kandahar with Helmand Province to the west.
Often the soldiers there run what are known as “move to contact” patrols that have no goal but to draw fire from the Taliban so aircraft can find and kill them.
Last Tuesday, a United States Army platoon left Forward Operating Base Wilson early in the morning and within 10 minutes, Taliban insurgents had opened fire with small arms, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.
Although helicopter gunships were soon overhead to support the ground forces, the insurgents continued to fire on the patrol throughout the day as the troops made their way through vineyards and fields of marijuana plants 10 feet high.
None of the Americans were wounded or killed on that patrol.
Journalists from The New York Times, during a weeklong stay there, observed that every time soldiers left their bases, they were either shot at or hit with bombs, often hidden or booby-trapped.
Frequently, the Taliban did not — as they normally would — stop shooting once air support arrived.
Soldiers on a recent patrol, clearing up after one bomb explosion, discovered that a piece of debris lodged in a tree had itself been rigged with a tripwire, practically under their noses.
Here in Arghandab, the flow of troops has made it possible to begin trying to take control of an area where thick vegetation, irrigation canals and pomegranate orchards provide good cover for the Taliban, according to Lt. Col. Joseph Krebs, deputy commander for the Second Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, but the results have been mixed.
No sooner had the First Battalion of the 22nd Armored Regiment of the Army arrived here than five soldiers were killed on Aug. 30, by a roadside bomb directed at their convoy. The dead included the first Army chaplain to be killed in active duty during the Afghan conflict.
The chaplain, Capt. Dale A. Goetz, 43, had been on a tour of some of the 18 combat outposts the military has established in the Arghandab District.
Three days later, rockets fired from orchards just outside the district center hit the dining tent at the main American base, slightly wounding five soldiers.
While no official casualty totals have been released for the recent operations in the Kandahar districts, American military reports list 16 American fatalities in the Kandahar area since Aug. 30, at least 10 of which were in the Arghandab or Zhari Districts.
An effort to bring all of the heavily Pashtun south under coalition control began on Feb. 14 with an attempt to suppress the Taliban in and around Marja. Kandahar was to be the next target.
But the Taliban in Marja have still not been subdued, so officials decided to concentrate first on bringing economic development to some districts around Kandahar city, then on gradually stepping up military operations.
“I look at each one of my 13 combat platoons as a development team,” said Lt. Col. Rodger Lemons, commander of the First Battalion, 66th Armored Regiment, stationed at the district headquarters here.
“I’m not going to tell you the population is fully in support, but they are much more in support of the government and the coalition than they are of the Taliban,” he said. Along with the military buildup has come a similar effort to increase the presence of State Department employees, along with aid contractors paid by the Americans, who would serve as stabilization teams in those areas.
Although some 300 American civilian staff members have arrived in Kandahar Province, at the district levels there are only a few, mainly because of security concerns.
In Arghandab, where the civilian effort is deemed to have been the most successful, the district team consists of two Americans in addition to contractors and local employees. “It’s hard to get people to come here,” said Kevin Melton, who is finishing up a yearlong tour running the State Department team in Arghandab.
When Mr. Melton arrived, the district government was not functioning. Now, there is an active shura or village council, with people coming to the district government’s building regularly, attracted by generous aid programs.
“Five dead and that’s the news that gets out,” Mr. Melton said, referring to the first fatalities in Arghandab. “Yeah, we know what’s going wrong, but look what’s going right. If we had done this eight years ago, would we have been here now?”
By comparison, other districts like Zhari and Panjwai are just getting started, he said.
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Saturday, September 25, 2010
Taliban Strategy Comes Full Circle
A very interesting article published at the AfPak Channel by Imtiaz Gul on September 22, 2010. I have his book "The Most Dangerous Place" on my list of books to read.
Late last week, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, General David Petraeus, and American AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrook descended on Islamabad to jointly think a way out of the Afghan imbroglio.
Officials touted their meetings with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, ISI officials and civilian Pakistani leaders as routine brainstorming sessions. Yet Afghanistan's surge in violence and its extremely low turnout in the Afghan parliamentary election two days later on Saturday, betray the bitter truth: the region is in crisis. Afghans are fear-stricken, the American top brass is frustrated by its failure in showcasing any tangible success back home, Karzai is resentful of Washington's high-handed approach and Pakistan itself is struggling with the consequences of an over-bearing counter-insurgency campaign, complicated by recent devastating floods. Not only do the stakeholders feel they're getting nowhere -- they feel like they're moving deeper into chaos.
This frustration essentially stems from an approach that from the first day centered more on money and military muscle than on long-term strategies.
Indeed, only two days before the big heads gathered in Islamabad, the National Security Archive (NSA) in Washington released several previously secret U.S. government documents which shed considerable light on the strategic missteps of the current war.
Contents of some of the memos suggest that despite joining hands in the anti-terror war in Afghanistan, there was little love lost between Washington and Islamabad in the aftermath of 9/11 - and that their differences centered on the question of how to best counter the Taliban
"We will not flinch from a military victory... but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men, it will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now," former ISI chief Gen. Mahmud Ahmed had told U.S. ambassador to Islamabad Wendy Chamberlin on September 23, 2001, according to a 12-page document titled "Islamabad 5337."
General Mahmud expressed these reservations after Chamberlin had "bluntly" ruled out a dialogue with the Taliban. The United States responded by pressuring Pakistan to sideline Mahmud (President Musharraf forced him to retire not long thereafter.)
Nine years since the U.S. and its allies unleashed war, the approach to Taliban has now come full circle. Where United States officials were once snubbing Pakistani requests for patience and dialogue, they are now seeking to "flip" Taliban militants.
The consequences of this long delay for Pakistan have been nightmarish. Particularly since 2007, thousands of angry young Muslims, inspired by al Qaeda's pan-Islamist revolutionary and anti-American appeals and trained in the remote tribal regions, have swelled the ranks of Pakistan's domestic radical outfits such as the TTP and Lashkare Jhangvi. Hundreds have blown themselves up in suicide bombings across Pakistan, killing thousands of innocent women and children as well as security personnel -- all in the name of Jihad against the "infidels occupying Afghanistan."
In another memo by NSA, Ronald E. Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, had warned Washington in 2005 that "if the (al Qaeda ) sanctuary in Pakistan were not addressed it would lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our (Operation Enduring Freedom] intervention in 2001."
"The 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government," Neumann wrote.
The sanctuary Neumann alluded to in his dispatches to Washington was obviously the Waziri border lands where Osama bin Laden and his cohorts settled down after their defeat by the U.S.-led coalition. The memos clearly explain how a porous and mountainous region spread over 27,200 square kilometers turned into a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and its Afghan affiliates. Initially "the tribes in [FATA regions] were overawed by U.S. firepower" after 9/11, which provided the Pakistan army a window of opportunity to march in, but the areas quickly became "no-go areas" where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, the NSA papers quote Neumann as saying.
And, as the events suggest, FATA did turn into a haven for al Qaeda, where it found local and foreign allies and facilitators to launch attacks on the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Not only that; FATA also became the birthplace for the Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a vicious al-Qaeda auxiliary that rose in the mountains of the Waziristan region, where Faisal Shehzad, the man behind the May One botched Times Square bombing attempt , received his terrorist training.
For FATA and its residents, it has been both a painful as well as a frightening ordeal; the Operation Enduring Freedom and the hunt for al Qaeda plucked these ultra-conservative and practically lawless regions from obscurity and brought them into the international limelight. Not only because of bin Laden but also because the Waziristan region became the breeding ground for future terrorists, something many in Pakistan including Gen. Mahmud Ahmed and Masood Sharif Khattak, former head of the Intelligence Bureau had warned about in September 2001.
The latest round of general elections in Afghanistan, accompanied by widespread violence and intimidation, doesn't inspire much hope for the future. The dire straits require all stake-holders to take a broader view of the situation, one embedded in ground truths, rather than driven by selfish concerns and considerations.
While I don't doubt the sincerity of General Mahmud, he was, after all, the head of ISI, which, at the time, was more interested in self-serving goals than in ridding the region of extremists. Between 2001 and 2007, ISI played both sides of the game, pitting Taliban groups against Western forces, internally hoping that the Taliban would be weakened and the US would withdraw. It wasn't until the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) was formed and began its brutal terror campaign against Pakistan, that the ISI "woke up" and realized that their pet project had turned against its master.
Gul, however, is right. We should have immediately eganged with moderate Taliban groups from the outset. Instead, we adopted a neanderthalic, "let god sort them out" mentality, which did nothing but recruit new Taliban and al Qaeda members and put a viable long term strategy on the back burner. This pragmatic, black and white approach is, unfortunately, not how the real world works.
While it may be too late to convince some Taliban groups to come to the table, it is still worth the effort to establish a dialogue and focus on the fact that neither side is winning. But, the Taliban have the trump card--as long as Pakistan refuses to effectively engage the militants in combat and kick them out of the Tribal Areas, all they have to do is wait until we pull out. Thus, this dialogue has to include Pakistan and Pakistan must demonstrate a willingness to not tolerate the presence of the Taliban. There has to be three-party talks, but each party has to be engaged in the process for it to work.
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Late last week, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, General David Petraeus, and American AfPak special envoy Richard Holbrook descended on Islamabad to jointly think a way out of the Afghan imbroglio.
Officials touted their meetings with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, ISI officials and civilian Pakistani leaders as routine brainstorming sessions. Yet Afghanistan's surge in violence and its extremely low turnout in the Afghan parliamentary election two days later on Saturday, betray the bitter truth: the region is in crisis. Afghans are fear-stricken, the American top brass is frustrated by its failure in showcasing any tangible success back home, Karzai is resentful of Washington's high-handed approach and Pakistan itself is struggling with the consequences of an over-bearing counter-insurgency campaign, complicated by recent devastating floods. Not only do the stakeholders feel they're getting nowhere -- they feel like they're moving deeper into chaos.
This frustration essentially stems from an approach that from the first day centered more on money and military muscle than on long-term strategies.
Indeed, only two days before the big heads gathered in Islamabad, the National Security Archive (NSA) in Washington released several previously secret U.S. government documents which shed considerable light on the strategic missteps of the current war.
Contents of some of the memos suggest that despite joining hands in the anti-terror war in Afghanistan, there was little love lost between Washington and Islamabad in the aftermath of 9/11 - and that their differences centered on the question of how to best counter the Taliban
"We will not flinch from a military victory... but a strike will produce thousands of frustrated young Muslim men, it will be an incubator of anger that will explode two or three years from now," former ISI chief Gen. Mahmud Ahmed had told U.S. ambassador to Islamabad Wendy Chamberlin on September 23, 2001, according to a 12-page document titled "Islamabad 5337."
General Mahmud expressed these reservations after Chamberlin had "bluntly" ruled out a dialogue with the Taliban. The United States responded by pressuring Pakistan to sideline Mahmud (President Musharraf forced him to retire not long thereafter.)
Nine years since the U.S. and its allies unleashed war, the approach to Taliban has now come full circle. Where United States officials were once snubbing Pakistani requests for patience and dialogue, they are now seeking to "flip" Taliban militants.
The consequences of this long delay for Pakistan have been nightmarish. Particularly since 2007, thousands of angry young Muslims, inspired by al Qaeda's pan-Islamist revolutionary and anti-American appeals and trained in the remote tribal regions, have swelled the ranks of Pakistan's domestic radical outfits such as the TTP and Lashkare Jhangvi. Hundreds have blown themselves up in suicide bombings across Pakistan, killing thousands of innocent women and children as well as security personnel -- all in the name of Jihad against the "infidels occupying Afghanistan."
In another memo by NSA, Ronald E. Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, had warned Washington in 2005 that "if the (al Qaeda ) sanctuary in Pakistan were not addressed it would lead to the re-emergence of the same strategic threat to the United States that prompted our (Operation Enduring Freedom] intervention in 2001."
"The 2005 Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan was a direct product of the four years that the Taliban has had to reorganize and think about their approach in a sanctuary beyond the reach of either government," Neumann wrote.
The sanctuary Neumann alluded to in his dispatches to Washington was obviously the Waziri border lands where Osama bin Laden and his cohorts settled down after their defeat by the U.S.-led coalition. The memos clearly explain how a porous and mountainous region spread over 27,200 square kilometers turned into a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and its Afghan affiliates. Initially "the tribes in [FATA regions] were overawed by U.S. firepower" after 9/11, which provided the Pakistan army a window of opportunity to march in, but the areas quickly became "no-go areas" where the Taliban could reorganize and plan their resurgence in Afghanistan, the NSA papers quote Neumann as saying.
And, as the events suggest, FATA did turn into a haven for al Qaeda, where it found local and foreign allies and facilitators to launch attacks on the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Not only that; FATA also became the birthplace for the Tehreeke Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a vicious al-Qaeda auxiliary that rose in the mountains of the Waziristan region, where Faisal Shehzad, the man behind the May One botched Times Square bombing attempt , received his terrorist training.
For FATA and its residents, it has been both a painful as well as a frightening ordeal; the Operation Enduring Freedom and the hunt for al Qaeda plucked these ultra-conservative and practically lawless regions from obscurity and brought them into the international limelight. Not only because of bin Laden but also because the Waziristan region became the breeding ground for future terrorists, something many in Pakistan including Gen. Mahmud Ahmed and Masood Sharif Khattak, former head of the Intelligence Bureau had warned about in September 2001.
The latest round of general elections in Afghanistan, accompanied by widespread violence and intimidation, doesn't inspire much hope for the future. The dire straits require all stake-holders to take a broader view of the situation, one embedded in ground truths, rather than driven by selfish concerns and considerations.
While I don't doubt the sincerity of General Mahmud, he was, after all, the head of ISI, which, at the time, was more interested in self-serving goals than in ridding the region of extremists. Between 2001 and 2007, ISI played both sides of the game, pitting Taliban groups against Western forces, internally hoping that the Taliban would be weakened and the US would withdraw. It wasn't until the Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) was formed and began its brutal terror campaign against Pakistan, that the ISI "woke up" and realized that their pet project had turned against its master.
Gul, however, is right. We should have immediately eganged with moderate Taliban groups from the outset. Instead, we adopted a neanderthalic, "let god sort them out" mentality, which did nothing but recruit new Taliban and al Qaeda members and put a viable long term strategy on the back burner. This pragmatic, black and white approach is, unfortunately, not how the real world works.
While it may be too late to convince some Taliban groups to come to the table, it is still worth the effort to establish a dialogue and focus on the fact that neither side is winning. But, the Taliban have the trump card--as long as Pakistan refuses to effectively engage the militants in combat and kick them out of the Tribal Areas, all they have to do is wait until we pull out. Thus, this dialogue has to include Pakistan and Pakistan must demonstrate a willingness to not tolerate the presence of the Taliban. There has to be three-party talks, but each party has to be engaged in the process for it to work.
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Senior Haqqani Member Killed
I wrote a while back that the Haqqani Network was in the process of extending its reach directly into Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan. An airstrike killed Qari Mansur, a senior leader in the Network, on September 24, 2010.
From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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From the ISAF website (September 24, 2010):
KABUL, Afghanistan (Sept. 24) - Coalition forces conducted a precision air strike in Kabul province Thursday killing Qari Mansur, a senior Haqqani Network facilitator, after he and five of his associates conducted an attack against an Afghan National Police unit Wednesday.
Qari Mansur reportedly took attack instructions directly from Haqqani senior leaders in Pakistan prior to the Saturday's elections. Based on intelligence sources, coalition forces tracked Qari Mansur to a remote valley east of Kabul City. After careful planning to ensure no civilians were present, coalition aircraft conducted a precision air strike against the Haqqani insurgents. A suspected minefield prevented a follow-on ANP ground force from assessing the engagement area, but Afghan and coalition forces confirmed all six insurgents were killed.
"Qari Mansur was one of the most prolific attack planners for the Kabul insurgent network," said U.S. Army Col. Rafael Torres, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Combined Joint Operations Center director. "This is just further proof that we do not allow insurgent groups to get away with attacks that directly harm Afghan civilians."
Initial reporting indicates no civilians were harmed during this operation.
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