From the AP (September 19, 2010):
MIR ALI, Pakistan – Intelligence officials say a suspected U.S. missile strike has killed five alleged militants in northwestern Pakistan.
The officials say Sunday's strike targeted a house belonging to a local militant in the town of Datta Khel in the North Waziristan tribal area. They spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to the media.
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Sunday, September 19, 2010
No al Qaeda in Afghanistan?
An interesting article from the Longwar Journal (September 18, 2010). This is not too much of a stretch to believe since Kunar and Nuristan Provinces are so close to the Bajur in the FATA. Keep in mind that we pulled out of Nuristan last year when 8 our troops were killed at the remote outpost attack in 2009. How is SecDef Gates claiming progress when we are ceding entire provinces to the Taliban and al Qaeda?
A Taliban commander with links to al Qaeda was killed while plotting to attack a polling station in the northeastern province of Kunar today. Haji Mohammad, the Taliban's shadow governor for the district of Shigal, was killed by Coalition forces "in a precision airstrike," the International Security Assistance Force stated.
Mohammed was described as "a key insurgent leader" in Kunar who was behind multiple attacks against US and Afghan forces. "Mohammad orchestrated attacks on Afghans who opposed his tactics, conducted illegal checkpoints intended to intimidate local Afghans, and kidnapped wealthy individuals in order to finance his activities," ISAF said.
ISAF linked Mohammed to two attacks in June, both which killed US soldiers: the June 7 IED attack that killed five US soldiers; and the June 21 suicide attack that killed two US soldiers and wounded 18 Afghans, including eight children.
The suicide attack on June 21 was the first in Afghanistan to have been carried out by a woman. ISAF directly linked the June 21 suicide attack to Qai Zia Rahman, one of the senior most terrorist leaders in northeastern Afghanistan. Qari Zia took credit for the suicide attack.
Qari Zia Rahman is the Taliban's top regional commander as well as a senior member of al Qaeda. He operates in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan province in Afghanistan, and he also operates across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. Earlier this year, the Pakistani government claimed they killed Qari Zia in an airstrike, but he later spoke to the media and mocked Pakistan's interior minister for wrongly reporting his death.
Qari Zia is closely allied with Faqir Mohammed as well as with Osama bin Laden. Qari Zia's fighters are from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and various Arab nations. He commands a brigade in al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army, or the Lashkar al Zil, US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal.
The US has targeted Qari Zai in three raids over the past summer. On June 29, the US launched a battalion-sized operation in Kunar's Marawara district. Move than 150 Taliban fighters were reported killed in the operation. On July 20, US and Afghan forces launched another battalion-sized operation in Marawara to flush out Qari Zia. And on Aug. 2, combined forces conducted a raid, again in Marawara, that targeted the al Qaeda leader.
The top al Qaeda commander in Kunar province is Abu Ikhlas al Masri, an Egyptian who has spent years in Afghanistan and has intermarried with the local tribes. Abu Ikhlas is al Qaeda's operations chief for Kunar province, having assumed command after Abu Ubaidah al Masri was promoted to take over al Qaeda's external operations branch (Abu Ubaidah died in early 2008 of a disease).
Kunar province is a known sanctuary for al Qaeda and allied terror groups. The presence of al Qaeda cells has been detected in the districts of Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Dangam, Asmar, Asadabad, Shigal, and Marawana; or eight of Kunar's 12districts, according to an investigation by The Long War Journal.
ISAF has ceded ground to al Qaeda and the Taliban over the past year when it withdrew from outposts in remote districts in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan as part of its population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. The Taliban and al Qaeda have taken advantage of these new safe havens to strike at neighboring districts and provinces.
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A Taliban commander with links to al Qaeda was killed while plotting to attack a polling station in the northeastern province of Kunar today. Haji Mohammad, the Taliban's shadow governor for the district of Shigal, was killed by Coalition forces "in a precision airstrike," the International Security Assistance Force stated.
Mohammed was described as "a key insurgent leader" in Kunar who was behind multiple attacks against US and Afghan forces. "Mohammad orchestrated attacks on Afghans who opposed his tactics, conducted illegal checkpoints intended to intimidate local Afghans, and kidnapped wealthy individuals in order to finance his activities," ISAF said.
ISAF linked Mohammed to two attacks in June, both which killed US soldiers: the June 7 IED attack that killed five US soldiers; and the June 21 suicide attack that killed two US soldiers and wounded 18 Afghans, including eight children.
The suicide attack on June 21 was the first in Afghanistan to have been carried out by a woman. ISAF directly linked the June 21 suicide attack to Qai Zia Rahman, one of the senior most terrorist leaders in northeastern Afghanistan. Qari Zia took credit for the suicide attack.
Qari Zia Rahman is the Taliban's top regional commander as well as a senior member of al Qaeda. He operates in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan province in Afghanistan, and he also operates across the border in Pakistan's tribal agency of Bajaur. Earlier this year, the Pakistani government claimed they killed Qari Zia in an airstrike, but he later spoke to the media and mocked Pakistan's interior minister for wrongly reporting his death.
Qari Zia is closely allied with Faqir Mohammed as well as with Osama bin Laden. Qari Zia's fighters are from Chechnya, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, and various Arab nations. He commands a brigade in al Qaeda's paramilitary Shadow Army, or the Lashkar al Zil, US intelligence officials have told The Long War Journal.
The US has targeted Qari Zai in three raids over the past summer. On June 29, the US launched a battalion-sized operation in Kunar's Marawara district. Move than 150 Taliban fighters were reported killed in the operation. On July 20, US and Afghan forces launched another battalion-sized operation in Marawara to flush out Qari Zia. And on Aug. 2, combined forces conducted a raid, again in Marawara, that targeted the al Qaeda leader.
The top al Qaeda commander in Kunar province is Abu Ikhlas al Masri, an Egyptian who has spent years in Afghanistan and has intermarried with the local tribes. Abu Ikhlas is al Qaeda's operations chief for Kunar province, having assumed command after Abu Ubaidah al Masri was promoted to take over al Qaeda's external operations branch (Abu Ubaidah died in early 2008 of a disease).
Kunar province is a known sanctuary for al Qaeda and allied terror groups. The presence of al Qaeda cells has been detected in the districts of Pech, Shaikal Shate, Sarkani, Dangam, Asmar, Asadabad, Shigal, and Marawana; or eight of Kunar's 12districts, according to an investigation by The Long War Journal.
ISAF has ceded ground to al Qaeda and the Taliban over the past year when it withdrew from outposts in remote districts in Kunar and neighboring Nuristan as part of its population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. The Taliban and al Qaeda have taken advantage of these new safe havens to strike at neighboring districts and provinces.
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Friday, September 17, 2010
A New Way Forward??? Part 3
A further analysis of the recent plan offered by the Afghanistan Study Group:
3. Keep the Focus on Al Qaeda and Domestic Security. The U.S. should redirect some part of the savings from this troop reduction toward improved counter-terrorism efforts and protecting U.S. citizens from terrorist attacks. Special forces, intelligence assets, and other U.S. capabilities should continue to seek out and target known Al Qaeda cells in the region. They can be ready to go after them should they attempt to relocate elsewhere. The Study Group also believes that more effort should be made to exploit potential cleavages among different radical groups in the region, a goal that would be facilitated as the U.S. military presence declines.
Extra Cash Laying Around
I think keeping the focus on al Qaeda is obviously the proper course to follow. It's just too bad we took it off for so many years because of Iraq. However, the Department of Homeland Security and its satellite agencies already have way too much money. So much in fact, that the national security apparatus has become bloated and inefficient. I think this outstanding investigation by the Washington Post says it all:
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/
Our intelligence apparatus needs better communications and a stream-lined process of information sharing. Had that been in place, the dots might have been connected and 9/11 averted. The dots were there, but pissing contests and jostling for importance and funding prevented critical information sharing.
If we were to scale back troop deployments (and presumably save money), we should either (1) keep the money and use it reduce the national debt or (2) reinvest the money back into the conventional military forces.
Nearly 10 years of unconventional warfare has relegated our nuclear-triad forces (land based ICBMs, submarine-based SLBMs, and bomber aircraft nuclear delivery capabilities) to take a backseat. ICBMs (Minuteman III) and SLBMs (Trident II) need to undergo modernization and warheads need to be tested and upgraded for reliability, B-52 bomber aircraft need to be upgraded for extended service life (coming up on 60 years), B-2 bomber numbers need to be doubled (to 50), and ramp up production of the AGM-129 stealth air launched cruise missile which carries the W-80 150 kT warhead.
Additionally, our air and naval aircraft need modernization. The only major tactical aircraft modernization done in the past 15 years is the F-18F Super Hornet. F-15Es and F-16Fs are great for home defense, but they are aging and, most importantly, not stealth, making their offensive capabilities somewhat limited against technological foes. The F-22 Raptor aircraft, perhaps the most fearsome fighter aircraft ever to be built, should be resurrected, but with a cheaper price tag. The F-35 JSF development needs to be accelerated and adapted for carrier deployment. Finally, additional Aegis Class destroyers need to be built. The latest version of Aegis operates a powerful radar and the SM-3 missile system which, to date, works infinitely better than any land-based defensive missile systems. Aegis also gives operational flexibility of balistic missile defense because it can be deployed anywhere in the world rather than being stuck in just Alaska and Poland.
The reason for this Cold War focused strategy is that (1) we will avoid "fighting the last war" curse that we always seem to be stuck in, and (2) with the emergence of China and resurgence of Russia as military superpowers, we need to be able to deal with either country in a long-range conventional and nuclear way. I don't say this to scare folks, but we can improve our future capabilities while not sacrifcing our current ability to fight the insurgency in South Asia.
Cleavage
No, not that cleavage. Cleavage between militant groups based on goals and politics. I think this is extremely arrogant and naive. The Taliban are masters of this game. If it could be done, Pakistan would have already tried it with the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban) who are hell bent on destroying Pakistan. I think it's worth a try, but don't hold your breath. Militant Muslim groups are bound not only by their hatred of the West, but more importantly, by religion. As history has sadly proven, extreme religious beliefs can motivate humans to do some really ugly things, without remorse, and without division. The only thing that defeats such zealotry is time.
3. Keep the Focus on Al Qaeda and Domestic Security. The U.S. should redirect some part of the savings from this troop reduction toward improved counter-terrorism efforts and protecting U.S. citizens from terrorist attacks. Special forces, intelligence assets, and other U.S. capabilities should continue to seek out and target known Al Qaeda cells in the region. They can be ready to go after them should they attempt to relocate elsewhere. The Study Group also believes that more effort should be made to exploit potential cleavages among different radical groups in the region, a goal that would be facilitated as the U.S. military presence declines.
Extra Cash Laying Around
I think keeping the focus on al Qaeda is obviously the proper course to follow. It's just too bad we took it off for so many years because of Iraq. However, the Department of Homeland Security and its satellite agencies already have way too much money. So much in fact, that the national security apparatus has become bloated and inefficient. I think this outstanding investigation by the Washington Post says it all:
http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/a-hidden-world-growing-beyond-control/
Our intelligence apparatus needs better communications and a stream-lined process of information sharing. Had that been in place, the dots might have been connected and 9/11 averted. The dots were there, but pissing contests and jostling for importance and funding prevented critical information sharing.
If we were to scale back troop deployments (and presumably save money), we should either (1) keep the money and use it reduce the national debt or (2) reinvest the money back into the conventional military forces.
Nearly 10 years of unconventional warfare has relegated our nuclear-triad forces (land based ICBMs, submarine-based SLBMs, and bomber aircraft nuclear delivery capabilities) to take a backseat. ICBMs (Minuteman III) and SLBMs (Trident II) need to undergo modernization and warheads need to be tested and upgraded for reliability, B-52 bomber aircraft need to be upgraded for extended service life (coming up on 60 years), B-2 bomber numbers need to be doubled (to 50), and ramp up production of the AGM-129 stealth air launched cruise missile which carries the W-80 150 kT warhead.
Additionally, our air and naval aircraft need modernization. The only major tactical aircraft modernization done in the past 15 years is the F-18F Super Hornet. F-15Es and F-16Fs are great for home defense, but they are aging and, most importantly, not stealth, making their offensive capabilities somewhat limited against technological foes. The F-22 Raptor aircraft, perhaps the most fearsome fighter aircraft ever to be built, should be resurrected, but with a cheaper price tag. The F-35 JSF development needs to be accelerated and adapted for carrier deployment. Finally, additional Aegis Class destroyers need to be built. The latest version of Aegis operates a powerful radar and the SM-3 missile system which, to date, works infinitely better than any land-based defensive missile systems. Aegis also gives operational flexibility of balistic missile defense because it can be deployed anywhere in the world rather than being stuck in just Alaska and Poland.
The reason for this Cold War focused strategy is that (1) we will avoid "fighting the last war" curse that we always seem to be stuck in, and (2) with the emergence of China and resurgence of Russia as military superpowers, we need to be able to deal with either country in a long-range conventional and nuclear way. I don't say this to scare folks, but we can improve our future capabilities while not sacrifcing our current ability to fight the insurgency in South Asia.
Cleavage
No, not that cleavage. Cleavage between militant groups based on goals and politics. I think this is extremely arrogant and naive. The Taliban are masters of this game. If it could be done, Pakistan would have already tried it with the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban) who are hell bent on destroying Pakistan. I think it's worth a try, but don't hold your breath. Militant Muslim groups are bound not only by their hatred of the West, but more importantly, by religion. As history has sadly proven, extreme religious beliefs can motivate humans to do some really ugly things, without remorse, and without division. The only thing that defeats such zealotry is time.
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
A New Way Forward??? Part 2
Continuing my analysis of the Afghanistan Study Group's new proposal...
2. Scale Back and Eventually Suspend Combat Operations in the South and Reduce the U.S. Military Footprint. Simultaneous to these efforts at achieving a new, more stable political equilibrium in the country, the U.S. should downsize and eventually discontinue combat operations in southern Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to draw down its military presence, which radicalizes many Pashtuns and often aids the Taliban’s recruitment effort.
The Study Group recommends that President Obama firmly stick to his pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in the summer of 2011—and earlier if possible. U.S. force levels should decline to the minimum level needed to help train Afghan security forces, prevent massive human rights atrocities, resist an expansion of Taliban control beyond the Pashtun south, and engage in robust counter-terrorism operations as needed. We recommend a decrease to 68,000 troops by October 2011, and 30,000 by July 2012. These residual force levels should be reviewed as to whether they are contributing to our broader strategic objectives in the fall of 2012 – and if not, withdrawn in full over time.
This step would save the U.S. at least $60 billion to $80 billion per year and reduce local resentment at our large and intrusive military presence.
Southern Withdrawl
There's no doubt that the presence of Western combat troops in southern Pashtun areas piss off the local populace, but their reaction is based not on our presence per se, but on our presence without providing security and development. The southern portion of Afghanistan, mainly the Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, have been largely neglected since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. The region is mostly vastly flat desert (except the "green zone" surrounding the Helmand River) with a low population density. This region served, and continues to serve, as the main artery of transport of opium to Pakistan and Iran and transport of weapons and supplies for the Taliban and al Qaeda located inside Afghanistan. Until 2009, British and American forces adopted a "hands off" approach and did not interdict drug or weapons shipments.
The US must adopt a three pronged strategy for the south.
First, the US must adopt a comprehensive and sensible opium policy. Rather than destroy the crops, the US should purchase the opium directly from the farmers and adopt a phased-in approach of conversion to food crops. Farmers get paid market price for their opium in exchange that they convert 20% of their arable land each year.
Second, the US must adopt an Iraq-based strategy on a much larger scale. Becasue inhabitants are widely spread out, company-sized units must deploy to small villages so that their spheres of influence cover the majority of each province. Fire support bases will be strategically located to provide indirect fire support. The localized combat units will be assigned NGO and State Department personnel, so that civilian reconstruction projects may proceed with security. The key to winning support is security and development on the local scale, not on the national scale. The goals of the development teams (similar to the PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan) is to align with the provincial governors (not Kabul).
Third, the US must establish a substantial forward operating base in the south. This would provide logistical support and air support assets (A-10/Apaches/etc.) for localized combat units. Additionally, it would provide advanced medical support for civilians and a staging point for airstrikes into South Waziristan and Balochistan in the FATA. The presence of a large FOB would assuredly draw militants into an open confrontation. With the decreased chance of civilian casualties (sparsely populated region), this would provide military units the opportunity to bring all assets to bear in a direct action confrontation.
2. Scale Back and Eventually Suspend Combat Operations in the South and Reduce the U.S. Military Footprint. Simultaneous to these efforts at achieving a new, more stable political equilibrium in the country, the U.S. should downsize and eventually discontinue combat operations in southern Afghanistan. The U.S. needs to draw down its military presence, which radicalizes many Pashtuns and often aids the Taliban’s recruitment effort.
The Study Group recommends that President Obama firmly stick to his pledge to begin withdrawing U.S. forces in the summer of 2011—and earlier if possible. U.S. force levels should decline to the minimum level needed to help train Afghan security forces, prevent massive human rights atrocities, resist an expansion of Taliban control beyond the Pashtun south, and engage in robust counter-terrorism operations as needed. We recommend a decrease to 68,000 troops by October 2011, and 30,000 by July 2012. These residual force levels should be reviewed as to whether they are contributing to our broader strategic objectives in the fall of 2012 – and if not, withdrawn in full over time.
This step would save the U.S. at least $60 billion to $80 billion per year and reduce local resentment at our large and intrusive military presence.
Southern Withdrawl
There's no doubt that the presence of Western combat troops in southern Pashtun areas piss off the local populace, but their reaction is based not on our presence per se, but on our presence without providing security and development. The southern portion of Afghanistan, mainly the Kandahar and Helmand Provinces, have been largely neglected since the fall of the Taliban in late 2001. The region is mostly vastly flat desert (except the "green zone" surrounding the Helmand River) with a low population density. This region served, and continues to serve, as the main artery of transport of opium to Pakistan and Iran and transport of weapons and supplies for the Taliban and al Qaeda located inside Afghanistan. Until 2009, British and American forces adopted a "hands off" approach and did not interdict drug or weapons shipments.
The US must adopt a three pronged strategy for the south.
First, the US must adopt a comprehensive and sensible opium policy. Rather than destroy the crops, the US should purchase the opium directly from the farmers and adopt a phased-in approach of conversion to food crops. Farmers get paid market price for their opium in exchange that they convert 20% of their arable land each year.
Second, the US must adopt an Iraq-based strategy on a much larger scale. Becasue inhabitants are widely spread out, company-sized units must deploy to small villages so that their spheres of influence cover the majority of each province. Fire support bases will be strategically located to provide indirect fire support. The localized combat units will be assigned NGO and State Department personnel, so that civilian reconstruction projects may proceed with security. The key to winning support is security and development on the local scale, not on the national scale. The goals of the development teams (similar to the PRTs currently operating in Afghanistan) is to align with the provincial governors (not Kabul).
Third, the US must establish a substantial forward operating base in the south. This would provide logistical support and air support assets (A-10/Apaches/etc.) for localized combat units. Additionally, it would provide advanced medical support for civilians and a staging point for airstrikes into South Waziristan and Balochistan in the FATA. The presence of a large FOB would assuredly draw militants into an open confrontation. With the decreased chance of civilian casualties (sparsely populated region), this would provide military units the opportunity to bring all assets to bear in a direct action confrontation.
Background on Datta Khel, North Waziristan
From the Longwar Journal (September 15, 2010):
The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. Six out of the last 12 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel. The US has conducted 17 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, or 25 percent of its current total of 67 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 161 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 22 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
Some top al Qaeda leaders have been targeted and killed in Datta Khel. A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
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The Datta Khel region has been hit hard by the US, especially in the past several weeks. Six out of the last 12 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel. The US has conducted 17 airstrikes in the Datta Khel region this year, or 25 percent of its current total of 67 airstrikes in Pakistan in 2010. Of the 161 strikes in Pakistan since 2004, 22 strikes have taken place in Datta Khel.
The Datta Khel region is a known hub of Taliban, Haqqani Network, and al Qaeda activity. While Bahadar administers the region, the Haqqani Network, al Qaeda, and allied Central Asian jihadi groups are also based in the area. The Lashkar al Zil, or al Qaeda's Shadow Army, is known to have a command center in Datta Khel.
Some top al Qaeda leaders have been targeted and killed in Datta Khel. A strike on Dec. 17, 2009, targeted Sheikh Saeed al Saudi, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law and a member of al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or executive council. Al Saudi is thought to have survived the strike, but Abdullah Said al Libi, the commander of the Shadow Army or Lashkar al Zil, and Zuhaib al Zahibi, a general in the Shadow Army, were both killed in the attack.
But the most significant attack in Datta Khel took place on May 21 this year and resulted in the death of Mustafa Abu Yazid, a longtime al Qaeda leader and close confidant of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.
Yazid served as the leader of al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the wider Khorasan, a region that encompasses portions of Pakistan, Iran, and several Central Asian states. More importantly, Yazid was as al Qaeda's top financier, which put him in charge of the terror group's purse strings. He served on al Qaeda's Shura Majlis, or top decision-making council. Yazid also was closely allied with the Taliban and advocated the program of embedding small al Qaeda teams with Taliban forces in Afghanistan.
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Bahadur,
Datta Khel,
drone,
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North Waziristan,
Taliban
Another Strike at the Haqqani Network
From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRANSHAH: A second US drone attack on a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghan border Wednesday killed three rebels, local security officials said.
The strike took place in Payekhel village of Datta Khel district of North Waziristan tribal region, where US missile strikes have increased since early this month.
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MIRANSHAH: A second US drone attack on a militant compound in Pakistan's northwestern tribal region near the Afghan border Wednesday killed three rebels, local security officials said.
The strike took place in Payekhel village of Datta Khel district of North Waziristan tribal region, where US missile strikes have increased since early this month.
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A Death in the Haqqani Family
Seems that the Hellfires are getting closer to their ultimate target.
From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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From the AFP (September 15, 2010):
MIRAMSHAH: An Afghan Taliban commander and close relative of Afghan warlord Sirajuddin Haqqani was among those killed in a recent US missile strike, Pakistani security officials said Wednesday.
A US drone fired two missiles into a vehicle in Qutabkhel village in North Waziristan tribal district on Tuesday, killing four militants.
“Afghan Taliban commander Saifullah travelled to the region from Afghanistan three days ago and was killed in yesterday's US missile strike,” a senior security official in the area told AFP.
The information was based on intelligence intercepts, the official said.
He described Saifullah as the first cousin of Sirajuddin Haqqani, who runs the Haqqani network created by his father, Afghan warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani.
The network is based in North Waziristan, a known hub of Taliban and Al-Qaeda linked militants just across the border from Afghanistan.
The group is blamed for fuelling the nine-year insurgency in Afghanistan; attacking US-led Nato troops and working to destabilise the Western-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Another Pakistani security official confirmed Saifullah's death.
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